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Abstract 
 
This study argues that the so-called Sicilian Slave Wars are best understood as two 
differing instances of civic disquiet, social disorder and provincial revolt in Sicily, 
rather than as slave wars. Both events are reconnected to their Sicilian context 
geographically, politically and socially, and shown to have arisen from those 
contexts. This thesis is demonstrated in seven chapters. Chapter I reassesses the 
principle evidence for the kingdom established by the rebels in the first war: their 
numismatic issues. This evidence is best understood in the context of contemporary 
Sicilian numismatics and emphasises the Sicilian nature of the uprising. It is argued 
that the insurgency was contingent on the support of certain parts of the (free) 
Sicilian populace. Chapter II presents a reinterpretation of Diodorus’ text from a 
narratological point of view. The text is shown to be highly rhetorical and 
constructed with a view to demonise the leaders of the first war, Eunus and Cleon, 
through reference to Hellenistic stereotypes of femininity, cowardliness, magic and 
banditry. Chapter III argues that Diodorus’ explanation of the origin of the war is 
anachronistic and shows evidence of narratorial intervention and invention, thereby 
rendering his interpretation unreliable. Chapter IV considers Cicero’s Verrine 
Orations and shows that his engagement with the two wars in the text cannot be used 
as a reliable indicator of historical fact because of the text’s continual engagement 
with history. Chapter V argues that the two leaders of the so-called Second Slave 
War, Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion, were described using the same matrix of ideas 
that were present for Eunus and Kleon, for the same rhetorical and narratological 
effect. Chapter VI analyses Diodorus’ narrative of the origin of the war, and shows 
that Diodorus only provides a chronology of coincidental events, and beyond a single 
connective narrative line, demonstrates no connection between these events. Finally, 
Chapter VII suggests that the best context in which to understand this war is that of a 
general breakdown of social order on Sicily at the end of the second century B.C. 
caused by internal political problems in the cities of Sicily. Further, the insurgency 
led by Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion is shown to be only part of a broader crisis on 
Sicily that stretched from 106-93 B.C., part of an extended stasis for the island. In 
sum, I argue that the events typically referred to as the Sicilian Slave Wars are better 
understood through a focus on the historical contexts provided by the Hellenistic 
milieu in which the wars arose and the development of the Roman provincial system 
– rather than through the (preconceived) lens of slavery: instead of servile unrest, 
there was civic disquiet, social disorder and provincial revolt on Sicily in the 2nd 
century BC. 
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Introduction: 
Understanding Second Century B.C. Sicily 
 
 
Enim vero et servilium armorum dedecus feras… 
 
‘One can tolerate, indeed, even the disgrace of a war against slaves…’ Flor. 2.8.1. 
 
 
 
 
In 136 B.C., and again in 104 B.C., Sicily broke out in two of the largest slave 
revolts of antiquity – so the literary sources tell us. On each occasion thousands of 
slaves seized the opportunity to claim their freedom and violently resisted the Roman 
authority’s attempts to stop them. The rebels, in a perverse imitation of the society 
they strove against, chose from among their numbers men to be kings, who affected 
the look and ideology of Hellenistic kings. Indignant ancient writers seethed over the 
defeated Roman praetors and consuls, their camps captured, and grudgingly admitted 
that the slaves even succeeded in taking several important cities of Sicily. In each 
event, Rome regained control of the province only through the application of large-
scale military force. From these events writers drew clear warnings of the dangers of 
excessive arrogance, luxury and greed, and developed them into carefully composed 
moral tales (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2 and 36.1-10; Val. Max.2.7.3, 2.7.9, 4.3.10, 6.9.8, 
9.12.1). For some the collapse of Sicilian society into slave revolts was an intrinsic 
part of the gathering speed with which the Roman Republic hurtled headlong into 
autocracy (Flor. 2.7; App. B Civ.1.9). With the addition of Spartacus in 73 B.C., 
these three events constitute an oddity in the history of antiquity: never again in the 
ancient world did slaves rise up in such numbers, nor resist their masters for such 
lengths of time. The lesson, so it seems, had been learned. 
 
 The same basic narrative regarding the events that struck Sicily in the 130s 
B.C. and again some thirty years later is found in the standard reference works for 
the ancient world. For example, in Volume IX of The Cambridge Ancient History1 
the events of the two wars are, essentially, a rewording of the ancient narrative given 
                                                 
1 A. Lintott, ‘The Roman empire and its problems in the late second century’, in CAH IX², 16-39. 
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in Diodorus, Florus and various other authors from antiquity. In the brief account 
given in the CAH, we find all of the features that are prevalent in other modern 
accounts. For example, there is a stress on the chain-gangs supposedly working in 
Sicily in this period (26), the moralising tone of the main ancient narrative is noted 
(26), and the importance of the actions of the free poor in Sicily during the conflicts 
is suppressed (26-7), often quite dismissively (27): ‘Although poor Sicilians became 
involved, their activities were marginal…’ Throughout the rest of the volume the two 
‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ are then given as evidence of the availability of slaves in the 
second century B.C. and the growth of their numbers in Italy (55, 605); of the 
escalation of violence and corruption in Roman politics (60-1); of the ‘land problem’ 
in Italy in the mid-second century B.C. brought on by excessive use of slave labour, 
and combated by the Gracchi (73); of the gradual worsening of slave treatment in the 
second century B.C. in Italy (605); and finally, of the rise in the importance of the 
villa economy in Italy (620). In short, the two ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ are considered, 
throughout the CAH’s treatment of the second century B.C., to be a key aspect of 
interpreting the development of Italy’s agriculture and society, although interestingly 
only a very short section is given over to consideration of the relevance of the wars 
to Sicily (25-7). Most noteworthy of all, however, is the certainty with which the 
information given in the brief account is expressed, in particular when dismissing the 
importance of the poor Sicilians to the revolts. In this case Lintott confidently states 
that the actions of the free poor were (27) ‘…contrary to the aims of the leaders of 
the rebels.’ 
 
 Despite the notice given in various sources for both conflicts, and the 
certainty of the interpretation expressed in the CAH, there is in fact very little 
evidence for either of the two so-called Sicilian Slave Wars. In terms of literary 
evidence we rely for the most part on the fragmentary narrative of books 34-6 of 
Diodorus’ Bibliotheke and the short account of Florus. Other authors record a few 
details, typically in unrelated and chronologically hard to place anecdotes or short 
impressionistic narratives: in this category we find the Periochae of Livy, Valerius 
Maximus’ tales, Strabo’s geographical narrative, Orosius’ history and Cicero’s 
Verrine Orations. It is an indication of the paucity of the literary evidence that our 
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main account of the conflicts preserved in Diodorus survives only in an epitome 
written by Photius in his Bibliotheke, and in the excerpts ordered by Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus. To this collection of literary evidence we can add only the material 
evidence of a handful of coins from the first of the two conflicts and a collection of 
slingshots from each event. The evidential basis for understanding the events in 
question is so poor that it is unclear not only when and with what forces Roman 
commanders were assigned to the provincia, but also when the so-called First War 
began.2 
 
 In spite of, or perhaps rather because of the problems with the evidence for 
both events there has been considerable scholarly interest in them in the past. That 
interest has been focused, in essence, on two distinct spheres: slavery3 and Sicily. 
Each of these two spheres of interest has attracted its own unique set of 
methodological problems. 
 
 In the first sphere of interest the main emphasis has been on explicating the 
problems with the literary evidence, and on recovering as far as possible the 
historical context of the outbursts of servile insurrection. Bradley (1989: ix) noted in 
his preface that he considered there to be 
 
…a need…for a straightforward narrative of the slave rebellions, set within their 
immediate context, that at the same time is related to the wider background of 
modern slavery studies. 
 
He went on to comment on his hope that his monograph would contribute to the 
history of ‘...Roman social relations in particular and to the history of slavery in 
broader compass’. Bradley’s intention to find the ‘immediate context’ for the conflict 
is quite typical of the majority of scholarship on the subject, and can be found in any 
attempt to explain the peculiarities of the literary evidence. To this end, a number of 
                                                 
2 For discussion of the dating of the outbreak of this conflict see: Bradley (1989), 152-7 and 170-83; 
Brennan (1993), 153-84; Keaveney (1998), 73-82; and my discussion in Chapter I.1 no. 67. 
3 I exclude from this category any work which is not directly interested in engaging with the evidence 
for the two so-called Sicilian Slave Wars: a great many articles and books refer to the two conflicts, 
but typically only to comment on the topic that is more immediately relevant to the work; see e.g. the 
account given in CAH2 XI, 25-7, and discussed above. 
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contexts have been drawn on including Syrian nationalism amongst the enslaved 
(Vogt 1965: 41-3), modern theories of maroonage (Bradley 1989: xiv-xv; 123-6; 
Bradley 2011b: 365), as well as numerous efforts to understand the particular social 
requisites necessary for widespread servile discontent, often with a focus on the 
religious characteristics of the leaders of each revolt.4 One commonplace has been to 
look for explanatory and contextual foundations further afield than the location of the 
events in Sicily; indeed, and as we shall see throughout this thesis, for many of the 
analyses cited above the most ‘immediate context’, that of the island itself, has been 
missed. In addition, all of these approaches have foregrounded the literary evidence 
for the conflicts, and display a general reluctance to analyse the other, non-literary 
evidence preserved, such as the limited amounts of numismatic or epigraphic 
material. In spite of the emphasis given to the literary evidence, scholars have been 
hesitant to subject it to detailed study because of its fragmentary nature, leading 
Bradley (1989: 136) to conclude that ‘…it requires too great an act of faith to believe 
that the excerpts now extant [of Diodorus] preserve evidence of literary ingenuity…’ 
This has led to interpretations that have accepted too readily the assertions made by 
the literary sources because of an assumed lack of creativity on the part of the main 
literary source, Diodorus Siculus. 
 
What is more, it has been demonstrated in a series of articles by two scholars 
that it is precisely the careful scrutiny of the literary sources, combined with the 
integration of the non-literary sources studied in their geographical context, that can 
lead to developments in our understanding of the conflicts. For the first ‘Sicilian 
Slave War’, Manganaro argued in a series of articles (1967; 1980; 1982; 1983; 
1990a; 1990b; 2000) that it is only by incorporating the numismatic evidence into 
our study of the conflict that we can begin to understand the rebel movement on its 
own terms. He showed (1982; 1983) that these issues derived their meaning from the 
context of Sicilian numismatics in the second century B.C., and that they strongly 
implied that the rebels, whoever they were, attempted to appeal to the people of 
                                                 
4 This category encompasses the majority of the works on the two events: see Pareti (1927); 
Westermann (1945); Westermann (1954), 63-9; Green (1961); Toynbee (1965), 316-27, 405-
7;Canfora (1985); Dumont (1987), 197-268; Sacks (1990), 144-9; Callahan and Horsley (1998); 
Mileta (1998); Shaw (2000); Wirth (2004) and (2006), 125-8;Urbainczyk (2008a) and (2008b); 
Strauss (2010). 
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Sicily in their struggle (1990a; 1990b). This is not clear from the literary evidence 
alone. Rubinsohn (1982) later argued, through a close reading of Diodorus’ text and 
a consideration of the broader historical context of the Mediterranean, that the 
explanation of the second ‘Sicilian Slave War’ as a slave war (436) ‘does not do 
justice to the rather complex phenomena covered by it.’ He noted (449-51) that 
Diodorus’ narrative preserves telling evidence of internal disorder among the free of 
Sicily, and in particular (450) ‘between the influential bourgeoisie and the poor.’ 
Most importantly, both Manganaro and Rubinsohn acknowledged the importance of 
understanding the evidence for both conflicts in their immediate chronological, 
geographical and political contexts. Regardless of the point of view taken on the 
conflicts by the scholars other than Manganaro and Rubinsohn, all have under-
appreciated these geographical, cultural and political contexts of the events that took 
place in Hellenistic Sicily. 
 
In the second sphere of interest, the main emphasis has been to use the 
evidence of the two events to define watershed moments in the history of Sicily. This 
particular approach has, itself, two distinct focuses. In the first – comprised of 
Verbrugghe (1972; 1974) and Manganaro (1982; 1983; 1990b; 2000) – the evidence 
of the ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ is reinterpreted as indicative of provincial revolts against 
Rome. For example, Verbrugghe argued that the main literary source’s purported 
opinion that herdsmen were the chief culprits of the so-called First Sicilian Slave 
War was inaccurate because Sicily’s main agricultural produce was grain, something 
focused on by Livy and Cicero. Moreover it is assumed that there could not possibly 
have been 200,000 rebels involved had they all been slaves (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.18). 
Yet, even for Verbrugghe, the use of the Sicilian context is only to disprove the 
thesis that the event in question was a slave revolt; he suggests no reason for a 
Sicilian revolt beyond a history of rebelliousness (1972: 53-8), and does not suggest 
why, in the mid to late second century B.C., a revolt would have taken place.5 
Furthermore, Verbrugghe, despite his aggressive attacks on certain details in 
                                                 
5 A similar criticism could be made of Manganaro’s arguments. 
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Diodorus’ narrative, accepted without question Diodorus’ assertions regarding the 
nationality and character of Eunus.6 
 
The more common focus focus for scholars interested in Sicily is the one seen 
in recent work on the maintenance of Sicily’s strong Hellenistic civic culture and all 
of the civic structures that are part of this.7 Here, the two ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ are 
commonly noted as a watershed moment in the development of Sicilian history, but 
usually with at most cursory analysis devoted to the evidence. As such, the two 
events are poorly integrated into the narrative of Sicilian history. Moreover, the 
evidence for the two conflicts is often cited as testimony contrary to the development 
of Sicily noted in the archaeological and epigraphic evidence, typically without 
asking why this distinction appears to exist. While this will be discussed in detail 
throughout the thesis and in particular in Chapter I.2 and the Conclusion, a brief 
demonstration is appropriate here. 
 
Wilson (2000: 134-60) studied the Sicily of Cicero’s Verrine Orations from 
an archaeologist’s perspective. He demonstrated the substantial material remains of 
Sicily that showed an island with a powerful economy capable of supporting a 
provincial elite that was politically active, and financially prospering from Rome’s 
stewardship (137-57). However, when moving onto the archaeological evidence for 
the development of Sicily’s agriculture, Wilson noted the following (159): 
 
One thing which is strikingly clear from Cicero’s accusations is the apparent 
prevalence of farmers with small- to medium-sized estates, and this provides a 
striking contrast to the picture provided by Diodorus and others of the Sicilian 
countryside being dominated by vast estates (latifundia) with huge slave run 
ranches. There must have been plenty of examples of the latter in Sicily – otherwise 
the island would never have experienced two slave wars at the end of the second 
century BC – but that they coexisted with small- and medium-sized estates at the 
time of Verres’ governorship (and no doubt before) seems certain. 
 
He earlier noted that while the archaeological field survey evidence is far from 
complete for Sicily, it is nonetheless the case that in areas that have been surveyed, 
                                                 
6 Verbrugghe (1974) is not alone in accepting without question Diodorus’ account of Eunus: for 
references see Chapter II. 
7 For a more detailed look at these studies, see Chapter I.2. 
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the pattern of land-use is complex, even if (149) ‘…the limited amount of field 
survey evidence…suggests the presence in the countryside of plentiful smallholdings 
in the first half of the first century BC’. Both Heraclea Minoa and Himera, for 
example, seem to have had only small scale farms, giving way to larger estates in the 
early Empire (160), and in general Wilson comments on the development of large 
estates in Sicily by the late Republic, but only scantily, if at all, at an earlier date 
(147-60). What is interesting to note is the assumption made that Diodorus’ narrative 
requires the presence of ‘latifundia’ to make sense, and that therefore ‘there must 
have been plenty of examples of [these] in Sicily’. This lack of examination of the 
Diodoran evidence is problematic. 
 
This tendency to leave unexamined the evidence we have for these watershed 
moments in Sicilian history is further demonstrated by another author. In two 
articles, Serrati (2000a; 2000b), in the same volume as Wilson noted above, 
considered the manner in which Rome slowly established its control over the 
province. In particular, Serrati looked at the lex Rupilia promulgated after the first 
‘Sicilian Slave War’ by P. Rupilius (2000a: 112-3; 2000b: 121-2). He argued (2000a: 
112-3) that the reforms regulated the administration of the province and dealt with a 
wide variety of issues including (113) ‘agriculture, ports, imports and exports, 
poverty and the law courts.’ Later Serrati (2000b: 121-2) stated that the lex Rupilia 
was a true lex provinciae, and therefore marked the transition of Sicily from (121) 
‘an area of Roman administration and control to a provincia in the late republican 
and imperial sense.’ Yet, in none of this did Serrati consider why it was in 132 B.C. 
that this took place, nor did he explain the broader historical context of the lex 
Rupilia beyond naming the two conflicts. Therefore, he did not engage with the 
evidence that Diodorus and the other sources for the two ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ 
provide for the condition of Sicily in this period.8 Even when included in La Sicilia 
antica – a series of monographs aiming to document the development of Sicily 
throughout history – and placed within the section on ‘La provincia romana’ 
(Manganaro 1980: 411-61), the two ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ were, nonetheless, 
                                                 
8 We might note that Serrati, like Wilson above, assumes the existence of (2000a), 112, ‘massive 
slave-run farms’ in the period of the two ‘Sicilian Slave Wars’. 
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discussed as entirely separate incidents from the rest of Sicily’s history, with almost 
no consideration given to how they related to the history before and after (435-41). 
This approach is particularly problematic, because by treating the two events as 
separate from the rest of the island’s history the importance they held for the 
development of the province is missed. Both these approaches, and the ones I 
outlined above concerning scholars interested in slavery rather than Sicily, fail to 
engage fully with the evidence that we have for the two conflicts in question: as I 
will show, this renders their analyses less convincing.  
 
Thus, I propose to take a different approach in this thesis to those outlined 
above. This change in direction is inspired by the careful work of Rubinsohn and 
Manganaro noted already. I do not think it possible to understand the two ‘Sicilian 
Slave Wars’ without placing them into their geographical, cultural and political 
contexts in Hellenistic Sicily; nor is it possible to comment on Hellenistic Sicily 
without fully understanding how the two conflicts reflect on the social and cultural 
factors that drove the island to have such great problems. In essence, I want to bring 
together and develop our understanding of both the events in question and the 
general development of Hellenistic Sicily, subjects which have been typically treated 
in isolation from each other in the past. This is only possible through a thorough 
study of both the literary and numismatic evidence for the two conflicts, analysed in 
their most immediate contexts – Hellenistic Sicily and the literary culture of the 
Mediterranean more broadly – and a reintegration of this evidence into the narrative 
of Sicily’s development as a provincial partner with Rome. 
 
 To this end, this thesis is divided into seven chapters, each of which deals 
with a specific aspect of the evidence for the two conflicts. In the first chapter I 
provide a reassessment of the evidence for the kingdom established by the rebels in 
the so-called First Sicilian Slave War: their coins. This chapter argues that when 
viewed in the context of Sicilian numismatics of the second century B.C., the coins 
produced under the authority of King Antiochus, the leader of the rebels, are best 
understood as emphasising the Sicilian nature of his uprising. Moreover, this 
suggests that King Antiochus was aiming to rouse the people of Sicily in a united 
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insurgency against Rome. In turn, it will be argued that it is entirely plausible that 
many Sicilians would have been sympathetic to this cause, and that Diodorus’ 
narrative preserves evidence of this (34/5.2.48): in other words, that this event was 
not, uncomplicatedly, a ‘slave war’, but something more complex that reflected and 
was contingent on the support of certain parts of the (free) Sicilian populace. In 
Chapter II I present a new interpretation of Diodorus’ text from a narratological point 
of view. First, I demonstrate that the character of Eunus, the leader of the so-called 
First Sicilian Slave War, is constructed with Hellenistic stereotypes of femininity, 
cowardliness and magic. Second, the character of Kleon, Eunus’ subordinate, is 
shown to be connected to violent banditry as a counterpoint to Eunus. Finally, I 
argue that if we view Diodorus’ narrative from a rhetorical and narratological 
viewpoint we can see Diodorus acting as a covert external and omniscient narrator 
who sought to carefully influence his readers’ reactions to certain key events in the 
narrative. This, combined with Diodorus’ deliberate portrayal of Eunus through 
stereotyped character traits, questions how much we can rely on Diodorus’ narrative 
for an accurate portrayal of the events in question. In Chapter III this conclusion is 
built upon with an analysis of Diodorus’ explanation of the origin of the ‘First 
Sicilian Slave War’. This origin narrative is, I argue, based upon a notorious 
anachronism that illustrates the fact that Diodorus was not describing events that he 
already understood, but was rather striving to link a series of unconnected events 
through his narrative. From this it is concluded that we must reject Diodorus’ causal 
explanation for the event, and reinterpret the episodes of the main narrative in the 
context of a Sicilian insurrection against Rome rather than a ‘slave war’. 
 
 In Chapter IV the only other near to contemporary source for the events in 
question is considered: Cicero’s Verrine Orations. Because of the nature of the text – 
a speech aiming to convict a corrupt governor of Sicily – this text must be 
approached from a different perspective. First, Cicero’s various uses of both the 
‘Sicilian Slave Wars’ and their leaders as comparatives for Verres and his lieutenants 
in Sicily are discussed. It is noted that Cicero engages more directly and completely 
with the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War and its leader Athenion than with the 
prior war and its leader King Antiochus. Second, this conclusion is furthered through 
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demonstrating Cicero’s approach to history throughout the Verrine Orations. 
Through a study of Cicero’s understanding of Sicily’s history vis-à-vis Rome, and 
the Roman general M. Claudius Marcellus, it is shown that Cicero was willing to 
misrepresent historical data. It is concluded that Cicero’s preference for the so-called 
Second Sicilian Slave War as a comparative over the first was caused by rhetorical 
constraints: the latter event was more problematic for Cicero’s thesis that Sicily was 
Rome’s antiquus socius fidelissimus because it was not, as is commonly thought, 
simply a ‘slave war’.  
 
 Chapters V, VI and VII then focus on the so-called Second Sicilian Slave 
War. First, in Chapter V the two leaders of the war, Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion, 
are shown to have been described using the same matrix of ideas that were present 
for Eunus and Kleon. Therefore, Salvius/Tryphon is implied to be effeminate and 
lacking military nous, while Athenion is described as a charlatan prophet and a brave 
soldier. I then argue that these character portraits set up the narratives of both men so 
that the subsequent events are read in the correct context. In Chapter VI, Diodorus’ 
narrative of the origin of the war is studied. I argue that the narrative in Diodorus 
only provides a chronology of coincidental events, and beyond a single connective 
narrative line, demonstrates no connection between these events. We must therefore 
look beyond the text of Diodorus for the origins of the revolt. Finally, Chapter VII 
provides the context that I argue was lacking for the events of the so-called Second 
Sicilian Slave War in Chapter VI. I show that the narrative of Diodorus for the event 
provides evidence for a general breakdown of social order in Sicily at the end of the 
second century B.C. This was caused by internal political problems in the cities of 
Sicily, a growing number of landless free people, and an over-reliance on the 
authority of the Roman governor to maintain the status quo. The insurgency led by 
Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion, the element of the conflict in Sicily in this period 
typically foregrounded as demonstrating the ‘servile’ nature of the disorder, in turn is 
shown to be only one part of a broader crisis in Sicily that stretched from 106-93 
B.C. This period, rather than being a single moment of servile insurrection was in 
fact an extended time of stasis for the island which represented far larger problems 
than those exemplified by the ‘kingdoms’ of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion. Finally 
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I demonstrate that Salvius/Tryphon’s insurgency had the aim of establishing a 
politically active society at Triocala. The actions of Athenion, by contrast, lacked any 
coherent social form. Therefore the ancient authors typically foregrounded Athenion 
at the expense of Salvius/Tryphon. 
  
 The aim throughout these chapters and this thesis is to show that it is only by 
engaging in detail with the evidence for the conflicts and understanding them in their 
various contexts that we can begin to understand the complex and important events 
that took place in Sicily during the second century B.C.9 Furthermore the aim is to 
formulate important questions that have yet to be asked about the events under 
consideration: what did it mean for Sicily and the Sicilian people that the island twice 
in the space of forty years descended into conflict and warfare in the second century 
B.C.? And how did these events shape the development of Sicily as a province and a 
politically active Hellenistic culture, and the island’s relationship with the imperial 
centre at Rome? First, however, Antiochus’ kingdom. 
                                                 
9 As such, the revolt led by Spartacus, Crixus and Oenomaus from 73-71 B.C. will not be discussed 
except where strictly necessary. 
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I. Negotiations of Power 1: 
The Coinage of King Antiochus 
 
 
‘But Eunus’ coins…are best understood as a mechanism to cultivate solidarity 
among the slave dissidents. Their depiction of Demeter is a reminder that the goddess’s 
cult had been manipulated earlier in Sicilian history for political purposes and even 
anti-Roman purposes. But it would be illogical to assume at once that a rebellion of 
slaves was now a rising against Roman rule.’ Bradley (1989), 120. 
 
‘The types and legends of an ancient coin normally had two functions, first to identify 
the authority responsible for the coin, second to proclaim the message, if any, 
which that authority wished to put out. The first function is clearly the 
more important.’ Crawford (1983), 51. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The literary accounts concerning the so-called First Sicilian Slave War are heavily biased 
against the kingdom established by King Antiochus.10 Investigation of the aims and 
intentions of the insurgents in the war against Rome is made difficult by this bias, and even 
the make-up of these rebels is all too easily reduced to ‘slaves’,11 with some free-booting 
poor taking advantage of the situation on the island for their own gain. However, it is still 
possible to gain knowledge about the kingdom of Antiochus through a body of original 
primary evidence that has survived the passage of time from his kingdom, and by a thorough 
appreciation of how this evidence fits into the context of Mid/Late Hellenistic Sicily. The 
body of evidence in question is numismatic: the short-lived kingdom of Antiochus produced 
four issues of coinage that have left a trace for posterity. The interpretation of these issues in 
the correct context is of paramount importance in understanding what his kingdom 
represented in the negotiation of power between Sicily and Rome in this period. The 
following pages will show that this negotiation between the island and Rome was not wholly 
one-sided, and that at critical moments in this chapter of Sicilian history its people challenged 
the authority of the Romans outright. In turn, this challenge forced concessions from Rome 
that affected the course of the Roman dominance of the island until its reorganisation by 
                                                 
10 See Chapter II for a discussion of this bias, and its consequences for our interpretation of the literary sources. 
11 By using the term ‘slave’ to describe the insurgents involved both on the side of King Antiochus and in the 
so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, modern scholars have accepted the biases and preconceptions engrained in 
the primary sources. This vocabulary serves only to skew analysis away from objective results. In an effort to 
correct this tendency, the terms ‘insurgents’ and ‘rebels’ will be used, wherever possible, to describe those 
fighting against Roman interests in both conflicts.  
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Augustus. Perhaps more important than this, the evidence for the Kingdom of Antiochus 
challenges persuasively the accounts of the literary sources about Mid/Late Hellenistic Sicily, 
and forces a reconsideration of the role that Sicily played in the burgeoning Roman empire. 
 
 In order to avoid the preconceptions and biases mentioned above and to investigate 
the evidence from Antiochus’ kingdom in a neutral manner, in the following analysis of the 
evidence I will try as far as possible to avoid bringing the literary sources into the discussion. 
By doing this we will also be better able to understand how King Antiochus wanted himself 
to be seen. Furthermore, by separating the numismatic evidence from the literary we will be 
able to connect the numismatic evidence to contexts other than those given in the literary 
sources, which will broaden our understanding and create a more nuanced picture of the 
actual events in question. As a basis for analysis I will in the first instance present the four 
surviving issues of coins produced by King Antiochus, and where necessary provide a short 
discussion of the different interpretations of what is displayed on them. As far as possible the 
images will be connected to ones that correspond to them in other Sicilian coinages that are 
contemporary or as close as possible to contemporary, although historical correspondences 
will also be discussed. Following on from this introductory presentation of the surviving 
numismatic evidence, the coins will then be analysed in two sections. In the first I will try to 
reconstruct the circulation of coinage in Sicily in the second century B.C. This will allow us 
to understand the immediate relevance of King Antiochus’ coinage in the context in which it 
would have been viewed and used. In the second the types chosen by King Antiochus will be 
reconnected to the numismatic context from which they arose in order to investigate if the 
types chosen held any special significance. This will also help us to assess the way in which 
King Antiochus was presenting himself: as a man aware of and influenced by Sicilian culture, 
and displaying this awareness in an effort to garner the support of the Sicilian people. With 
these conclusions in mind, I will, finally, demonstrate that previous interpretations of what 
the coinage of King Antiochus represented have been inadequate because they have invoked 
the wrong contexts for understanding these coins, and that this inadequacy was the result of 
placing the study of the coinage into a quite different argument, consequently misinterpreting 
that evidence. 
 
I. The Coins 
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There are four issues of bronze coinage that can be attributed to King Antiochus.12 Without 
exception all of the coins are of a very low weight, produced in differing values, and are of 
uniformly poor quality. The significance, if any, of the imagery placed on the coins will be 
dealt with later, but possible precedents in other Sicilian coinages that may help to understand 
the images of King Antiochus’ coinage will be discussed here.  
 
FIGURE KA1 (Campana, Enna 11) 
 
Figure KA1 
Obv: Male head right, bearded and diademed. 
Rev: Winged thunderbolt; ΒΑϚΙΛΕΩϚ upwards at left, ΑΝΤΙΟ downwards at right. 
a) 10.05g Cammarata 1 = Calciati 9 
 
I am aware of reference to this coin in three catalogues.13 The head has been identified as that 
of King Antiochus, although Campana (1997: 155) also suggested that it could be Zeus or 
Herakles as there is no inscription. The poor quality of the coin means that a definite 
identification is not possible. Because of the lightning bolt design on the reverse, an 
identification of the head as that of Zeus is plausible.14 This parallels one known elsewhere in 
Sicily: the town of Centuripae minted coins featuring Zeus on the obverse and a winged 
lightning bolt on the reverse (Figure 1). These types continued from the third century B.C. 
until the mid-second century B.C.15 However, if we consider regal types from Sicily then we 
can find perhaps the best identification of the head. Hieron II placed the head of his son 
                                                 
12 For a discussion of the two gold issues that have been attributed to King Antiochus, but which I think are 
either forgeries or unrelated to King Antiochus see Appendix 1: The ΦΙΛΙΠΗΙΟΝ Gold Coinage. 
13 The three catalogues are Calciati, R. (1987), Corpus Nummorum Siculorum: La Monetazione di Bronzo Vol. 
3, Milan; Campana, A. (1997), ‘Corpus Nummorum Antiquae Italiae (Zecche Minori): Sicilia: Enna (440-36 
a.C.)’, Pan. Num. 112-3: 145-67; and Manganaro, G. (1990a), ‘Due studi di numismatica Greca’, Annali della 
Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Lettere e Filosofia 3.20: 409-427. 
14 Graf, OCD³, ‘Zeus’, 1638. 
15 According to Head (1911), 135, Centuripae continued this type till some point after 241 B.C., however in HN³ 
Sicily there are coins with this type from Centuripae until much later: 150 B.C. See also Calciati III, p169-72, 
nos. 3-4, and SNG Morcom 572-4. I am grateful to Prof. Rutter for kindly allowing me to see a copy of a draft of 
Historia Numorum. Sicily. Any further mentions of HN³ Sicily refer to this draft. 
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Gelon on the obverse of coins that had on the reverse a winged thunderbolt, and Hieronymus 
did the same for himself (Figures 2 and 3 respectively). In both cases their heads are 
diademed. This particular affectation of placing their head on the side of the coin usually 
reserved for Zeus was common among Hellenistic kings,16 and we need not draw on 
examples only from Sicily to demonstrate this tendency, nor assume that it was a Sicilian 
one. But the examples used above suffice to show that perhaps the most likely choice for the 
head on the obverse is that of King Antiochus himself.17 
 
FIGURES KA2a-i (Campana, Enna 12) 
 
Figure KA2b 
Obv: Male head right, bearded and diademed. 
Rev: a) Quiver; ΒΑϚΙΛΕΩϚ upwards at left, ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ downwards at right. 
        b) Quiver; ΒΑϚΙΛΕΩ upwards at left, ΑΝΤΙ downwards at right. 
Var. a) CNG 37/1996, 98, 10.00g; Cammarata 2, 7.40g; Cammarata 2a, 7.60g; Cammarata 
2b = Calciati 10, 7.35g. 
Var. b) Cammarata 4, 5.40g; Cammarata 4a, 4.70g; Cammarata 4b, 5.00g;  Cammarata 4c, 
3.75g; Cammarata 2c, 4.80g. 
 
Both series, of which four specimens of Variety a survive, and five of Variety b, have a 
reverse design that is difficult to identify. Campana (1997: 156) describes it as a lit torch on a 
pedestal,18 while Manganaro has variously identified it as a club (1982: 237), as a bunch of 
grapes (1983: 405), and most recently as a quiver with a cap and swollen base (1990a: 418). 
The latter is the most likely as Manganaro’s comparison with other quivers on coins of 
Demetrius I Soter and a coin from Halaesa dateable to after 241 B.C.19 has shown (Figures 4 
                                                 
16 Fleischer (1996), 38, described this phenomenon among Hellenistic kings as one of a number of aspects of 
their repertoire of imagery on coinage and he called this aspect ‘affinity to gods’. Others he listed were affinity 
to Romans (37), militarism (31-6), and dynastic affectations (31). Divine patrons were a well-established motif 
of justifying claims to kingship; see Lund (1992), 162. 
17 A suggestion also proffered by Lorber (1994), 2. 
18 An identification shared by Lorber (1994), 2. 
19 HN³ Sicily. 
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and 5 respectively). This leaves the coins as something of a puzzle. Usually the presence of a 
quiver, in the absence of a club (which would indicate a link to Herakles), would be 
combined with an obverse image of Artemis, which is indeed the case on the coin from 
Halaesa. Clearly, however, the head on the obverse is male. Manganaro (1990: 418-9) 
considered that the obverse head was that of Herakles.20 He then inventively argued that these 
coins were paired with Figure KA3, and that each coin had an obverse that complemented the 
reverse type of the other. I do not think we need to be so inventive. First, as a type, Artemis is 
not so rare in Sicilian numismatics. Coins from Halaesa, Syracuse, and Morgantina 
(Hispanorum) all feature Artemis on coins dating from after 210 B.C.  (Figures 5, 8, and 9 
respectively).21 In terms of Sicilian numismatics the quiver is an intelligible design, clearly 
linked to Artemis, and we need not link the type to the obverse of another issue of coins; the 
problem that remains is that of the obverse head. If the head is not diademed then it could be 
Herakles, but that does not answer the question as to why King Antiochus put these two types 
together. Comparison with Figure KA1 provides the most likely explanation: the head on the 
obverse of this coin looks very similar to the head on the obverse of Figure KA2a-i: the lips, 
eyes, and face shape are almost identical. Furthermore, while it is hard to tell from the 
pictures if the head on the obverse of Figure KA2a-i is wearing a diadem, Manganaro, who 
saw the actual coins, definitely identified a diadem (1990: 418), which constitutes a further 
similarity with Figure KA1.22 The temptation, therefore, is to suggest that it is King 
Antiochus on the obverse of this coin also, as the coin lacks any other mark to help identify 
the head. 
 
FIGUREs KA3a-b (Campana, Enna 13) 
                                                 
20 One could argue that the head is that of Apollo given his association with the bow and quiver as symbols on 
coinage. However, two aspects of this issue of coins argue against this suggestion. First, the most common 
reverse types associated with Apollo on Sicilian coins are the tripod and the lyre (Figures 6 and 7). Second, 
Apollo is, in the vast majority of cases, depicted laureate on the obverse (see again Figure 6). The issue of King 
Antiochus (Figure KA2a-i) does not fulfil either of these criteria, and therefore I conclude that the coins are not 
invoking Apollo, nor showing any ‘affinity’ to Apollo on King Antiochus’ part. 
21 Halaesa after 241 B.C.: HN³ Sicily, SNG ANS 3 1191; Syracuse after 212 B.C.: HN³ Sicily, SNG ANS 5 1104; 
Morgantina (Hispanorum) c. 150-50 B.C.: HN³ Sicily, SNG ANS 4 481. 
22 It should be noted that Herakles is depicted wearing a lion’s skin on the majority of Sicilian coinage, although 
a minority show him wearing a tainia, which looks very much like a diadem. Therefore the presence of a 
diadem does not confirm that the head is that of King Antiochus. However, because otherwise the head is so 
similar on both coins, I think that this identification is the most likely. For Herakles wearing a lion’s skin: 
Aluntium (SNG ANS 3: 1193), Cephaloedium (SNG ANS 3: 1332), Thermae (SNG ANS 4: 190), Menaenum 
(SNG ANS 4: 288), Messana (SNG ANS 4: 396), Mamertini (SNG ANS 4: 417), Panormus (SNG ANS 4: 605), 
Selinus (SNG ANS 4: 716), Solus (SNG ANS 4: 735); For Herakles wearing a tainia: Agyrium (SNG ANS 3: 
1167), Centuripae (SNG ANS 3: 1327), Syracuse (SNG ANS 5: 732), Tauromenium (SNG ANS 5: 1133). 
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Figure KA3b 
Obv: Female head right, helmeted. 
Rev: Club; ΒΑϚΙΛΕΩϚ ΑΝΤΙ upwards at left and curling round the coin. 
a) Cammarata 3, 5.7g; Cammarata 3a. 2.6g. 
 
Campana (1997: 156-7) suggests that the obverse head on this series, of which two specimens 
are attested, is Ares because of the helmeted design, while he suggests that the club invokes 
Herakles. However, there are other possibilities. The town of Agyrium had historical links 
with Herakles, 23 and if the head on the obverse were to be taken as female, and the quality of 
the coins does not completely rule out this possibility, then a series from Agyrium bearing a 
helmeted head of Athena on the obverse, and the club of Herakles on the reverse does 
provide a precedent, although the date, c. 339 B.C. for the series, is rather early.24 Another 
coin from Agyrium has been suggested to show the helmeted head of Ares on the obverse, 
and a club on the reverse (Figure 10). The quality of this coin is very poor though, and the 
date is again rather early, in this case 345-300 B.C., and so this precedent cannot be taken 
without reservation.25 We can be fairly certain that the club is a reference to Herakles from 
several examples of coinage from Aluntium, Caleacte, Centuripae, Cephaloedium, and 
Menaenum, all of which minted coins with Herakles on the obverse, and a club on the reverse 
dated from 241 B.C. to the second century B.C. (Figures 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 
respectively).26 This leaves the obverse as the more difficult image to identify, although 
Agyrium perhaps suggests a link. There is, however, a better, more general precedent.  If the 
head on the obverse is identified with Athena rather than Ares, given the goddess’ links in 
mythology to Herakles,27 then the general importance of Herakles to Sicily could be seen as 
the reason for the choice of the imagery. This is a far more intelligible reason for choosing 
                                                 
23 Bell (1976), 18-19. 
24 Head (1911), 125. 
25 Schachter, OCD³, 684-5. 
26 Aluntium c. 212- 150 B.C.: HN³ Sicily, Calciati I, 68-9, nos. 9-10, SNG ANS 3 1193; Caleacte c. 241-150 
B.C.: HN³ Sicily, Calciati I, 130, no. 5, SNG Cop. 157; Centuripae c. 212-150 B.C.: HN³ Sicily, Calciati III, 176, 
no. 9; Cephaloedium c. 241-210 B.C.: HN³ Sicily, Calciati I, 373-4, no. 10; Menaenum after 210 B.C.: HN³ 
Sicily, SNG ANS 4 288-9. 
27 Grimal (1985), 195-206.  
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the images on the coin, as opposed to a specific precedent like Agyrium.28 Furthermore, 
according to Florenzano (2005: 27), Athena represented part of the nucleus of deities typical 
to Hellenistic monarchy. I argued above that King Antiochus represented himself on the 
previous two coins in a manner typical of Hellenistic kings, and therefore the identification of 
Athena on the obverse is consistent with Hellenistic monarchical coinage. 
 
FIGUREs KA4a-c (Campana, Enna 14) 
 
Figure KA4a 
Obv: Head of Demeter right, veiled. 
Rev: Ear of barley; ΒΑϚΙ upwards at left, ΑΝΤΙ downwards at right. 
a) Cammarata 5 = Calciati 11, 3.65g; London, BM, 3.43g. 
 
There are three surviving specimens of this coin. Owing to a similar coin type from Enna 
minted at some point after 340 B.C., which also has a head of Demeter on the obverse and an 
ear of barley on the reverse, the identification with Demeter is sound.29 The image of 
Demeter associated with corn is present on coins of Centuripae, Hybla Magna, and Leontini 
into the second century B.C. (Figures 16, 17, and 18 respectively).30 Cicero confirms that 
Enna had a close association with Demeter by describing a major shrine to Demeter there 
(Verr. 2.4.111-2). Unlike the previously mentioned coins, this coin is easy to understand in 
the historical context of Sicily under discussion here, especially in the famously fertile grain 
lands of southeastern Sicily, which were considered in the ancient world to have been the 
place of origin of wheat (Cic. Verr. 4.48.106; Diod. Sic. 5.2.4; De Angelis 2006: 33). 
 
Thus far the short presentation of the numismatic evidence. With the coins and their 
imagery now understood, I will proceed with my analysis of this evidence in two different 
                                                 
28 Malkin (1994), 207-17); Diod. Sic. 4.23-4. The coin could even be a reference to the Sicilian poet 
Stesichorus’ poem Geryoneis, which, as argued by Dunbabin (1948), 330, was an effort for the ‘…glorification 
of the brave Greeks who were winning new lands for Greek settlements’, suggesting that Antiochus himself was 
achieving the same goal.  
29 Head (1911), 137; Robinson (1920), 175-6; Verbrugghe (1974), 53. 
30 Centuripae c. 212-150 B.C.: HN³ Sicily, Calciati III, 175-6, nos 7-8, SNG Morcom 569-571; Hybla Magna 
after 210 B.C.: HN³ Sicily, Calciati III, 41, no. 2; Leontini after 210 B.C.: HN³ Sicily, Calciati III, 81, no. 9. 
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contexts. First, I will outline the wider context of coin circulation in Sicily in the period of the 
rule of King Antiochus,31 and consider how his coinage related to this context. Once this is 
established I will consider what significance the types chosen for the coins held in relation to 
Sicilian history and culture. These two analyses will show that properly understanding the 
numismatic and cultural contexts of King Antiochus’ coinage is imperative to understanding 
the historical significance of his kingdom. 
 
I.i. Context: Circulation 
 
In this section of the chapter I will attempt to recreate, as far as possible, the circulating 
coinage of our period of interest in Sicily. This context will allow us to appreciate the 
immediate relevance of the coinage produced by King Antiochus in the context of circulating 
coinage among which it would have been viewed originally. It is generally accepted that in 
Sicily under Roman rule there was a flourishing of localised production of coinage.32  This is 
true in essence, and a glance through any Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum will provide ample 
evidence for the widespread production of localised bronze coinage.33 Consequently, scholars 
concerned with the coinage of King Antiochus have interpreted the few remaining coins 
within the context of this flourishing of localised coin production. However, in what follows I 
will take a closer look at the wider contexts of coin circulation in Sicily with a view to 
arguing that these small local productions did not have a major impact on the circulation of 
coinage in Sicily. This affects the manner in which we view the coinage of King Antiochus in 
a significant way. 
 
In order to assess the circulation of coinage in this period, I have collated coin hoard 
deposits from the time after the Roman takeover of the Kingdom of Syracuse, roughly 210 
B.C., until the middle of the first century B.C., the latest coin hoard being dated to just into 
the second half of the first century B.C. The analysis is split into three sections.34 In the first, 
I will discuss the findings of coin hoards and strata deposits in Morgantina as an example of a 
                                                 
31 See Chapter II and Appendix 7: King Antiochus’ Title in Diodorus for a discussion of the chronology of King 
Antiochus, and in particular for evidence that he ruled in Sicily in the second century B.C. 
32 Hill (1903), 204-23; Crawford (1985), 115; Frey-Kupper and Barrandon (2003), 414; Prag (2007a), 99. 
33 As an example, taken from HN³ Sicily, it can be shown that Acrae, Aetna, Agrigentum, Agyrium, Aluntium, 
Assorus, Caleacte, Catana, Centuripae, Hybla Magna, Ietas, Leontini, Lilybaeum, Messana (Mamertini), 
Menaenum, Morgantina (Hispanorum) Petra and Segesta all certainly produced bronze coinage under the 
Roman Republic. 
34 For a full breakdown of the hoard information see Appendix 2: Sicilian Coinage c. 210 B.C. to the First 
Century B.C. 
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thoroughly excavated, eastern Sicilian site.  In the second section, I will analyse the coin 
hoards from the rest of Sicily as a whole, and in the final section I will combine both totals to 
provide an overall analysis. For these analyses I rely on the material published in: An 
Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards; Roman Republican Coin Hoards; Morgantina: The Coins; 
and the journals Coin Hoards and the Numismatic Chronicle, both of which collected 
together the latest coin hoards discovered since the publication of The Inventory of Greek 
Coin Hoards. There are a total of thirty one hoards: thirteen from Morgantina, and eighteen 
from the rest of Sicily. Certain coin hoards could not be used because of inadequate 
information regarding their contents, and where this is the case it has been noted in Appendix 
2: Sicilian Coinage c. 210 B.C. to the First Century B.C. Furthermore, following the 
methodology laid out by Lockyear (1999: 220), I have chosen not to use deposits that number 
above 1000 coins in order to avoid the problems that can be associated with large coin 
deposits.35 With this in mind, the largest coin hoard used in the following analysis holds 648 
coins (CH 8: no. 334), whereas I could have opted to use a single hoard of 60000 identical 
Hieron II coins (IGCH: no. 2222); but that would have skewed the analysis and made it 
useless. I have then determined what particular mints, if any, dominated the picture at that 
time, as far as the data reveals. To provide a local, eastern Sicilian context close to that of 
King Antiochus, it is best to start with the evidence from Morgantina. 
 
I.ii. The Coins from Morgantina 
 
As I stated above, there are thirteen hoards and strata that date to the relevant period for 
Morgantina. These thirteen hoards contain 1201.5 coins.36 The largest hoard (CH 8: no. 329) 
has 274.5 coins, while the smallest (Morg: no. 40) has only 6. Of the 1201.5 coins, 906.5 
came from only five mint authorities, which is 75.45% of the total. Of the remaining 295 
coins, 42 are illegible, and 116 are from a single collection of Carthaginian coins (CH 8: no. 
329),37 leaving 137 from the rest of Sicily: 11.40%. The breakdown of the five major hoards 
reveals further details of the overall picture:  
                                                 
35 Lockyear (1999), 220, argued that in spite of the statistical logic that states that a larger coin hoard should 
represent the general circulation of coins, owing to the manner in which they are often formed  (i.e. often of a 
single coin issue), they are in fact less useful for determining circulation than hoards of up to a few hundred 
coins. 
36 Certain hoards contain half denarii and half Poseidon flans. I have counted these as .5 coins each. 
37 In no other hoard in Morgantina, or indeed in the east of Sicily, is there such a large number of Carthaginian 
coins. I would explain this anomaly by the date of the hoard, c. 210 B.C., which is right on the edge of my 
chronological limits, and the historical circumstances that surrounded Morgantina at this time. The city had 
recently rebelled against Rome, under the influence and encouragement of the Carthaginians, and so it is 
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 Syracuse (Hieron II onwards) - 413 coins  = 34.37% 
Rome    - 224.5 coins  = 18.68% 
 Catana    - 129 coins  = 10.74% 
 Hispanorum   - 87 coins  = 7.24% 
 Mamertini   - 53 coins  = 4.41% 
 
 
Graph 1: Sources of Morgantina Coin Finds 
 
Apart from Rome, all of the dominating mints represented in the coins from Morgantina are 
eastern Sicilian. This information provides some clarity regarding the Mamertini coinage. 
Särström’s 1940 study of the coinage of the Mamertines identified twenty-three series of their 
coinage, which, she argued, ran until the late first century B.C.38 In HN³ Sicily, twenty-three 
different types alone are attributed to the period after 210 B.C. In spite of this production, 
appearing considerable in the analysis of Särström (1940: 37, 134-5) and in the catalogue of 
HN³ Sicily, the coins of the Mamertines only account for 4.41% of Morgantina’s coins, 
despite the proximity of the two towns. The situation is perhaps more interesting with regard 
to the coins with the legend HISPANORUM. After the sack of Morgantina in 211 B.C. (Livy 
                                                                                                                                                        
understandable that large quantities of Punic coinage would be found in a hoard from this period (see Liv. 24.37 
for the influence of the Carthaginians in this rebellion). Owing to the anomalous nature of this deposit, I have 
not included Carthage in the list of major mints for the Morgantina hoards, even though the 116 coins 
representing Carthage account for 10.04%. All the other dominating mints are present in multiple deposits. 
38 Särström (1940), 37, 134-5. 
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26.21), for which there is considerable archaeological evidence,39 the Romans repopulated 
the town with Spanish mercenaries,40 and thus the Hispanorum coins are generally regarded 
as having been minted in Morgantina itself by the mercenaries.41 This particular coinage is an 
example of the local bronze coinages I mentioned at the start of this discussion, and yet they 
only account for 7.24% of the coinage analysed here. Otherwise a considerable dominance is 
displayed by Catanian and Syracusan coins: 45.11% of all the coins found in Morgantina 
come from these two places. If we add the Roman coins to this figure, then we can see that 
63.79%, nearly two thirds of all the coins found in Morgantina came from just three mints. 
All three of these mints produced their coinage in enormous quantities. Furthermore, all the 
silver coinage found there, barring a negligible number of Siceliote coins, was produced by 
Rome.42 Overall, with the exception of Rome, the coinage appears to be very localised, with 
every mint representing a major percentage being eastern Sicilian, and close to Morgantina: 
                                                 
39 Sjöqvist (1958), 158-60; Stillwell (1959), 169, 171; Sjöqvist (1960a), 133; Stillwell (1963) 169-70; White 
(1964), 273-7. 
40 Toynbee (1965), 211; Verbrugghe (1974), 56; Bradley (1989), 63; Goldsworthy (2000), 267; Longo (2004), 
236. 
41 Erim (1958), 79-90. Buttrey, Erim, Groves and Holloway (1989), 35-6. 
42 This also ignores the 116 Carthaginian coins that were silver, but as explained above in no. 36, these coins are 
being ignored as anomalous in the assessment of the coinage. 
 
Map 1 Ancient Sicily (copyright Frances Morton) 
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see Map 1: Ancient Sicily. This data certainly does not suggest that the flourishing of 
localised coinage production across Sicily resulted in any wide circulation of those coins, as 
the coin evidence from Morgantina is dominated either by very large productions of coinage 
that date back into the third century B.C. (i.e. those of Catana, Syracuse, and the Mamertini), 
completely local coinage minted during the period in question (Hispanorum), or the coins of 
the great economic power of the period (Rome). In short: this analysis has shown that the 
circulation of small coin productions remained local. 
 
I.iii. Other Sicilian Coin Hoards 
 
From the rest of Sicily there were eighteen coin hoards with a total of 1874.5 relevant coins. 
The largest hoard (CH 8: no. 334) holds 648 coins, and the smallest (CH 8: no. 354) 3. In the 
wider context of Sicily, two mints, Rome and Syracuse, dominated the total quite 
conspicuously. These two mints account for 1641.5 out of the 1874.5 coins: 87.57% of the 
total.43 The next biggest mint, that of the Mamertines, accounts for only 61 coins, totalling 
3.25% of the total. Otherwise, discounting the 27 coins minted in Palermo (RRCH no. 137), 
but under Roman authorities, we have only 145 coins from the rest of Sicily combined: 
7.73% of the total. The figures break down as follows:  
 
 Syracuse Hieron II onwards - 723 coins  = 37.03% 
 Roman precious metals - 634.5 coins  = 26.40% 
Roman bronze   - 284 coins  = 11.16% 
 
                                                 
43 However, if we were to remove a single entry, CH 8: no. 334, from the equation, the numbers change quite 
drastically. This hoard, from c. 210 B.C., is at the edge of my prescribed chronological limits, and is rather 
anomalous in that it has 648 coins, all of which are of Hieron II. If this hoard is ignored, then the Syracusan 
share of the coinage plummets, and Roman coinage dominates with 918.5 of 1226.5 coins: 74.89%. Syracuse 
would have a more modest 75 of 1226.5 coins, or 6.11%. I have chosen to keep the hoard in, as it represents the 
end of the period, from 250 to the end of the third century B.C. in which Syracusan coins made up 60.56% of all 
coin hoards in Sicily, and is therefore representative of a closely related period of Syracusan numismatics to the 
period under study here; see Appendix 3: Sicilian Coinage 250 B.C. to c. 210 B.C.for the breakdown of the 
figures. 
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Graph 2: Sources of Sicilian Coin Finds 
 
As is evident from the table, I have split the categories of Roman coins into two separate 
sections: precious metal coins and bronze coins. If we consider the proportions of bronze 
coinage alone, then Roman coins make up 284 out of 1240 coins, or 22.90%, while 
Syracusan coins make up 58.31%, which combined is 81.21%; regardless of whether we 
consider the coinage as a whole, or separately in bronze and precious metals, Syracuse and 
Rome still dominate the total by at least 80%. Some other small points should be noted, 
especially regarding differences between the data across time. In total there were 233 coins 
from the rest of Sicily.44 However, only 63 of these were found in hoards that featured after 
150 B.C. As I noted above, Mamertine coinage was produced on a very large scale, but in 
spite of this all 61 of the Mamertine coins found in coin hoards from across Sicily are in 
hoards dated from 208 to 150 B.C., which would certainly suggest that Mamertine coinage 
ceased to be important on a grand scale by the mid-second century B.C. (RRCH nos. 122, 
127).  Even the Syracusan coinage, post-150 B.C., only accounts for 68 coins, and this is 
from a total of 509.5 coins. If we continue with this statistical analysis, it can be shown that 
Rome accounts for 378.5 coins, or 74.29%, of the total post-150 B.C., whereas every other 
source of coinage combined, including Syracuse, accounts for only 25.71%. This is in 
marked contrast to the statistics prior to 150 B.C., in which Roman coinage accounts for only 
540 of 1365 total coins, which is 39.56% of the total.  The most noticeable feature of this 
analysis is that it suggests that the coinage of Syracuse, so dominant in the late third and early 
second century B.C., becomes a marginal coinage much like the other local coinages in 
                                                 
44 This includes 61 coins from the Mamertines, and 2 from Catana. 
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Sicily, and Roman coinage becomes almost completely dominant. It is clear, moreover, that 
despite the flourishing of a variety of individual, local Sicilian mints, the overall circulation 
of coins in Sicily by the late second century B.C. was dominated by Roman coinage. 
 
 A consideration of the geographical find spots of the various coin hoards supplements 
this picture of a strong Roman influence through. Of the hoards from the rest of Sicily, two 
cannot be considered geographically because their find spot can only be listed as ‘Sicily’ (CH 
7: no. 201; CH 8: no. 334). Of the rest, only two are from the west of the island (RRCH: nos. 
135, 137), catalogued as ‘West Sicily’ and ‘Bisacquino’ respectively. Three are from the 
middle of the island (RRCH: no. 198; CH 8: nos. 328, 377), catalogued as Manfria, Agrigento 
and Enna respectively. The rest are from the east of Sicily (Map 2: Modern Find Sites of 
Ancient Coin Hoards). While this does not give a particularly good representation of western 
Sicilian deposits, certain features of the distribution do become noticeable. The two western 
hoards contain only coins from Rome or Panormus. The furthest west any coin from the east 
of the island is found is in Manfria, in the south of the island (RRCH: no. 198). The other two 
sites from the centre of the island, Agrigento and Enna, contain only coins from Agrigentum 
and Rome respectively. The coins of the Mamertines, Catana and Syracuse are all found in 
eastern coin hoards, and while the number of hoards does not allow definite conclusions to be 
 
Map 2: Modern Find Sites of Ancient Coin Hoards (drawn by P. Morton) 
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made, the evidence does at least suggest that the majority of coin circulation was fairly 
localised in Sicily, with the clear exception of Roman coinage, which is found island-wide, 
thus confirming the conclusions reached above from the comparison of mints. 
 
I.iv. Interim Conclusions 
 
We can draw some interim conclusions from these analyses: the data sets show that on the 
whole Sicily, certainly by the end of second century B.C., if not by 150 B.C., was largely 
Romanised in terms of its coinage. This is in spite of the evidence from Morgantina that 
local, large scale bronze coinages, like the Mamertini issues, could have an impact on 
circulation for a brief time. It can certainly be argued that since five mint authorities 
(Syracuse, Messana, Morgantina, Catana and Rome) account for 84.88% of the combined 
total of coins from both Morgantina and the rest of Sicily, minor, local mints did not play any 
significant part in the circulation of coinage in Sicily.45 In fact, between Syracuse and Rome, 
74.09% of the coins are accounted for, and Rome alone accounts for 37.16% of all the 
coinage; however as I have shown above, this statistic hides the fact that Roman coinage 
came to dominate the wider Sicilian financial system throughout the second century B.C.46 
Overall, we can say that in at least 75% of all cases during the second century B.C., a coin in 
Sicily either proclaimed its authority as stemming from Rome, or from a dead monarch. Only 
in 25% of cases did it proclaim anything else, and of this 25%, 10% would have been 
proclaiming authority from Spanish mercenaries (the Hispanorum coinage of Morgantina), 
the Mamertines or the city of Catana. However one views the dialogue between the 
                                                 
45 It need not surprise us that such a small number of mints could dominate the context so completely. In the 4th 
century B.C. The coinage of Pegasi that was either from Corinth, or based upon the coinage of Corinth, became 
the main coinage of Sicily. A study of hoard deposits in Sicily at this point shows that from 43 hoards, 
containing in total 5196 coins, 73.61% (3825 coins) were Pegasi: see Appendix 4: Sicilian Coinage in the 
Fourth Century B.C. Furthermore, Kraay (1969), 54, stated that his study of thirty substantial coin hoards from 
the fourth century B.C. showed that only two had a proportion of Corinthian coinage below 70%. Talbert 
(1971), 55-7, argued that the principal reason for this dominance was that all Greek cities knew that Pegasi were 
accepted in Sicily at this point, owing to the Corinthian expedition there led by Timoleon (see Finley (1968), 94-
100, and Plut. Tim. and Diod. 16), and so exchanged their currency for Pegasi before going to Sicily to trade. It 
could be argued that this single-state dominance of Sicilian trade could be compared to the Roman dominance of 
Sicilian grain exports after the 2nd Punic War, and that this could therefore be one reason to explain the large 
quantities of denarii and asses in Sicily during this period. 
46 A useful point to consider here is the comparison with Thessaly in the fourth and third centuries B.C. Martin 
(1985), 46, 164-5, and 153-6, argued that the various mints of Thessaly ceased to produce silver coinage not 
because they were forbidden to by Philip II of Macedon and Alexander the Great, but because Macedonian 
silver was by that time convenient and well-known, and Thessaly itself had suffered an economic downturn that 
prevented the importation of silver bullion for minting. The situation bears a number of similarities with Sicily 
in the second century B.C. Furthermore, Martin (1985), 166-94, showed that this situation existed for a number 
of other Greek cities in the period of Macedonian domination. 
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Mamertines and the Greeks of the city of Messana47 (and the legend on their coinage is in 
Greek) it is nonetheless the case that they were originally foreign mercenaries who settled in 
Messana, as were the Spanish mercenaries who were settled in Morgantina. Sicily had not, on 
any noticeable scale, produced a new coinage with a Greek legend, proclaiming Greek 
authority on the island since the coinage of King Hieron II. With this wider context in mind, 
the coinage of King Antiochus takes on an added significance.  
 
 Crawford (1983: 51) argued that in the Roman world the typical user of a coin did not 
care especially for what was on the coin except for the legend or portrait that expressed the 
authority by which that coin was guaranteed, and with some reservations I do not see any 
reason to doubt that the same goes for the Greek world too.48 With this in mind, along with 
the wider context just described, King Antiochus’ coinage takes on hitherto unsuspected 
importance. In Sicily at this point a large proportion of legends on coins were either in Latin, 
or were proclaiming a long dead authority. Furthermore, the production of coinage was seen 
in the Greek and Roman worlds as a ‘mark of sovereignty (Crawford 1983: 51). The very act 
of producing coinage established the aura and constructs of kingship around King 
Antiochus;49 but we can go further than this in understanding the significance and, perhaps, 
purpose of this coinage. From all we know, it had been sixty years since Sicily had seen a 
Greek king. King Antiochus’ declaration of his royal status, and therefore his authority to 
produce coinage, would stand in a direct contrast to the Roman economic dominance of the 
island. In terms of imagery, to which I shall turn in a moment, the coins did not stand out as 
being in any way particularly remarkable, although that in itself will show something very 
important about this coinage; yet, the legend represents a reversion to older patterns in the 
political make-up of the island. In the specific historical context, that is the growing conflict 
between this new Greek monarch and the Roman state, it would be very clear that this new 
monarchy was not ‘pro-Roman’. I will argue in Chapter I.2 that this evidence relates to the 
                                                 
47 Crawford (2006), 524, argued that ‘the process of negotiation between [the Greeks of Messana and the 
Mamertines] was a complex one’ and that it is not something that can be concluded adequately from current 
evidence, although later (2007), 278, he argued that by the time of Cicero the people of Messana ‘called 
themselves Mamertini and they spoke Greek’, thus essentially ending the process of negotiation between the 
Oscan and Greek speakers of Messana. 
48 Erhardt (1984), 41-54, challenged the conclusions of Crawford as going too far in the direction of scepticism. 
He, rightly, pointed out that the images on coins could be aimed at certain groups of society, such as the military 
or public servants (46), and that these groups most likely did notice the imagery placed on the coins. His 
arguments provide an important corrective to Crawford’s assertion (1983), 54, that the only types noticed were 
typically very common and devoid of programmatic elements. However, in the context of the Roman Empire, 
Crawford’s position (1983), 58, that the majority of people saw any new issue of coins only as a ‘tiny part of a 
mass of issues covering a century or more’ is vitally important.  
49 Green (1961), 16; Finley (1968), 114; Bradley (1989), 116, 120; Shaw (2001), 84; Urbainczyk (2008a), 42. 
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development of Roman provincial control of Sicily, but it is enough to say now that the 
emergence of a new king, and therefore a new kingdom in Sicily, would upset the system put 
in place in Sicily by the Romans,50 and the coinage is evidence for (and medium of) one part 
of this disturbance.  
 
I.v. Context: Imagery 
 
I highlighted above that there is some debate about the importance of what is depicted on 
coins in the ancient world.51 While in essence I agree with Crawford (1983: 51, 54-5) about 
the lack of significance of images on coins, I do not believe that they can be completely 
ignored, nor that their more programmatic elements reveal nothing about the authority from 
which they arise. The debate about the importance of imagery on coinage essentially hinges 
on the context of that imagery: I think that neither the position of Crawford (1983), nor that 
of Erhardt (1984), is applicable to all situations. It would be incorrect to think that the 
situation in the imperial period was the same as that in Sicily during the second century B.C., 
but it can be said that the number of people involved in the episode of Sicilian history under 
discussion here, and the short time span of it argue that the significance of the imagery would 
not have been diluted in the manner stressed by Crawford, nor delayed in its reaching the 
people of Sicily as much as would have been the case in the imperial period (Crawford 1983: 
58). Therefore, I would like to assess another context in which to consider the coinage of 
King Antiochus, one briefly touched on above: imagery. In keeping with my previous 
analysis of the circulation of coins in Sicily I will now consider how the imagery on the 
coinage of King Antiochus relates to its contemporary historical context, in an attempt to 
understand if the images on his coinage would have stood out. I will also try to understand, 
where possible, what the historical significance of the different designs may be with relation 
to the wider Hellenistic, and especially Sicilian, history: to this end I will consider the 
imagery on the coinage of King Antiochus in relation to the dominant coinages identified in 
the previous section. This analysis will show that King Antiochus was trying, through his 
coinage, to portray himself as a Hellenistic monarch with strong ties to Sicilian culture. 
 
                                                 
50 Liv. 25.40.1 notes that Marcellus, on capturing Syracuse, made a settlement of affairs in Sicily, and dealt with 
the various towns of Sicily as they deserved from their conduct in the war. 
51 See Crawford (1983: 51) and Erhardt (1984), 41-54. 
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 A good place to start is a comparison with the other recent monarchical power of 
Sicily: the dynasty of King Hieron II. There were three major designs of coins produced 
under Hieron II. The first was a bronze issue, minted in two different forms – a wide flan 
series and a small flan series – that showed the head of Poseidon on the obverse, and a trident 
on the reverse (Figure 19). If we consider the figures of the coin deposits in Morgantina 
detailed above, from which the most accurate account of the hoards can be gathered, these 
Poseidon flan coins accounted for 103 out of the 239 Syracusan coins found there, or 43.10% 
of the total.52 The second major bronze issue produced by Hieron II had on the obverse his 
head, and on the reverse a horseman (Figure 20): Rutter (1997: 178) noted that these two 
issues, actually minted not long after the First Punic War, were both enormous and 
represented a large part of the bronze coinage of Hieron II. The final important design, used 
often throughout Syracusan history and adapted continually, showed a quadriga on the 
reverse and a head of Arethusa on the obverse (Figure 21). This coin design was minted until 
the end of the Syracusan monarchy in 212 B.C.,53 and copied across Sicily. The head of 
Arethusa was replaced with the head of Kore on later issues of this type (Figure 22), 
especially under the reign of Hieron II, although earlier also under Agathocles (Rutter 1997: 
175, 178). If we compare these three coin designs with those of King Antiochus then we can 
say with certainty that there is no overlap of imagery (beyond the use of Kore on the obverse 
of a limited number of Syracusan coins) between these important types of the dynasty of 
Hieron II and those of King Antiochus. We can, therefore, quite categorically say that despite 
being a Greek king in Sicily, Antiochus was not trying to represent himself as continuing 
specifically in the tradition of the former Kings of Syracuse. We might therefore see the 
obverses of Figures KA1 and KA2a-i, which showed, as I argued above, the head of King 
Antiochus, as demonstrating King Antiochus’ position as a Hellenistic king in Sicily, rather 
than striving to see a close, directly Syracusan inspiration for them.  
 
 Can we make a similar comparison with the other important mints identified in the 
analysis above? If we accept that the Hispanorum coinage was peculiar to Morgantina, as the 
coin hoard evidence suggests, then we have three remaining major mints: Catana, the 
Mamertines, and Rome. We shall start with Catana. 
 
                                                 
52 This ignores the coins from CH 8 no. 333 because the listing of the coin hoard did not give details of what 
Syracusan coins were found in the hoard. 
53 Kraay (1976a), 293; Rutter (1997), 177-9. 
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Again, looking to Morgantina, where the majority of the coinage of Catana was 
discovered in the coin hoards discussed above, 129 coins from Catana were found. Of these 
120, or 90.02% were of a single type, which had on the obverse a head of Apollo, and on the 
reverse Isis (Figure 23). The other types of Catana constitute such a small group statistically, 
nine in all the hoards of Morgantina, that they do not warrant detailed attention in this 
context, but include the Catanean brothers, Serapis and Zeus among their images. The 
Mamertine coinage also has a variety of images (Figures 24, 25, and 26 respectively). A 
study of the issues minted after 210 B.C. shows (according to HN³ Sicily) that the coins have 
several important similarities to each other overall. Of the twenty three issues minted after 
210 B.C.,54 nine have a reverse with either a warrior or horseman standing or charging, ten 
have a standing figure of a god or goddess (Apollo, Artemis or Nike), while the remaining 
four types have on the reverse a variety of designs that do not relate to one another; one 
should note that this still leaves nineteen of the twenty-three with a design featuring a 
standing figure. Rather unsurprisingly, all twenty-three types feature an obverse design 
showing the head of either a god or goddess. It should be noted, however, that only three of 
the obverses show any gods other than Zeus, Apollo, Ares and Herakles, and Apollo accounts 
for nine of the twenty coin obverses with these four gods on them; the three remaining coins 
feature Aphrodite and Artemis (Särström Series XIV Group D, Särström Series XV Groups D 
and F respectively). If we compare the images typical to Mamertine or Catanian coinage to 
those of King Antiochus, once again we can see that the types are quite different. No piece of 
Antiochan coinage features standing figures on the obverse, and there is certainly no heavily 
martial element to his designs. While there is some overlap of obverse designs, this should 
not really surprise us, and there is no subsequent overlap in the combination of types from 
obverse to reverse. To complete this analysis, Rome’s bronze coins will be considered. 
 
 The vast majority of the Roman bronze coins found in Sicily in this period are asses, 
and as such feature the Janus-head on the obverse, and a ship’s prow on the reverse (Figure 
27), and indeed the other bronze coins feature the designs one might expect of their different 
weights.55 It should elicit no surprise, therefore, that these types do not correspond to those of 
King Antiochus, given his Sicilian, and thus non-Roman, position. 
                                                 
54 The issues are as follows in the Särström Series: Särström Series XI Group A, Särström Series XII Groups A-
C, Särström Series XIV Groups A-D, Särström Series XV Groups A-E, Särström Series XVI Group A, Särström 
Series XVII Group A, Särström Series XIX Group A, Särström Series XX Group A, Särström Series XXI Group 
A, Särström Series XXII Groups A-B, Särström Series XXIII Groups A-C. 
55 Sutherland (1974), 60 and 60 no. 74. 
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 If the types of Antiochus do not correspond especially to those of the major mints I 
identified as dominating to a greater or lesser extent Sicilian circulation in this period, can a 
correspondence be found elsewhere in Sicilian numismatics, for example among the abundant 
small scale productions in the Roman Republican period? I noted when describing the coins 
at the beginning of this chapter that the types do relate to certain other coins from a Sicilian 
context, and it is this that I would like to examine further. We shall start with Figures KA2a-i, 
the coin showing the head of King Antiochus and a quiver. We can see that this type, while 
being in some way original for having his head on the obverse, had on the reverse a type that 
invoked Artemis, a goddess who was very typical in eastern and northern Sicily: the towns of 
Aleasa, Syracuse and Morgantina (Hispanorum) all used imagery similar to that on this coin. 
This same similarity can be seen with Figure KA1. While the types on this coin can be 
considered to have been inspired by typical Hellenistic monarchical practices with regard to 
imagery, they still nonetheless have certain correspondences to sites in the east of Sicily: 
Caleacte and the monarchy of Syracuse both used similar types relating to Zeus on their 
coins. Figures KA3a-b has the strongest links to a widespread group of Sicilian towns, with 
its strong typology connected to Herakles: Aluntium, Caleacte, Centuripae, Cephaloedium, 
and Menaenum all minted coins bearing similar types, once again spread across the east and 
north of the island. Finally, we have Figures KA4a-c, on which are images relating to the 
goddess Demeter. This image had close ties to a very narrow area of Sicily, with Enna, 
Leontini and Hybla Magna as towns that also utilised this image. If we consider all four 
issues of King Antiochus together, then something very important should become apparent. 
While none of the types used on the issues could be called specific to any one town in Sicily, 
and often the types are quite generic to the Sicilian context (e.g. Figures KA3a-b and KA4a-
c), all the types arose only in contexts specific to eastern Sicily (Map 3: Correspondences in 
Sicily). With the exceptions of Cephaloedium and Halaesa, all the towns that used similar 
imagery are clustered around either the fertile grain lands of eastern Sicily, or in the north-
east of the island, with the majority situated around the eastern grain lands. Furthermore, the 
imagery of King Antiochus’ coinage is very Greek, one might almost say deliberately so, and 
is based in Sicilian culture and history as Manganaro has shown.56 Yet, as we have seen 
above, it does not correspond to certain mints of Sicily that had been very important 
                                                 
56 Manganaro (1982), 240-3 and (1983), 405-7. 
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economically. In what follows, I would like to comment on this aspect of the imagery and its 
implications. 
 
 As we have seen above, King Antiochus’ types closely relate to the history and 
culture of Sicily. It is certain that these types would have been recognised and understood by 
the people of Sicily, particularly of eastern Sicily. These connections should also lead us to 
ask who the coins were aimed at. Manganaro (1982: 243) concluded that they were designed 
to elicit a response from the people of Sicily in support of their revolt, but we can see that 
King Antiochus, if this was his aim, was not appealing to all of Sicily: the correspondences 
between the types used on the coinage of King Antiochus, and those used on previous 
Sicilian coinages are all with coinages of cities and towns in the east of Sicily. We might 
remember that whoever King Antiochus was, his rise caused a conflict with Rome, and his 
coinage seems to stress the continuity that he represented even as he challenged Rome: he 
was, in regard to his coinage, a Hellenistic monarch representing a piece of the culture and 
history of Sicily to which he belonged. Bearing in mind all the difficulties concerning the 
Map 3: Correspondences in Sicily (copyright Frances Morton) 
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survival of the numismatic evidence, the problem is in identifying why he chose to avoid 
some images, and embraced others, and what these choices were intended to convey about 
King Antiochus. The answers, I will suggest, lie in a quite different war: that of Rome against 
perhaps its most fearful enemy: Hannibal. 
 
I.vi. Sicily Before Antiochus 
 
On the death of Hieron II in 215 B.C. his grandson Hieronymus took the throne of Syracuse. 
His initial advances to Carthage in the wake of the battle at Cannae were cut short by his 
assassination, but owing to Rome’s brutal sack of the town of Leontini the pro-Carthaginian 
party in Syracuse won out, and a siege ensued in 214 B.C. (Liv. 24.4-7, 29-32; Poly. 7.2-8). 
After the initial revolt at Syracuse, several other towns are recorded as having gone over to 
the Carthaginian side: Helorus, Herbessus, and Megara Hyblaea, of which Megara Hyblaea 
was then sacked and devastated by the Romans (Liv. 24.35). Not long after this the town of 
Morgantina sided with the Carthaginians against the Romans, and this event triggered, so 
Livy tells us, a wave of betrayals of Roman garrisons across Sicily (24.37). In an effort to 
stem this problem, and specifically a suspected betrayal by Enna, the Roman commander L. 
Pinarius pre-emptively massacred the men of Enna by tricking them into gathering in the 
theatre of the town in order to discuss their grievances and then turning on them and the city 
more generally. Marcellus, the overall Roman commander on the island, hoped that this 
would deter other towns from rebelling (24.37-9). The effect was the opposite, and because, 
as Livy tells us, the Sicilians felt that the town of Enna was sacred to Demeter and this act 
was therefore sacrilegious, it meant that it resulted in a widespread eruption of disaffection 
(24.39).57 In the series of revolts that followed, Livy informs us that Morgantina, once 
recovered, revolted again (26.21), as did Heraclea Minoa (26.41), Ergetium, Hybla and 
Macellum (26.21) in addition to the towns already mentioned. Furthermore, Livy mentions, 
but frustratingly does not name, 66 other towns that also had to be recovered by the Romans. 
We must also keep in mind that Syracuse also opposed Rome, and these 66 towns, plus the 
                                                 
57 See also Finley (1968), 118-9. It is possible that Livy records later Roman misgivings about this particular 
action of the Second Punic War in the speech that he credits to L. Pinarius before the massacre. In the speech 
(24.38) Pinarius invokes the goddesses Ceres and Proserpina (Demeter and Kore) to side with his men, as they 
are acting to prevent a greater evil. That Livy felt it necessary for Pinarius to try to justify what he was about to 
do, in a city sacred to Demeter, by a plea to the goddess, perhaps suggests the misgivings that Livy and his 
audience felt about the action. 
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named ones also mentioned by Livy, indicate a widespread and heartfelt dislike of Roman 
domination amongst the Sicilians.58 
 
 The Roman reaction to the revolts was severe. Enna, pre-emptively punished, had 
suffered a ruthless loss of citizenry. Agrigentum and Morgantina, once recovered, were 
repopulated: most of Agrigentum’s population was sold into slavery (Liv. 26.40), while 
Morgantina, as noted before, was retaken and then handed over to Spanish mercenaries (Liv. 
26.21). The other towns, most likely out of self-preservation following the collapse of the 
Carthaginian and Syracusan cause in Sicily, quietly surrendered (Liv. 26.40). However, we 
should focus much more on the Sicilian reaction, and how important to the events the cult of 
Demeter was. Cicero noted that the towns of Catana and Enna both held important shrines to 
Demeter (Verr. 2.4.99-100, 111-2). He even commented on the fact that the shrine at Enna 
was central to the religious life and identity of the Sicilians (Verr. 2.4.106-8). Essential, 
indeed critical, to the massive spread of disaffection with Roman control of Sicily was their 
inopportune insult to the sacred ground of Demeter. As we shall shortly see, there is 
numismatic evidence that suggests that this cult was very important not only to Sicily in 
general, but also specifically to the military efforts against Rome among the Sicilians at this 
point. 
 
A number of coins have been found in Sicily with the legend ΣΙΚΕΛΙΩΤΑΝ on their 
reverses. Their reverses also regularly feature Nike driving a quadriga or biga, although one 
type has instead a galloping horseman. The obverse type is uniformly a wreathed head of 
Persephone, with the exception of one type that features Zeus (Buttrey, Erim, Groves and 
Holloway 1989: 31-4). The issue has been dated, from hoards finds and stylistically, to 212 
B.C.59 Starting with Sjöqvist (1960b: 61), several scholars have linked these coins to the 
resistance displayed by Sicilian cities to Roman rule. Sjöqvist (1960b: 62-3) argued, from 
personal comments from two different sources,60 that no coin bearing this legend had been 
found with a provenance other than Morgantina or Enna, indicating that they were linked to 
                                                 
58 Finley (1968), 117-21. 
59 Sjöqvist (1960b), 55-7, identified them as stylistically similar to Hieronic or Syracusan democracy coinage 
while Buttrey, Erim, Groves and Holloway (1989), 33, noted that hoard finds in Morgantina in addition to 
stylistic similarities placed the date of the coins to c. 212 B.C. 
60 One source was a landowner in the area around Aidone, who reported that his estate had, at some prior date, 
unearthed a coin with the ΣΙΚΕΛΙΩΤΑΝ legend in an area that is now known to be the area of Morgantina’s 
agora. The second source was that of the collection of Dr Joseph V. Caltagirone of New York, who owned a 
private collection of antiquities, all of which had been discovered on the Serra Orlando ridge (the site of ancient 
Morgantina), in which collection there was a coin with the ΣΙΚΕΛΙΩΤΑΝ legend. See Sjöqvist (1960b), 62-3. 
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the resistance to Roman rule, although he accepted that many of the examples had no 
recorded provenance.61 Bell (2007a: 197-8) considered the possibility that under Roman rule 
there was a κοινόν of Sicilian cities that had centralised funds and wondered if this had arisen 
from a prior κοινόν of Greek cities that had produced the ΣΙΚΕΛΙΩΤΑΝ coinage.62 In an 
article documenting the use of the cult of Demeter in Sicily as a political instrument, White 
(1964: 271-3) saw the use of Demeter on the ΣΙΚΕΛΙΩΤΑΝ coinage as a very appropriate 
image, and also linked this significance of the cult to its subsequent treatment by the Romans. 
He noted that in the period of the suppression of the revolt, or immediately after, 
archaeological evidence suggests that the cult centres of Demeter were affected directly. 
Specifically, there is archaeological evidence that the shrine to Demeter at Morgantina was 
destroyed in the sack of 212 B.C. Thereafter it ceased to function as a sanctuary, which White 
considered to indicate the strength of the Roman response against the cult.63 Furthermore, he 
commented that the sanctuary at Agrigentum ceased to operate after the end of the third 
century B.C., although it was not brutally destroyed like the shrine at Morgantina.64 White 
noted, however, that Agrigentum was taken in 210 B.C., and he linked this cessation of 
activity at the shrine to the repopulation of the city, and supposed the suppression of the cult 
to have been quieter and less violent than that of Morgantina’s. It has also been argued that in 
the period of Roman rule the number of offerings to Demeter and Kore are drastically fewer 
than in earlier periods (Hinz 1998: 243). This is in spite of the fact that the number of mints 
producing coinage bearing the images of either Demeter or Kore is much greater in this 
period than in any previous, and this change in quantity of votive offerings is linked to the 
Roman domination of Sicily at this point (Florenzano 2005: 11, 27).65 I would suggest that 
this is further evidence of Rome’s engagement in a widespread reduction, if not suppression, 
of the cult of Demeter, and that this might be due to the importance of the cult in the Sicilian 
resistance movement against Rome. 
 
                                                 
61 Sjöqvist (1960b), 59, also argued that the unusual symbol on the coins, which appears to be a Τ atop an Μ, 
but both turned on their side, represented a symbol for Morgantina. Buttrey, Erim, Groves and Holloway (1989), 
33, did not consider the argument to be strong enough to account for the unusual symbol. 
62 However, Prag (2009b), 89, while not dismissing Cicero’s suggestions (Verr. 2.2.103, 112; 2. 4.138; Att. 
10.12.2) that there was a form of Sicilian conventus or concursus, argued that for the period  preceding Hieron II 
there was no explicit evidence of a Sicilian κοινόν. 
63 Stillwell (1959), 169, 171; Sjöqvist (1960a), 133; Stillwell (1963) 169-70; White (1964), 276; Verbrugghe 
(1974), 54-5. 
64 Marconi (1933), 108-9; White (1964), 273; Verbrugghe (1974), 54-5. 
65 Both Ciaceri (1911), 187, and Florenzano (2005), 6, agree that the cult of Demeter/Kore was one that 
appealed to all the Greek inhabitants of Sicily, and could therefore be termed a ‘popular’ cult. 
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If we look at the coinage of King Antiochus in this light, then we can begin to make 
sense of the problems posed by its iconography. I suggest that we can now understand why 
he seems to be connecting to some parts of Sicily through his coinage, whilst avoiding 
connecting to others. This, in turn, will allow us to gain a better understanding of what his 
coinage was saying about him. His coinage, in general, appears to be emphasising his 
position as a Greek, eastern-Sicilian monarch through its use of types typical to eastern 
Sicilian coinages of the period, and its elements that characterised Hellenistic monarchic 
coinages. However, the sites that, in the subsequent numismatic history of Sicily after the 
Second Punic War, were the major producing mints of Sicily were Catana, Messana, and 
Rome. The two that were not Roman both flourished under Rome.66 Another town that 
benefited from Roman control of the island was Tauromenium, which according to Cicero 
held a special treaty with Rome down to his own day (Verr. 2.2.160; 2.3.13; 2.5.49-50). We 
could term these cities pro-Roman, and we should note, as implied above, that King 
Antiochus avoided the types used by these cities in spite of the fact that the literary sources 
confirm that he held two of them (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.20-2. 43; Strabo 6.2.6; Oros. 5.9.5). 
Considering the context of the production of the coinage – a new Greek kingdom in the east 
of Sicily that came into conflict with the Romans –the use of Demeter as a type is very 
important.67 The last invocation of the cult, centred on the events in Enna, was in the Second 
Punic War, in an effort to unite disparate eastern-Sicilian forces of Sicily against Rome. It is 
                                                 
66 Catana: Rizza (1976), 442-3; Messana: Scibona (1976), 998-9. Finley (1986), 156-7, noted that archaeological 
evidence indicated that Catana and Messana were both populous and wealthy cities under the Romans. 
67 The chronology of the so-called First Sicilian Slave War is difficult enough to fix, and it would be impossible 
to fix any date for the production of the King Antiochus’ coinage. However, we must not assume that it was 
only produced once the conflict between the new kingdom and Rome had already begun. Manganaro (1990a), 
418-9, (followed by Sánchez León (2004), 224) has argued that the date of the coinage of King Antiochus is 
split into two distinct phases: the first, comprising Figures KA1 and KA4a-c were then followed in the second 
phase by Figures KA2a-I and KA3a-b, although there is no way to decide the dates of these issues within the 
period of King Antiochus’ kingdom. For discussion of the dating of the outbreak of the conflict itself, see: 
Green (1961), 10-29; Forrest and Stinton (1962), 22; Astin (1967), 133 no. 5; Verbrugghe (1973), 27-9; 
Manganaro (1980), 435-40; Bradley (1989), 152-7 and 170-83; especially Brennan (1993), 153-84, who has the 
fullest discussion and has, I think, conclusively shown that the first major encounters between Rome’s praetors 
and the forces of King Antiochus took place in 135 B.C. This does not preclude actions such as raiding and 
banditry taking place in the year 136 B.C. prior to the full-scale outbreak of war, but Brennan’s chronology was 
the first that took full account of all of the problematic names of praetors given by Florus 2.7.7. Keaveney 
(1998), 73-82, added further reasons for putting the start of the conflict to 135 B.C. while also criticising 
Brennan’s methodology. However, it would seem clear to me, from all the evidence, that any ‘start date’ derived 
from the written accounts is always based on when Rome responded with considerable military force, and 
therefore views the conflict from an entirely Romano-centric viewpoint. It is perhaps more important to stress 
the highly conflicted nature of Sicily in the period prior to increased Roman involvement, especially considering 
Hopwood’s contention (1989), 172-5, that much banditry in the ancient world was indicative in fact of proto-
revolutionary protest from discontented poor. In this light, if the conflict, as it will be argued below, was indeed 
about the manner in which Sicily was to be run in future, then the rise of banditry could rather be considered the 
opening of the war, in contrast to the strict attention paid to the Roman response seen in the scholars above. This 
will be considered further in Chapter III. 
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not credible to think that the people of Sicily would fail to see the implications of this choice, 
ideologically loaded as it is and with a history of exploitation for political purposes, and it is 
equally not credible to think that King Antiochus was unaware of the history of this image. 
Therefore it must be considered that King Antiochus’ aim, partially achieved through his 
invocation of this cult and informed by the ideological and political implications that the cult 
had, was to unify the people of eastern Sicily, and to consolidate his own rule; in doing this 
he became another in a line of Sicilian monarchs going back to Agathocles to utilise the cult 
of Demeter for these purposes.68 
 
The picture emerging from the numismatic evidence for what is typically called the 
First Sicilian Slave War is very much two-sided: on the one side are towns and cities that 
benefited from Roman control, and which had a history of Roman sympathies, and on the 
other is King Antiochus reaching into Sicilian culture and numismatic traditions to present 
himself as a Hellenistic monarch with close ties to Sicilian religious history. Regardless of 
how one might read the evidence regarding the origins of his kingdom,69 it cannot be denied 
that the coinage of King Antiochus betrays a strong influence from Sicilian culture, and that it 
reflected this influence with purpose and intent. Furthermore, the ways in which the 
coinage’s types interact with Sicilian types and culture suggests that they were aimed at 
people who would understand these references, that is to say, people as steeped in Sicilian 
culture as those producing the coins. We can therefore say that not only was King Antiochus 
trying to display himself as a monarch with a strong base in Sicilian culture, but also that he 
was demonstrating these ties to fellow Sicilians. In sum, although the origins of King 
Antiochus himself may still remain an open question, the effect of his rise was a native 
Sicilian movement against Rome: what we can now call, in the context of Roman republican 
history, the Sicilian Insurrection. 
 
II. Earlier Treatments of King Antiochus’ Coinage 
 
Having now demonstrated what the surviving coinage of King Antiochus represented and 
how it fitted into its Sicilian context, we can put to rest a number of contentions brought 
forward in the past by other scholars. Here I would like to briefly analyse how the approaches 
that each scholar used when studying the Sicilian Insurrection affected their interpretations of 
                                                 
68 White (1964), 261-79; Verbrugghe (1974), 54. 
69 This will be considered in Chapter III. 
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the coinage of King Antiochus, and furthermore demonstrate how the conclusions reached 
above show these interpretations to be inadequate.  
 
II.i. Slave Kings and Maintaining Rebellion 
 
The discussion of the coinage of King Antiochus goes back to the early publications of the 
coins as they were first linked to the Sicilian Insurrection. Robinson (1920: 175-6) noted that 
a coin attributed to a King Antiochus of Syria showing Demeter and an ear of grain (Figure 
KA4a), but found in Sicily, had been wrongly considered Syrian, when in fact it could more 
easily, and sensibly, be attributed to King Antiochus, the leader of the Sicilian Insurrection. 
Since that starting point, various efforts have been made to understand the significance of 
King Antiochus’ coinage. The publication by Manganaro (1982; 1983) of another coin 
showing grapes on the obverse (Figure KA2a: he later (1990a), 418, amended his 
identification to that of a quiver, which I share; see above), and finally the work of Calciati 
(1987) that published the remaining two issues (Figures KA1 and KA3a-b) meant that by 
1987 all the now known evidence was available.70 In spite of this, the majority of discussion 
of the coins considers only Figures KA4a-c, and this is the most widely published coin. 
 
We may begin this discussion from a basic starting point. Commonplace among 
scholarship are the statements that the coinage represent merely some form of advertising by 
the ‘slaves’ of their success, often linked directly to the city of Enna, or that they represent 
the institutions of kingship being established around King Antiochus. For example, Green 
(1961: 16) stated that once he was firmly established King Antiochus was able 
 
...to issue his own coinage, with Demeter on one face and a corn-ear on the other – 
appropriate emblems for a new capital (Enna). 
 
Appropriate indeed, but we have seen above that this choice of image has implications and 
connections across eastern Sicily, and not just to Enna.  Finley (1968: 141), Goldsberry 
(1973: 250), Dumont (1987: 217-8) and Berk and Bendall (1994: 7-8) saw the coinage in a 
very similar light: in Finley’s case as part of the royal insignia adopted by King Antiochus, in 
Goldsberry and Dumont as choices appropriate to a kingdom centred on Enna and in Berk 
                                                 
70 A further publication of the four types was done by Campana (1997), and a full publication, including 
examples of every specimen of each of the four issues known, was released by Manganaro in 1990a. 
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and Bendall’s case as a method by which King Antiochus kept his name before his ‘slave’ 
subjects.71 In a similar vein, Bradley (1989: 120) acknowledged that 
 
…the fact that Eunus minted coins could be urged as evidence of an aspiration on his part 
toward a highly formalized monarchy. 
 
However, the simple production of coinage was seen in the Greek and Roman worlds as a 
‘mark of sovereignty’ (Crawford 1983: 51) and this statement should be taken as a starting 
point for understanding the coinage, as opposed to concluding that this aura of kingship was 
the sole purpose. Making this the conclusion of any analysis risks underplaying the other 
avenues of investigation and avoids the question of what kind of aura, what kind of 
monarchy, the coins are establishing; we have seen above that it connected very firmly with 
Sicilian history and culture more generally, something that cannot be established if we were 
to content ourselves with the above conclusions.  
 
In addition to the idea of King Antiochus’ kingship, the study of the coinage, rather than 
trying to understand what the insurgents’ aims were in minting the coinage, is often aimed at 
confirming the scholar’s considerations of the rebels’ intentions. Returning to Bradley (1989: 
120), his overall thesis was that the ‘slave wars’ were essentially aberrant forms of normal 
slave resistance, with particular reference to maroonage, and therefore did not contain 
‘grandiose objectives’ (1989: xiv-xv): 
 
The slave wars were…not the outcome of resistance to a particular political dispensation but 
to the reality of slavery and the material conditions it imposed…the wars were essentially 
aberrant extensions of [more common forms of resistance to slavery]. 
 
His book contained a whole chapter on ‘The Maintenance of Rebellion’, and it is in this 
chapter that he discussed the coins, notably outside his discussion of the narrative of the 
conflict. The analysis of the coins was placed into his examination of the use of kingship as a 
method of maintaining a rebellion, an analysis that emphasised the limitations inherent in the 
kingship claimed by the ‘slave’ leaders because of their ‘servile’ status (116-20). 
Consequently, Bradley never looked beyond the limits of his chosen context – the slave 
context – when considering the coins, and as his overall thesis dictated that ‘slaves’ did not 
rebel for grandiose objectives, and he was concerned with maintenance of ‘slaves’ with only 
                                                 
71 Shaw (2001), 84, saw the coin showing Demeter to be an advert of ‘slave autonomy’ but went no further with 
his analysis. 
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such a limited outlook, it is not surprising that his analysis of the coins focused so closely on 
supply. By way of example, he dismissed the imagery on the coins as recalling (Bradley 
1989: 120) 
 
…the slaves’ concerns with ensuring adequate supplies of food for themselves, re-
establishing as a result the importance attached to the practical aspects of resistance. 
 
By understanding the coins in this way he thereby misunderstood the potential significance of 
the images on the coins, and demoted the insurgents from holding ideals or aims any higher 
than survival and sustenance. Furthermore, it would seem too simplistic, once the links to 
Sicilian numismatics have been shown, to conclude that these coins could represent the 
concerns of the slave for grain and grapes.72 Bradley would appear to be aware of this 
problem, but does not follow his own logic through. In a telling passage, he highlights the 
potential importance of the imagery on the coins, but then argues away the implications of 
this (1989: 120): 
 
But Eunus’ coins…are best understood as a mechanism to cultivate solidarity among the 
slave dissidents. Their depiction of Demeter is a reminder that the goddess’s cult had been 
manipulated earlier in Sicilian history for political purposes and even anti-Roman purposes. 
But it would be illogical to assume at once that a rebellion of slaves was now a rising against 
Rome rule. (my emphasis) 
 
As this quotation shows, Bradley acknowledged that the cult of Demeter had been 
manipulated in the past for political and anti-Roman purposes, and that the coinage of King 
Antiochus was a reminder of this; but a reminder to whom? One wonders, as the 
manipulation of the cult was so central to Sicilian culture and history as has been shown 
above, and the slaves were a disparate group, why King Antiochus would have bothered to 
put a reminder of this importance of Demeter’s cult onto his coins for the benefit of the 
slaves, who could not, one assumes, have known the full significance of this. In contrast to 
Bradley’s statement, it would seem to be illogical to assume that a reminder that was so 
culturally and historically loaded could have been meant for anyone but the Sicilians, and 
therefore we must question if the revolt was just a ‘rebellion of slaves’, and if it might not 
have been instead ‘a rising against Rome rule’. 
 
                                                 
72 This same argument can be found in Bradley (1983), 450, although less fully developed. 
41 
 
The tendency to acknowledge a potentially important implication of the coinage and 
then subsequently fail to follow the thread of logic through can also be seen in Urbainczyk’s 
study of slave wars in antiquity (2008a). Her overall argument was that slaves in the ancient 
world planned their rebellions and aimed at wide-scale rebellion (29-50). When she brought 
the coins into the argument she was engaged in disproving Bradley’s view (1989: 120-5) that 
slave rebellions represented slaves running away from their masters on a massive scale, and 
did not show slave intentions to go to war with their masters. Urbainczyk (2008a: 42) argued 
that 
 
(h)ere, then, we see signs that the slaves were organized, had definite ideas about how their 
campaign should proceed and seem to have had long term plans. Issuing coins is not the 
action of people hoping either to escape attention or to run off elsewhere. The slaves at least 
appear to have seen their hope in attracting as many of the slaves of Sicily to their side as 
possible. 
 
This is an excellent point, and it is true that the production of coinage does not suggest a 
group of individuals keen to abandon their location or cause; interestingly, however, her 
position is essentially the same as that of Bradley (1989: 120-5) in spite of her critical 
engagement with his ideas: while they disagree about the aim of the coins in terms of 
attraction of followers, both agree that their primary function was maintenance. However, we 
must ask, if the coinage is intended to attract followers, how it set about achieving this? Can 
we identify any culture that the imagery related to? We saw above that the coins, with their 
close ties to Sicilian culture and history, cannot be realistically attached to anyone other than 
the people of Sicily. Urbainczyk’s argument does not go far enough in following its own 
logic: if we are to claim that the coinage is aimed at attracting followers it is imperative to 
then try to understand who the target group might be. 
 
II.ii. Syrian Nationalism and Kingship 
 
A second theme employed by scholars when discussing the coinage of King Antiochus stems 
from Diodorus. On two occasions Diodorus makes direct use of the term Σύρος to describe 
the rebels. On the first occasion (24/5.2.24) he merely comments that Eunus called himself 
Antiochus, and named his rebels Syrians. On the second occasion (34/5.8), which is separated 
from the rest of the narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection, he notes that οἱ Σύροι οἱ δραπέται 
τῶν αἰχµαλώτων amputated the arms as well as the hands of their captives. These passages, 
42 
 
along with the eastern elements of Eunus’ character in Diodorus (34/5.2.5-9), were used by 
Vogt (1965: 29-30, 40-3) to argue that the rebellion represented a nationalistic uprising of 
Syrian slaves held in Sicily during this period, which he considered to be influenced by the 
Maccabean war of liberation.73 Indeed, he went so far as to say that (43) 
 
(w)enn das Unternehmen des Eunus, seinem Ursprung nach religiös, den Charakter eines 
nationalen Freiheitskampfes annahm, dann ist die Fernhaltung der sizilischen Städte von 
diesem fremdherrschaftlichen Gebilde erst ganz verständlich. 
 
By making the connection to the Maccabean War, Vogt also saw the role of the cult of 
Atargatis as a uniting religious force for the new kingdom. He described how the cult spread 
to Delos because of the slaves that were sold there, and then considered that (41) 
 
(g)ewiß haben die syrischen Sklaven, wenn sie die Verehrung ihrer heimischen Göttin nach 
Sizilien brachten, in ihrem Kult dieselbe active Rolle gespielt wie auf Delos. 
 
As part of his justification for the stress he laid on Syrian elements in the revolt, especially 
Atargatis, Vogt (1965: 40) considered that the coinage of King Antiochus represented his 
attempt to integrate Seleucid practices into his court. The coins were given no separate study, 
but considered only in light of the dominant position given to the eastern practices and 
names. This position cannot be maintained in light of what I have argued above. The coinage 
of King Antiochus does not contain any features that would link him or his kingdom to 
Seleucid practices apart from his name and the title ΒΑϚΙΛΕYϚ, indeed he depicts himself 
through his coinage as positively Sicilian. 
 
                                                 
73 Central to his argument was the supposition that the majority of the slaves in Sicily at this point were Syrian 
(42), a position also adopted by Shaw (2001), 9. This position cannot be maintained. As noted by Verbrugghe 
(1974), 51-2, this would require not only that there were large numbers of Syrian slaves on the market at all 
times, but also that Sicilian land-owners favoured these slaves over any other on the market (for the figures of 
those enslaved between 262 B.C. and 133 B.C. see Toynbee (1965), 171-3). It also ignores that the terms Syrian 
and Assyrian were roughly interchangeable and referred to people from anywhere in the Syrio-Palestine region 
(Millar (1993), 227, 454-5; Dickie (2001), 110; Steel (2001), 50; Strabo 2.1.31). Furthermore, there are only two 
passages that refer to the rebels being called Syrian in book 34/5 of Diodorus: 34/5.2.24 and 34/5.8. The latter 
passage does not necessarily come from the account of the Sicilian Insurrection, the only link being the 
reference to ‘Syrian’ runaways echoed in 34/5.2.24. However, the former passage is clearly an addition by 
Photius (see Appendix 6: King Antiochus’ Title in Diodorus) and so cannot be trusted to necessarily reflect 
information from Diodorus’ narrative. Otherwise, in the narrative given either by Photius or the Constantinian 
excerpts, there is no reference to Syrian slaves anywhere, and it seems best, given the evidence presented in this 
chapter, to err on the side of caution regarding the Syrian nature of the revolt. See also Dumont (1987), 218-9, 
256, for the difficult argument that Eunus chose the title Syrian for the slaves to reflect this typical slave name in 
New Comedy. 
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However, the concept of a close tie between slave religion on Delos and its 
subsequent spread to Sicily was picked up by Kunz (2006: 329-348) in her book discussing 
the history of religion on Roman Sicily. Given the nature of her work it is hardly surprising 
that she focussed on the references to eastern religious practices. Like Vogt, Kunz looked to 
Seleucid history to provide justification for large parts of her argument, and also stressed 
(2006: 338-341) that large-scale movement of slaves from the east to the west of the 
Mediterranean provided widespread knowledge of cult practices for the participants to utilise. 
For Kunz, Atargatis was vital to the unity of the insurgents and the construction of Eunus’ 
kingship. When she reached the coinage, however, Kunz had to account for the fact that the 
coinage did not fit the context she had constructed, and she so dismissed the evidence in two 
pages (346-7), by claiming that (346) 
 
(i)n bezug auf die Motive können keine eindeutigen sizilischen Parallelbelege angeführt 
werden…Für eine zweifelsfreie Interpretation bleibt eine eindeutige lokale Zuordnung der 
Münzmotive aber der einzige Schlüssel. 
 
She went on to claim that (367) 
 
(d)ie Sklaven in Sizilien hatten kein besonderes Verhältnis zu den Kulten der Demeter und 
des Zeus Aitnaios. 
 
She thus dismisses the Sicilian Insurrection as the reason for the Roman delegation sent to 
fence off the shrines of Zeus Aitnaios in 135 B.C. (Obsequens 26 and Orosius 5.6.2); her 
alternative explanation of this action and the fencing off of the areas by the Romans appears 
to be rather anachronistic: 
 
Zur Vorsicht vor etwaigen Erdstößen, Lavaströmen oder Ascheregen könnte eine Umzäunung 
entlang des Ätna fremde ortsunkundige Besucher abgehalten haben, die Kultstätten 
aufzusuchen und sich in Gefahr zu begeben. Man hätte damit den üblichen Pilgerstrom aus 
Sicherheitsgründen auf Zeit unterbunden. 
 
She did not consider why King Antiochus’ coinage carried the images that it did. However, 
as we have seen above, unambiguous local parallels in terms of imagery can be found, and as 
such Kunz’s conclusions regarding the religious and cultural background to the war are 
redundant. In short, none of these scholars have tried to understand the coinage of King 
Antiochus in a Sicilian context; but we have seen through the analysis carried out above that 
their conclusions regarding the coinage can be discarded. 
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II.iii. Between Slave and Free 
 
A different approach was taken by Manganaro (1982, 1983, 1990a).74 He considered, when 
first publishing the coin – that he then thought to show grapes (Figures KA2a-i) – that the 
coins known to him seemed to relate to Sicilian types and culture. He argued (1982: 240-3; 
1983: 405-7) that the types chosen reflected an interest in the culture and lives of the people 
of Sicily, and were designed as part of an effort to garner support for the rebellion from the 
people of Sicily, not the slaves. He concluded, from the coin evidence and from passages in 
Diodorus which detailed the actions of certain free people during the war (Diod. Sic. 
34/5.2.48), that this appeal was successful, and that free people did indeed join forces with 
the slaves against Rome. He finally argued (1990a: 419) that 
 
(q)ueste emissioni costituiscono un’affermazione di potere e la risposta a una esigenza 
«economica» dell’area territoriale controllata dal re Antioco (Euno), il quale appare l’ultimo 
defensore della independenza dei Sicelioti (o almeno di alcune città come Enna, Morgantina, 
Katane e Tauromenium) contro Roma. 
 
Manganaro’s aim was to connect a coin found in Sicily with a historical context in which to 
understand it, and in this he differed quite markedly from all the approaches discussed above, 
because he felt the context that would best enable an understanding of the coinage was that of 
Sicilian culture, history and numismatics. Others have since picked up on this idea. Guzzetta 
(2006: 190-1), following Manganaro closely, noted that 
 
(i) loro tipi che si riferiscono a «divinità agrarie di antica tradizione siceliota»75 come 
Demetra sarebbero la testimonianza di istanze religiose tipiche non dei gruppi servili ribelli 
ma del mondo contadino siceliota che partecipava alla rivolta. 
 
Thereby he also connected the coinage with the history and culture of Sicily. An unusual 
view was taken by Sánchez León (2004), who combined the approaches of Manganaro (1982, 
1983, 1990a) and Vogt (1965). Sánchez León concentrated very closely on two aspects of the 
coinage: the title on the coins, and the image of Demeter. He correctly insisted that the 
coinage had not been rightly integrated into the study of the Sicilian Insurrection (223), but 
                                                 
74 This approach was foreshadowed by Verbrugghe (1974), 53-4, in which Verbrugghe correctly linked Figure 
KA4a-c to the cult of Demeter in Sicily, and suggested that this showed, following White (1964), that King 
Antiochus was appealing to prior Sicilian history. However, Verbrugghe failed to connect King Antiochus 
himself to Sicily, in spite of this. 
75 Here quoting Manganaro (1983), 406. 
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while his work stressed the Sicilian nature of the types on the coin showing Demeter (224),76 
his other focus on the title on the coins, which he viewed as eastern in type, led him to stress 
the alternative, eastern nature of King Antiochus’ monarchy (225-6), seemingly in contrast to 
the clearly Sicilian types on the coins. What is interesting to note is that while no-one other 
than Bussi (1998 discussed below) has found fault with Manganaro’s conclusions, and in the 
case of Bussi the arguments against Manganaro are not convincing, scholars writing strictly 
on the ‘slave wars’ tend to brush over his work, if they note it at all.77 Bussi (1998: 24-5) 
noted that the coinage of King Antiochus was minted on the same weight system as the 
coinage circulating at that point, but concluded in her work that the similarities to Sicilian 
coinage were purely pragmatic (25): 
 
…se le monete emesse da Euno si integrano, a loro volta, nel sistema monetario in corso, ciò 
significa che egli le coniò con l’interno che esse avessero una reale circolazione e che 
servissero agli schiavi per le transizioni commerciali loro necessarie durante I lunghi anni 
della loro «egemonia» sulla Sicilia. 
 
And that therefore (25) 
 
(n)on è quindi necessario pensare ad un sollevamento di Siciliani di ispirazione anti-romana 
per spiegare la presenza di Demetra, della spiga e del grappolo d’uva sui bronzo di Euno. 
 
Furthermore, she did not see the participation of free people in the revolt as a result of the 
coinage, and therefore as a ‘rivolta anti-romana’, but as a result of opportunism by the poor to 
react against the system that had been put in place by Rome (27). In her view ‘che Roma ne 
era l’artefice’, she thought it natural that those seeking to alter the system would have fought 
against the Romans: it was only a ‘rivolta anti-romana’ because the upholders of the system 
were Roman. However, Bussi’s argument that the images on the coins can be explained as 
practical choices to facilitate trade is not entirely convincing. First, as shown above, some of 
the images are ideologically and politically very loaded. Second, and most importantly, 
Sicilian numismatics in this period was dominated by a very small number of coin types, 
                                                 
76 The stress placed on the coin showing Demeter (Figures KA4a-c) seemed to lead Sánchez León from 
considering adequately the place of the other issues in the productions of King Antiochus, with his analysis of 
these coins consisting of a consideration of how they enriched the knowledge of the religious variety among the 
‘slaves’. 
77 Urbaincyzk (2008a) did not include Manganaro (1982; 1983; 1990a) at all, and as I noted above, barely 
considers the coins. Bradley (1989), the only other major work on the ‘slave wars’ since two of Manganaro’s 
articles, did include them in his bibliography, and included one reference in a footnote (116, no. 22) but did not 
engage with the arguments, nor acknowledge that his own argument was fundamentally challenged by the 
conclusions of Manganaro. 
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none of which was imitated by King Antiochus: if his intention had been to have his coinage 
easily accepted then his most sensible course of action would have been to have mimicked 
the coinage of, for example, Catana, Syracuse or Rome. That he did not, as I have shown 
above, is most telling. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As we can now see, once the coinage of King Antiochus has been reconnected with the 
historical, numismatic and cultural contexts from which it arose, the contentions brought 
forward in the past about the coins can be dismissed. It should now be quite clear that study 
of the coins depends heavily upon context. In this chapter the context chosen was that of 
Sicilian history in the third and second centuries B.C. This context has allowed some very 
useful correspondences to be noted. Sicilian numismatics in the second century B.C. was 
largely dominated by only four mints: Messana, Catana, Syracuse and Rome. The emergence 
in the second century B.C. of numerous small-scale local mints had little effect on the overall 
circulation of coinage in Sicily, and by the end of the second century B.C. Roman coinage 
largely dominated. When considered against this background, the coinage of King Antiochus 
stood out. His coinage, in contrast to all the other coinages in the island at the time, 
proclaimed a new authority that stood apart from, and was aligned against, the Roman system 
in place: a new Greek king, and therefore a new Greek kingdom with all that could go with 
that. Comparison of the types of the coinage showed that, while the legend would have stood 
out in Sicily at this time, the imagery was completely intelligible in a Sicilian context, and 
that the types chosen related very closely to Sicilian religious culture and history. Most 
importantly, the use of images of Demeter suggested very strongly that the issuing authority 
was trying to mobilise and unite the people of eastern Sicily under a new venture against 
Rome, led by King Antiochus as a Greek monarch in Sicily, by invoking a cult that had been 
central to the last efforts to resist Rome in the war against Hannibal. Importantly, it is much 
easier to understand the coins as relating to the free people of Sicily than the slaves that 
Diodorus claimed were the main protagonists of what we should better refer to as the Sicilian 
Insurrection to which the evidence discussed here is typically attributed. However, it is 
important to understand how King Antiochus, and the kingdom he was attempting to create, 
fit into the context of Sicily in the second century B.C., and this will be the subject of the next 
section of this chapter. 
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I. Negotiations of Power 2: 
The Decline and Fall of Inland Sicily 
 
 
‘The frequent revolts and resistance on the part of individual Sicilian poleis down to 
210 B.C. are strongly suggestive of a lively sense of independent political – and military – identity 
…the activity evidenced in post 210 B.C. Sicily is no less suggestive of such a 
lively sense of identity.’ Prag (2007a), 76. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the first section of this chapter the only evidence to come directly from the kingdom of 
King Antiochus, his coinage, was considered in the context of Sicilian history up until his 
reign. It was shown that the coinage is best understood as arising from, and linked to, the 
culture and history of eastern Sicily. As a corollary to this conclusion, it was necessary to 
acknowledge that the people most likely to respond to the iconographic choices made for the 
coinage were the free people of eastern Sicily. It is one thing, however, to argue that King 
Antiochus was appealing to the people of eastern Sicily; it is quite another to answer the 
question of why Sicily was discontented enough with Roman ‘provincial’ control of the 
island to align itself with a Greek monarch whose existence was a cause for potential conflict 
with Rome. The aim of this section is to provide a context for understanding the rise of King 
Antiochus’ kingdom that sets it firmly into the world of mid-second century B.C. Sicily. 
 
 The following will demonstrate that Sicily in the mid-second century B.C. was 
experiencing complex socio-political and economic problems. Several contexts will be 
developed to argue this. First, the development of the Roman provincial system will be 
considered, following Richardson’s (2008) argument that Rome, in the second century B.C., 
did not view the provincia assigned to its officials to be territorial possessions. They were, 
rather, spheres of influence through which Rome could affect its international policy. 
Moreover, Prag (2007a) has shown that this necessitated a much more loose form of control 
in Sicily, which involved strong local oligarchies and a gymnastic culture that enabled 
Sicilian soldiers to police Sicily. Second, Rome’s interests in Sicily will be demonstrated to 
have been principally with the taxation of the province.  This was causing a declining inland 
and a burgeoning coastal region. Through a comparison with another provincial context in 
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which taxation caused considerable problems between an imperial power and its provincial 
subjects – the period leading up to the American War of Independence – it will be shown that 
Sicily’s taxation by Rome could have been the catalyst for an insurrection by the people of 
Sicily, especially those in the declining interior. This section will conclude that the Kingdom 
of King Antiochus represents a pivotal moment in the negotiation of power between Rome 
and Sicily, and an episode that confirmed the downward spiral of inland Sicily. 
 
I. Mid to Late Hellenistic Sicily 
 
In recent scholarship there have been important advances in the understanding of how Rome 
controlled its provincial interests, and in relation to Sicily several recent works have stressed 
the considerable degree of autonomy afforded to the island by Rome. Detailing this critical 
context will provide important tools to help explain the events surrounding the rise and fall of 
King Antiochus. 
 
I.i. Roman Practice of Empire 
 
An important place to start this discussion is with the general concept of how Rome 
controlled areas in which it had been successful in its wars. A recent consideration of this 
policy proposed by Richardson (2008) has demonstrated that Rome did not consider itself to 
‘own’ the provincia of its officials, or indeed territories of defeated enemies, but sought to 
control from a distance the political and economical policies of defeated enemies. In his 
words (24):78 
 
The naming of an area as a provincia did not (so far as we can tell) alter its legal status or 
constitute a Roman assertion of sovereignty, any more than the omission of an area from the 
list of provinciae in a subsequent year meant a de-annexation of a previous Roman 
“territory”. 
 
As an example of Roman practice Richardson (2008: 24-5) focussed on Macedonia. He 
argued that Rome never sought, in the aftermath of the initial conflicts with King Philip, to 
annex the territory of Macedonia. Even after King Perseus was defeated, Rome actually 
withdrew forces from Macedonia, and contented itself with reorganising the territory into 
                                                 
78 In general agreement with Crawford (1990), 91-2, and Lintott (1993), 22-4, although in Richardson’s case the 
statement was much more forceful in its conviction. 
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four distinct Republics, which subsequently were only required to pay tax back to Rome.79 In 
this period Macedonia was on the list of provinciae only when military forces were required 
there: an example of this would be the war against Andriscus in 149 B.C., when Roman 
forces were sent to suppress his movement having not been present since 167 B.C. (Zonar. 
9.28.4). Richardson’s argument hinged on the interpretation that the term provincia merely 
denoted the task or area within which a magistrate could exercise his imperium (16-9), and 
formulated this further, saying that (43) 
 
(t)he creation of a province was not, at least in the context in which it took place, the seizure 
of a piece of territory or an extension of a world empire but the defining of the 
responsibilities of an imperium-holder as he entered office or began a new period as a pro-
magistrate. 
 
In this interpretation he departed from the opinion held by Brennan (2000: 182-90) who 
maintained a distinction between certain provinciae, such as Sicily after 241 B.C., that were 
‘fixed’, and ‘special’ provinciae that were assigned as, when, and where needed. Brennan 
actually titles the ‘fixed’ provinciae the ‘Ordo Provinciarum’, but as Richardson has shown 
(2008: 16-9), this concept in Brennan is based upon a single passage of Livy that cannot 
support it (Liv. 27.22.4-6).80 
 
This understanding of what the Romans meant by a provincia is important when 
considering the implications of the conflict between Rome and King Antiochus in Sicily. 
Before we move on to consider Sicily specifically during the Roman Republic, it is worth 
considering again Macedonia. As Richardson (2008: 24-5) has shown, Rome only intervened 
with a military force, or even a governor, when the settlement that it had created in 
Macedonia was under threat from Andriscus. In fact it is notable that it was precisely once 
Macedonia had been reorganised by L. Aemilius Paullus that Rome ceased to send troops 
there.81 This suggests two very important facts about Rome’s involvement in Macedonia. 
First, Rome’s only concern with Macedonia was taxation and an end to a military threat; 
apart from that they had no involvement in the area. Secondly, had Andriscus not attempted 
to take Macedonia there is no guarantee that Rome would have entered the area for any other 
                                                 
79 Although, as Richardson (2008), 25, notes, some ancient authors considered this to be an act of annexation; 
see Liv. Per. 45. 
80 The passage in Livy records the list of provinciae for the praetors of the coming year (208 B.C.) and then 
describes the prorogations of imperia which applied to them. Richardson (2008), 19, stated that arguing for a 
concept of ‘fixed’ provinces on the evidence of one passage of Livy that seemed to suggest different practices 
for certain provinces, was not credible given the other possible readings of the passage possible. 
81 Liv. 45.18.1-8 and 29.4-14. 
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reason: by way of example of an area that remained unchanged, the cities of Thessaly 
remained a union of free cities until the end of the Republic, in spite of their proximity to 
Macedonia (Lintott 1993: 24). In sum, it was the end of the status quo in Macedonia on 
Roman terms that led to Roman intervention, not an attack on a Roman ‘territory’. 
 
 So how do these broader ideas about Roman attitudes to provinciae relate to Sicily? 
Crawford (1990: 93) argued that in 241 B.C. the Senate in Rome was expressing its desire to 
administer Western Sicily in the future: that is that they wanted to ‘annex’ the territory and 
make it into a provincia in the traditional sense.82 I think that the most important point here is 
the definition of ‘annexation’. It is undeniable that Rome sent regular if not annual praetors to 
Sicily, and a recent list compiled by Prag (2007c: 287-310) has shown that from 210 B.C. to 
100 B.C. there were 65 consuls or praetors, many of them prorogued, assigned to Sicily, and 
it must be noted that these are only the known examples: it is most likely that Sicily had an 
annual magistrate of at least praetorian rank. However, this does not necessarily constitute 
military control, nor close control of Sicilian administration. Elsewhere Prag (2007a: 71-6) 
has argued against the assumption that the annual magistrate in Sicily necessarily had 
garrison forces assigned to him from Rome, or indeed Italy, and argued that the evidence at 
the very least suggested that the forces used to patrol Sicily were from the island itself. His 
argument warrants special attention, as it has other important implications about Roman 
attitudes to Sicily in the period of interest here. 
 
It is clear that during the Second Punic War there were regularly Roman troops in 
Sicily: its status as a warzone necessitated this. As Prag (2007a: 73) said ‘(i)t is what follows 
that is of most interest here’. He noted (73) that at first levies of troops made up of Latins and 
Italian allies were dispatched with governors, in 200 B.C. (Liv. 31.9.9), 198 B.C. (Liv. 
32.8.5-8), and perhaps again in 193 B.C. (Liv. 34.56.7-8). An emergency levy of Sicilians in 
192 B.C. was also used, in this case – and, Prag argued, indicative of the purpose of the other 
levies – to protect the coastal towns against an invasion from Antiochus III: an external 
invasion, rather than an internal rebellion. The last mention of troops in Sicily from the 
literary sources comes in 188 B.C., when Sicily was decreed to a praetor ‘sine supplemento’ 
(Liv. 41.21.3). From this evidence Prag (2007a: 74) tentatively suggested that the use of Latin 
                                                 
82 Although he noted that he could not prove this hypothesis. 
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and Italian allies as a garrison force was phased out by 188 B.C.83 Prag (74-6) then argued 
that the evidence for the period after 188 B.C. until the foundation of veteran and colonial 
settlements in Sicily by Augustus in 21 B.C. (Res Ges. 28) did not indicate a ‘standing-force’ 
during the second century B.C. in Sicily. In what followed this statement, Prag (76-99) 
argued that Rome’s shortfall in manpower in Sicily was made up by using Sicilian troops to 
guard and patrol the province, on land and sea, utilizing the gymnastic culture prevalent in 
Sicily in this period. Critically, he argued that (76) 
 
(t)he frequent revolts and resistance on the part of individual Sicilian poleis down to 210 B.C. 
are strongly suggestive of a lively sense of independent political – and military – 
identity…the activity evidenced in post 210 B.C. Sicily is no less suggestive of such a lively 
sense of identity. 
 
When related to the evidence of Roman practice as regards the controlling of Macedonia, 
some useful observations can be made. As in Macedonia, although with an undeniably 
different, localised style, Rome chose the method of least resistance for controlling Sicily. No 
doubt Rome maintained friendly oligarchies in the cities of Sicily, as they preferred to do in 
the Greek east;84 but it is very important to remember, as Prag (2007a: 82-7) has shown, that 
the Sicilian levies used to police the island and protect it from pirates were often led by 
Sicilian officers. That the Roman governor sent to Sicily was not accompanied by levies of 
even Italians, let alone Roman legionaries, indicates that his primary function was largely 
related to taxation and legal matters, a matter to which we shall return shortly.85 It is notable 
that when Rome does send additional troops, of any kind, into Sicily during the second 
century B.C. it is only to deal with situations that were a threat to the peaceful taxation of the 
province: the wars that we typically know as the First and Second Sicilian Slave Wars. 
 
I.ii. Sicily’s Vibrant Culture 
 
As a corollary to this laissez-faire approach in terms of the military, the evidence from other 
fields of study confirms that Sicily had a vibrant Hellenistic culture during the second and 
first centuries B.C., and one that was afforded a certain level of autonomy. It is useful to start 
with epigraphic evidence. Manganaro (1996: 129-44) has demonstrated that the epigraphic 
                                                 
83 In this he followed Brunt’s (1987), 683, argument that while the evidence of Livy could imply the existence 
of a force in Sicily already, it was better to be prudent regarding the evidence. 
84 Finley (1968), 126. 
85 We should note here that the only known effect of the ‘reorganisation’ of Sicily by P. Rupilius after the 
Sicilian Insurrection was a clarification and emendation of the legal system in Sicily; see Cic. Verr. 2.2.32. 
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habits of Mikrai show a strong civic activity and identity in the town, and also (1999: 76-7 
and 141) that the town of Halaesa possessed a strong civic centre, evidenced by civic 
document seals in lead found there. Similarly Prag (2007b: 257-9) also noted that in the 
second and first centuries B.C. Sicily had a strong Hellenistic epigraphic culture. He argued 
in particular that the sites of Segesta and, once again, Halaesa, with (258) ‘…formal agora, 
statue bases, honorifics, gymnasium-related material, building inscriptions, the presence of 
Romans etc.’ were ‘paradigmatic’ of Sicilian towns in this period. Perhaps most important for 
the focus here, Prag noted (260) that there was a concern in ‘Sicilian’ epigraphy outside the 
island to stress the ‘civic identity’ of the people named on the inscriptions, displayed 
alongside the generic ethnic Siculus, and that this implied ‘…an interesting tension between 
the externally imposed «Sicilian» of, for instance, Cicero and the internal emphasis in the 
epigraphy on civic or sub-civic identity.’ Related to these arguments based on epigraphic 
evidence, which underscore the importance of civic identity and civic life, the concern in the 
primary literary sources for the make-up of the ruling bodies of Sicilian cities, with their 
frequent references to Roman officials called in to determine the dispensation of the ‘senates’ 
of the towns,86 also point up the general interest among some Sicilians in the running of their 
cities, and the importance that they placed on these administrative bodies. 
 
Archaeological evidence further supports this general trend. In a recent summary of 
archaeological fieldwork Wilson (2000: 144-5) reflected that the evidence from a number of 
towns indicated that Sicily had a ‘buoyant’ economy, and that ‘…local elites, even after 
paying off their tithe to Rome, still had money to spare to invest in new construction’, an 
interpretation backed up by Campagna (2006: 15-34) and Bell (2007b: 118). In particular 
Wilson noted (140-50) the towns of Soluntum,87 Ietas,88 Segesta,89 Tyndaris90 and Halaesa91 
as places that demonstrated considerable prosperity during the Roman Republic. All these 
locales had important civic buildings: active theatres, stoai, and most importantly 
bouleuteria. In a departure from previous scholarship, recent studies have also suggested that 
                                                 
86 In 197 B.C. the town of Agrigentum had its population bolstered by order of the Senate, and in 193 B.C. the 
governor of the province specified the rules of cooptation into the Agrigentine senate, with the stipulation that 
the new settlers could not constitute a majority in the senate; see Cic. Verr. 2.2.123. Again in 95 B.C the city of 
Halaesa asked the Roman Senate to resolve the disputes over the same issues in its senate, and again was 
supplied with new regulations; see Cic. Verr. 2.2.122.  
87 Cutroni Tusa, Italia, Lima, and Tusa (1994). 
88 Isler (1991); Perkins (2007). 
89 Camerata Scovazzo (1996); Molinari (1997); Nenci (1995).  
90 Bernabò Brea and Cavalier (1965). 
91 Prestianni Giallombardo (1998); Scibona (1971); Wilson (1990), 46-8.  
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important cultural buildings, like some theatres in the thriving centres of Sicily, were actually 
constructed during the Roman Republic, and not in the fourth century B.C. as previously 
thought.92 Of course, it would be wrong to think that cities across the island were prosperous, 
and there is considerable evidence for the decline of hill-top sites, such as Leontini,93 
Morgantina,94 Megara Hyblaea95 and Heraclea Minoa96 (Wilson 2000: 137-9), as well as 
certain sites on the coast, such as Camarina and Selinus (Bell 2007b: 118). This should not 
cause any real surprise: as Wilson noted (2000: 137), it makes little sense to live atop a hill if 
there are no aggressive armies to stay away from. What is perhaps surprising is that some 
sites on hill-tops flourished under the Romans, most notably Centuripae. The most likely 
explanation for this is that Centuripae, along with Halaesa, Segesta, Panormus and Halicyae, 
was declared a free community and tax-exempt under the Romans, and so unlike the other 
hill-top towns mentioned (and in particular Leontini that lost most of its land to the Romans 
as ager Romanus; see Cic. Verr. 2.3.109), Centuripae was not economically stressed by the 
necessity to relinquish a portion of its harvests to Rome (Cic. Verr. 2.3.13). I shall return to 
this particular subject shortly, but it is important to note now that one of the few exceptions to 
the general rule of hill-top towns in Sicily declining under the Romans had a special 
dispensation from taxation from them. On the whole, however, the coastal towns of Sicily 
generally appear to have flourished under Rome, and in the latest archaeological studies, the 
second and first centuries B.C. represent a ‘buoyant’ time for the economy of Sicily; and with 
the mention of ‘economy’ we come to the final body of evidence that demonstrates the 
vibrancy of Hellenistic Sicily: coinage. 
 
As I have mentioned before, under Rome local coinage flourished. Crawford (1985: 
115) attributed this to ‘…a deliberate encouragement of local autonomies’. This impression 
has been confirmed by Frey-Kupper (2006: 27-56). While the basic pattern from this 
evidence is undeniable – i.e. that a widespread group of Sicilian towns and cities were given 
free rein to produce their own coinage – certain aspects of this trend should be noted that 
downplay this outline. It has been stated on more than one occasion by Crawford (1985: 113-
                                                 
92 Tindari: dated to 100 B.C. by Bernabò Brea (1964-5) and Buckler (1992), 289-93; Segesta: dated to the 
second century B.C. by Campagna (1997) and D’Andrea (1997); Soluntum: dated to the second century B.C. by 
Wiegand (1997), 52-5. 
93 Nenci, Vallet and Panessa, (1977), 524-55; Wilson (2000), 138. 
94 Stillwell and Sjöqvist (1957); Sjöqvist (1958); Stillwell (1959); Sjöqvist (1960a); Stillwell (1961);  Sjöqvist 
(1962); Stillwell (1963); Sjöqvist (1964); Tsakirgis (1995: esp. 139-43). 
95 Vallet, Villard and Auberson (1981), 174-5. 
96 De Miro (1965). The site was certainly deserted by the end of third quarter of the first century B.C. because, 
as Wilson (2000), 139-40, noted, not a scrap of Italian red-gloss sigillata pottery was found there. 
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5; 1987: 48-9) that this new burst of coinage was aligned with Roman coinage in terms of 
weight and standard, and we must not over-emphasise the Sicilian autonomy displayed in 
producing local coinages at the expense of the more important fact that Rome dominated 
Sicily economically during this period. Furthermore, the results of the analysis given in the 
previous section of this chapter implied that these local coinages, however widespread, were 
very small and local in terms of circulation: I shall return to these coinages again shortly. 
 
 In sum, the island of Sicily can be seen, through its epigraphy, archaeology and 
coinage, to have been a vibrant, politically active, and in some cases rich area with a strong 
Hellenistic culture that was still very much Greek. Furthermore, Rome utilised this vibrancy 
in its own policing of the island, allowing the cities of Sicily to furnish the praetor with men 
for protecting the island against pirates. The main question to address now, given the 
conclusions drawn from the coinage of King Antiochus, is how to interpret the way in which 
King Antiochus and his kingdom fit into this wider picture of Sicily during the Roman 
Republic. While a Hellenistic monarch fits perfectly into the context of a vibrant Hellenistic 
culture, it does not fit so well with the situation as it existed between Sicily and Rome. 
Furthermore, the subsequent conflict with Rome, normally interpreted as a slave war, that I 
have shown to have drawn on support from the people of Sicily, is at odds with the picture 
sketched above of a ‘buoyant’ economy thriving under the Roman economic dominance and 
a strong civic culture. Or is it? In spite of the general reluctance among scholars of provincial 
Republican Sicily to discuss the events of the Sicilian Insurrection, they are, by their very 
nature, central to understanding the interrelationship between Rome and the people of Sicily 
during the second century B.C. The answer to how this kingdom fits into the picture of late 
Hellenistic Sicily lies in Rome’s principal interest in Sicily, and the discrepancies in Sicily 
that this created: taxation. 
 
II. King Antiochus’ Sicily 
 
I earlier emphasised that when Rome intervened in Macedonia, it was because of a threat to 
the status quo that they had arranged there: it was not that Rome stood to lose territory, but 
financial gain and political and military control. This situation is a persuasive paradigm for 
Rome’s military interventions in Sicily. An analysis of the rhetorical stratagems employed by 
Cicero in his Verrines (Steel 2001: 23-4) has revealed that Cicero’s speech, albeit published 
for the most part having never been delivered, was designed to climax with Verres’ most 
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horrible crimes – in the Roman mind at least – and so therefore finished with a description of 
his crimes relating to Roman citizens.97 In this scheme, with the smallest crimes coming first, 
and the worst at the end, the mismanagement of the grain tithe in Sicily was third out of five 
sections of the second speech. We should note that the theft of art was considered by Cicero 
to be more shocking to a Roman audience than the embezzlement of Sicilian grain.  Finley 
(1968: 130) implied that the reason that Verres was eventually brought to court was because 
of ‘his inability to leave the Romans in Sicily alone’, and elsewhere (129) declared that when 
the Roman Senate had to choose between a corrupt governor and hard-pressed provincials, 
their personal ties to their fellow ruling class ‘normally overrode all other considerations’. It 
was to this tendency that Cicero played in the Verrines, and this implies that Rome’s 
principal interest in Sicily was getting the grain out; how it was done did not really matter, 
and it is noteworthy that Cicero went to great lengths to discredit Verres’ achievements in 
squeezing grain and profit out of Sicily (Cic. Verr. 2.3.40-9): clearly this could have been an 
important argument against Cicero’s case.98 I would therefore suggest that, in a manner 
similar to Roman affairs in Macedonia, Rome would not have become involved militarily in 
Sicily unless their primary interest in the island was under threat: the status quo that provided 
their easy access to grain. It is, therefore, with the relevant tax that we should begin to 
consider the behaviour of Rome in Sicily. 
 
 We have seen (Wilson 2000: 137-9) that the majority of hill-top towns in Sicily, 
mostly located in the interior of Sicily, went into decline during the second century B.C.99 
One of those that did not decline, Centuripae, was also one of the few cities in Sicily that was 
exempt from the Roman taxation, which had to be a major advantage. It is, to an extent, 
                                                 
97 As Steel (2001), 24, puts it: ‘From a Sicilian point of view, Cicero moves from actions which had the greatest 
ill-effects on the province, to conclude with a series of events which affected only a small number of people; but 
for his Roman audience, the worst is saved until the end.’ In terms of rhetorical strategy, Cicero’s tactic is 
absolutely valid: he acknowledges that the topic of grain tithes is boring (Verr. 2.3.10-11), and so does not make 
it the climax of his argument. Vasaly (2002), 95, also noted that Cicero was aware that crimes against Roman 
civilians were more likely to stir Roman sympathies than those against provincials. Frazel (2009), 202-17, 
moreover argued that Cicero’s main thrust in the third speech of the second Actio was to demonstrate that it did 
not matter whether Verres had provided Rome with a large supply of grain during his praetorship, but that he 
had endangered the long-term supply through his actions. 
98 Steel (2007), 39, commented that this reference to a potential defence, obviously never given, for Verres’ 
actions, placed so early in this particular section of the speech, was designed to counter the potential belief in the 
people reading the speech that ‘…the most important aspect of the grain supply was that Rome was efficiently 
supplied with sufficient quantities of grain’ and that the same people thinking this might ‘…simply ignore the 
evidence of the cost of this efficiency to the inhabitants of Sicily’. This has also been noted by Vasaly (2002), 
99; Lintott (2008), 97; and Frazel (2009), 210-3.  
99 Perkins (2007), 50, has questioned this interpretation, asking why, if certain hilltop towns could flourish under 
Rome, others did not? He suggested that ‘(p)erhaps it is necessary to look for further causes.’ In what follows, I 
hope to suggest some ‘further causes’. 
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uncertain when Rome instituted the 10% tax on grain (in accordance with the practice of 
Hieron II in his kingdom in south-east Sicily) across Sicily as a whole, which included an 
optional enforced purchase of a further 10% at a fixed price decided by the senate. However, 
it is unlikely to have happened immediately after Rome’s acquisition of Western Sicily at the 
end of the First Punic War.100 In any case, it is certain that Rome either extended or had 
extended the scheme across Sicily at some point soon after the Second Punic War, if not 
before, in some manner, in Western Sicily. This extension instituted a fixed taxation that may 
not have been experienced by the central and western cities of Sicily. Certainly Rome’s main 
concern, especially immediately after the Second Punic War, was with Sicily’s regeneration 
as a productive agricultural region (Liv. 26.40.13-16; 27.5.1-5; 27.8.18), and this seems to 
have led some scholars to assume a benevolent attitude from Rome: Serrati (2000b: 123-4) 
commented that ‘Sicily was so productive that a second tithe was often requisitioned by the 
Roman government to feed its legions’. We should not, however, confuse practicality (Rome 
wanting to maximise profits) with benevolence. For example, I think it to be highly unlikely 
that Rome held back from taking the second tithe when the harvest in Sicily was poor, 
especially since this poor harvest in Sicily would have adversely affected Roman taxation, 
and therefore the grain supply in Rome itself. Garnsey (1988: 16), in his analysis of the 
regularity of food crises in the ancient world, argued that ‘…inasmuch as communities lacked 
the capacity to exploit other peoples, or did not enjoy stability of government over long 
periods of time, they were endemically vulnerable to food crisis through a combination of 
human and natural causes.’ Sicily, in this period, was a ‘community’, in the broadest sense, 
unable to ‘exploit other peoples’, and indeed was itself exploited; one can imagine that losing 
a fifth of a poor harvest, for a nominal sum of compensation for a tenth of it, would have 
caused considerable shortages of food in Sicily.101 While this is somewhat an argument from 
                                                 
100 See Carcopino (1914), 1-75, Capozza (1956-7), 81-2, Berve (1957), 51-55, Pritchard (1970), 352-68, and 
Pinzone (1999b), for accounts of the original law, and see Finley (1968), 122-3, Manganaro (1980), 418-22, 
Ferrary (1988), 13-23, Garnsey (1988), 183, and Serrati (2000b), 122-6, for a discussion of the extension of the 
taxation system across Sicily. 
101 Comparatively, Jones (1940), 217-8, noted the large number of sitones attested in Hellenistic and Roman 
period cities, that is magistrates for grain commission, leading Garnsey (1988), 15, to argue that the ‘alleviation 
of food crises by private benefactors was so regular as to be an institutionalised feature of the society’.  In spite 
of Sicily’s fame for grain production, this must have been offset for the Sicilians themselves by the tax: an area 
producing an average yield of 8:1 for grain harvested to grain sown is as profitable as an area producing an 
average yield of 10:1 but taxed at 20%. Furthermore, Pritchard (1970), 360, noted that the lex Hieronica 
contained stipulations that the grain paid in the tax had to be approved, and therefore constituted the better part 
of the farmers’ crop (Cic. Verr. 2.3.73.171 and 2.3.74.172); the obvious corollary of this is that the Sicilian 
farmers were left with the poorer quality, and therefore less valuable, grain they produced each year. We should 
also bear in mind the calculations in Garnsey (1988), 10-1, that wheat as a crop was susceptible to failure, and 
even taking his lower estimates of crop failure (roughly 25%) as applicable for Sicily, that still leaves a 
significant failure of the wheat every fours years. In addition to this, subsistence farmers, who would have made 
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silence, it is not surprising that the ancient sources typically do not record any details of grain 
shortages in Sicily: their focus is on Rome.102 As Erdkamp said (1998: 196) ‘(t)axation of this 
kind [Roman tax in Sicily] ensured a more stable access to agricultural production at the cost 
of agricultural producers and landowners’ (my emphasis).  
 
 Yet Rome’s exploitation of Sicily was more complete than merely taxation of the 
grain. We should also remember that, along with the land of Leontini, which was often 
farmed by the Centuripans who were supposedly renowned as tenant farmers of other cities’ 
land (Cic. Verr. 2.3.108), a large part of the best agricultural land in Sicily was made into 
ager publicus (Cic. Verr. 2.3.109). Furthermore, a passage from Polybius (28.2.17), in which 
he records a special dispensation in 169 B.C. from the senate allowing the city of Rhodes to 
trade with Sicily, implies that Sicily itself had trade restrictions imposed upon it:103 while 
certain towns (notably coastal towns) thrived under the Romans, it is clear that the Roman 
taxation and control of commerce did negatively affect some areas of Sicily. As I have 
shown, the coinage of King Antiochus suggests that he was appealing to the people of eastern 
Sicily, but that he avoided the types of certain major towns: I argued that this was because 
they were typically pro-Roman. The evidence from archaeology, epigraphy and coinage 
suggests that these areas flourished under Rome, whereas the areas appealed to by King 
Antiochus, i.e. those containing a number of declining hill-top towns, were not flourishing 
under Rome. King Antiochus’ Sicily was not the rich coast, and its tax-free ‘allies’ of Rome, 
                                                                                                                                                        
up the majority of farmers in Sicily (see below no. 103), typically aimed to store enough grain to survive lean 
seasons and crop failures; compare the case of farmers in East Africa in the 1960’s who aimed to overproduce in 
good seasons by 40% (Allan (1965), 38). When this is also taken into consideration, the loss of 20% of a crop 
could have had a significant impact if it took place for several poor seasons in a row. Furthermore, even in 
ancient times it was acknowledged that for sowing seed had to be at most two or three years old, but ideally one 
year (Theophrastus Hist. Plant. 8.11), a further strain on the production of Sicilian farmers. Finally, a lack of 
technology, and the low labour productivity of subsistence farming both contributed to the ‘small and moreover 
vulnerable surplus production’ (Erdkamp (1998), 190), a surplus then taxed and taken away by Rome (see also 
Braudel (1972), 244, and Finley (1973), 169).  
102 The single time that we do hear of grain shortages in Sicily is precisely because a Roman was involved in 
alleviating the problem: Cicero in the De lege agraria (2.83) records that during the so-called Second Sicilian 
Slave War M’. Aquilius was required to donate grain to Sicilian towns because of a shortage there. For further 
discussion on this point see Chapter VII. 
103 It was noted by Casson (1954), 182, that this implied a limitation in Sicilian trading before the dispensation 
to Rhodes. It should be considered, however, that the limitation would not have affected the majority of farmers 
in Sicily who would have been farming at subsistence level, and therefore not producing for export, but would 
have affected large-scale farmers producing for export; see Carandini (1981), 249-60, and Garnsey (1980b), 41-
3. De Angelis (2006), 46-7, has recently argued for a re-evaluation of the make-up of Sicilian exports, with a 
greater stress on the export of wine and oil: if this is the case then these trade restrictions would have been very 
frustrating for the export farmers involved. Furthermore, given the importance of Rhodes for the grain trade of 
the Mediterranean, even after the creation of Delos as a free port (see Casson (1954), 171-82, for discussion of 
both Rhodes and Delos), if Sicily was cut-off from both Delos and Rhodes, and therefore the eastern markets of 
the Mediterranean, this could have been a significant issue for the exporting farmers and merchants of Sicily. 
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but the declining centre. Moreover, Rome’s attitude to governing Sicily was not based on 
tight control, but the method of least resistance. Local levies supported the governor, and 
cities were largely free to run themselves on a local scale, even if some appealed to Rome for 
help in doing so: this is evidenced by the number of bouleuteria excavated in Hellenistic sites 
in Sicily. King Antiochus’ kingdom is a logical, Hellenistic, extension of this comparative 
freedom. 
 
 The situation in Sicily in the second century B.C. is also mirrored, mutatis mutandis, 
by that among the thirteen colonies of America before the American War of Independence. In 
the years preceding the outbreak of open warfare between the British Empire and the 
American colonies, a series of economic disputes regarding taxation soured the relationship 
between the two sides. The Stamp Act crisis of 1764-65, followed by the resistance to the 
Townshend Program of 1767 and culminating in the Boston Tea Party of 1773, saw an 
articulation of American awareness of their exploitation by an imperial power that was, 
politically, unanswerable for its actions.104 The duties charged on British imports by these 
acts, combined with the British monopoly on American trade, was viewed on the British side 
as the Americans shouldering their share of the burden of supporting British troops in the 
Americas;105 but to the Americans, who at this time remained British citizens, this was 
exploitation of a captive market against which they had no direct political recourse.106 It was, 
in particular, the tax on tea which remained after the general withdrawal of the Townshend 
Program that forced the issue, since this was a product that affected all the colonials.107 After 
                                                 
104 Of particular note was the Stamp Act Congress in New York during October 1765. At this congress the 
delegates from various American colonies resolved that, as British citizens, any taxation of American colonists 
required their representation in parliament, and the right to collect their own taxes: see Cogliano (2000), 33-5, 
for details and also see 36 no. 6 for further bibliography. A detailed analysis of the various reactions among the 
American colonists to the taxation is not possible here. Morgan (1992) outlined in general terms the colonial 
conclusion that they could not accept taxation without representation. See Breen (2004), 235-53, for the primary 
evidence, and a detailing of the stress laid among American writers of the time on the link between unfair 
taxation and a loss of liberty, and especially the link that existed between resisting British imports as a form of 
solidifying and protecting American liberty. 
105 For a full account of the Townshend Program see Thomas (1987), but also Jensen (1968), 215-38, Cogliano 
(2000), 38-44, and Breen (2004), 239, for further comments on the aims of this program. 
106 The First Continental Congress on September 5th, 1774, outlined very clearly the perceived problem 
regarding taxation of the colonies and representation of their interests. In the Declaration of Rights and 
Grievances, the Congress stated that the foundation of ‘English liberty’ was the ‘right in the people to 
participate in their legislative council: and as the English colonists are not represented, and from their local and 
other circumstances, cannot properly be represented in the British parliament, they are entitled to a free and 
exclusive power of legislation...’ and that taxation of the ‘subjects in America’ could not be enacted ‘without 
their consent’. For the text see Hunt and Ford (1904-37), 1: 67. 
107 Breen (2004), 304-6, argued that the choice of tea on the British part as the remaining product to be taxed 
also enabled all colonists to take part in the non-importation and non-consumption protests. Moreover, the fact 
that Britain taxed the colonists, in spite of their ardent protests, worsened the developing separation between the 
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the Boston Tea Party the harsh British measures against the town united the colonies in 
resistance,108 and in many ways precipitated the war, but continually the American colonists 
stressed their desire to remain loyal citizens and subjects, provided they received better 
representation, and alleviated tax conditions.109 Indeed, in many cases the only people to 
resist the importation embargo were the merchants, who were benefitting from British 
trade.110 
 
The comparison with Sicily in the second century B.C. is instructive. Wheat, albeit 
alongside barley, was one of the staples of the ancient diet, and a product that had an impact 
on every inhabitant of Sicily, much like tea in the colonies. We also know from Cicero that 
Rome taxed the other produce of Sicily (Verr. 2.3.18-9), olive oil, wine and other minor 
crops: these were also staples of the ancient diet. Moreover, as we saw above, there is 
evidence that Sicily had limitations placed on it by Rome as to who it could trade with, just as 
the colonies could only import British goods.111 While the form of tax was different from that 
which caused the conflict between the colonies and Great Britain – a tax on comestibles 
produced in Sicily rather than on goods imported into America – it was nonetheless a tax that 
could not be avoided,112 and provided Sicily with almost nothing in return; indeed, we could 
argue that it provided Sicily with less than the American colonials received. Sicilian soldiers 
still policed the island, the cities still decided their own internal affairs, and maintained their 
own navy to patrol the coast.113 The Sicilians had no representation in Rome, and even 
needed a Roman patronus in order to protest legally against any abuse of the province by its 
praetorian governors,114 a situation mirrored very clearly by that between the American 
                                                                                                                                                        
colonists and the ‘distant English government that seemed to have squandered [the colonists’] trust and 
affection’. 
108 The port of Boston was closed to all commerce until the value of the tea destroyed was reimbursed to the 
East India Company, the city’s town meetings were limited to one meeting a year, and the constitution of the 
city was altered; the details are cited in Thomas (1976), 76. 
109 See no. 106 for references to the primary evidence. It is noteworthy that some communities, even up until the 
final weeks before the start of the revolution, pleaded with the British government to remember that taxation of 
and unfair trade agreements with the colonies damaged the colonists as much as they profited the Empire; for 
citations of this evidence see Nourse (1894), 304-5. 
110 See especially Jensen (1968), 265-87, but also Schlesinger (1918), 106-31, and Breen (2004), 245. 
111 See Polybius (28.2.17) and no. 103. 
112 Indeed, unlike the citizens of the colonies, Sicily could not just embargo Roman imports, but would have had 
to refuse to pay tax, an altogether more problematic form of protest. 
113 Butler (2000), 231, noted that the colonial assemblies of the colonies in America would have been incapable 
of sustaining the protest of 1763-76 a hundred years earlier, but had by 1763 developed the ‘institutional 
experience’ required for such acts.  
114 See Chapter III for a discussion of the dates and forms of the Roman alterations to the courts that heard 
repetundae cases against governors. 
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colonies and the British government.115 In short, Sicily had very similar, if not worse 
problems to another much better evidenced provincial context, albeit one from much later in 
history, and these same problems in the later context led to a military conflict between the 
provincials and the overbearing imperial centre. There is evidence, furthermore, that Sicily 
had internal problems that were exacerbated by the Roman presence on the island. 
 
In the account of the Insurrection in Diodorus, at the end of the Constantinian 
excerpts, the text describes the deep divisions in Sicilian society, although the roots of these 
divisions are inadequately explained in the passage. At an unspecified time in the 
Insurrection,116 an outbreak of violence by free people is recorded (34/5.2.48): 
 
Ὅτι πολλῶν καὶ µεγάλων κακῶν ἐπισυµβάντων τοῖς Σικελιώταις, τούτοις ἅπασιν ὁ δηµοτικὸς 
ὄχλος οὐχ οἷον συνέπασχεν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἐπέχαιρε προσεπιφθονῶν ἀνίσου τύχης καὶ 
ἀνωµάλου ζωῆς. ὁ γὰρ φθόνος ἐκ τῆς προγεγενηµένης λύπης µετέβαλεν εἰς χαράν, ὁρῶν τὸ 
λαµπρὸν τῆς τύχης µεταπεπτωκὸς εἰς τὸ πρότερον ὑπ΄ αὐτῆς ὑπερορώµενον σχῆµα, καὶ τὸ 
πάντων δεινότατον, οἱ µὲν ἀποστάται προνοηθέντες ἐµφρόνως περὶ τοῦ µέλλοντος οὔτε τὰς 
ἐπαύλεις ἐνεπύριζον οὔτε τὰς ἐν αὐταῖς κτήσεις καὶ καρπῶν ἀποθέσεις ἐλυµαίνοντο, τῶν τε 
πρὸς τὴν γεωργίαν ὡρµηκότων ἀπείχοντο, οἱ δὲ δηµοτικοὶ διὰ τὸν φθόνον ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει 
τῶν δραπετῶν ἐξιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν οὐ µόνον τὰς κτήσεις διήρπαζον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς 
ἐπαύλεις ἐνεπύριζον. 
 
When many great evils fell upon the Sicilians, the popular mob was not only unsympathetic to all 
these, but on the contrary rejoiced, since they begrudged their unequal fate and irregular way of life. 
For envy turned quickly from a prior pain into joy, when the mob saw that the glorious fate had 
changed into a form formerly overlooked by them. Most terrible of all, the rebels, exercising rational 
forethought concerning the future, neither set fire to farm houses nor damaged the stock in them and 
the harvest lying in store, and held off from those who had turned to farming. The populace, however, 
because of their envy, and behind the pretext of the runaways, went out into the countryside and not 
only plundered the estates, but even set fire to the farm houses. 
 
Two aspects are immediately clear. First, ὁ δηµοτικὸς ὄχλος, ‘the popular mob’,117 is 
characterized as worse than the rebels following Antiochus; indeed, by comparison, the rebels 
                                                 
115 If we look to the American situation the position is mirrored. A New Yorker who referred to himself as A.B. 
argued (New-York Journal; or General Advertiser, 23 November 1769) that the colonists had to ‘prevail with 
those who are represented in the British Parliament, and may be supposed to have some influence there, to exert 
themselves in our Behalf and make our Cause their own.’ See also Cogliano (2000), 40-1, and Breen (2004), 
242. 
116 Although the location of the fragment at the end of the recorded Constantinian excerpts suggests after, rather 
than before, the outbreak of widespread conflict. 
117 The term δηµοτικὸς is, in Diodorus, a term that can have a range of feeling behind it. The word is used 19 
times in Diodorus, and the tone of the word is entirely dependent on context: the two uses of it as an adverb 
(5.60.5; 8.30.1) are both positive; on nine occasions the noun is used in a non-pejorative context (10.28.2; 
13.2.2; 13.48.3 and 7; 13.91.5; 15.40.2; 18.21.6 and 8; 37.2.2); on eight occasions the noun is used in a clearly 
pejorative context (13.92.3; 18.10.2; 18.65.6; 18.66.6; 18.67.5; 19.9.2; 34/5.2.48 twice). The noun is used with 
ὄχλος four times (including the passage under discussion), and of these two are clearly in a pejorative context 
(13.92.3 and 34/5.2.48) and two are clearly non-pejorative (13.48.3 and 15.40.2). 
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are pragmatic and rational. Second, the passage makes a clear distinction between 
Σικελιώται, ‘Sicilians’ and other members of Sicilian towns only referred to as ὁ δηµοτικὸς 
ὄχλος, ‘the popular mob’. This vocabulary is problematic, and the passage itself is notable for 
the comparative lack of discussion it has elicited. It is typically commented that it displays 
divisions in Sicilian society, but we must go further than this and ask why there were 
divisions.118 The passage is implicitly propertied in its outlook: the poor, called ὁ δηµοτικὸς 
ὄχλος, are denigrated as acting only through envy. There is no effort to understand why this 
loss of social order took place beyond the reference to envy; but we might be able to form a 
better understanding if we look at other evidence, and most importantly that concerning the 
aftermath of the revolt.  
 
After the war, we know that P. Rupilius, with a commission of ten senators, 
reorganised the province. Only one aspect of this reorganisation is certain, and it concerns a 
reform of the legal systems of Sicily (Cic. Verr. 2.2.32).119 These reforms ensured that the 
correct court was set up for each case heard, which Finley (1968: 127) argued was designed 
to clarify the way in which legal trials were carried out between the increasingly diverse 
statuses of those in Sicily.120 Yet there is another explanation. Cicero (Verr. 2.2.32) makes 
clear that Sicilian farmers and tax collectors could sue one another in Sicilian courts if either 
side attempted to cheat the other; a large part of Cicero’s attack on Verres in the second and 
third speeches of the second Actio was devoted to outlining how Verres had subverted these 
                                                 
118 Farrington (1936), Green (1961), Verbrugghe (1972; 1973; 1974; 1975) and Bradley (1989) all fail to 
mention the passage; Vogt (1965), 31, noted that the passage argues against any communist/marxist 
interpretation of the Sicilian Insurrection; Urbainczyk (2008a), 13 and 40, merely noted the passage, but did not 
consider its importance to the narrative of events, likewise Goldsberry (1973), 245; Yarrow (2006), 337-8, 
considered this passage to represent Diodorus’ condemnation of the elevation of lower social classes (c.f. Diod. 
Sic. 34/5.25); Dumont (1987), 247, argued that this passage is evidence of the problems caused among the free 
by the excesses and injustices of the Sicilian, Roman and Italian landowners in Sicily; Perkins (2007), 47, 
similarly to Dumont, considered the passage as evidence of the divisions in Sicilian society only made plain 
during times of conflict; Manganaro (1980), 438, viewed the passage as indicative of free people joining with 
the rebels, and not merely taking advantage of the situation afforded by the rebels. Canfora (1985), 160, argued, 
contra Manganaro above, that the passage demonstrates the definite division between the slaves and the free 
people, characterising the episode as ‘una esplosione di ribellismo’.  
119 Serrati (2000a), 112-3, chronologically misplaces the reform to after the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, 
but more importantly assumes that the reforms were regulations for the administration of the province that dealt 
with (113) ‘agriculture, ports, imports and exports, poverty and the law courts.’ He does not consider the context 
of the institution of Rupilius’ reforms, nor note that in terms of poverty (not least), the so-called Second Sicilian 
Slave War demonstrates that had the reforms tackled this problem, they were not successful: see Chapter VII.  
120 Although see Capozza (1956-7), 91-2, for a more imaginative recreation of the actions of Rupilius, that ran 
along the lines of the Gracchan attempts at reform in Italy in the same period. There is no evidence to support 
this supposition. See also Pinzone (1999), 393, for a sceptical view of any imaginative recreation of Rupilius’ 
reforms. Crawford (1985), 115, and (1987), 48, suggested that the flourishing of local coinages across Sicily 
took place in the second half of the second century B.C. and that this was linked to Rupilius’ reforms. It is 
possible that these coinage reforms were a form of concession to the cities of Sicily.  
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courts in his, and his cronies’, favour (Verr. 2.2.37-44; 2.3.38, 92, 117, 123, 147). It is to be 
assumed, from Cicero’s argument, that the courts, in their Rupilian form, worked to the 
benefit of the Sicilian farmers, and formed an internal mechanism of relieving legal disputes 
in the province that may have been created by abuses of the taxation system. The timing of 
these reforms, immediately following a major conflict on the island, throughout which King 
Antiochus aimed to unite the people of eastern Sicily in a kingdom aligned against Rome, is 
certainly suggestive of a need to correct a problem that had been in place before, and had 
perhaps caused the Insurrection. Regardless, it is clear that Rupilius saw that there was a 
problem with the legal system as it stood. As Finley (1968: 126) noted, Rome encouraged, in 
the eastern Mediterranean, pro-Roman oligarchies, and he considered this to have been a 
likely practice in Sicily (and certainly the occurrences of Sicilian towns asking Rome to 
restructure their senates is indicative of this inter-dependence).121 If these same rich Sicilians 
had been colluding with corrupt Roman praetors in this period to abuse the collection of the 
grain tax, as Verres colluded with tax collectors in his infamous governorship, then it is likely 
that they used a similar system of legal conniving to that which Verres engaged in so 
famously. We might then expect an outburst of violence to be directed at these men in the 
event of a breakdown of social order, which the passage above appears to outline. There is 
nothing to prevent those involved in this destruction being part of Antiochus’ forces.122 
 
 This context provides us with a firm framework to understand King Antiochus’ place 
in Sicily in this period. We cannot hope to reconstruct any negotiations that took place 
between Rome and Sicily in the period prior to the conflict, if indeed there were any. If the 
paradigm presented by Verres’ actions holds true, the praetors in Sicily would not have been 
sympathetic, and Rome itself had little reason to listen to the Sicilians. If we allowed 
ourselves to widen our vista through the model provided by the American War of 
Independence – itself not directly relevant for an understanding of events two millennia 
earlier, but offering historically plausible ideas and view-points – it seems quite probably that 
the Sicilians only resorted to physical resistance once it was clear that negotiation would 
                                                 
121 See also Rizzo (1980); Prag (2003); Pittia (2005); and Campagna (2006), 21, 32-4, for details of the elite’s 
role in Hellenistic Sicily. 
122 This analysis disagrees with Canfora’s (1985), 60, otherwise excellent discussion of the passage in question 
on one important point. While Canfora is correct that the passage of Diodorus stresses the fact that the free 
people running riot were doing so on under the πρόφασις of the slaves, this does not preclude their complicity 
with the rebels: it is merely the interpretation of the text, a text which we will see is constructed in such a way as 
to create contexts and draw connections for events that are not as accurate as they appear at first view. Canfora 
does not address, for example, why the text differentiates the two parties, οἱ Σικελιώται and ὁ δηµοτικὸς ὄχλος, 
in the manner that it does, nor why there were division in Sicilian society in this period. 
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achieve nothing. It is, therefore, significant that one of the two traceable results of the 
breakdown of communication and order on the island was a typical Greek reaction to 
conflict: alliance under a Greek monarch, a much more potent form of negotiation. Naturally 
the cities and people that benefitted from the Roman domination sided with Rome in the 
conflict, but it is clear from the passage of Diodorus discussed above (34/5.2.48) that large 
portions of the population of Sicily did not feel this way, and, more importantly, understood 
who those colluding with Rome were. King Antiochus’ coinage, with its clear Greek legend, 
proclaiming a Greek monarchy in Sicily, was a direct challenge to Roman authority on the 
island and those who supported it, in a gesture that is in many ways symbolically similar to 
the American declaration of independence.  
 
 King Antiochus represents the turning point in Republican Sicilian history, and the 
last effort by the inland cities of Sicily to improve their position. The cities that fought 
against him and that he subsequently took or attacked – Catana, Tauromenium, Agrigentum 
and Syracuse123 – were all successful under Rome subsequently, while Enna and Morgantina 
faded as settlements after this. That we do not know more about the disposition of the cities 
of Sicily in the conflict is a great loss, but this consideration of the wider context of Sicily, 
further illuminated through comparison with a similar provincial context from another time in 
history, confirms the conclusions reached from the numismatic evidence in the previous 
section: Sicily in the mid-second century B.C. was divided by its different stances towards 
Rome. King Antiochus, rather than being a slave-king, was, instead, a Greek reaction to 
difficult socio-political and economic circumstances, representing an effort by them to better 
their position and a testing of the boundaries that Rome was starting to negotiate in 
Republican Sicily. That, from a Roman perspective, King Antiochus and his people went too 
far is not in question; and their major crime, in Roman eyes, was their military and political 
challenge to the Roman supported status quo on the island in the form of the Sicilian 
Insurrection. 
 
                                                 
123 It is possible that King Antiochus’ forces also attacked Syracuse. In a disconnected passage that is dateable to 
133 B.C., Diodorus (34/5.9) records that a group of people suffered both in reality and in history because they 
ate sacred fish. This has been connected to the sacred fish of Arethusa at Syracuse (Bradley (1989), 60, 110), 
and therefore to the forces of King Antiochus. Given that Diodorus had in book 5 of his Bibliotheke promised to 
record examples of those times when the taboo on eating the sacred fish at Syracuse had been broken, it seems 
likely that the passage refers to this particular pool: see Malitz (1983), 158 no. 182 and 182; Bradley (1989), 60; 
Rubincam (1989), 41; Urbainczyk (2008a), 89-90. However, it is unclear who it is eating the fish in the extract, 
and therefore why they had to do so, and thus it remains impossible to say what caused this anecdote to be 
recorded, or to say for certain that King Antiochus’ forces did make an attempt on Syracuse. 
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Conclusion 
 
Sicily, in the mid-second century B.C., was faced with fundamental problems. From 
corruption among the ruling elite, complicit with the governors placed over the province from 
Rome, to the annual taxes which were removed from the island it is far from surprising that 
some of the Sicilians felt the need to negotiate a change in their circumstances. Considered in 
the context of provincial unease over taxation without representation such as was also the 
case for the American colonies before the American War of Independence, Sicily’s unrest is 
completely explicable. Viewed in this light, King Antiochus’ kingdom represented a central 
moment in the negotiation of power between Rome and the Sicilians, a negotiation that 
challenged Rome, but ultimately confirmed the trend of a declining Sicilian inland, and a 
burgeoning, privileged coast – which holds true up to this day. Yet, the textual tradition 
concerning the Sicilian Insurrection emphasises the role of slavery in the conflict, and does 
not describe a conflict between two states, but of one state internally divided between slaves 
and masters. How this apparent disconnect between the literary and numismatic accounts can 
be resolved is the subject of the following two chapters. There is still a need, it would seem, 
for a (Bradley 1989: ix) ‘straightforward narrative of the [Sicilian Insurrection], set within 
[its] immediate context.’ 
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II. Eunus: 
The Cowardly King124 
 
 
‘It is difficult to say anything definite about the individuals who led the revolts, but we can 
say that the sources attributed to them all the powers, abilities, wisdom, and cunning that 
challenges to the status quo had to have in order to succeed.’ Urbainczyk (2008a), 74. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter that King Antiochus went to great lengths to connect 
his kingdom with the culture and history of Sicily through his coinage. However, the 
character of King Antiochus – called Eunus in the ancient literary sources – in the way he is 
presented in Diodorus in many ways contradicts the evidence that came from the kingdom of 
King Antiochus discussed before. Furthermore, Diodorus’ narrative of events125 does not 
correspond with the reconstruction of events in Chapter I. The focus of this chapter is how we 
can reconcile these two narratives. Owing to the low regard in which Diodorus is held 
amongst modern scholars, relatively little attention has been paid to his historiographic 
setting,126 i.e. his debt to other historians in his narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection in 
general, and his description of the character of Eunus in particular.127 When approaching the 
narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection in Diodorus, modern scholars hastily focus on the 
historicity of the events related by him. In turn, they underplay other parts of his narrative: 
                                                 
124 A version of part of this chapter has been accepted for publication by Classical Quarterly. 
125 A full text of the narrative, together with a translation, is given in Appendix 5: Text and Translation of 
Diodorus' Account of the Sicilian Insurrection. The text of Diodorus is not preserved in its original state, but in 
the epitome of Photius and in the Constantinian excerpts. These two collections differ in the manner in which 
they preserve Diodorus. Matsubara (1998), 11-7, argued that the Constantinian excerpts are normally verbatim, 
with changes made: for explanation; to omit information the excerptor was not interested in; through misreading 
or a different manuscript tradition; and through abbreviations, for a similar reason to omissions. With regard to 
Photius, Matsubara (1998), 17-29, argued that Photius typically preserves a good summary, with some parts 
verbatim that were of particular interest, noting in particular the description provided for Eunus (Diod. Sic. 
34/5.2.5-9). To this I think we can add the following: where it is possible to compare the Constantinian version 
of a passage to the Photian for both of the so-called Sicilian Slave Wars, the Constantinian version is usually 
more detailed. In this category we should note: 34/5.2.10 (Photius) vs 34/5.2.34-38 + 24b (Constantinian); 
34/5.2.1-3 (Photius) vs 34/5.2.27-31 (Constantinian); 36.2 (Photius) vs 36.2a (Constantinian); 36.6 (Photius) vs 
36.11 (Constantinian); and finally 36.9.1 (Photius) vs 36.9.2 (Constantinian). On each occasion that there are 
parallel accounts of an episode, both will be noted, and their differences discussed. 
126 See Appendix 6: Merely a Slavish Copyist? for a discussion of Diodorus’ source for the Sicilian Insurrection. 
127 Throughout this chapter I will use the name of Diodorus Siculus to refer to the text of Diodorus and the 
historical tradition that it represents. I will not be engaging with the Quellenforschung surrounding the Sicilian 
Insurrection narrative other than where it is essential. For notable contributions on the textual issues see e.g.: 
Sacks (1990); Matsubara (1998); Green (2006); Hau (2006) and (2009). 
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they privilege the historical interpretation over a narratological assessment. In contrast to this 
approach, I will foreground the narrative thread over the historical one in this chapter. By 
doing so I will show the careful literary construction of the character of Eunus, the purpose of 
this construction in the narrative, and how the narrative of Diodorus sought to be understood 
by his ancient readers.128 This, in turn, will reveal many of the descriptions offered by 
Diodorus (and used by modern scholars) to write the history of the Sicilian Insurrection as 
unsuitable for historical reconstruction. The aim of this chapter, then, is to expose the 
narrative context in which Eunus was created. Only once this is achieved can we begin to use 
Diodorus’ text in our quest to understand the history of Sicily in the second century B.C. 
 
 To this end, it will be necessary, first, to look at the important passages of Diodorus 
relating to Eunus’ election to, and the conclusion of, his kingship. As we shall presently see, 
these passages clearly show Diodorus’ conception of Eunus’ (un)suitability for kingship, and 
therefore reflect more widely on his character and on the rebellion that he led. This analysis 
will show that Diodorus, by carefully constructing a character for Eunus based on cowardice, 
military inexperience, and luxurious accoutrements, aimed to undermine the figure of Eunus 
in his narrative, and thereby undermined the cause for which he fought. These character traits 
will be shown to be based on stereotypes and literary topoi peculiar to the Hellenistic world, 
and Diodorus’ own Bibliotheke. Furthermore, I will show that Eunus’ character was 
constructed following a circular narrative composition that strove to connect his character 
with that of his master, Antigenes. The analysis will then focus on how Diodorus’ use of 
terms relating to wonder-working (τερατεία; τερατευόµενος; µάγος) placed another layer of 
Hellenistic stereotypes onto the character of Eunus in order to further separate his character 
from a positive model of kingship. This section will also consider how this connection to 
wonder-working, along with Eunus’ unique position in relation to his master, separated him 
from his followers, and introduced further questions concerning his suitability to rule. 
Following this I will discuss how Eunus’ choice of general reflects on his integrity as a king. 
                                                 
128 Diodorus had his own expectations of who his audience would be. The following discussion follows Pelling 
(2000), 15-6, in arguing that ancient authors, like Diodorus, would have constructed the meaning in their 
narratives from how this imagined audience thought. This is also based on a reader-response form of audience 
reconstruction (Slater (1990), 5-7) in which the reader imagined has the (Slater (1990), 6) ‘minimum knowledge 
of linguistic, cultural, and literary background to elicit meaning from the (text)’. Diodorus imagined that his 
history would inspire the leadership of the ancient world to undertake noble deeds (1.1.5) and also be relevant to 
those men who were inspired by history to found cities, revise law and push the boundaries of science (1.2.1). 
He also suggested that his work had benefited from being written in Rome (1.4.2). Moreover, regardless of the 
authorship, the text, written in Greek, and in particular the narrative under discussion, relied on an implict 
understanding of Hellenistic culture and literary topoi: this would suggest at the very least literate Greeks but 
perhaps also Hellenised Romans. 
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The character of Kleon will be discussed as an example of the ways in which Diodorus was 
capable of creating a negative character for a military figure, in the clear absence of the 
relevant qualities in Eunus himself. Finally, a fresh look at the text, considering it as an 
overtly rhetorical text, will show that Diodorus, consciously or unconsciously, was working 
his text in a rhetorical fashion and through narratological devices in order to connect with his 
reader to make a clear point: it is the recognition of authorial intervention and narratological 
devices in Diodorus that will help to explain the dichotomy between the evidence of 
Diodorus and the coinage of King Antiochus. 
 
I. King of the ‘Slaves’ 
I.i. The Coronation 
 
Eunus is introduced into Diodorus’ narrative as (34/5.2.5) τις οἰκέτης Ἀντιγένους Ἐνναίου, 
Σύρος τὸ γένος ἐκ τῆς Ἀπαµείας,129 ἄνθρωπος µάγος καὶ τερατουργὸς τὸν τρόπον, ‘…a 
certain household slave of Antigenes of Enna, a Syrian from Apamea, a magician and 
wonder-worker in manner’. His reputation in Sicily as a prophet (one who, we shall see, was 
a charlatan) led to the slaves of Damophilus turning to him to receive consent from the gods 
for their rebellion (34/5.2.10-1, 24b). At his exhortation they then seized the town of Enna, 
and in the aftermath proclaimed him king. Modern scholars have seen Eunus’ coronation as a 
high-point in Diodorus’ characterisation of Eunus; it is in many ways the pivotal moment of 
Eunus’ career in Diodorus’ narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection. Yet, on closer inspection, 
the passage defines Eunus’ character and the unlikelihood of his continuing success: it is the 
lynchpin of his whole relationship to his subjects. After the sack of Enna and the execution of 
various notable slave-owners, Diodorus relates the following (34/5.2.14): 
 
ἐκεῖθεν αἱρεῖται βασιλεὺς ὁ Εὔνους οὔτε δι’ ἀνδρείαν οὔτε διὰ στρατηγίαν, διὰ δὲ µόνην 
τερατείαν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἄρξαι, ἅµα δὲ καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας οἱονεί τινα καλὸν 
οἰωνὸν ἐχούσης πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὑποταττοµένων εὔνοιαν. 
 
Then, Eunus was chosen king, and not because of his courage, nor his generalship, but only because of 
his knowledge of wonders and his setting of the revolt in motion, but also at the same time because his 
name seemed to hold some favourable omen with regard to the goodwill of his subjects. 
 
In the first case, we should note the negative assessment this passage suggests of Eunus’ 
suitability for kingship. The passage implies that he has neither ἀνδρεία, ‘bravery’, nor 
                                                 
129 The formulation of the phrase Σύρος τὸ γένος ἐκ τῆς Ἀπαµείας is similar to those found on manumission 
inscriptions for slaves at Hellenistic Delphi: see Lewis (2011), 93-8. 
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στρατηγία, ‘generalship’. It seems that Diodorus did not have a high opinion of Eunus’ 
worth, and in this case it appears that he also judged the critical faculties of the men selecting 
Eunus to be very poor: he was elected for superficial reasons based on his name,130 his 
wonders – I shall return to both later - and the fact that he had incited the revolt. For the 
moment, we should look more closely at the apparent failings in Eunus’ character, to assess 
in greater detail not only what Diodorus is saying, but how he is saying it. 
 
 It is important to note that the phrasing of this passage is typical for Diodorus, 
although in this case with an interesting twist: in his history Diodorus consistently used 
expressions based on the phrase ἀνδρεία τε καὶ στρατηγία to denote the qualities of generals 
and kings whom he considered to be exceptional leaders. In some variations of the expression 
ἀνδρεία is replaced with ἀρετή, ‘valour’, or στρατηγία is replaced with στρατηγικός, 
‘general-like’. However, the meaning remains essentially the same: ‘brave and a good 
general’. This expression, in all combinations of ἀνδρεία and ἀρετή with στρατηγία or 
στρατηγικός, features 28 times throughout the Bibliotheke, and is reserved for such notable 
men as Herakles (4.53.7), Epameinondas (15.39.2, 88.3), King Philip II of Macedon (16.1.6) 
and Fabius Cunctator (26.3.3) among others whom Diodorus felt were noteworthy for their 
military prowess.131 Furthermore, the wide chronological spread of the uses in the Bibliotheke 
suggests that this was a favoured expression of Diodorus himself, and not one lifted from his 
sources. Yet, the use of this phrase for Eunus is the only occasion, out of a total of 28, in 
which the expression is given in the negative. Notwithstanding the fragmentary nature of 
Diodorus, it appears that Eunus is rhetorically set up as the antithesis of all the previous 
leaders described with this phrase. Therefore, we should look more closely at why these two 
attributes were associated with ‘good’ leaders in order to understand better the choice of an 
implied negative for Eunus. 
 
 We must first consider Hellenistic ideals of kingship, and in particular why bravery 
and generalship could be picked out by Diodorus as emblematic of a ‘good’ leader. In 
surviving works on Hellenistic kingship, courage and a warlike ability are often noted as 
                                                 
130 It is possible that Eunus’ name was one of the few features over which he had no control: perhaps the name 
came from his master. 
131 Descendants of Scythes (2.43.4); the Dioscuri (6.6.1); Leonidas (11.4.2); the citizens of Athens (11.62.2, 
85.2); Gelon (11.67.2); Pericles (12.39.3); King Agesilaus (15.31.3); Timotheus (15.36.6); Chabrias (15.69.4); 
Pelopidas (15.80.1); Dion (16.6.3); Nypsius (16.18.1); Diophantes and Lamius (16.48.2); Timoleon (16.65.2); 
Memnon of Rhodes (17.7.2); Charidemus (17.30.2); Antiphilos (18.13.6); Scipio Africanus (29.20.1); Viriathus 
(33.21a.1); Cleptius (36.8.1); Sulla (37.25.1). 
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important. While there were acknowledged limits to this aspect – preferably a king was 
πολεµικός, yet if he was φιλοπόλεµος this was not desirable (see Philod. On the Good King 
according to Homer col 9.13-5 and Murray 1965: 169) – it was nonetheless an important 
aspect of a king’s role and character.132 The election, or acclamation of a king in the 
Hellenistic period, like the episode including Eunus above, was directly linked to the 
ideology of how a king was meant to behave. From authors as early as Xenophon it is 
possible to trace the development of this ideology, and its component parts. 
 
 For Xenophon a good leader was one who achieved excellence through unremitting 
effort (Memorabilia 2.1.212-34; noted by Beston 2000: 317), and in his Cyropaedia he 
contrasted this quality in Cyrus with the attitude of Cyaxares, who often counselled the less 
brave or adventurous tactic (see Cyr. 1.3.20-3; 2.1.1-9, 4.13; 3.3.13-20, 46-7). This idea was 
maintained in Xenophon’s opinion that men desert pathetic figures when presented with a 
better alternative: for example in the Cyropaedia, when the Medes, given a choice between 
following their king, Cyaxares, or following Cyrus, the superior man, chose to obey Cyrus, 
thereby breaking from their own king (5.1.24-6). In other authors this same idea is expressed, 
notably in Polybius (5.40.1-2) and in Diodorus (33.22.1). Austin (1986: 457) showed that 
kings were often proclaimed after military victories: see, for example, Alexander the Great 
after the battle of Gaugamela (Plut. Alex. 34); Demetrius Poliorcetes after his victories in 
Cyprus against Ptolemy (Plut. Dem. 18; c.f. Diod. Sic. 20.53.1-4); Attalus after his success 
against Antiochus and the Galatians (Poly. 18.41), to name a few.133 Since this aura of 
success was directly tied to the kings, the link was maintained because an unsuccessful king 
could quickly become an object of contempt, and therefore vulnerable (Austin 1986: 458-
9).134 It was also important to the soldiers that they profited from their Hellenistic monarch’s 
                                                 
132 The king’s ability to gain ‘spear-won territory’ could often be considered their strongest right to rule: for 
example, according to Polybius (11.34.15-6) this was the method by which Antiochus III became considered 
worthy of his throne; Theocritus (Id. 17.90-4, 98-103) expresses a similar ideology concerning Ptolemy II 
Philadelphus. For further discussion of this, see: Barner (1889), 16-7; Born (1934), 22-3; Goodenough (1928), 
66, 70; Schubart (1937), 5; Walbank (1984), 66, 82-3. See also Cairns (1989), 19-20, for further bibliography. 
133 Bradley (1989), 117, noted that the acclamation of Eunus was typically Hellenistic; see also Vogt (1965), 29-
30. 
134 This ideology is most famously presented in the Suda lexicon, which outlined the basis of monarchical power 
as an ability to command an army, and to handle affairs sensibly (s.v. Βασιλεία (2)): 
Βασιλεία. οὔτε φύσις οὔτε τὸ δίκαιον ἀποδιδοῦσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰς βασιλείας͵ ἀλλὰ τοῖς δυναµένοις ἡγεῖσθαι 
στρατοπέδου καὶ χειρίζειν πράγµατα νουνεχῶς· οἷος ἦν Φίλιππος καὶ οἱ διάδοχοι Ἀλεξάνδρου. τὸν γὰρ υἱὸν 
κατὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν ὠφέλησεν ἡ συγγένεια διὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀδυναµίαν. τοὺς δὲ µηδὲν προσήκοντας βασιλεῖς 
γενέσθαι σχεδὸν ἁπάσης τῆς οἰκουµένης. ‘Basileia. Neither birth nor lawful claim yield kingship to men, but to 
those who are able to command an army and to handle affairs sensibly: just as it was for Philip and the 
Successors of Alexander. For kinship through birth did not help his son because of his poverty of spirit, while 
those by no means related to him became kings of almost the whole inhabited world.’ 
70 
 
success: without that, they could be quick to turn on their king, as was the case with 
Demetrius (Plut. Demetr. 42.1-6; 44.8; see also Bosworth 2002: 258). Indeed, failure as a 
military leader was enough to castigate a king as unmanly and feminine. The account of King 
Prusias preserved in Polybius gives a clear example of this form of denigration (32.15.9): 
 
ἀνδρὸς µὲν γὰρ (ἔργον) οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεσάµενος κατὰ τὰς προσ βολάς, ἀγεννῶς δὲ καὶ 
γυναικοθύµως χειρίσας καὶ τὰ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους µετήγαγε τὸ στράτευµα 
πρὸς Ἐλαίαν 
 
After doing nothing worthy of a man in his attacks on the town, but behaving in a cowardly and 
womanish manner both to the gods and men, he marched his army back to Elaia. 
 
The military sphere was a distinctly masculine one in antiquity (Beston 2000: 316-7), thus a 
complete failure in the military sphere was connected to effeminate tendencies (Poly. 
28.21.3). As a corollary to this idea was the wider idea that leaders ought to focus on matters 
of administration and the military at the expense of all other considerations. Several 
anecdotes from the ancient world preserve this idea: for example, Polybius recorded that 
Philopoemen censured the Achaean strategoi for their concern over their retinues and dress, 
claiming that they would be better to focus on their arms and armour (11.8-9).135 He noted, 
moreover, that Philopoemen’s admonishment and example was so firm that all the strategoi 
followed his advice immediately and even went out of their way to correct others who had 
not heard Philopoemen’s advice. Plutarch commented that Pyrrhus, in a similar vein, 
focussed so much on the art of generalship that, when asked at a drinking-party his opinion 
on the relative merits of two flute players, he responded by stating that Polyperchon was a 
good general: Plutarch commented that this implied that Pyrrhus meant that a king ought to 
care only about these matters (Pyrr. 8.3). In his letter to Philocrates, Aristeas stated that a 
king ought to focus only on forethought and care for his subjects (245), and spend time 
studying the records of his kingdom to ensure good rule (283).136 Diodorus’ account of 
Viriathus also reflects these concerns, especially in Viriathus’ disdain for the wedding gifts 
offered him, and his preference for self-sufficiency, open-country, and the eminence won 
through ἀνδρεία, ‘bravery’ (33.7.1-4). 
 
                                                 
135 Champion (2004), 150, commented that this was typical of the characterisation of Philopoemen in Polybius, 
in which he ‘exhibited self-restraint in his private life and dress and self control in money matters’. 
136 For a discussion of this text see Murray (1967), and for these passages see especially 357. See also Cairns 
(1989), 15 and 20. 
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Diodorus’ use of the phrase ἀνδρεία τε καὶ στρατηγία as a ‘catch-all’ definition of a 
good leader is in accord with the described Hellenistic attitudes about kingship: for Diodorus 
the best leaders were brave in battle and had a knowledge of strategy. It hardly needs to be 
added that a brave leader was not effeminate or luxurious. 
 
 We should now return to Eunus, the ‘slave’ king. I noted above that Diodorus’ choice 
of vocabulary when describing Eunus’ acclamation – which followed a very minor success – 
suggested that he was setting Eunus up in opposition to ‘good’ leaders. The outline of 
Hellenistic literature on kingship has clarified this contrast: Diodorus clearly describes 
Eunus’ acclamation as taking place for the wrong reasons, and implies that Eunus was the 
inverse of what a Hellenistic king should be.137 We should now pursue this recognition 
through the rest of Diodorus’ narrative, after a final comment. In terms of the narrative, and 
especially in terms of Eunus’ own career, his acclamation was the apex of everything that had 
gone before. During Diodorus’ introduction of his character, we learn that Eunus predicted 
his own rise to kingship (34/5.2.7-9; although not, as will become clear, through true 
prophetic ability), and Diodorus, by describing Eunus’ crowning achievement as he does, 
directly downplays Eunus’ success: the description of Eunus’ acclamation was composed 
intentionally with the literary objective of characterising Eunus negatively.138 Furthermore, 
Diodorus achieved this denigration through appeal to Hellenistic ideals of kingship, and so 
connected Eunus to a wider contemporary ideology, with all the salient links involved in this. 
In spite of the very real success of the leader of the Sicilian forces in the Sicilian Insurrection 
for a number of years (as discussed in the previous chapter on King Antiochus), Diodorus 
continues to under-cut actions of the character he calls Eunus throughout his narrative, 
thereby negating his success, and turning any Hellenistic reader against him. It is to these 
various negations of Eunus’ achievements we now turn, in order to assess by what literary 
means they were achieved, as well as to explore Diodorus’ intentions. 
 
                                                 
137 For Dumont (1987), 207, Eunus was ‘la parodie d’un vrai roi’. 
138 This description of Eunus’ acclamation as king has not been commented on in the past: Green (1961), 14, 
does not discuss how Diodorus describes Eunus’ acclamation, nor does Goldsberry (1973), 243; Vogt (1965), 
29-30, discusses the institutions built up around Eunus after his election, but not why he was chosen, beyond 
Eunus’ name. The following do not mention the reasons for Eunus’ election: Manganaro (1967; 1980; 1982; 
1983; 1990a; 1990b); Forte (1972), 100-1; Bradley (1989), 58-9, 116-20; Callahan and Horsley (1998), 146. 
Wirth (2004), 284, and (2006), 125-6, does not go beyond a straight interpretation of Diodorus’ text; Kunz 
(2006), 336, ignores the negatives in Eunus’ acclamation; finally Urbainczyk (2008a), 55-6, does at least 
acknowledge Diodorus’ attack on Eunus’ credentials, but fails to follow up on the terms in which the attack was 
mounted. 
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II. An Ignoble End 
 
From his apex, we turn first to Eunus’ downfall. The narrative of it is compressed – 
34/5.2.20-3; the climax of the war, and the subsequent capture and death of Eunus, is 
preserved only in Photius – but it is clear that Eunus’ demise came at the very end of the 
revolt, and completed Diodorus’ narrative of the war. After the town of Enna was retaken by 
the Romans, Diodorus gives the following account (34/5.2.22-3): 
 
ὁ δὲ Εὔνους ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς σωµατοφύλακας ὄντας χιλίους ἔφυγεν ἀνάνδρως εἴς τινας 
παρακρήµνους τόπους. ἀλλ΄ οἱ µὲν σὺν αὐτῷ ἄφυκτον τὸ περὶ αὑτοὺς δεινὸν ἐπιστάµενοι, 
ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὁ στρατηγὸς Ῥουπίλιος ἐπ΄ αὐτοὺς ἤλαυνεν, ἀλλήλους τοῖς ξίφεσιν ἔφθαζον 
ἀπαυχενίσαντες. ὁ δὲ τερατίας Εὔνους καὶ βασιλεὺς καταφυγὼν διὰ δειλίαν ἔν τισι κοιλάσιν 
ἐξειλκύσθη ἅµα τεττάρων, µαγείρου καὶ ἀρτοποιοῦ καὶ τοῦ τρίβοντος αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ λουτρῷ 
καὶ τετάρτου τοῦ παρὰ τοὺς πότους εἰωθότος ψυχαγωγεῖν αὐτόν. καὶ παραδοθεὶς εἰς φυλακὴν 
καὶ τοῦ σώµατος αὐτοῦ διαλυθέντος εἰς φθειρῶν πλῆθος οἰκείως τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν ῥᾳδιουργίας 
κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον ἐν τῇ Μοργαντίνῃ. 
 
Eunus, taking up a bodyguard of a thousand men, fled in an unmanly fashion to certain precipitous 
regions. But those with him, knowing that the danger around them was inescapable, for already the 
general Rupilius was hastening towards them, took the initiative by beheading one another with 
swords: however Eunus, the wonder-worker and king, having through cowardice fled for refuge in 
certain caves, was dragged out together with four men, a cook, a baker, the man who massaged him in 
the bath and a fourth, who had been accustomed, throughout the drinking bouts, to beguiling him. 
Transmitted to prison, and after his flesh had dissolved into a mass of lice, he ended his life in a way 
worthy of his knavery, in Morgantina. 
 
There are several aspects of this passage that warrant attention for present purposes. 
 
II.i. Cowardice 
 
Diodorus describes Eunus’ flight as ἀνάνδρως, ‘in an unmanly fashion’, and relates that he 
fled to the caves διὰ δειλίαν, ‘through cowardice’. This is in keeping with the way Diodorus 
portrays Eunus’ acclamation as king.139 Unlike in his acclamation, in which he was 
contrasted implicitly with ‘good’ leaders for his potential lack of bravery and generalship, 
Eunus’ behaviour is explicitly contrasted with that of his followers. Therefore, while he fled 
through cowardice, they bravely took their own lives. This is a damning indictment on Eunus: 
not only did he take the coward’s way, but his men refused to fight for him. Their actions 
                                                 
139 Noted by Urbainczyk (2008a), 55, with no further comment. Oddly, Wirth (2004), 282-3, and (2006), 126-7, 
consistently argued for a positive interpretation of Eunus’ demise, arguing that Eunus was spared (2006), 127, 
‘ein grausamer Tod’, and furthermore (2004), 283, that his death by psoriasis could be seen as a form of 
martyrdom. This is entirely at odds with how Diodorus himself views Eunus’ end, and in this case we must 
privilege the ancient context of the comments over any modern reinterpretation of psoriasis or a cowardly end 
(for ancient uses of psoriasis, or similar diseases in the accounts of ancient figures’ deaths, see below). 
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mirror those of other soldiers of Hellenistic monarchs, who abandoned their leader because of 
flaws in their leader’s character: faced with a choice of dying fighting for their king and death 
by their own hands, they chose the latter. 
 
The portrayal of a leader as a coward was exploited for propagandistic purposes by 
other ancient authors as well. Plutarch (Aem. 19.3-10) contrasted the two differing accounts 
of King Perseus’ withdrawal from the battle of Pydna, one from Polybius (29.18) and the 
other from Posidonius: the former argued that Perseus withdrew through cowardice at the 
start of the battle, while the latter argued that it was through injury late in the battle. Both 
Chaniotis (2005: 219-20) and Walbank (1979: 390) thought that Polybius described this 
episode as he did to strengthen his pro-Roman bias. For present purposes it is notable that 
Polybius’ version used cowardice as a method of denigrating Perseus. 
 
Furthermore, for a king the manner of death was significant. Diodorus characterises 
Eunus’ death as οἰκείως τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν ῥᾳδιουργίας, ‘worthy of his knavery’.140 He died, it 
has been argued, from scabies,141 and the manner of his death is an interesting feature of this 
passage. Urbainczyk (2008a: 55 no. 20) noted that Antiochus IV Epiphanes was described as 
dying in a similar fashion according to 2 Maccabees 9:5, 8-10, albeit infested with worms. In 
the narrative Antiochus IV is a monstrous enemy of the Jews, and his death is described as a 
divine punishment. Similarly, Plutarch (Sul. 36) linked Sulla’s death from a disease like that 
of Eunus to his excessive lifestyle after he retired from public life; also Pheretime in 
Herodotus (4.205), who is described as dying from a festering body as divine punishment for 
her way of life. Finally, Herod Antipater is described as dying having been eaten up by 
worms (Acts 12.23). This particular form of decay, either by lice or by worms, was attributed 
to people who were the object of hostile narrative treatment.  
 
II.ii. The Companions 
 
There is more to Eunus’ negative characterisation in this passage than just cowardice: Eunus’ 
companions on his capture also deserve attention. We learn that he had only four attendants 
left when he was dragged out of his cave: a cook (µάγειρος); a baker (ἀρτοποιός); a masseuse 
                                                 
140 Not the death at the head of any army, as was preferable for a Hellenistic monarch: see e.g. Poly. 18.41; 
Chaniotis (2005), 60-1; Landucci Gattinoni (1990). Dumont (1987), 206, described Eunus’ death as ‘la mort 
ignominieuse’. 
141 Keaveney and Madden (1982), 94. 
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(τρίβων); and a drinking party entertainer. Eunus was thus depicted as a degenerate monarch 
(Grünewald 2004: 61), and therefore is contrasted directly with his former guards: no military 
figure was left with him, only creators of luxury. In other words, these four companions serve 
to intensify the accusations of Eunus’ cowardice in his flight with further suggestions of 
excessive luxury in his lifestyle.142 Again, this contrasts with the prevalent model in Greek 
thought that a ‘good’ leader refused luxuries and excesses, as I demonstrated above. Indeed, 
some Hellenistic authors singled out leisure and the dining companions of a king as an 
important subject.143 Moreover, Xenophon noted in his Oeconomikos that it was necessary to 
exercise control over yourself before you can rule others (12.9-14).144 The focus on luxury in 
the roles of the attendants is also reminiscent of Theopompus of Chios’ criticisms of Philip’s 
court, which he accused of engaging in excessive drinking and extravagance (Athen. 166f-
167c and 260d-261a; see also Flower 1994: 104-11). The focus on luxury in his demise is 
clearly designed to complement Eunus’ characterisation as a cowardly and unworthy 
Hellenistic king. Moreover, as we shall see in what follows, the language of the passage 
concerning the fourth attendant, the entertainer, is related directly to the introduction of 
Eunus himself in the narrative in a manner that suggests that the construction of the narrative 
of Eunus’ death was serving a very specific purpose in the overall story of the revolt. 
 
II.iii. From Beguiler to Beguiled 
 
The fourth attendant is described as (34/5.2.22) τετάρτου τοῦ παρὰ τοὺς πότους εἰωθότος 
ψυχαγωγεῖν αὐτόν, ‘a fourth, who had been accustomed, throughout the drinking bouts, to 
beguiling (Eunus)’. The verb used, ψυχαγωγέω, meaning ‘to beguile’ in this context, echoes 
Eunus’ introduction into the narrative. In this introduction Diodorus gave a lengthy aside on 
Eunus’ history prior to his involvement in the rebellion. The passage contains more important 
facets of his character which further demonstrate his unsuitability for kingship, but we will 
focus on another aspect of it, in which Diodorus describes Eunus’ relationship with his 
master (34/5.2.7-8): 
                                                 
142 Bradley (1989), 117, suggests that the hostility of the narrative towards the slaves at this point hides a typical 
institution of Hellenistic monarchs, the philoi, and that the four attendants were perhaps re-labelled by Diodorus 
to denigrate them, following typical ‘Greek contempt’ for philoi (quotation from Bradley (1989), 117; see also 
Herman (1980-1), 117-24. 
143 See, e.g., Aristeas’ advice that a king ought to attend only restrained theatrical shows (ad Phil. 284), and 
receive only learned men in his symposia (ad Phil. 286). For modern discussions of this subject see 
Goodenough (1928), 69-70, 87-9 and 95; Schubart (1937), 6; Murray (1967), 356; Cairns (1989), 19-20. 
144 For similar comments see also: Xen. Mem. 1.5.1-5; Pl. Grg. 527D; Isoc. To Nicocles 29 and Nicocles 39 
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οὗτος πρὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἔλεγε τὴν Συρίαν θεὸν ἐπιφαινοµένην αὐτῷ λέγειν ὅτι 
βασιλεύσει· καὶ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς ἄλλους µόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν κύριον αὑτοῦ διετέλει 
λέγων. εἰς δὲ γέλωτα τρεποµένου τοῦ πράγµατος, ὁ µὲν Ἀντιγένης ψυχαγωγούµενος ἐπὶ τῇ 
τερατείᾳ παρῆγε τὸν Εὔνουν εἰς τὰ σύνδειπνα τοῦτο γὰρ ὄνοµα τῷ τερατίᾳ καὶ διηρώτα περὶ 
τῆς βασιλείας καὶ πῶς ἑκάστῳ χρήσεται τῶν παρόντων· τοῦ δὲ ἀτρέπτως πάντα διηγουµένου, 
καὶ ὡς µετρίως χρήσεται τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ τὸ σύνολον ποικίλως τερατευοµένου, γέλωτες 
ἐγίνοντο τοῖς παρακεκληµένοις, καί τινες αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης ἀξιολόγους µερίδας 
αἴροντες ἐδωροῦντο, ἐπιλέγοντες ὅπως, ὅταν γένηται βασιλεύς, τῆς χάριτος µνηµονεύοι. 
 
Before the revolt this man used to say that the Syrian goddess showed herself to him saying that he 
would be King: and he kept repeating this not only to others, but also to his own master. When the 
matter became something of a joke, Antigenes, beguiled by his knowledge of wonders, would bring 
Eunus (for this was the wonder-worker’s name) into his banquets and continually ask about his 
kingdom and how he would treat each of those present: and since he explained everything without 
hesitation, explaining how moderately he would treat the masters, and in general talked in a colourful 
manner about wonders, laughter erupted among the guests, and some of them, lifting substantial 
portions from the table gave them to him as gifts, saying as they did so that whenever he became King 
he should remember the favour. 
 
The outline of the passage is clear. Eunus’ master, Antigenes, was rather taken with his 
slave’s outspoken claims, and made him into a dinner entertainer; he was so successful that 
he was able to extract extra food from his master’s guests.145 However, the verb describing 
Antigenes’ relationship to Eunus (ψυχαγωγέω) is used in exactly the same way as in the 
previous passage: Antigenes was beguiled by Eunus.146 Interestingly, this verb is the same as 
that used by Polybius in his discussion of ‘tragic historians’ at 2.56.10 to describe the aim of 
the ‘tragic historian’.147 Diodorus used the verb ψυχαγωγέω, along with the noun ψυχαγωγία 
in a variety of ways. The basic use of the words as ‘to please’ and ‘pleasure’ in a neutral 
sense are found seven times (1.91.7; 2.8.7, 10.5, 53.6; 3.50.1; 4.4.3; 16.52.4) and are typically 
placed in the ‘mythological’ sections of his work. The negative use of the verb to mean ‘to 
beguile’ or ‘to seduce’ is found six times (1.76.2; 20.77.2; 26.17.1; 30.6.1; 31.14.1; 32.9b.1; 
this list is not inclusive of the two uses described in the main text concerning Eunus) and is 
generally used of leaders or peoples that are negatively described in the narrative: e.g. the 
                                                 
145 Eunus’ unusual relationship with his master, in regard to his position as an entertainer and acquisition of 
additional food, is regularly commented on, although the language used, discussed below, has not been: see 
Green (1961), 11-2; Vogt (1965), 25-6; Dumont (1987), 224; Bradley (1989), 114; Urbainczyk (2008a), 55. 
146 The verb ψυχαγωγέω is used by Diodorus in the context of dinner parties three times in his history. Two 
occasions involve Eunus, and the final occasion involves the Ichthyophagi (3.17.1) whom Diodorus describes as 
ψυχαγωγοῦντες ‘entertaining’ one another. In this context the verb is clearly being used neutrally, whereas I 
would argue that this is not the case with Eunus. Therefore, the use of this verb depends upon the context of the 
passage in which it is used. 
147 The bibliography on ‘tragic historians’ is too great to give here, as is the debate concerning how best to 
understand ‘tragic history’, but for a seminal work on the origins of ‘tragic history’ see Walbank (1960). Also 
see Zeger (1959); Meister (1975), 109-11; Sacks (1977), 144-6; Seibert (1983), 15-7; Richter (1987), 38-41; 
Marasco (1988), 48-67; Rebenich (1997), 267-9; and Marincola (2010), 445-60. 
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Campanians are described as ψυχαγωγούµενοι, ‘deluding themselves’, about their 
relationship with Hannibal, and therefore they sided with him against Rome (see 26.17.1).148 
 
The relationship between the passage describing Eunus’ beguilement of his master 
and his own death is clear, and suggests an effort at ring composition in the construction of 
Eunus’ character. For example, Eunus’ beguilement of his own master took place in the 
context of dinner parties, while his servant149 (34/5.2.22) παρὰ τοὺς πότους εἰωθότος 
ψυχαγωγεῖν αὐτόν, ‘had been accustomed, throughout the drinking bouts, to beguiling 
(Eunus)’ (my emphasis).150 While the context is not identical, the implication of luxury is 
there in both passages, and the link must be intentional. The inference from this internal 
allusion is that Diodorus links Eunus to his own master and creates a circle in Eunus’ 
personal narrative: he has gone from the beguiler of a foolish master to the beguiled himself 
(and by logical association, foolish as well). It also suggests that Diodorus’ intention was to 
portray Eunus, in spite of his status as the leader of a revolt against the actions and 
mistreatments of harsh masters, as no better than the same men he had risen up against: in a 
sense, Eunus became his master, who, we must not forget, Eunus had put to death during the 
uprising (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.15). Owing to the state of Diodorus’ narrative we can only hint at 
the full inter-relationship between Eunus and Antigenes, but I suggest that this allusion 
demonstrates the effort to create a convincing literary account of Eunus’ character, which, 
through certain careful applications of vocabulary, had a clear purpose in mind: to turn the 
reader against him, but also to create a circular narrative that is clearly a piece of literary 
stylisation (as opposed to one of historical reality). 
 
We have seen that the character of Eunus in the narrative of Diodorus, specifically 
relating to his role as king, is made up of cowardice, military inexperience and luxurious 
                                                 
148 Twice the verb is used in its original meaning, or in a neutral sense (4.7.4 – Melpomenē ‘charmed the souls 
of her listeners’; 4.25.4 – Orpheus ‘entranced’ Persephone). On three occasions the use of the verb and noun 
exactly mirrors the usage of Polybius in his attack on Phylarchus (Poly. 2.56.3-13): on these occasions Diodorus 
described either why he had included material in his history (32.12.1: Diodorus explains that he includes stories 
about shifts of sex οὐ ψυχαγωγίας ἀλλ' ὠφελείας...τῶν ἀναγινωσκόντων ‘not for the entertainment but the 
improvement…of our readers’) or used the noun to criticise other authors for using invention of fact for the 
ψυχαγωγίας ‘pleasure’ of their readers, a technique he claimed he would not follow (1.69.7: 3.11.1). The 
context determined the intended meaning. See also Meijering (1987), 5-12, for a discussion of the changing 
meaning of ψυχαγωγέω in Greek literature. 
149 A slave? The matter is not specified by Diodorus but it is interesting to note that Eunus was still served by 
his compatriots. 
150 This reference to πότοι ‘drinking bouts’ also echoes the criticisms of Philip voiced by Theopompus regarding 
his habit of engaging in drinking bouts (Athen. 10.435b-c), which was a sign of his intemperance, and an aspect 
of his inability to carefully manage his kingdom’s finances: see also Flower, (1994), 104-8. 
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tendencies, described in terms that were consistent with Diodorus’ own conception of (bad) 
Hellenistic leadership as well as wider ideas about Hellenistic kingship. Furthermore we have 
seen that Diodorus made explicit links between Eunus and his master Antigenes, creating a 
comparison between the two and thus completing Eunus’ character arc that ended with his 
own assumption of the role that his master had filled in the narrative. It is also important to 
note that this portrayal of Eunus – in spite of the fragmentary and compressed nature of the 
source that does not give the full picture of his development – is consistent throughout his 
rise to power and his subsequent demise. There is only one other aspect directly related to 
Eunus’ character to consider, and that is Diodorus’ insistent references to wonder-working 
when introducing Eunus, and, subsequently, on his rise to kingship. 
 
III. Τερατεία and τερατευόµενος 
 
As already seen, Diodorus’ introduction of Eunus includes a lengthy aside on his actions 
prior to the start of the revolt. This episode, of which I have already discussed the second 
half, contains an important aspect of Diodorus’ representation of Eunus: his pretensions to 
wonder-working. Before relating Eunus’ relationship with his master, Diodorus relates the 
following (34/5.2.5-8): 
 
ἦν δέ τις οἰκέτης Ἀντιγένους Ἐνναίου, Σύρος τὸ γένος ἐκ τῆς Ἀπαµείας, ἄνθρωπος µάγος καὶ 
τερατουργὸς τὸν τρόπον. οὗτος προσεποιεῖτο θεῶν ἐπιτάγµασι καθ΄ ὕπνον προλέγειν τὰ 
µέλλοντα, καὶ πολλοὺς διὰ τὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ µέρος εὐφυΐαν ἐξηπάτα. ἐντεῦθεν προϊὼν οὐ 
µόνον ἐξ ὀνείρων ἐµαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγρηγορότως θεοὺς ὁρᾶν ὑπεκρίνετο καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν 
ἀκούειν τὰ µέλλοντα. πολλῶν δ΄ ὑπ΄ αὐτοῦ σχεδιαζοµένων ἀπὸ τύχης ἔνια πρὸς ἀλήθειαν 
ἐξέβαινε· καὶ τῶν µὲν µὴ γινοµένων ὑπ΄ οὐδενὸς ἐλεγχοµένων, τῶν δὲ συντελουµένων 
ἐπισηµασίας τυγχανόντων, προκοπὴν ἐλάµβανεν ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν δόξα. τελευταῖον διά τινος 
µηχανῆς πῦρ µετά τινος ἐνθουσιασµοῦ καὶ φλόγα διὰ τοῦ στόµατος ἠφίει, καὶ οὕτω τὰ 
µέλλοντα ἀπεφοίβαζεν. εἰς γὰρ κάρυον ἤ τι τοιοῦτο τετρηµένον ἐξ ἑκατέρου µέρους ἐνετίθει 
πῦρ καὶ τὴν συνέχειν αὐτὸ δυναµένην ὕλην· εἶτα ἐντιθεὶς τῷ στόµατι καὶ προσπνέων ποτὲ 
µὲν σπινθῆρας, ποτὲ δὲ φλόγα ἐξέκαεν. οὗτος πρὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἔλεγε τὴν Συρίαν θεὸν 
ἐπιφαινοµένην αὐτῷ λέγειν ὅτι βασιλεύσει· καὶ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς ἄλλους µόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς 
αὐτὸν τὸν κύριον αὑτοῦ διετέλει λέγων. εἰς δὲ γέλωτα τρεποµένου τοῦ πράγµατος, ὁ µὲν 
Ἀντιγένης ψυχαγωγούµενος ἐπὶ τῇ τερατείᾳ παρῆγε τὸν Εὔνουν εἰς τὰ σύνδειπνα τοῦτο γὰρ 
ὄνοµα τῷ τερατίᾳκαὶ διηρώτα περὶ τῆς βασιλείας καὶ πῶς ἑκάστῳ χρήσεται τῶν παρόντων· 
τοῦ δὲ ἀτρέπτως πάντα διηγουµένου, καὶ ὡς µετρίως χρήσεται τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ τὸ σύνολον 
ποικίλως τερατευοµένου, γέλωτες ἐγίνοντο τοῖς παρακεκληµένοις, καί τινες αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς 
τραπέζης ἀξιολόγους µερίδας αἴροντες ἐδωροῦντο, ἐπιλέγοντες ὅπως, ὅταν γένηται βασιλεύς, 
τῆς χάριτος µνηµονεύοι. 
 
There was a certain household slave of Antigenes of Enna, a Syrian from Apamea, a magician and 
wonder-worker in manner. This man claimed by divine commands to foretell the future through 
dreams and because of his talent in this direction he fooled many. Progressing from there, he did not 
simply prophesy from dreams, but even while awake he pretended to see gods and to hear from them 
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the future. Of the many stories that he invented, some, by chance, turned out to be true, and since those 
that did not come to pass were questioned by no-one, while those that did happen were acclaimed, the 
reputation of this man grew. Finally, through some contrivance, in the midst of some frenzy, he 
produced fire and flames from his mouth, and thus foretold the future. For he would place into a nut, or 
something such as this, that was pierced on both sides, fire and fuel to maintain it: then placing it in his 
mouth and blowing kindled either sparks or flame. Before the revolt this man used to say that the 
Syrian goddess151 showed herself to him saying that he would be King: and he kept repeating this not 
only to others, but also to his own master. When the matter became something of a joke, Antigenes, 
beguiled by his knowledge of wonders, would bring Eunus into his banquets (for this was the wonder-
worker’s name) and continually ask about his kingdom and how he would treat each of those present: 
and since he explained everything without hesitation, explaining how moderately he would treat the 
masters, and in general talked in a colourful manner about wonders, laughter erupted among the guests, 
and some of them, lifting remarkable portions from the table gave them to him as gifts, saying as they 
did so that whenever he became King he should remember the favour. 
 
There is a definite consistency in how Eunus is described. In the first line Eunus is described 
as a µάγος καὶ τερατουργὸς, ‘magician and wonder-worker’. However, Diodorus does not 
allow Eunus’ status as a µάγος καὶ τερατουργὸς to appear legitimate. Immediately afterwards, 
Diodorus clarifies the situation: Eunus προσεποιεῖτο…προλέγειν τὰ µέλλοντα, ‘claimed…to 
foretell the future’;152 but there is no real prophecy taking place. We soon learn that Eunus 
went on to pretend (ὑποκρίνετο)153 that he saw gods. The language chosen here is specific. In 
spite of his claims to the contrary, Eunus’ actions are always described strictly in terms of 
creative impulse, not divine inspiration.154 However, these claims, despite their fraudulent 
nature (as highlighted by Diodorus), gained Eunus considerable fame. This led to his position 
as entertainer at his master’s dinner parties (34/5.2.8) and, ultimately, to his election as king. 
When Eunus was elected king, Diodorus remarked that it was principally because of his 
wonder-working (τερατεία), a point to which I will return. Throughout the passage quoted 
above (34/5.2.5-8), Diodorus consistently uses words based on this concept of ‘wonders’ 
(τέρατα: for example see 34/5.2.5 for τερατουργός; or 34/5.2.8 for τερατεία and 
τερατεύοµαι). In keeping with Diodorus’ description of Eunus’ character in other respects, 
the description of Eunus’ reputation as a wonder-worker remains uniform. However, it is 
important to enquire if, as with his portrayal of Eunus as possessing neither ἀνδρεία nor 
                                                 
151 It is possible that the details regarding Eunus’ relationship with Atargatis reflect a form of perverted hero 
tradition, such as those attributed to Scipio Africanus and others. In this case, Diodorus’ narrative leaves little 
room for doubting the falsity of this tradition: on this type of tradition see Walbank (1967), 54-69. 
152 See Chapter V for a discussion of the verbal links to the description of Athenion here (Diod. Sic. 36.5.3). 
153 The choice of ὑποκρίνετο to describe Eunus’ actions is important. The verb’s strong connections to acting on 
stage and exaggeration stress that Eunus’ pretence was intentional, further damning his duplicity. 
154 The sole Latin text to record anything significant about Eunus repeats this tradition concerning him. Florus 
(2.7.4) describes him as a  ‘(s)yrus quidam nomine Eunus – magnitudo cladium facit, ut meminerimus – fanatico 
furore simulato, dum Syriae deae comas iactat…’, ‘certain Syrian named Eunus - the seriousness of our defeats 
causes his name to be remembered - counterfeiting an inspired frenzy and waving his dishevelled hair in honour 
of the Syrian goddess…’ As with Diodorus, Florus is explicit that Eunus’ frenzy is counterfeited. 
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στρατηγία, Diodorus is again linking his portrayal of Eunus to general stereotypes, and if this 
portrayal has an even deeper pejorative sense than that suggested by its surface appearance. 
 
III.i. The Connotations of τερατεία and τερατευόµενος 
 
The negative connotations of the words τερατεία and τερατευόµενος can be found earlier 
than Diodorus in Polybius and his descriptions of other authors’ techniques.155 The word is 
consistently used to describe a style of history that focussed more on sensationalism than 
historical ‘fact’: at 2.56.10 Polybius describes how ‘tragic’ historians like Phylarchus would 
describe their history τερατευόµενον, ‘sensationally’; at 2.58.12, once again attacking 
Phlyarchus, Polybius states that Phylarchus included excessive detail and invented outrages 
that took place at the sack of Mantinea purely for the sake of τερατείας, ‘sensationalism’; 
finally, at 7.7.1, Polybius asserts that other historians (not named), when describing the fall of 
Hieronymus of Syracuse, introduced πολλήν...τερατείαν, ‘much sensationalism’. In Polybius, 
in the historiographical context, τερατεία and τερατευόµενος were both linked to ψεῦδος, 
‘falsehood’ in history (e.g. 2.58.12),156 and, as I argued above, Diodorus makes it quite clear 
that Eunus’ τερατείαι were false; although he does not use the word ψεῦδος he does seem to 
be working from the same concept of τερατεία as does Polybius.157 Returning to Diodorus’ 
Bibliotheke in general, in two places (3.36.2; 6.1.3) he uses the adjective τερατώδης, 
‘monstrous’, to describe stories told about gods that he felt were invented; indeed in the latter 
case he states explicitly that the writers of myth πεπλάκασιν, ‘invented’, the monstrous tales. 
He also used the verb τερατολογέω, ‘to tell of marvels’, twice (1.63.8; 4.53.7) to criticise first 
                                                 
155 The Suda lexicon provides two separate explanations of τερατεία and τερατευόµενος, two words (noun and 
verb) used to describe Eunus and his actions (Suda s.v. Τερατευόµενος and Tερατεία): 
Τερατευόµενος. ψευδόµενος, καὶ µηδὲν ἀληθὲς µηδὲ ὑγιὲς λέγων. τερατευόµενοι καὶ κοµπάζοντες, ὡς εἰς πολλὰ 
εἴη χρήσιµος ἡ τοῦ τόπου κατάληψις. ‘Terateuomenos – one who deceives, and speaks nothing true or sound. 
Wonder workers bragging that not giving the point can be useful in all things.’ 
Τερατεία. ψευδολογία. παραδοξολογία. τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τερατευοµένων καὶ γοήτων περὶ ἐπῳδῶν καὶ δαιµόνων 
ἀποποµπῆς. ‘Terateia – a falsehood, a tale of wonder. [Used] by wonder workers and sorcerers for spells and 
averting ghosts.’ 
The texts of these entries are quite difficult to understand, as they are very compressed. However, it should 
immediately be apparent that the understanding of both terms given in the Suda contains negative connotations: 
specifically the underlying assumption is one of deception and trickery, and legitimacy is not accorded to the 
one so labelled. These connotations tally well with the impression given in Diodorus of an implicit distrust in 
the kind of ‘wonder working’ engaged in by Eunus. For example, it is notable that in the case of τερατεία the 
idea of falsehoods is also linked to sorcerers (γόητες), and in the narrative of Diodorus Eunus is linked to 
another related descriptive term in his introduction: magician (µάγος). 
156 Mohm (1977), 108-16, argued that τέρατα are without value because they contained falsehood. 
157 For a discussion of the meaning of τερατεία in Polybius in relation to sensationalism and critique of other 
historians, see Marincola (2001), 135, and (2010), 453-4. Regarding Polybius’ critique of other historians, see 
also Walbank (1972), 34-40; Rebenich (1997), 265-6, 281 and 285. 
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the Egyptians for creating sensational tales of the pyramids, and in the latter passage the tales 
told by the poets about Herakles, which he felt were inaccurate. Nonetheless, these are the 
only surviving passages of Diodorus’ Bibliotheke to use the vocabulary in this manner.158 I do 
not want to speculate on the origin of the terminology used to describe Eunus in this passage 
– and in any case the answer may well be unattainable; but it is enough to note that Polybius, 
just like the Suda,159 provides a persuasive framework for the proposed interpretation of 
Diodorus: Eunus’ description is linked to a mode of behaviour stereotyped as deceptive and 
false. At this point it is worthwhile investigating Greek ideas of ‘magic’ and ‘magic-workers’ 
to see how the connotations inherent in these concepts inform our interpretation of Eunus’ 
character. 
 
III. ii. Μάγος, γόης and φαρµακεύς 
 
As we have seen, Diodorus labours to characterise Eunus’ actions as illegitimate and 
fraudulent. Additionally, he describes Eunus as a µάγος: magician. There were several terms 
in the ancient world that carried the meaning of ‘magician’. These terms, µάγος, ‘magician’, 
γόης, ‘sorcerer’ and φαρµακεύς, ‘poisoner/sorcerer’, in spite of their varied origins,160 
became synonymous, meaning ‘magic worker’, although typically in a disparaging sense.161 
In particular the terms µάγος and γόης were almost entirely interchangeable with no 
distinction as to what type of magic was practiced, resulting in a generic meaning. These 
terms, linked as they were by the Suda to τερατεία which, as we saw, the Suda considered to 
                                                 
158 Vocabulary linked to τέρατα features sporadically throughout the Bibliotheke. The noun τέρατα appears 5 
times (2.29.3; 4.6.5; 4.77.4; 32.12.1; 32.12.3) and consistently refers to either portents or monsters of some 
kind. Τερατώδης, ‘prodigious’ or ‘monstrous’, appears one further time (4.47.3) to describe a monstrous tale, 
but with no clear pejorative meaning. The adverbial form is used once (1.26.6), and the noun τερατεία is found, 
outwith the narrative of Eunus, only two more times (4.51.3; 4.56.1), although in the latter case it does appear to 
be being used in a manner similar to Polybius’ criticisms of Phylarchus.   
159 See note 155 above. 
160 The term µάγος originally meant a Median priest (Nock (1972), 309), but during the archaic period it came to 
mean a fraudulent magician; Nock (1972), 323-4; Gordon (1999), 99, 104; Dickie (2001), 14-5; Janowitz 
(2001), 9. According to the Suda s.v. Γοητεία, a γόης designated a magician who summoned up corpses. 
Modern scholars trace the term γόης to one who used lamentations in summoning the dead: see Johnston (1999), 
103. Chantraine (1968), s.v. goao defines γόης by their use of cries and incantations; see also Dickie (2001), 14. 
Φαρµακεύς is related to the use of drugs or poisons, although quickly lost this association; Dickie (2001), 14. 
161 See Nock (1972), 323-4, and Dickie (2001), 13-6. In the case of Eunus, the focus in the modern literature 
has, without exception, been on his status as a µάγος in order to understand how Diodorus was characterising 
him, with no attention given to the other vocabulary highlighted here: see Toynbee (1965), 405; Finley (1968), 
140; Vogt (1965), 40-3; Yavetz (1988), 8; Bradley (1989), 55-7, 113-4; Callahan and Horsley (1998), 147; 
Shaw (2001), 12; Wirth (2004), 282, and (2006), 126; Urbainczyk (2008a), 52. Kunz (2006), 338-41, argued 
that Diodorus (whom she refers to as Posidonius) denounced only the magic and prophetic powers of Eunus, but 
not his choice of religious calling. All these authors take great pains to demonstrate the validity of Diodorus’ 
characterisation, without identifying if Diodorus was connecting his description to already existing stereotypes. 
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be based on falsehoods, carried certain expectations of trickery.162 Furthermore, in the Roman 
mind, foreign peoples and their religions were often associated with witchcraft, and different 
regions held different expectations of their specific craft.163 Holy men and ‘magicians’ from 
the east of the Mediterranean were typically understood, in both the Greek and the Roman 
worlds, to be skilled in prophecy, provided their prophetic abilities were not used to enhance 
their own authority: in this case they were considered lowly magicians (Dickie 2001: 112).164 
Furthermore, the Romans believed, at least in the first century B.C., that the religious 
observances of the µάγοι in Persia were suspect (Graf 1996: 37-8; Catull. 90); in Roman 
literature there were also clear distinctions between Roman ‘state’ religious practices, which 
were acceptable, and magical rites of a foreign and dangerous nature (Dench 1995: 167). In 
Greek and Roman literate society of the mid-first century B.C. there was a clear opinion that 
the dubious magical practices of other religions and those of ‘magicians’ were aiming to alter 
the course of nature and were implicitly wrong (Dickie 2001: 137-41). This led to the use of 
the terms µάγος and γόης for stigmatising ‘socially deviant, and therefore undesirable, views 
and behaviour’ (Flintermann 1995: 67).165 However, in spite of clear prejudices against these 
magical practitioners, some were very successful: for example, Simon Magus from the Acts 
of Peter, or Alexander the False Prophet from Lucian’s Alexander. When looked at from this 
perspective, even Jesus could be considered to have been one of the most successful charlatan 
magicians.166 However, my main point is not that these men could be successful, but that the 
purpose of the terminology used to describe them was consistently negative.  
 
                                                 
162 Dickie (2001), 75-6, noted that Herodotus called the Neuroi γόητες for their claims to change into wolves, 
because he thought their claims to be false, and not because he believed they did magic.  
163 The Marsi were characterised as having the ability to charm snakes in various literary sources from as early 
as the second century B.C. through to the first century A.D.; see Dench (1995), 159-66. These powers were also 
associated with certain parts of North Africa; see Gibson (2006), 221. 
164 I do not think it is surprising that the word chosen for Eunus was µάγος given his supposed origins from 
Syria; see Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.5. 
165 This is not to deny that Roman religion was in regular interaction with ‘foreign’ cults or practices, many of 
which became incoporated into Roman religious practice: see e.g. North (1976), 8-11; Beard (1985); North 
(2000), 54-7.  Roman religion was not, of course, completely open, and in many respects after the third century 
B.C. became much more closed to outside influences (North (1976), 8), and in cases could be vehemently 
opposed to certain cultic practices, most notably the Bacchanalia and the Chaldaeans in 139 B.C. (Val. Max. 
1.3.2) and others: see Gallini (1970); North (1979), 85-9; Pailler (1988); North (1992), 181; North (2000), 63-8. 
166 In Mk. 3.22, Lk. 11.15-20, and Mt. 10.24-5, 12.27-8, the scribes and Pharisees called Jesus a magician, who 
cast out demons in the name of Beelzebul. Smith (1978), 32 and 174, notes that this demon is (32) 
‘unmistakably Palestinian’. Moreover, Jesus was called (Jn. 8.48) a Samaritan, a connection to Simon Magus, 
the Samaritan magician. Justin Dial. 69.7, 108.2, preserves evidence of Jewish claims that Jesus was a magician 
(69.7: µάγος) and Origen C. Cels. 1.68, notes that Jesus was compared to a γόης. For a discussion of the varied 
views of Jesus in the ancient world see Smith (1977). 
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 Furthermore, the centrality of this ‘wonder-working’ to Eunus’ character returns, as 
we have seen, in his election to kingship: the apex of his success. After commenting on the 
qualities for which Eunus was not elected, ἀνδρεία τε καὶ στρατηγία, Diodorus informs us of 
the reasons for his election (34/5.2.14): διὰ δὲ µόνην τερατείαν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἄρξαι 
‘but only because of his knowledge of wonders and his setting of the revolt in motion’. We 
can now understand Diodorus’ tone in this exclamation, given his clear prejudices against the 
use of τερατεία. For example, it is hardly positive that the slaves were duped by Eunus, and 
his charlatan ability could not be considered flattering, if we keep in mind the negative view 
driving the use of these terms. It is therefore apparent that this characteristic of Eunus infects 
his crowning achievement, further undermining his success, on top of the fact that Diodorus 
considered Eunus a coward and an inept leader. But, there is still an additional element of 
Diodorus’ scorn for Eunus at his crowning moment that we have not yet examined. 
 
IV. τὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἄρξαι 
 
We have seen above that Diodorus gave yet another reason for Eunus’ election (34/5.2.14): 
τὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἄρξαι, ‘his setting of the revolt in motion’. In order to understand the 
event to which Diodorus refers, we have to turn to two separate, parallel passages from 
earlier in the narrative. After describing the treatment of Damophilus’ slaves, Diodorus 
relates that they went to Eunus in order to ascertain if they had the approval of the gods for 
their rebellion (34/5.2.10 and 34/5.2.24b): 
 
ἐξ ὧν ἀποθηριωθέντες οἱ προπηλακιζόµενοι συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ ἀποστάσεως καὶ 
φόνου τῶν κυρίων. καὶ πρὸς τὸν Εὔνουν ἐλθόντες ἠρώτων εἰ συγχωρεῖται παρὰ τῶν θεῶν 
αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευµένον. ὁ δὲ µετὰ τερατείας, ὡς εἰώθει, συνθέµενος ὅτι συγχωροῦσι, 
παραχρῆµα πείθει ἔχεσθαι τῆς ἐγχειρήσεως. 
 
In consequence of this, those treated with contempt, who had been made savage by the treatment, came 
to a mutual agreement to revolt and to murder their masters. They went to Eunus and asked if their 
plans found favour with the gods. He used his usual wonder-working to confirm that the gods did 
favour them, and persuaded them to embark on their undertaking forthwith. 
 
Ὅτι συνετίθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ δοῦλοι περὶ ἀποστάσεως καὶ φόνου τῶν κυρίων. 
παρελθόντες δὲ πρὸς τὸν Εὔνουν οὐκ ἄπωθεν διατρίβοντα ἠρώτων εἰ συγχωρεῖται παρὰ τῶν 
θεῶν αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευµένον. ὁ δὲ τερατευόµενος µετ΄ ἐνθουσιασµοῦ καὶ περὶ τίνων 
ἥκουσι ἀκούσας διεσάφησεν ὅτι διδόασιν αὐτοῖς οἱ θεοὶ τὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἐὰν µηδεµίαν 
ὑπερβολὴν ποιησάµενοι παραχρῆµα µὲν ἐγχειρήσωσι ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς· ὑπὸ γὰρ τῆς 
πεπρωµένης αὐτοῖς κεκυρῶσθαι πατρίδα τὴν Ἔνναν, οὖσαν ἀκρόπολιν ὅλης τῆς νήσου. 
 
The slaves agreed with one another about revolt and the murder of their masters. They came to Eunus, 
who was spending time not far away, and they asked if their decision was approved by the gods. He 
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began working wonders in a frenzy, and when he heard why they had come he made clear that the gods 
gave them permission to revolt, so long as they did not delay but immediately undertook their 
enterprise: for it was fated that Enna, the citadel of the whole island, was fixed as their homeland. 
 
First, we should note that Diodorus is consistent in the language he is using to describe the 
actions of Eunus, once again using language based on τέρατα and its derivations. The two 
passages are similar, although the first passage, from Photius, is simpler and less detailed 
than the second, Constantinian, excerpt. For example, in the Photian version, the slaves ask 
Eunus for advice, and immediately on working his wonders (µετὰ τερατείας) Eunus is 
presented as assenting: he acts without knowing what the slaves’ resolve was. In the 
Constantinian excerpt, there is a delay in the assent: Eunus, who still began working wonders 
(ὁ δὲ τερατευόµενος), waited until περὶ τίνων ἥκουσι ἀκούσας, ‘he heard why they had 
come’, to tell them that they had permission. The slaves only asked initially if their decision 
was approved (εἰ συγχωρεῖται παρὰ τῶν θεῶν αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευµένον), and it appears from 
the narrative that Eunus delayed his prophecy in order to hear the full details.167 Eunus, 
furthermore, does not provide a true prophecy, for Diodorus has already made it clear by this 
stage that Eunus was a charlatan: he was not divinely inspired, and so preferred, as this 
passage implies, to know as much as possible before ‘divining’. We should also consider how 
the characterisation of Eunus discussed above affects our reading of this passage. 
 
Throughout the narrative, Eunus is described in very different terms from those of the 
rebels whom he then led. Concerning the slaves, we should note first how Diodorus describes 
their treatment: their lack of food and clothing, and their alienation from their masters. This is 
consistent throughout the general descriptions of slave mistreatment in the narrative, as well 
as the specific case of the slave owner Damophilus, whose actions caused the initial outbreak 
of war. For example, we learn from Diodorus the following (34/5.2.2 and 26): 
 
βαρέως δ΄ αὐτοῖς κατά τε τὰς ὑπηρεσίας ἐχρῶντο, καὶ ἐπιµελείας παντελῶς ὀλίγης ἠξίουν, 
ὅσα τε ἐντρέφεσθαι καὶ ὅσα ἐνδύσασθαι. ἐξ ὧν οἱ πλείους ἀπὸ λῃστείας τὸ ζῆν ἐπορίζοντο, 
καὶ µεστὰ φόνων ἦν ἅπαντα, καθάπερ στρατευµάτων διεσπαρµένων τῶν λῃστῶν. 
 
                                                 
167 Only Green (1961), 12, and Urbainczyk (2008a), 55, note this distinction. For Green it is evidence of 
differing biases in the narrative of Diodorus, one pro-Roman, and the other not (he does not make clear what 
bias the latter tradition held): I think it is more accurate to consider the difference in details to be caused by the 
distinct compositional styles of the two excerpters (Photius tends to compress his account, whereas the 
Constantinian excerpts are often verbatim), and not two differing accounts contained in the same text of 
Diodorus. Urbainczyk, on the other hand, notes that there is varying treatment of Eunus across the two different 
excerpts, but pursues the point no further. 
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They abused them (the slaves) with a heavy hand in their service, and altogether thought them worthy 
of the minimum of care: as far as concerned food and clothing. The majority of them provided 
themselves with a livelihood through banditry, and everywhere was full of bloodshed, since the bandits 
were scattered like armies of soldiers. 
 
διὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εὐπορίας τῶν τὴν κρατίστην νῆσον ἐκκαρπουµένων ἅπαντες 
σχεδὸν οἱ τοῖς πλούτοις προκεκοφότες ἐζήλωσαν τὸ µὲν πρῶτον τρυφήν, εἶθ΄ ὑπερηφανίαν 
καὶ ὕβριν. ἐξ ὧν ἁπάντων αὐξανοµένης ἐπ΄ ἴσης τῆς τε κατὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν κακουχίας καὶ τῆς 
κατὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀλλοτριότητος, ἐρράγη ποτὲ σὺν καιρῷ τὸ µῖσος. ἐξ οὗ χωρὶς 
παραγγέλµατος πολλαὶ µυριάδες συνέδραµον οἰκετῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀπώλειαν. 
 
For because of the excessive wealth of those enjoying the fruits of the most excellent island, nearly all 
of those who had become wealthy strove after first luxury, then arrogance and insolence. Because of 
this, and since the mistreatment of the slaves and their estrangement from their masters increased 
equally, there was, when opportune, a general outburst of hatred. From this, without formal command, 
tens of thousands of slaves joined forces for the destruction of their masters. 
 
When describing Damophilus’ treatment of slaves, Diodorus specifically notes his lack of 
provisioning for his herdsmen (34/5.2.36) and his poor relationship toward slaves in 
supplication (34/5.2.38). When compared with Eunus, the contrast is apparent. A lack of 
provision, even if it had occurred in Eunus’ case (and for this we have no evidence), was 
offset by Eunus’ close access to his master at dinner parties with the added bonus that 
(34/5.2.8) τινες αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης ἀξιολόγους µερίδας αἴροντες ἐδωροῦντο, ‘some of 
(the dinner guests), lifting substantial portions from the table gave them to him as gifts’. 
Furthermore, Eunus’ position as the dinner entertainer gave him a close, and to judge by the 
narrative in Diodorus, good-natured relationship with his master;168 it is clear from these 
aspects of the narrative that he was a favoured slave. Up to the moment when the estranged 
and mistreated slaves came to Eunus, his lifestyle had been completely separate from theirs, 
as he had not experienced nor shared in their collective plight. This might suggest that his 
subsequent leadership of the revolt was vitiated in the mind of an ancient reader: Eunus was 
actually benefiting from his position as a slave and his opportunistic pretence of prophecy. 
This suggests in turn that his leadership of the revolt was a mark of further opportunism on 
his part: it was not based on a shared experience of bad treatment, creating a separation 
between Eunus and his subjects in the mind of the reader. 
 
By singling out Eunus in this way, Diodorus set up the platform for his subsequent 
negative portrayal of Eunus, the cowardly king. As is clear now, Diodorus was not crediting 
                                                 
168 This understanding of Diodorus does not accord with that generally put forward by scholars on the subject. 
Typically the relationship is viewed as one of Antigenes and his dinner guests patronising Eunus (see Green 
(1961), 12; Urbainczyk (2008a), 55), or a dangerous mocking of a ‘holy idiot’ (see Vogt (1965), 25-6), or just 
exploitation of Eunus’ reputation by Antigenes (Bradley (1989), 114). 
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Eunus with any positive characteristics. The connotations inherent in the language, shown 
above, and the clear indications given by Diodorus that Eunus was not actually a divinely 
inspired seer serve to denigrate his character in preparation for his subsequent important role. 
Indeed, the strength of this characterisation led one scholar – interested in magic and 
magicians, not slavery – to comment that the ‘…account we have of Eunus’ career will be in 
some measure an imaginative recreation…based on patterns of behaviour with which [the 
author] was familiar’.169 This view of Diodorus’ text is unusual in that it allows for a certain 
level of creativity on the part of the author, creativity which we have seen in Diodorus’ 
choices of language when describing Eunus. And this description left little doubt about the 
author’s opinion of the man. 
 
The depiction of Eunus in Diodorus is unremittingly hostile. At no point in the 
narrative is Eunus praised unless the praise is tempered with a corresponding caveat or 
explanatory denigration of either him or his followers. The associations crafted throughout 
Diodorus’ narrative with Hellenistic kingship and wonder-working are consistent from 
Eunus’ introduction to his pathetic death in a Morgantina jail. It is striking that the strongest 
scorn was reserved for the most significant moment of Eunus’ career, his acclamation to 
kingship. At this moment Diodorus tied together all the threads of abuse employed 
throughout the narrative against Eunus, negating the importance of Eunus’ achievements and 
destroying any credibility that Eunus, once king, sought to achieve. Furthermore, his 
depiction in Diodorus is composed to create certain literary effects. The symbolic connection 
between Eunus and his master, Antigenes, indicates that, because of literary finesse that had 
Eunus assume the place of his own degenerate master by the end of his life, we cannot trust 
the impression given by the text for historical purposes. Awash with stereotypes and literary 
plays, Eunus’ character is a caricature designed to turn the reader against him. This 
suggestion can be further analysed by considering how Diodorus contrasted Eunus with his 
στρατηγός, Kleon. 
 
V. A Military Man 
 
As I argued above, one of Eunus’ defining negative features at the moment of his election to 
kingship was his lack of ἀνδρεία τε καὶ στρατηγία. The character of Kleon, and to a certain 
                                                 
169 Dickie (2001), 113. 
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extent that of his brother Komanus, contrasts with this facet of Eunus’ character. There is 
considerably less evidence for Kleon compared with Eunus, but the evidence that there is 
suggests that his character, like Eunus’, was generally portrayed negatively, and with a 
definite literary purpose. Unlike Eunus, Kleon has only two defining moments in Diodorus’ 
narrative, and although he is mentioned in other authors he does not feature prominently. 
Kleon’s introduction into the narrative comes after the description of the initial uprising in 
two parallel passages in Photius and the Constantinian excerpts (34/5.2.17; 34/5.2.43): 
 
Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Κλέων τις Κίλιξ ἄλλων δούλων ἀποστάσεως ἦρξε. καὶ πάντων ταῖς ἐλπίσι 
µετεωρισθέντων ὡς ἀντιπολεµήσει τὰ στασιάσαντα πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς οἱ 
ἀποστάται διαφθείροντες ἐλευθερώσουσι τὴν Σικελίαν τῆς στάσεως, παρὰ δόξαν ἀλλήλοις 
συνέβησαν, τοῦ Κλέωνος ὑποταγέντος ψιλῷ τοῦ Εὔνου προστάγµατι καὶ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ 
οἷα δὴ βασιλεῖ χρείαν ἀποπληροῦντος, ἔχοντος οἰκεῖον πλῆθος στρατιωτῶν πεντακισχιλίων· 
ἡµέραι δ΄ ἐγγὺς ἦσαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως τριάκοντα. 
 
During this time Kleon, a certain Cilician, began a revolt of other slaves: and although all were buoyed 
up by hope that the seditious factions would wage war against one another, and that the rebels 
themselves, by destroying themselves utterly, would release Sicily from discord, unexpectedly they 
came to terms with one another, Kleon having been subordinated to the mere command of Eunus, and 
discharging the service of a general such as indeed for a king, having his own band of five thousand 
soldiers.  It was nearly thirty days after the revolt. 
 
Ὅτι καὶ ἄλλη τις ἐγένετο ἀπόστασις δραπετῶν καὶ σύστηµα ἀξιόλογον. Κλέων γάρ τις Κίλιξ 
ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ταῦρον τόπων, συνήθης ὢν ἐκ παίδων τῷ λῃστρικῷ βίῳ καὶ κατὰ τὴν 
Σικελίαν νοµεὺς γεγονὼς ἱπποφορβίων, οὐ διέλιπεν ὁδοιδοκῶν καὶ παντοδαποὺς φόνους 
ἐπιτελούµενος. ὃς πυθόµενος τὴν κατὰ τὸν Εὔνουν προκοπὴν καὶ τὰς τῶν µετ΄ αὐτοῦ 
δραπετῶν εὐηµερίας ἀποστάτης ἐγένετο, καί τινας τῶν πλησίον οἰκετῶν πείσας 
συναπονοήσασθαι κατέτρεχε τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων καὶ τὴν πλησιόχωρον πᾶσαν. 
 
There was another revolt of runaways and a band worthy of mention. For a certain Kleon, a Cilician 
from a region about the Taurus, who was accustomed from childhood to a life of banditry and in Sicily 
became a herder of horses, constantly waylaid people and committed murders of every kind. When he 
learned of the progress of Eunus, and the successes of the runaways with him, he became a rebel and 
persuading some of the slaves nearby to share in folly with him he overran the city of Acragas and all 
the surrounding countryside. 
 
It is clear from the two passages that Photius is compressing the original Diodorus quite 
heavily, but compared with the Constantinian excerpts he features a narrative that constitutes 
a longer chronological period in the work: his extract continues to include the subordination 
of Kleon to Eunus and the size of his army. From Valerius Maximus we gain the only 
mention of Kleon in Latin. In a short passage about the death of Kleon’s brother, Komanus, 
Valerius records the following (9.12.Ext. 1): 
 
Sunt et externae mortes dignae adnotatu. Qualis in primis Comae, quem ferunt maximi 
latronum ducis Cleonis fratrem fuisse. 
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There are external deaths too worth noting, such as that of Coma [Komanus in Diodorus], who is said 
to have been brother to Cleon, the great leader of brigands. 
 
Description’s of Kleon’s character use two main operative terms: latro170 and λῃστής171. Both 
of these translate the same from Latin and Greek respectively, both meaning ‘bandit’ or 
‘robber’.172 For the remainder of this section I will use the term latro to account for both 
terms. It is with this term that we should begin to analyse the depiction of Kleon, for it is the 
central concept of his character as it is described by Diodorus and Valerius Maximus. 
 
V.i. Bandits in the Ancient World 
 
In the ancient world, as Shaw has shown (1984: 9; see also Grünewald 2004: 18-25), banditry 
was considered endemic. Indeed, the terms latro and λῃστής both carry with them a 
commonly understood knowledge that they spoke of someone engaged in violent robbery; the 
terms were predicated on the concept of the ‘ubiquity of banditry’.173 However, the terms are 
more complicated than just that. Legally the term latro meant, of course, a robber,174 but it 
was also used to cover someone who fought against the Roman state by unconventional 
means, meaning that they could not be termed hostes and were instead termed latrones or 
praedones.175 Beyond the legal definition in the Roman world the terms had strong literary 
connotations. Often an ancient author writing about a conflict in which he had particular 
disdain about one party would use terms such as latrocinium and λῃστήρια, ‘banditry’, at the 
author’s discretion in order to slander the disdained party: e.g. the war with Viriathus (App. 
Hisp. 71.301; 73.310); the fight against Tacfarinas (Tac. Ann. 2.52; 3.20, 32, 73; 4.23-6; Aur. 
Vict. Caes. 2.3); the constant wars and battles in Judaea from 64 B.C. to the Jewish War.176 
Furthermore these terms could be used to describe a great range of individual people whom 
an author particularly disliked, and in fact this became something of a political topos.177 
                                                 
170 In this case used to describe the men that Kleon led: ‘maximi latronum ducis’, (a great leader of brigands). 
171 In the case of the passage above, it is a variant in the adjectival form: συνήθης ὢν ἐκ παίδων τῷ λῃστρικῷ 
βίῳ ‘who was accustomed from childhood to a life of banditry’. 
172 However, it should be noted that the terms latro and λῃστής have a far greater variety and complexity of 
meaning than the English translations ‘robber’ or ‘bandit’. 
173 Shaw (1984), 9. 
174 The specific requirement to classify as a latro was the resort to violence (Call. Dig. 48.19.28.10), although 
another aspect of a latro was the gathering of a band (factio) around them (Marc. Dig. 48.19.11.2); see also 
Grünewald (2004), 15. 
175 Pompon. Dig. 50.16.118 pr.; Mommsen (1899), 629 no. 4; Grünewald (2004), 15-6. 
176 Josephus consistently uses the term λῄσται to refer to the rebel groups of Jews. See Rhoads (1976), 159-62, 
and Rajak (1983), 84-5, 123, 132, 161. 
177 Watson (2002), 215-6. 
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Cicero branded his political opponents such as L. Sergius Catilina and M. Antonius latrones 
(Cic. Cat. 1.9.23; 1.10.27; 1.13.31, 33; Phil. 3.29.11);178 leaders of guerrilla movements 
against Roman authority such as Viriatus or Bulla Felix were also described this way (Livy 
Per. 52; Flor. 1.33.15; Dio Cass. 76.10). In each example the actual events taking place could 
hardly be realistically termed λῃστήρια or latrocinium, ‘banditry’, and yet, nonetheless, the 
ancient writers used these terms as derogatory expressions to slander their enemies. 
 
 It should now be clear that, in using the terms latro and λῃστής to describe Kleon, the 
ancient authors were linking him to an established system of abuse that an ancient reader of 
their works would have understood. Furthermore, the actual narrative itself leaves no doubt 
concerning the character of Kleon. While the terms latro and λῃστής had a legal definition 
that specifically stressed the use of violence, Diodorus relates that Kleon (34/5.2.43) οὐ 
διέλιπεν ὁδοιδοκῶν καὶ παντοδαποὺς φόνους ἐπιτελούµενος, ‘constantly waylaid people and 
committed murders of every kind’.179 It is also clear from the description of Kleon’s actions 
once in Sicily that he was not forced into his brutal behaviour, rather he was συνήθης ὢν ἐκ 
παίδων, ‘accustomed from childhood’, to this type of behaviour. Another aspect of his 
background further intensifies this fact: he is a Cilician. In the second century B.C., Cilicia 
was an area that had become rife with piracy (Rostovtzeff 1941: 783-5). Because of this, an 
association built up in the Roman and Greek minds that connected Cilicians with brigands on 
principle: De Souza (1999: 97) has shown that Strabo (14.3.2), Appian (Mith. 92), Dio 
(36.20-3), and Plutarch (Vit. Pomp. 24) presented a picture of Cilicians and Pamphylians as 
‘dyed-in-the-wool pirates’.180 From Diodorus we can see this particular prejudice: Kleon, a 
Cilician, was a brigand from childhood. 
 
V.ii. A Natural Savage 
 
                                                 
178 This list is by no means exhaustive: Cicero refers to Antony himself as a latro 25 times (Phil. 2.5.6, 5.9, 6.2, 
9.10, 62.14; 3.29.11; 4.5.13, 15.3, 15.8; 5.23.6, 30.6; 6.12.10; 11.36.9; 12.12.15, 17.2, 20.4, 27.18; 13.10.5, 
16.5, 19.2, 21.2; 14.8.2, 10.4, 27.15, 31.9), his band of followers as latronēs 11 times (Phil. 2.87.6; 4.9.9; 
5.6.10, 18.9; 6.3.14, 4.12; 8.9.2; 11.14.10; 12.15.7; 13.26.21; 14.21.3), and his associates and followers as 
latronēs 5 times (Phil. 11.4.10, 7.5, 10.0, 32.5; 13.26.21). Cicero even compares Antony with Spartacus; see 
Cic. Phil. 4.15.3 and 13.22.16. 
179 We should also note that, in terms of Hellenistic ideologies regarding kingship, an insatiable desire for 
warring was not a positive characteristic. Following Murray’s (1965) reconstruction of Philodemus, Philodemus 
argued that (Col. IX 14-6) ‘(t)he good ruler must therefore be warlike, but not a lover of war or of battle’. 
Aristeas likewise argues that military exploits for their own sake are a negative characteristic of leaders (ad Phil. 
223): see Schubart (1973), 5, and Murray (1967), 354-5.  
180 The association was long lasting, even into the Byzantine period when the area also produced the finest 
soldiers of the Byzantine army. See Ormerod (1924), 192, and De Souza (1999), 97. 
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Above we saw that Diodorus carefully segregated Eunus from his followers in terms of the 
treatment received by him from his master. We can see this particular pattern emerging again 
with Kleon. As I have shown, Kleon was not forced into brigandage, but having been 
accustomed to it from childhood then engaged in extremely violent brigandage once in Sicily. 
If we compare this background with that of the men he eventually led into battle then we find 
a significant contrast. In terms of choice, Diodorus is clear that the slaves were forced into 
their acts of brigandage (34/5.2.2, 27-8): 
 
ἐχρῶντο δὲ αὐτῶν τοῖς µὲν νέοις νοµεῦσι, τοῖς δ΄ ἄλλοις ὥς πῃ ἑκάστῳ ἡ χρεία ἐπέβαλλε. 
βαρέως δ΄ αὐτοῖς κατά τε τὰς ὑπηρεσίας ἐχρῶντο, καὶ ἐπιµελείας παντελῶς ὀλίγης ἠξίουν, 
ὅσα τε ἐντρέφεσθαι καὶ ὅσα ἐνδύσασθαι. ἐξ ὧν οἱ πλείους ἀπὸ λῃστείας τὸ ζῆν ἐπορίζοντο, 
καὶ µεστὰ φόνων ἦν ἅπαντα, καθάπερ στρατευµάτων διεσπαρµένων τῶν λῃστῶν. 
 
They employed the young men as herdsmen, while they employed the others in such ways as need 
arose for each. They abused them with a heavy hand in their service, and altogether thought them 
worthy of the minimum of care as far as concerned food and clothing. The majority of them provided 
themselves with a livelihood through banditry, and everywhere was full of bloodshed, since the bandits 
were scattered like armies of soldiers. 
 
εἰς τοιαύτην γὰρ συνήθειαν ῥᾳδιουργίας τοὺς νοµεῖς ἤγαγον οἱ πολλοὺς οἰκέτας κεκτηµένοι 
τῶν Ἰταλικῶν ὥστε τροφὰς µὲν µὴ παρέχειν, ἐπιτρέπειν δὲ λῃστεύειν. τοιαύτης δοθείσης 
ἐξουσίας ἀνθρώποις διὰ µὲν τὴν ἰσχὺν τῶν σωµάτων δυναµένοις πᾶν τὸ κριθὲν ἐπιτελεῖν, διὰ 
δὲ τὴν ἄνεσιν καὶ σχολὴν εὐκαιροῦσι, διὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἔνδειαν ἀναγκαζοµένοις ταῖς 
παραβόλοις ἐγχειρεῖν πράξεσιν, συνέβη ταχὺ τὴν παρανοµίαν αὐξηθῆναι. 
 
The Italians who had acquired many slaves allowed their herdsmen such a self-indulgent life-style that 
they did not provide them food, but permitted them to plunder. Since power such as this had been 
given to men who, because of their physical strength were able to accomplish everything they chose, 
and because of their licence and leisure had the opportunity, and because of their lack of food were 
compelled to undertake perilous tasks, it came about that there was a swift increase in lawlessness. 
 
This decision to turn to brigandage stands in contrast to Kleon who chose, once in Sicily, to 
continue his actions with unremitting violence. In another passage Diodorus clarifies that the 
slaves were not violent through nature but because of how they had been treated in Sicily 
(34/5.2.40): 
 
Ὅτι ἀπηγριωµένων τῶν ἀποστατῶν δούλων πρὸς ὅλην τὴν οἰκίαν τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ 
τρεποµένων πρὸς ἀπαραίτητον ὕβριν καὶ τιµωρίαν, ὑπέφαινον ὡς οὐ δι΄ ὠµότητα φύσεως, 
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς προγεγενηµένας εἰς αὐτοὺς ὑπερηφανίας ἐλύττων πρὸς τὴν τῶν 
προαδικησάντων κόλασιν τραπέντες. 
 
Ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς οἰκέταις αὐτοδίδακτός ἐστιν ἡ φύσις εἰς δικαίαν ἀπόδοσιν χάριτός τε καὶ 
τιµωρίας. 
 
Although the rebellious slaves had become savage against the whole household of their masters and 
turned to implacable violence and revenge, they showed a little that it was not because of the natural 
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savagery, but because of the arrogance that had earlier been shown to them that they were raging, 
having turned to the punishment of those who had been first in wrong doing. 
 
Even among slaves, nature is self-taught with regard to just restitution of both gratitude and vengeance. 
 
By describing Kleon as accustomed to violence throughout his life rather than through 
circumstances, he is further separated from his subsequent followers. The final facet of this 
characterisation lies in the origin of Kleon’s decision to go to war. He was, at this stage, 
already a brigand, and his decision to revolt was predicated not on the fact that he was forced 
into brigandage, but merely because Eunus had been successful (34/5.2.43): 
 
ὃς πυθόµενος τὴν κατὰ τὸν Εὔνουν προκοπὴν καὶ τὰς τῶν µετ΄ αὐτοῦ δραπετῶν εὐηµερίας 
ἀποστάτης ἐγένετο… 
 
When he learned of the progress of Eunus, and the successes of the runaways with him, he became a 
rebel… 
 
Much like Eunus, who is presented as having joined the rebellion in what could be interpreted 
as an act of opportunism, Kleon also opportunistically seizes the moment. In spite of these 
negative pronouncements about the character of Kleon, it is undeniable that he was quite 
successful at first: the rebels captured at the very least (in the narrative of ancient authors) 
Enna, Morgantina, Tauromenium, Agrigentum and Catana (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.20-2, 43; Strabo 
6.2.6; Oros. 5.9.5) and won a number of battles against Roman commanders (Diod. Sic. 
34/5.2.18-20; Flor. 2.7.7-8). Diodorus’ record of this success does not outweigh the 
extensively negative account Kleon receives elsewhere by the narrative. It was not impossible 
in ancient histories for a character to be a successful general and a terrible person 
simultaneously: L. Sergius Catilina181 and Q. Servilius Caepio182 were both severely censured 
for the manner in which they gained their wealth or victories. Even Alexander the Great, in 
spite of his reputation as a great general, did not escape criticism from ancient authors: for 
example, in the description of the revolt at Opis recorded in Arrian, Alexander was 
reprimanded by the author for his quick-temper and gradual acceptance of eastern flattery 
(7.8). Furthermore, it could be argued that the success attributed to Kleon, which had to be 
acknowledged given the length of the war and the broad area that was controlled by the rebel 
                                                 
181 Despite his character being represented as ‘…malo pravoque’ (evil and depraved), and as a person that 
‘…bella intestina, caedes, rapinae, discordia civilis grata fuere…’ (revelled in civil wars, murders, pillage, and 
political dissension) (Sall. Cat. 5.1-2) he is later credited with considerable skills as a general (Sall. Cat. 59; 
60.4-5) and bravery in death (Sall. Cat. 60.7). 
182 He was heavily criticised for the murder of Viriatus. See Val. Max. 9.6.4; App. Hisp. 69.295-300. 
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forces, was undercut by the way in which the overall narrative of the war was presented in the 
ancient sources. 
 
V.iii. Death and Redemption 
 
As we have seen, Kleon’s character is presented as that of a bloodthirsty bandit. However, in 
one context he is described positively, as is his brother Komanus, and that is on the occasion 
of his death.183 For Kleon, the passage is preserved by Photius in a very compressed form, but 
clearly shows a brave ending to his life (34/5.2.21): 
 
καὶ Κλέωνα τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐξελθόντα τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἡρωικῶς ἀγωνισάµενον µετ΄ ὀλίγων 
ὑπὸ τῶν τραυµάτων δείξας νεκρόν… 
 
After the general Kleon had come out of the city, and had exerted himself heroically with a few men, 
Rupilius displayed him dead from his wounds… 
 
There are some features here to come back to, but for the moment it is necessary to note the 
adverb ἡρωικῶς, ‘heroically’ used to describe Kleon’s struggle. For Komanus our evidence 
comes from Valerius Maximus, recording his capture and death before the Roman 
commander P. Rupilius (noted in Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.20). In this passage, from a series ‘de 
mortibus non vulgaribus’ ‘of deaths out of the ordinary’, Komanus, called Coma by Valerius 
Maximus, is praised for his willingness to part with his life through his own actions, rather 
than holding out through torture in order not to give away details of the rebels’ efforts (Val. 
Max. 9.12.ext. 1). The regard that these two rebel leaders gained for their actions is marked, 
but we must be careful to consider them in their context. In the narrative the deaths of the two 
brothers come immediately before the cowardly and unmanly flight of Eunus discussed 
above. These heroic deaths – Kleon died while fighting µετ’ ὀλίγων, ‘with a few men’, further 
augmenting his heroism – served to contrast with the failure of Eunus to end his life well: the 
narrative implies that even Kleon and his brother, brigands of the worst kind and thoroughly 
deplorable men, could die in a brave and worthy manner.184 By this narrative flourish, 
Diodorus adds yet another layer to the character assassination of Eunus, and so while their 
                                                 
183 Noted by Toynbee (1965), 326-7, Manganaro (1980), 438, Wirth (2006), 128, and Urbainczyk (2008a), 58, 
but not commented on. 
184 My thanks go to John Marincola for suggesting this interpretation. 
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brave deaths do not make up for their otherwise bad lives, Kleon and Komanus regain some 
recognition from Diodorus.185 
 
 This acknowledgment of bravery in death completed the negative portrayals of these 
characters, but did not make amends for their actions. For Kleon, and to a lesser extent his 
brother Komanus, reference to preconceptions about behaviour and character linked to 
geographical locations (Cilicia) or political invective based on concepts of banditry (latro; 
λῃστής) created about him a natural blood-lust at odds with his compatriot slaves. 
Furthermore his only redeeming feature, his brave death, was part of a narrative structure 
designed to emphasise the lack of bravery in Eunus’ own death. Kleon’s character 
complements that of Eunus. The latter, a coward without military experience is assisted by 
his στρατηγός, a bloodthirsty bandit. Together, they represent poor choices for leadership, 
and in both cases their characters and descriptions are linked to literary stereotypes by 
Diodorus and other ancient authors. It is clear that with Kleon, as with Eunus, Diodorus used 
a vocabulary resonant with Hellenistic ideology. In the following section I will suggest that 
by understanding the purpose of this vocabulary in the context of rhetorical argumentation, 
either consciously or unconsciously used by the author, we can begin to understand why 
Diodorus wrote as he did about the rebel leaders, and what this should suggest to us about the 
place of his narrative in a historical reconstruction of the events of the Sicilian Insurrection. 
 
VI. Rhetoric and History 
 
In this section, I will pursue a new reading of some important passages analysed above. This 
new analysis will give strict attention to how the conclusions reached above concerning the 
resonance of ideology invoked in Diodorus’ language can help us to understand the 
                                                 
185 It is possible that the deaths of Kleon and Komanus also served to augment the glory of the victorious Roman 
generals. In each ancient description of the war the narrative progresses in a similar fashion: a succession of 
incompetent generals conceded defeats to the rebels, until a worthy commander was appointed, at which point 
the war instantly changed in character. For example, Florus describes four previous commanders who had failed 
against the rebels only for Perperna to turn everything around during his command (2.7.7-9); Valerius Maximus 
confusingly credits both L. Calpurnius Piso (4.3.10) and P. Rupilius (6.9.8) with ending the war; Diodorus 
makes clear that P. Rupilius cleared Sicily of the war and the whole island of bandits very quickly afterwards 
(34/5.2.20-3). The descriptions of the deaths of Kleon and Komanus, always given in relation to one of the men 
credited with ending the war, perhaps served the purpose of extolling the virtues of the victorious general: these 
heroic deaths, like a captive general displayed in a triumph, augmented the individual general’s brilliance; see 
Flower (2004), 339-40, and Beard (2007), 12-3, 120-2, on triumphs. Ancient authors also noted the role of the 
displayed captives in glorifying the victorious general; see for example App. Mith. 116-7, Plut. Vit. Pomp. 45.4, 
and Dio Cass. 36.19 for reference to Pompey’s triumphs. 
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relationship between Diodorus and his ancient (and perhaps also modern) readers.186 In 
particular, the texts will be reconsidered from a rhetorical and narratological viewpoint in 
order to fashion a new understanding of what Diodorus was trying to achieve with his 
descriptions of Eunus and Kleon. The principle tools in this analysis will be the rhetorical 
theory of ‘identification’ between rhetorician and audience187 and the narratological concept 
of a covert omniscient narrator. This will enable us to see how Diodorus manipulated his 
readers into agreeing with (or for the modern reader, more likely disagreeing with) his 
depiction of Eunus, regardless of the historical truth or untruth of his analysis.188 This, in 
turn, will also show that the statements and values represented by Diodorus’ depictions of 
Eunus and Kleon reflect more on the values that he held than on any that Eunus and Kleon 
themselves may have held. 
 
VI.i. Diodorus and his reader 
 
The previous five sections of this chapter offered no answer to why Diodorus sought to use 
language that was resonant with Hellenistic ideologies beyond denigration of those described. 
I will now suggest that we can understand the choices of vocabulary and ideology if we 
consider the narrative as a piece of rhetorical persuasion, in which the reader was intended to 
accept the descriptions given, and draw the correct conclusions from them. To demonstrate 
this, we should look again at two examples from Diodorus’ narrative for which it seems more 
likely that he wrote inventively, rather than from a position of knowledge:189 Eunus’ 
acclamation and the rebels’ approach to Eunus before the attack on Enna. 
                                                 
186 Following the definition of Diodorus’ reader I gave at no. 127. 
187 Aristotle considered this concept in his Rhetorica (3.14.7-8) when he discussed the ways in which an ancient 
orator would strive, by appealing to respectability, to bring the audience on to their side: see also the discussion 
in Burke (1950), 55-6, which, although old, is nonetheless a most lucid analysis of ‘identification’ as a rhetorical 
technique. The ancient methodology of appealing to respectability, or any other trait thought acceptable to the 
audience (see also Cic. De or. 2.178; 182; 3.211-2) is also reflected, as early as Booth (1961), 119-47, in his 
discussion of the role of shared beliefs and interests between the author and the audience in literature in general. 
188 I disagree with Quintillian (Inst. 10.1.31) that history is ‘…quodammodo carmen solutum, et scribitur ad 
narrandum non ad probandum’ ‘a kind of prose poem, while it is written for the purpose of narrative, not of 
proof’, and consequently think that history has a purpose beyond the mere recording of events for posterity or 
the glorification of the reader: in this position, although not in my opposition to Quintillian, I follow Barthes 
(1966), 79, in regarding historiographical texts as a form of narrative, and therefore that they can be analysed 
through narratological considerations. For views contrary to Barthes see Genette (1991), 65-93, and Cohn 
(1999), 109-31. See also the discussion in de Jong (2004), 8-9, of the place of historiographical texts in field of 
narratology of ancient literature.  
189 Finley (1985), 13-4, reminded us of the important consideration that ‘… there can be no doubt that on the 
innumerable occasions Thucydides reported as a simple matter of fact that a political figure, a military 
commander, even a group of people adopted a particular course of action as the consequence of a particular 
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 The passage on Eunus’ acclamation is particularly relevant to the new manner of 
investigation proposed above. As Diodorus tells us (34/5.2.14) 
 
ἐκεῖθεν αἱρεῖται βασιλεὺς ὁ Εὔνους οὔτε δι’ ἀνδρείαν οὔτε διὰ στρατηγίαν, διὰ δὲ µόνην 
τερατείαν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἄρξαι, ἅµα δὲ καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας οἱονεί τινα καλὸν 
οἰωνὸν ἐχούσης πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὑποταττοµένων εὔνοιαν. 
 
(t)hen, Eunus was chosen king, and not because of his courage, nor his generalship, but only because 
of his knowledge of wonders and his setting of the revolt in motion, but also at the same time because 
his name seemed to hold some favourable omen in respect to the goodwill of his subjects. 
 
Diodorus acts, at this point, as a covert external narrator. That is to say that he does not 
overtly intrude into the narrative, nor was he taking an active part in the events described.190 
He does not openly give his opinion of what is going on, and instead uses an implicit 
focalisation to put the thoughts into the heads of the rebels, all in his role as omniscient 
narrator.191 The absence of any words indicating uncertainty or postulation on his part, 
however, should not confuse or obscure what the narrator is doing: despite his covert 
presence and apparent reticence to intrude, Diodorus is here diving beneath the surface of his 
narrative to provide information that it is highly unlikely he had and a judgement on that 
information. Unless the acclamation was most irregular it is improbable that the rebels chose 
to acclaim Eunus for the reasons given. We must remember the context: Eunus had just won 
a significant military victory, secured the first stronghold of the rebellion, and to this point 
shown himself, to the rebels, to be nothing but a good leader with a certain élan for military 
timing, all features that fit with a Hellenistic ideology of kingship and acclamation. These are 
far better, and far more Hellenistic reasons to acclaim Eunus. What we are being told by 
Diodorus is, at this point, in contradiction of what we have been shown of Eunus.192 It would 
seem that in a direct challenge of the events being narrated Diodorus chose to engage with his 
audience using language that reflected a strong strand of Hellenistic ideology about kingship, 
and also related to Diodorus’ own internal values of kingship, albeit in a negative sense 
                                                                                                                                                        
idea, opinion or judgement when that was at best the historian’s own assessment of the reason for the action, an 
inference back from the act to the thought’ (my emphasis). The same, as we will see, can be said of Diodorus. 
190 The distinction between an ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ narrator follows the distinction put forward by Lubbock 
(1921), 62, 67, although the terminology of ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ does not stem from his work. 
191 An omniscient narrator is quite at odds with that which we might expect to find in a modern historiographical 
text, where admissions of ignorance are accepted. The presence of an omniscient narrator in a historiographical 
narrative, moreover, ought to make us focus much more closely not only on the veracity of what we are reading, 
but also its purpose. 
192 See Booth (1961), 3-9, for a discussion of this concept, and an explication of ‘telling’ as opposed to 
‘showing’. 
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(ἀνδρεία; στρατηγία). In keeping with Aristotle’s pronouncement (Rh. 3.14.7-8) that a 
speaker causes an audience to like a figure through carefully chosen agreeable traits, 
Diodorus caused his readers to side against Eunus by telling his audience that Eunus was the 
opposite of what the narrative showed that he was. 
 
At this stage in the narrative, moreover, Eunus has not yet been ‘shown’ to be a 
coward,193 we only have Diodorus’ word for it. In order for this pronouncement to be 
agreeable to his audience, Diodorus had to link his depiction to the beliefs and attitudes with 
which his readers would identify. This desire for the narrative to be agreeable, or 
‘identifiable’, in turn led to language which, as we have seen, connected to Hellenistic ideals 
about kingship and stereotypes of religious behaviour. While we have no proof of Eunus’ 
unsuitability, Diodorus’ version is a plausible depiction, and intentionally so. It says more 
about his and his expected audience’s views on the critical faculties of the rebels for selecting 
the leader they did, and the merits of that leader than it does about the rebels themselves. 
Furthermore, Diodorus’ use of the expression ἀνδρεία τε καὶ στρατηγία, seen already in his 
Bibliotheke so often, sets up an anticipation in the audience of what is to follow: the moment 
Eunus is described as elected οὔτε δι’ ἀνδρίαν, ‘not because of his courage’, the audience, by 
this point familiar with Diodorus’ narrative style, can already predict the completion of the 
phrase (οὔτε διὰ στρατηγίαν, ‘nor his generalship’). As Burke put it (1959: 58): ‘...you will 
find yourself swinging along with the succession of antitheses.’ The predictable flow of 
Diodorus’ prose is itself a rhetorical device.  
 
 Nor are these rhetorical and narratological considerations found only in the passage 
above. When the rebels approached Eunus to gain approval for their plans, Diodorus provides 
a narrative of events (34/5.2.24b; see also 34/5.2.10): 
 
Ὅτι συνετίθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ δοῦλοι περὶ ἀποστάσεως καὶ φόνου τῶν κυρίων. 
παρελθόντες δὲ πρὸς τὸν Εὔνουν οὐκ ἄπωθεν διατρίβοντα ἠρώτων εἰ συγχωρεῖται παρὰ τῶν 
θεῶν αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευµένον. ὁ δὲ τερατευόµενος µετ΄ ἐνθουσιασµοῦ καὶ περὶ τίνων 
ἥκουσι ἀκούσας διεσάφησεν ὅτι διδόασιν αὐτοῖς οἱ θεοὶ τὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἐὰν µηδεµίαν 
ὑπερβολὴν ποιησάµενοι παραχρῆµα µὲν ἐγχειρήσωσι ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς· ὑπὸ γὰρ τῆς 
πεπρωµένης αὐτοῖς κεκυρῶσθαι πατρίδα τὴν Ἔνναν, οὖσαν ἀκρόπολιν ὅλης τῆς νήσου. 
τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούσαντες καὶ διαλαβόντες ὅτι τὸ δαιµόνιον αὐτοῖς συνεπιλαµβάνεται τῆς 
προαιρέσεως, οὕτως παρέστησαν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν ὥστε µηδεµίαν ἀναβολὴν 
                                                 
193 Even later in the narrative, while Eunus is in some respects ‘shown’ to be a coward, his actions in fleeing to a 
cave are judged by the narrator for his reader, leaving, as I have argued above, no room for interpretation (see 
Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.22). 
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τῶν δεδογµένων ποιεῖσθαι. εὐθὺς οὖν τοὺς µὲν δεδεµένους ἔλυον, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τοὺς 
πλησίον διατρίβοντας συλλαβόµενοι περὶ τετρακοσίους συνήθροισαν ἐπί τινος ἀγροῦ 
πλησίον ὄντος τῆς Ἔννης. συνθέµενοι δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πίστεις ἐπὶ σφαγίων ἐνόρκους 
νυκτὸς ποιησάµενοι καθωπλίσθησαν, ὥς ποτ΄ οὖν ὁ καιρὸς συνεχώρει· πάντες δὲ τὸ 
κράτιστον τῶν ὅπλων τὸν θυµὸν ἀνελάµβανον κατὰ τῆς ἀπωλείας τῶν ὑπερηφάνων κυρίων· 
καὶ τούτων ἀφηγεῖτο Εὔνους. 
 
The slaves agreed with one another about revolt and the murder of their masters. They came to Eunus, 
who was spending time not far away, and they asked if their decision was approved by the gods. He 
began working wonders in a frenzy, and when he heard why they had come he made clear that the gods 
gave them permission to revolt, so long as they did not delay but immediately undertook their 
enterprise: for it was fated that Enna, the citadel of the whole island, was fixed as their homeland. 
Since they had heard these words and believed that the divine power was assisting them in their plan, 
they were so disposed in their minds for revolt that they made no delay in what they had decided. 
Immediately, therefore, they set free those who had been bound and of the others they collected those 
that lived nearby, and assembled about four hundred in a certain area near Enna. After making a 
covenant among one another and taking oaths of trust by night over sacrifices, they armed themselves 
as opportunity allowed at that time: all of them took up the strongest weapon of all, a desire for the 
destruction of their arrogant masters: and Eunus was their leader. 
 
Several aspects of this narrative would suggest the action of an involved, but covert 
omniscient narrator. First, there are two instances of focalisation, in which we see the 
narrative through the eyes of the participants. We gain an insight into the minds of the rebels 
on hearing Eunus’ proclamation about their plans, and learn that τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούσαντες 
καὶ διαλαβόντες ὅτι τὸ δαιµόνιον αὐτοῖς συνεπιλαµβάνεται τῆς προαιρέσεως, ‘(s)ince they 
had heard these words and believed that the divine power was assisting them in their plan, 
they were so disposed in their minds for revolt that they made no delay in what they had 
decided’. This is a clear literary device, but not something that the narrator could have been 
party to. The same is the case with the later example of how the rebels arm themselves: 
πάντες δὲ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὅπλων τὸν θυµὸν ἀνελάµβανον κατὰ τῆς ἀπωλείας τῶν 
ὑπερηφάνων κυρίων, ‘all of them took up the strongest weapon of all, a desire for the 
destruction of their arrogant masters’. In this case, again, Diodorus is providing a stylistic 
and rhetorical flourish with information that he would not have known, but plausibly 
suggested, through careful focalisation. Prior to this the reader has learnt of Eunus’ 
charlatanism,194 and so the naïve acceptance of his word by the rebels is all the more telling. 
This also suggests that Eunus’ delaying of his prophecy was a deliberate narrative ploy, as 
proposed earlier, because it implies a more cynical manipulation of the gullible rebels. 
Furthermore, this description of Eunus’ actions, carefully tied into the language of 
                                                 
194 I would add that in this case also the narrator told his reader what to think of Eunus’ wonder-working, and 
did not demonstrate the falsity of the wonder-working. See Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.5-9. 
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τερατεία,195 was designed to create an identification in the reader with the negative 
connotations this term held, not only in general but also specifically in the narrative itself.196 
If we accept that major elements of this passage are fabrications, then we can see that the 
reader is being prepared by the author to judge the rebels and their leader negatively once 
again. 
 
 These two passages reflect a greater problem in Diodorus’ narrative. Critical aspects 
of Eunus’ character belong, at important moments in his characterisation, to the ideology 
Diodorus attempted to share with his audience,197 and to his own authorial artifice. In sum, 
the description of Eunus given by Diodorus reflects his judgement of Eunus and his efforts to 
make this portrayal resonate with his audience: what is most difficult is that these aspects 
were often placed into the narrative through focalisation. It is hard to say whether any of the 
behaviour ascribed to Eunus throughout the rest of the narrative is actually based on an 
accurate portrayal or Diodorus’ attempts to create a convincing, negative depiction that 
persuaded his audience to side against the rebel movement. It is also difficult to assess if 
Diodorus was appealing to opinion or truth in his depiction,198 although we can be certain that 
in specific passages his depiction was completely dependent on his ideas being shaped to 
appeal to his audience.199 We cannot tell, at this stage, if the continuation of these themes into 
the rest of the narrative reflects their truth, or their effective use as a rhetorical tool. While the 
narrative was doubtless based on some ‘hard-core’ of historical data, it would appear that 
                                                 
195 Eunus: τερατευόµενος ‘started working wonders’ (34/5.2.24b); see also 34/5.2.10: ὁ δὲ µετὰ τερατείας͵ ὡς 
εἰώθει… ‘He used his usual wonder-working’. 
196 We saw earlier that Diodorus made it clear in his introduction of Eunus that his prophetic abilities were not 
genuine: see 34/5.2.5-7. 
197 Even if the ideas present in Diodorus’ narrative came from Posidonius it still remains that the language is 
Diodoran in many places and that he chose to keep these ideas in his narrative; this then reflects Diodorus’ own 
identification with the narrative of Posidonius. This suggests that the ideas expressed had resonated in the 
ancient world for at least fifty years prior to Diodorus’ own composition. 
198 For Burke (1959), 54-5, either course could work, however a more palatable untruth is more effective than an 
unpalatable truth: in a sense this line can be seen in Aristotle (Rh. 1.9.30-1) when he proclaimed that it is easy to 
praise Athenians in Athens, and Scythian virtues amongst Scythians, the point being that a virtue palatable to the 
audience will always be received better than one unpalatable. In this case we should ask, what is the more 
palatable to Diodorus’ aristocratic reader: a concerted effort from a united front to redefine the boundaries of 
Hellenistic Sicily, or a failed slave rebellion led by an incompetent and cowardly charlatan? 
199 We would do well here to remember the words of Aristotle (Rh. 2.19.16-25) that, rhetorically, if something 
seems likely to have happened, but did not, and something else seems less likely, yet happened, the audience 
will believe the former over the latter. In our case, Diodorus told his reader early in Eunus’ description that he 
was a coward: it follows that if Eunus then fled, it would more likely have been through cowardice in the 
readers’ mind because of Diodorus’ work regardless of the actual reason. 
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Diodorus is engaged in the rhetorical and stylistic embellishment of his text that Woodman 
(1988: 70-116) has described as typical of ancient historical narratives.200  
 
VI.ii. Coinage, Rhetoric and Diodorus 
 
The proposed conclusion drives at another problem: how do we reconcile the hostile rhetoric 
of Diodorus’ narrative with the conclusions reached in the previous chapter? I argued there 
that the coinage of King Antiochus represented an appeal to the free people of Sicily, and as 
such suggested an altogether different view of the Sicilian Insurrection. Bearing in mind all 
that has been said about the undercurrents of intentions in language, we should look again at 
the language of imagery on King Antiochus’ coinage, for imagery is a language as much as 
the written word, and speaks with its own network of meanings and subtexts.201 
 
 If, as I have argued, the work of Diodorus appealed to and engaged with a collection 
of Hellenistic ideas concerning kingship and magic, then it follows that the coinage, through 
its own vocabulary of images connected to and appealed to an ideology as well. This 
ideology, I argued in the last chapter, was the history and culture of Sicily, which suggested 
in turn that the insurgents in the war were more diverse than suggested in the literary sources. 
If we consider the ideology of the coinage to have been expressed by an author, King 
Antiochus (or at least his administration), then the intended audience who may have shared 
the ideology would have been the people of eastern Sicily. Leaving aside, for the moment, the 
question of the success of the coinage’s appeal, this allows us to delve deeper into the 
perceptions of the conflict in the contemporary debate, at least from one angle. The efforts, 
only represented to us now through the coinage, showed that regardless of the origins of the 
conflict, King Antiochus’ side identified with the free of Sicily: we can see that, consciously 
or subconsciously, they viewed the conflict as one involving the free of Sicily against Rome. 
This was demonstrated by understanding the careful connections the imagery of King 
Antiochus’ coinage made to Sicilian history and culture through uses of types that had strong 
historical meanings in the Sicilian context. However, we also saw in the previous chapter that 
this appeal was not based on a generic appeal to Sicilians, but carefully chosen images that 
appealed to (or identified with) specific groups of Sicilians from specific areas in much the 
                                                 
200 Woodman (1988), 70-116, argued that Cicero had no problem with embellishing historical data with 
rhetorical, yet likely, narratio, which did not have to be accurate, provided it was rhetorically persuasive. 
201 See Toynbee (1956) and Hölscher (2004). 
99 
 
same way that the characterisation of Eunus in Diodorus appealed to certain aspects of 
Hellenistic ideology. 
 
Diodorus’ negation of King Antiochus’ legacy through the creation of the figure of 
Eunus can also be understood in the ancient context. The deliberate castigation of failed 
monarchs was typical of ancient historiography. King Eumenes III,202 who claimed to be the 
son of Attalus of Pergamum and led a rebellion against Roman interests in Asia Minor, was 
called Aristonicus203 in the sources who claimed he was not the rightful heir, even though 
other sources suggest that he may have had a claim;204 King Philip VI, who claimed to be the 
son of King Perseus of Macedonia and tried to retake his supposedly legitimate kingdom, is 
called Andriscus in the hostile ancient tradition.205 It is important that on the two occasions in 
the text of Diodorus that we discover knowledge of Eunus’ title as monarch, King Antiochus, 
once in Photius, once in the Constantinian excerpts, this knowledge does not appear to come 
from Diodorus’ own text, but from the excerptors.206 Therefore, it was known in the ancient 
world that Eunus, at least once king, was actually called King Antiochus, but no surviving 
literary source from that period or after uses that title in their text. I would argue that this 
suppression is intentional and is part of the hostile narrative against the kingdom of King 
Antiochus, represented in this chapter through the character-assassination of his literary 
proxy: Eunus. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The creation of Eunus as a literary proxy for King Antiochus raises many questions about the 
veracity of the other information contained in Diodorus’ narrative, as noted above. The text 
of Diodorus is deliberately rhetorical in its description of Eunus and Kleon. For Eunus, 
connections to Diodorus’ internalised ideas of ideal kingship (ἀνδρεία; στρατηγία) or external 
Hellenistic stereotypes of religious behaviour (τερατεία; τερατευόµενος; µάγος) served to 
brand him incapable of leadership, and therefore turned the ancient reader against him. For 
                                                 
202 This title is confirmed from cistophoric tetradrachms bearing the title Basileōs Eumenous, which would fit 
into no other system of dating unless Aristonicus was Eumenes III; see Habicht (2006), 233; Robinson (1954), 
1-8. 
203 Just. Epit. 36.4.5-12, 37.1.1-3; Strabo 13.4.2, 14.1.38; Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.26, 34/5.3; Livy, Per. 59; Oros. 
5.10.1-5; Eutr. 4.8.21-9, 4.9.1-23; Vel. Pat. 2.4.1; Plut. Vit. Flam. 21.6; Flor. 1.35.1-7. 
204 Plut. Mor. 184b; Sall. Hist. 4.69.8-9. 
205 Poly. 36.10; Diod. Sic. 31.40a, 32.15; Zonar. 9.28; Liv. Per. 48-50. 
206 See Appendix 7: King Antiochus’ Title in Diodorus. 
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Kleon, references to preconceptions about behaviour and character linked to geographical 
locations (Cilicia) or hostile rhetoric based on concepts of banditry (latro; λῃστής) created 
about him a natural cruelty at odds with his compatriot slaves. Furthermore his only 
redeeming feature, his brave death, was part of a narrative structure designed to contrast the 
bravery of a λῃστής-turned-στραηγός with the cowardly death of Eunus, further condemning 
Eunus through this contrast. The ideologies and beliefs used to construct these identities for 
Eunus and Kleon served to create a convincing rhetorical identification between Diodorus 
and his audience, with the aim of turning the ancient reader against the leadership of the 
Sicilian Insurrection. Moreover, Diodorus presented these ideologies and beliefs through 
narratological techniques that served to hide their origin: by focalising these ideas through the 
eyes of the rebels involved in the conflict, Diodorus distanced his narration from the claims it 
made. We cannot, therefore, trust that Diodorus’ text gives a clear and uncomplicated 
description of the events of the Sicilian Insurrection. 
 
Even so, we do not have to lose all of Diodorus’ narrative, since it must have been 
based on some ‘hard core’ of historical data,207 but it is necessary to acknowledge the 
rhetorical embellishments outlined in this chapter for what they are: the narrator’s 
adornments for a narrative he was creating. Nor should we accept, tout court, the ideology 
expressed by King Antiochus’ coinage: not all in Sicily were against Roman rule, and not all 
would have risen freely to join his cause. It is imperative, then, for us to combine the two 
forms of evidence, and see how best we can construct our own narrative of the conflict from 
the rest of Diodorus’ narrative; and while we do this, we must be sure to carefully understand 
and integrate the two competing stories about the Sicilian Insurrection we have seen so far.  
                                                 
207 Woodman (1988), 88-94, described as the ‘hard core’ those details of history that are ‘singular factual 
statements about the past’, such as the fact that a battle took place, or a consul triumphed; this terminology he 
took from McCullagh (1984), 26, who described the ‘hard core’ of historical data to be statements such as ‘the 
battle of Waterloo was fought on Sunday, 18 June 1815’. 
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III. Understanding An Anachronism in Diodorus’ Narrative 1: 
The Anachronism208 
 
 
τὰ δικαστήρια, ἀδοξοῦντα ἐπὶ δωροδοκίαις, ἐς τοὺς ἱππέας 
ἀπὸ τῶν βουλευτῶν µετέφερε… 
 
‘[Gaius Gracchus] transferred the courts of justice, which had become discredited 
by reason of bribery, from the senators to the knights…’ App. B Civ. 1.22. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter that both the narrative presented in Diodorus and its 
narrator are consistently actively involved in deciding how the information contained in the 
narrative is presented to their audience. The focus of that chapter was the depiction of Eunus 
and Kleon. In what follows, I will extend the understanding of Diodorus’ text as actively 
being shaped towards a purpose, i.e. as a working historical text, to the rest of the narrative. 
The analysis will concentrate on the moment in Diodorus’ text when we can most clearly see 
the efforts of the author to artificially bind the narrative structure of the text together for 
didactic purposes. This was achieved through an explanation of how the Sicilian Insurrection 
came to pass that is anachronistic. In the first part of this chapter, however, I will concentrate 
only on exposing clearly the anachronism in question, and fully explaining the historical 
problems it causes with the text as it stands. 
  
I. The Text of the Anachronism 
 
Diodorus’ narrative of the Insurrection’s course opens with an explanatory prelude for the 
conflict, detailing the development of Sicily in the preceding years.209 This prelude describes 
a rise of banditry among the herdsmen of Sicily which Diodorus connected to their 
mistreatment at the hands of their masters (34/5.2.1-2 and 25-30). The failure of the 
governors of Sicily to react to the development then rounds off the prelude (34/5.2.3 and 31), 
at which point our anachronism appears. Diodorus explains that the governors failed to act 
because of constraints placed on them by the extortion courts in Rome. Both the Photian 
                                                 
208 A version of Chapters III.1 and III.2 has been accepted for publication by Histos.  
209 The prelude is given by both Photius (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.1-3) and the Constantinian excerpts (34/5.2.25-31) 
with some degree of overlap, although the Constantinian excerpts are far more detailed. 
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epitome and the Constantinian excerpts give this passage, in a very similar manner (34/5.2.3 
and 34/5.2.31 respectively): 
 
οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ κωλύειν µὲν ἐπεχείρουν, κολάζειν δὲ οὐ τολµῶντες διὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὸ 
βάρος τῶν κυρίων, οἳ ἐδέσποζον τῶν λῃστῶν, ἠναγκάζοντο περιορᾶν λῃστευοµένην τὴν 
ἐπαρχίαν· οἱ πλεῖστοι γὰρ τῶν κτητόρων ἱππεῖς ὄντες τῶν Ῥωµαίων, καὶ κριταὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἐπαρχιῶν κατηγορουµένοις στρατηγοῖς γινόµενοι, φοβεροὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὑπῆρχον. 
 
The governors tried to repress them, but did not dare to punish them because of the power and 
influence of the men who were the masters of the bandits, so they were forced to disregard the 
plundering of the province: for since most of the owners were Roman knights, and were judges for 
charges against governors from provinces, they caused fear in the governors. 
 
οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ κωλύειν µὲν ἐπεχείρουν τὴν ἀπόνοιαν τῶν οἰκετῶν, κολάζειν δὲ οὐ 
τολµῶντες διὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὸ βάρος τῶν κυρίων ἠναγκάζοντο περιορᾶν τὴν ἐπαρχίαν 
λῃστευοµένην. οἱ πλεῖστοι γὰρ τῶν κτητόρων ἱππεῖς ὄντες ἐντελεῖς τῶν Ῥωµαίων, καὶ κριταὶ 
τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπαρχιῶν κατηγορουµένοις στρατηγοῖς γινόµενοι, φοβεροὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὑπῆρχον. 
 
The governors tried to repress the madness of the slaves, but did not dare to punish them, and because 
of the power and strength of the masters they were forced to disregard the plundering of the province. 
For since most of the owners were recognised Roman knights, and were judges for charges against 
governors from provinces, they caused fear in the governors. 
 
The historical inaccuracy here is quite clear. The ἱππεῖς…τῶν Ῥωµαίων, ‘Roman knights’,210 
refer to equites. The statement that the equites were the judges on the courts for charges 
against governors, while certainly accurate in Diodorus’ day, is incorrect for the 130s B.C. 
The first court to be permanently established for trying cases of extortion was established in 
149 B.C., which is before the time of the Sicilian Insurrection, but this court was not 
composed in the manner in which Diodorus describes in his narrative. Rather than having a 
jury composed of equites, the proceedings took place in front of a board of senators, after an 
appeal had been made to a praetor, believed to be the praetor peregrinus.211 Diodorus could 
not have been referring to this court, and so we must look to the later history of the extortion 
courts. The next major change to the system of extortion courts that we know of took place at 
the earliest in 123 or 122 B.C. The lex Acilia set up a court in which the provincials 
themselves could bring extortion cases against governors, either with or without a Roman 
patronus.212 The case was then brought before a jury of fifty men chosen by a complex 
system of selection and rejection from a standing panel selected each year by the praetor of 
                                                 
210 We should note that the passage from the Constantinian excerpts is slightly different, including the additional 
information that these equites were also ἐντελεῖς, ‘recognised’: they were not only equites, but notable ones. 
211 Jones (1972), 48-9; Stockton (1979), 139; Mitchell (1986), 1; Lintott (1992), 14-6; Lintott (1993), 99-100. 
212 I agree with the arguments put forward by Lintott (1992), 166-9 and Crawford (1996), 49-50, that the tabula 
Bembina lex repetundarum records the lex of a colleague of C. Gracchus, rather than a later lex by C. Servilius 
Glaucia in 104 or 101 B.C. For this reason the following discussion is based on the reconstruction of the lex 
Acilia from the tabula Bembina. 
103 
 
four hundred and fifty men.213 The selection of this jury is the most interesting and pertinent 
part of the lex Acilia and relates directly to the account of Diodorus. 
 
The text of the lex Acilia stipulates very stringent limitations on the composition of 
the jury. The selected individuals had to be between thirty and sixty years old, could not be or 
have been major or minor magistrates, and could not be senators or the fathers, sons or 
brothers of senators.214 The text of the lex Acilia does not, however, preserve any positive 
qualifications. The account of Appian about the reform of the extortion courts states that C. 
Gracchus gave control of these courts to the equites (B Civ. 1.22). A passage from Pliny the 
Elder, however, suggests that the people to whom the courts were given were merely a group 
of people who came to be known as the equites, but were first known as iudices (HN 33.34). 
Jones (1972: 86-90) argued that this indicates that the positive qualification defined in the law 
was one of census qualification, that is of owning 400,000 sesterces, which is the census 
qualification required to be part of the eighteen voting centuries that were given the public 
horse. In time, this body became thought of as part of the equites, and was certainly thought 
of as such by the late Republic.215 Herein there may lie an additional anachronism: not only 
were the extortion courts changed in the manner described by Diodorus at the earliest in 123 
or 122 B.C., and therefore a full ten years after the end of the Sicilian Insurrection, but it was 
also the creation of this new court that led to the formation of the greater body known as the 
equites that Diodorus sees as so important to his narrative. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I am by no means the first to note this mistake in Diodorus, nor is the anachronism difficult to 
explain in terms of the basic details. However, a thorough understanding of how the text is 
mistaken at this point is vitally important for understanding how the whole prelude to the 
Insurrection is constructed by Diodorus, and how it seeks to link, artificially, two historical 
events that were in fact unconnected. In the following section of this chapter, I will show that 
the anachronism is in fact both the lever with which we can prise apart the logical 
                                                 
213 Lex repetundarum 6-8,12-5 (RS, Crawford). See Jones (1972), 49-50; Stockton (1979), 141; Mitchell (1986), 
2; Lintott (1992), 20-2; Lintott (1993), 101-2; Crawford (1996), 97. 
214 Lex repetundarum 12-8 (RS, Crawford). See Jones (1972), 49; Stockton (1979), 142; Mitchell (1986), 2; 
Lintott (1992), 21; Lintott (1993), 101-2; Crawford (1996), 98-100. 
215 Badian (1972), 82-4. 
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construction of the narrative and the tool with which we can begin to understand the purpose 
of various narrative elements in Diodorus’ account of the Sicilian Insurrection. 
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III. Understanding An Anachronism in Diodorus’ Narrative 2: 
The Narrative Function 
 
 
‘Further, attempts at repression on the part of Roman governors were of no avail: 
pressure exercised on them by wealthy slaveowners preempted their efforts, 
and their owners simply connived at and encouraged the illegalities of 
their pastores because they themselves benefited from them.’ Bradley (1989), 54. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous section of this chapter, I described and explained an anachronistic feature of 
Diodorus’ Sicilian Insurrection narrative. In what follows I will show why understanding this 
anachronism is so important for correctly interpreting the narrative in which it was placed. 
Typically the issue highlighted in the previous section of this chapter is dismissed as 
Diodorus (or Posidonius) mistaking generic aristocratic pressure on the praetores for the very 
real threat of legal retribution that made sense in his own time: essentially, it is argued, the 
text is fundamentally correct, as only the finer details are mistaken, which are easily 
accounted for.216 In what follows, I will demonstrate that this approach, in which the 
anachronism is excused with a probable historical gloss, represents a gross misunderstanding 
of what the anachronism represents in the Diodoran narrative, and how we can use it to 
further our analysis of Diodorus. 
 
We should start from the following proposition: the anachronism is proof of active, 
covert and unsuccessful authorial intervention. From this perspective, it is less important to 
suggest explanations for how the information in the narrative is partially correct. Moreover, 
with this understood, we are able to investigate, much more clearly, the narrative function of 
the anachronism, and the relationship of the narrator to the causal logic underlying the 
narrative. With this proposition in mind, we should now turn to the description of the events 
                                                 
216 Frank (1935), 62; Green (1961), 13-4; Vogt (1965), 25-6; Forte (1972), 98-9; Verbrugghe (1972), 544-5; 
Goldsberry (1973), 242; Dumont (1987), 214-5; Bradley (1989), 54; Matsubara (1998), 166-72; Sacks (1990), 
146-50; Shaw (2001), 13; Urbainczyk (2008a), 11. Finley (1968), 139-44 makes no mention of the anachronism 
in his discussion of the war. Verbrugghe (1975), 197-204, explains this anachronism as an example of 
Posidonius composing his history through the use of a narrative template, which, when projected backwards in 
history, became anachronistic. Manganaro (1980), 438, sees this as an example of ‘l’ostilità [di Posidonio] verso 
la classe equestre romana’; see also Manganaro (1967), 211, for an earlier version of this argument. Farrington 
(1936), 21-2, misses the anachronism completely, and takes Diodorus’ explanation at its word. 
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that this anachronism was attempting to explain to explore the potential for a new explanation 
of them. 
 
I. Background and Prelude 
 
First, let us turn to the function of the anachronism in the narrative: it serves as a means of 
connecting together two different parts of the narrative. While it comes at the end of an 
extended introduction to the condition of Sicily prior to the Insurrection, and effectively 
concludes that introduction, it also provides the step that then links this description to the 
following narrative. As an introduction and background to the more detailed account of the 
Sicilian Insurrection Diodorus describes the development of banditry on the island in the 
preceding years, presenting this development as the αἰτία of the conflict.217 Both Photius and 
the Constantinian excerpts contain versions of this narrative; however, as is so often the case, 
the version from the Constantinian excerpts is the more detailed. Following Diodorus’ 
narrative I will split my analysis into two sections: the first will discuss actions of the 
landowners in Sicily (the cause), and the second will consider the results of these actions (the 
effect). 
 
 Diodorus describes the actions of the landowners as follows (34/5.2.1-2, 27): 
 
ἐπὶ πολὺ τοῖς βίοις ἀναδραµόντες καὶ µεγάλους περιποιησάµενοι πλούτους συνηγόραζον 
οἰκετῶν πλῆθος, οἷς ἐκ τῶν σωµατοτροφείων ἀγεληδὸν ἀπαχθεῖσιν εὐθὺς χαρακτῆρας 
ἐπέβαλλον καὶ στιγµὰς τοῖς σώµασιν. ἐχρῶντο δὲ αὐτῶν τοῖς µὲν νέοις νοµεῦσι, τοῖς δ΄ 
ἄλλοις ὥς πῃ ἑκάστῳ ἡ χρεία ἐπέβαλλε. βαρέως δ΄ αὐτοῖς κατά τε τὰς ὑπηρεσίας ἐχρῶντο, 
καὶ ἐπιµελείας παντελῶς ὀλίγης ἠξίουν, ὅσα τε ἐντρέφεσθαι καὶ ὅσα ἐνδύσασθαι. 
 
Since they had become more prosperous in their daily lives and acquired great wealth they were 
buying up a large number of slaves, onto whose bodies, as they were led away from the slave merchant 
like cattle, they were inflicting brands and marks. They employed the young men as herdsmen, while 
they employed the others in such ways as need arose for each. They abused them with a heavy hand in 
their service, and altogether thought them worthy of the minimum of care as far as concerned food and 
clothing. 
 
                                                 
217 This vocabulary is present in the Photian version just before the beginning of the introductory narrative 
(34/5.2.1): ὁ δουλικὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπανέστη πόλεµος ἐξ αἰτίας τοιαύτης, ‘the slave war rose up against them for the 
following reasons’. This Polybian vocabulary is also reflected in a later section of Diodorus’ narrative in which 
the story of Damophilus is described as being (34/5.2.9) ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ὅλης ἀποστάσεως, ‘the start of the whole 
revolt’. This is very similar to Polybius’ theory of causation outlined in Book 3.6-7 of his History, in which he 
differentiates between the αἰτίαι, ἀρχαί, and the προφάσεις of wars: that is, following Walbank (1972), 158, the 
matters contributing to the decision to go to war, the first acts of the war, and the pretext under which war was 
declared respectively. 
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Ὅτι παραπλησίως καὶ πρὸς τὰς γεωργίας ἕκαστος τῶν πολλὴν χώραν κεκτηµένων ὅλα 
σωµατοτροφεῖα συνηγόραζον· ... τοὺς µὲν πέδαις δεσµεύειν, τοὺς δὲ ταῖς βαρύτησι τῶν 
ἔργων καταπονεῖν, πάντας δὲ τοῖς ὑπερηφάνοις χαρακτῆρσι κατέστιζον. διὸ δαὶ τοσοῦτο τῶν 
οἰκετῶν ἐπέκλυσε πλῆθος ἅπασαν Σικελίαν, ὥστε τοὺς ἀκούοντας τὴν ὑπερβολὴν µὴ 
πιστεῦσαι. καὶ γὰρ τῶν Σικελιωτῶν οἱ πολλοὺς πλούτους κεκτηµένοι διηµιλλῶντο πρὸς τὰς 
τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν ὑπερηφανίας τε καὶ πλεονεξίας καὶ κακουργίας. εἰς τοιαύτην γὰρ συνήθειαν 
ῥᾳδιουργίας τοὺς νοµεῖς ἤγαγον οἱ πολλοὺς οἰκέτας κεκτηµένοι τῶν Ἰταλικῶν ὥστε τροφὰς 
µὲν µὴ παρέχειν, ἐπιτρέπειν δὲ λῃστεύειν. 
 
In a similar fashion, the large landowners were buying whole slave markets to work their land ...218 to 
bind some with fetters, and to exhaust others with weight of work, and they marked all with arrogant 
brands. In consequence, so large a multitude of slaves flooded all Sicily, that those who heard the 
extravagant numbers did not believe them. For those of the Sicilian Greeks who had acquired much 
wealth were contending hotly with the Greeks of Italy in arrogance, greed and wickedness. The Italians 
who had acquired many slaves allowed their herdsmen such a self-indulgent life-style that they did not 
provide them food, but permitted them to plunder. 
 
In essence the content of the Photian passage agrees with the Constantinian excerpt, though it 
provides less detail and as we will see, it misses subtle nuances in the terminology. We can 
see that both narratives provide the same description of the landowners’ actions: they mistreat 
their slaves and do not provide adequate support to their herdsmen. Both also differentiate 
between the general bad treatment, and the specific treatment given to the herdsmen. Here 
though, the nuances of the terminology are lost by Photius, and are preserved only by the 
Constantinian excerpt. In the first line of the Photian version, there is no subject specified, but 
from the context of the Photian epitome it would appear to be the Sicilians. The lines 
immediately preceding read (34/.5.2.1): Ὅτι µετὰ τὴν Καρχηδονίων κατάλυσιν ἐπὶ ἑξήκοντα 
ἔτεσι τῶν Σικελῶν εὐροούντων ἐν πᾶσιν, ὁ δουλικὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπανέστη πόλεµος ἐξ αἰτίας 
τοιαύτης, ‘After the destruction of Carthage, when things had been flowing smoothly for the 
Sicilians in every respect for sixty years, the slave war rose up against them for the following 
reason.’ Were we to have only Photius it would appear that the mistreatment being described 
was the sole responsibility of the Sicilians; but the Constantinian excerpt shows this not to be 
the case: it appears that the Ἰταλιωταί ‘Greeks of Magna Graecia’ were in competition with 
the practices of the Σικελιωταί ‘Sicilian Greeks’ with regard to their slaves, whereas the 
Ἰταλικοί ‘Italians’ were specifically those who allowed the herdsmen to get out of hand. 
Sacks (1990: 144-51) concluded that this narrative actually comprised two separate 
narratives, with one blaming the Greeks of Sicily and Magna Graecia which came from 
Posidonius, and another blaming Italians and Romans that came from Diodorus, or some 
                                                 
218 The manuscript is defective here. 
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other Sicilian source.219 I do not think we need to be this complex, at least to understand the 
purpose of this narrative in the context of the Sicilian Insurrection. For example, in a passage 
that most likely introduced the whole narrative, Diodorus more generally states that the 
mistreatment of slaves was a general malaise among the slave-owners on the island 
(34/5.2.26): 
 
διὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εὐπορίας τῶν τὴν κρατίστην νῆσον ἐκκαρπουµένων ἅπαντες 
σχεδὸν οἱ τοῖς πλούτοις προκεκοφότες ἐζήλωσαν τὸ µὲν πρῶτον τρυφήν, εἶθ΄ ὑπερηφανίαν 
καὶ ὕβριν. ἐξ ὧν ἁπάντων αὐξανοµένης ἐπ΄ ἴσης τῆς τε κατὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν κακουχίας καὶ τῆς 
κατὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀλλοτριότητος, ἐρράγη ποτὲ σὺν καιρῷ τὸ µῖσος. 
 
For because of the excessive wealth of those enjoying the fruits of the most excellent island, nearly all 
of those who had become wealthy strove after first luxury, then arrogance and insolence. Because of 
this, and since the mistreatment of the slaves and their estrangement from their masters increased 
equally, there was, when opportune, a general outburst of hatred. 
 
It is not especially problematic that specific actions were attributed to the Italians regarding 
their herdsmen, which led to the herdsmen’s reaction. Furthermore, that Photius appears to 
miss this is not critical. He has compressed this part of the narrative so heavily that he 
provides no subject for his verbs, as we have seen. So perhaps the text need not be so difficult 
to interpret: the narrative is at least clear that the Sicilians, apparently competing with the 
Italian Greeks, were mistreating their slaves. This does not create undue problems with the 
introduction of the Italians who then figure so prominently in the overture to the war, 
especially since the narrator earlier confirms that mistreatment of slaves was a universal 
cause of revolt: essentially the αἰτία for the war. We do not need two different sources of 
information to understand why everyone was complicit in the treatment, or that some 
engaged in mistreatment in one form, some in another: in the narrative it works. We should 
now turn to the effect of their actions. 
 
II. Herdsmen and Praetors 
 
Once again in parallel passages, the results of the Italians’ – and to a lesser extent the 
Sicilians’ – mistreatment are narrated by Diodorus, leading to the introduction of the law-
                                                 
219 Verbrugghe (1972), 544-5, seems to consider the law-court anachronism, and the resulting confusion about 
who was to blame, was due to cross-contamination from the narrative of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave 
War. 
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courts anachronism. The Constantinian excerpt appears to record the details very closely 
(Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.28-30):220 
 
τοιαύτης δοθείσης ἐξουσίας ἀνθρώποις διὰ µὲν τὴν ἰσχὺν τῶν σωµάτων δυναµένοις πᾶν τὸ 
κριθὲν ἐπιτελεῖν, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἄνεσιν καὶ σχολὴν εὐκαιροῦσι, διὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἔνδειαν 
ἀναγκαζοµένοις ταῖς παραβόλοις ἐγχειρεῖν πράξεσιν, συνέβη ταχὺ τὴν παρανοµίαν 
αὐξηθῆναι. τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις τόποις τοὺς καθ΄ ἕνα καὶ δύο τὰς 
ὁδοιπορίας ποιουµένους ἐφόνευον· εἶτα ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων ἐπαύλεις νυκτὸς ἀθρόοι 
συντρέχοντες ἐξῄρουν βίᾳ ταύτας καὶ τὰς κτήσεις διήρπαζον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθισταµένους 
ἀνῄρουν. ἀεὶ δὲ µᾶλλον τῆς τόλµης προβαινούσης, οὔτε τοῖς ὁδοιπόροις νυκτὸς ἡ Σικελία 
βάσιµος ἦν οὔτε τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας ζῆν εἰωθόσιν ἀσφαλὴς ἐπὶ ταύτης ἡ διατριβή, πάντα δὲ 
βίας καὶ λῃστείας καὶ παντοδαπῶν φόνων ἦν µεστά. τοῖς δὲ νοµεῦσιν ἀγραυλίας γεγενηµένης 
καὶ σκευῆς στρατιωτικῆς, εὐλόγως ἅπαντες ἐνεπιµπλῶντο φρονήµατος καὶ θράσους· 
περιφέροντες γὰρ ῥόπαλα καὶ λόγχας καὶ καλαύροπας ἀξιολόγους καὶ δέρµατα λύκων ἢ 
συάγρων ἐσκεπασµένοι τὰ σώµατα καταπληκτικὴν εἶχον τὴν πρόσοψιν καὶ πολεµικῶν ἔργων 
οὐ πόρρω κειµένην. κυνῶν τε ἀλκίµων ἄθροισµα συνεπόµενον ἑκάστῳ καὶ τροφῆς καὶ 
γάλακτος καὶ κρεῶν παρακειµένων πλῆθος ἐξηγρίου τάς τε ψυχὰς καὶ τὰ σώµατα. ἦν οὖν 
πᾶσα χώρα µεστὴ καθάπερ στρατευµάτων διεσπαρµένων, ὡς ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν 
ἐπιτροπῆς τοῦ θράσους τῶν δούλων καθωπλισµένου. 
 
Since power such as this had been given to men who, because of their physical strength were able to 
accomplish everything they chose, and because of their licence and leisure had the opportunity, and 
because of their lack of food were compelled to undertake perilous tasks, it came about that there was a 
swift increase in lawlessness. For first they murdered those who travelled singly or in pairs in 
conspicuous221 places: then, coming together in bands, they attacked in the night the farm houses of the 
weak, and were destroying them by force and were plundering the possessions and were killing those 
who resisted. Since their courage kept growing ever greater, by night Sicily was not passable to 
travellers, and for those accustomed to living in the countryside it was not safe to spend time there. 
Everywhere was filled with violence, banditry and killings of all kinds. Since the herdsmen were 
experienced in the countryside and equipped like soldiers, they all were, with good reason, full of 
arrogance and boldness: for since they were carrying clubs, spears and remarkable shepherd’s crooks, 
and covered their bodies with the hides of wolves or wild boars, they had a striking appearance and one 
that was not far from warlike. A pack of fierce dogs following each man, and a plentiful supply of milk 
and meat being available made their bodies and minds wild. Therefore the whole countryside was full 
as though of scattered armies, as if the boldness of the slaves had been armed by the guardianship of 
the masters. 
 
The text is then concluded by ‘our’ anachronism: ‘The governors tried to repress the madness 
of the slaves, but did not dare to punish them, and because of the power and strength of the 
masters they were forced to disregard the plundering of the province. For since most of the 
landowners were recognised Roman knights, and were judges for charges against governors 
from provinces, they caused fear in the governors.’ It is an impressively circumstantial 
descent into lawlessness. The anachronistic reference to praetors unable to act because of 
                                                 
220 There is a parallel passage in the Photian version, but it is so compressed it does not appear to be of any use 
as a comparative example (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.2): ἐξ ὧν οἱ πλείους ἀπὸ λῃστείας τὸ ζῆν ἐπορίζοντο͵ καὶ µεστὰ 
φόνων ἦν ἅπαντα͵ καθάπερ στρατευµάτων διεσπαρµένων τῶν λῃστῶν. ‘The majority of them provided 
themselves with a livelihood through banditry, and everywhere was full of bloodshed, since the bandits were 
scattered like armies of soldiers.’ 
221 Critical notes suggest an ἀν to start the word, therefore ‘inconspicuous’. Perhaps, although the narrative is 
not inexplicable without this. 
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legal repercussions serves to amplify the magnitude of the problem: not only was there 
banditry, but no-one could stop it because the authorities at the time had their hands tied. This 
description has been used to reconstruct the development of slavery in Sicily in this period, 
including the causal link between mass-mistreatment of slaves and revolt;222 but we know, 
because the passage concerning the law-courts is anachronistic, that it must be understood as 
direct authorial intervention. The anachronism’s purpose is clear: the amplification of the 
problem that the herdsmen of Sicily were causing creates an apocalyptic setting for the events 
to come. Bearing this proposition in mind the question that remains is this: why did the 
narrator need to intervene? The answer, I would suggest, is that this αἰτία served to integrate 
the completely unrelated ἀρχὴ of the Insurrection into the larger picture of provincial 
mismanagement formed by the αἰτία. 
 
III. ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀπόστασεως 
 
Diodorus noted that, despite his own description of the rise of banditry, the true start of the 
war was the depredations Damophilus visited on his slaves (34/5.2.9).223 He then proceeded 
to introduce the character and to describe his actions with regard to his slaves. The salient 
                                                 
222 For a detailed discussion of these issues see: Farrington (1936), 21; Green (1961), 10; Vogt (1965), 24-7; 
Manganaro (1967), 211-2; Finley (1968), 137-9; Verbrugghe (1972), 540-58; Manganaro (1980), 437; Sacks 
(1990), 147-9; Dumont (1987), 213-5, 246-7; Bradley (1989), 47-55; Shaw (2000), 11-2; Urbainczyk (2008a), 
11-2, 41-2. Strabo (6.2.6) records a very similar account of why the revolt happened, with a focus on herdsmen. 
The passage appears to be grounded in the same logic as that of Diodorus, and is perhaps from the same source. 
For a discussion of the Polla Stone, often connected to the events of Sicily in this period, see Appendix 8: The 
Polla Stone. 
223 The line which links the rest of the narrative to Damophilus is preserved only in Photius, but in what follows 
the Constantinian excerpts on Damophilus will be used, as they preserve much greater detail of Diodorus’ 
account: the Constantinian excerpts record the story of Damophilus in 34/5.2.34-6, 38, 37+24b, roughly two full 
pages of the Loeb edition, while the Photian version (34/5.2.10) is barely a third of a Loeb page by comparison. 
A fragment of Posidonius, preserved in Athenaeus, also blamed Damophilus for the rise of the revolt (12.59.21-
9 = F59 Kidd): Ποσειδώνιος δ΄ ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ τῶν Ἱστοριῶν περὶ ∆αµοφίλου λέγων τοῦ Σικελιώτου͵ δι΄ ὃν ὁ 
δουλικὸς ἐκινήθη πόλεµος͵ ὅτι τρυφῆς ἦν οἰκεῖος͵ γράφει καὶ ταῦτα· τρυφῆς οὖν δοῦλος ἦν καὶ κακουργίας͵ διὰ 
µὲν τῆς χώρας τετρακύκλους ἀπήνας περιαγόµενος καὶ ἵππους καὶ θεράποντας ὡραίους καὶ παραδροµὴν 
ἀνάγωγον κολάκων τε καὶ παίδων στρατιωτικῶν. ὕστερον δὲ πανοικίᾳ ἐφυβρίστως κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον ὑπὸ 
τῶν οἰκετῶν περιυβρισθείς, ‘Posidonius, in the eighth book of his Histories, says about Damophilus of Sicily, 
because of whom the slave war was set in motion, that he was addicted to luxury, and he writes this: “He was 
therefore a slave of luxury and wickedness, leading round the countryside with him four-wheeled wagons, 
horses, beautiful attendants, an ill-bred following of flatterers and even of boys dressed as soldiers. But later he, 
with his whole household, wantonly ended his life after having been grievously insulted by his slaves’; for a 
discussion of this passage as evidence of Diodorus’ use of Posidonius and the interactions between the two 
texts, see Appendix 6: Merely a Slavish Copyist? See Mileta (1998), 142-3, for an argument that the very minor 
differences between the texts of Photius and the Constantinian excerpts reflect differing interpretations of 
Diodorus’ text, drawn from two different aims in their respective texts: this could well reflect the minor 
differences, but Mileta’s argument that this makes the two passages incompatible is not tenable. 
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passages – for the overall description of Damophilus is quite long – are as follows (34/5.2.34-
6): 
 
Ὅτι ∆αµόφιλός τις ἦν τὸ γένος Ἐνναῖος, τὴν οὐσίαν µεγαλόπλουτος, τὸν τρόπον 
ὑπερήφανος, ὃς πολλὴν χώρας περίοδον γεωργῶν, παµπληθεῖς δὲ βοσκηµάτων ἀγέλας 
κεκτηµένος οὐ µόνον τὴν τρυφὴν τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν Ἰταλικῶν ἐζήλωσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κατὰ 
τοὺς οἰκέτας πλῆθος καὶ τὴν εἰς τούτους ἀπανθρωπίαν καὶ βαρύτητα…ἀνάγωγος γὰρ καὶ 
ἀπαίδευτος τρόπος ἐξουσίας ἀνυπευθύνου καὶ τύχης µεγαλοπλούτου κυριεύσας τὸ µὲν 
πρῶτον κόρον ἐγέννησεν, εἶθ΄ ὕβριν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ὄλεθρόν τε αὐτῷ καὶ συµφορὰς 
µεγάλας τῇ πατρίδι. ἀγοράζων γὰρ οἰκετῶν πλῆθος ὑβρι στικῶς αὐτοῖς προσεφέρετο, 
στίγµασι σιδήρου χαράττων τὰ σώµατα τῶν ἐλευθέρων µὲν ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι γεγενηµένων, 
αἰχµαλωσίας δὲ καὶ δουλικῆς τύχης πεπειραµένων. καὶ τούτων τοὺς µὲν πέδαις δεσµεύων εἰς 
τὰς συνεργασίας ἐνέβαλλε, τοὺς δὲ νοµεῖς ἀποδεικνύων οὔτ΄ ἐσθῆτας οὔτε τροφὰς ἐχορήγει 
τὰς ἁρµοττούσας. 
 
There was a certain Damophilus, whose family came from Enna, an exceedingly wealthy man, and of 
arrogant character, who, since he cultivated a vast circuit of land, and had acquired large herds of 
cattle, not only emulated the luxury of the Italians in Sicily, but even their great numbers of slaves and 
their inhumanity and arrogance towards them…For his ill-bred and uneducated nature, having gained 
possession of unaccountable power and an excessive fortune, first produced satiety, then wantonness, 
and finally ruin for himself and great misfortunes for his country. For, buying great numbers of slaves 
in the market, he used to treat them outrageously, branding marks on the bodies of those who had been 
born free in their own countries, but who had experienced the fate of slavery through capture in war. 
Some of them he fettered in chains and threw into worker’s barracks, while others he assigned as 
herdsmen, and provided neither appropriate clothing nor food. 
 
The links to the prelude provided by Diodorus are clear. Initially Damophilus is introduced as 
emulating the luxury, slaves and attitudes τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν Ἰταλικῶν, ‘of the Italians in 
Sicily’. Furthermore, by the end of the passage we are informed that Damophilus is exactly 
copying with his own herdsmen the treatment given to the herdsmen in the prelude: οὔτ΄ 
ἐσθῆτας οὔτε τροφὰς ἐχορήγει τὰς ἁρµοττούσας, ‘(he) provided neither appropriate clothing 
nor food’. Thus far there do not appear to be any problems: these two aspects clearly link 
Damophilus to Diodorus’ prelude, and would appear to account for its importance in the 
narrative. Yet, this story makes sense as a self-contained tale without any need for the 
background of general disorder in Sicily, or even Italians influencing Damophilus’ behaviour, 
as becomes clear when we consider the actions that actually caused Damophilus’ slaves to 
revolt. 
  
Diodorus indicates in another place what truly drove Damophilus’ slaves to revolt, 
and it is not connected to his treatment of herdsmen. In several associated passages from the 
Constantinian excerpts Damophilus’ actions, as well as those of his wife, are recorded toward 
domestic slaves (34/5.2.38, 37 and 24b): 
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Ὅτι ∆αµόφιλος ὁ Ἐνναῖός ποτε προσελθόντων αὐτῷ τινων οἰκετῶν γυµνῶν καὶ 
διαλεγοµένων ὑπὲρ ἐσθῆτος οὐκ ἠνέσχετο τὴν ἔντευξιν, ἀλλ΄ εἰπών· Τί γάρ; οἱ διὰ τῆς χώρας 
ὁδοιποροῦντες γυµνοὶ βαδίζουσι, καὶ οὐχ ἑτοίµην παρέχονται τὴν χορηγίαν τοῖς χρείαν 
ἔχουσιν ἱµατίων; ἐπέταξε προσδῆσαι τοῖς κίοσι καὶ πληγὰς ἐµφορήσας ἐξαπέστειλεν 
ὑπερηφάνως. 
 
Ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ∆αµόφιλος διὰ τὴν αὐθάδειαν καὶ τὴν ὠµότητα τῶν τρόπων οὐκ ἦν ἡµέρα καθ΄ 
ἣν οὐκ ᾐκίζετό τινας τῶν οἰκετῶν ἐπ΄ αἰτίαις οὐ δικαίαις. οὐχ ἧττον δὲ ἡ γυνὴ τούτου 
Μεταλλὶς χαίρουσα ταῖς ὑπερηφάνοις τιµωρίαις ὠµῶς προσεφέρετο ταῖς θεραπαινίσι καὶ τῶν 
οἰκετῶν τοῖς ὑποπεσοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀµφοτέρων ὕβριν καὶ τιµωρίαν ἀπεθηριώθησαν οἱ 
δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς κυρίους, καὶ διαλαβόντες µηδὲν ἔτι χεῖρον τῶν παρόντων αὐτοῖς κακῶν 
ἀπαντήσεσθαι. ...  
 
Ὅτι συνετίθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ δοῦλοι περὶ ἀποστάσεως καὶ φόνου τῶν κυρίων. 
 
Damophilus of Enna, when some naked slaves approached him and talked with him about clothing, he 
could not endure the conversation, but said, “What? Do those who walk through the country go naked, 
and do they not offer a ready supply for those who need clothes?” He ordered them bound to pillars 
and beaten, and dismissed them arrogantly. 
 
Because of his wilfulness and cruelty of character, there was not a day when the same Damophilus was 
not mistreating some of his slaves without just cause. The wife of this man, Metallis224, who delighted 
no less in arrogant punishments, treated her maidservants, and the other slaves who fell in her way, 
cruelly. Because of the outrages and punishments from both of them, the slaves became brutal towards 
their masters, and believing that nothing worse than the present evils could come to them ...225 
 
The slaves agreed with one another about revolt and the murder of their masters. 
 
Here we see the actual cause of the revolt. In an important disconnection with the prelude 
given by Diodorus that focussed so intensely on the herdsmen and Italians, the treatment that 
caused an actual outbreak of revolt was directed, violently, at domestic slaves.226 The text is 
explicit that it was διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀµφοτέρων ὕβριν καὶ τιµωρίαν, ‘(b)ecause of the outrages and 
punishments from [their masters]’, that the slaves chose to revolt, and specifically because 
the slaves believed µηδὲν ἔτι χεῖρον τῶν παρόντων αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἀπαντήσεσθαι, ‘that 
nothing worse than the present evils could come to them’. A more stark contrast from the 
herdsmen is difficult to imagine, who were described as living in (34/5.2.27) συνήθειαν 
ῥᾳδιουργίας, ‘a self-indulgent life-style’, and (34/5.2.29) ἅπαντες…φρονήµατος καὶ θράσους, 
‘full of arrogance and boldness’. Damophilus’ excesses, attributed to his having learnt them 
from the Italians of Sicily, are described as being worse than those of the Persians and 
consequently, following the hyperbole, worse than those of the Italians. It was his own 
ἀνάγωγος γὰρ καὶ ἀπαίδευτος τρόπος, ‘ill-bred and uneducated nature’, not his learnt 
behaviour from the Italians, that τὸ µὲν πρῶτον κόρον ἐγέννησεν, εἶθ΄ ὕβριν, τὸ δὲ 
                                                 
224 More accurately recorded as Megallis in the Photian version: see Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.10, 14. 
225 The narrative picks up again immediately with no change in subject in 34/5.2.24b. 
226 This disconnection has been noted by Matsubara (1998) 166-7. 
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τελευταῖον ὄλεθρόν τε αὐτῷ καὶ συµφορὰς µεγάλας τῇ πατρίδι, ‘first produced satiety, then 
wantonness, and finally ruin for himself and great misfortunes for his country’ (all the above 
from 34/5.2.35). In fact, the critical aspects of Damophilus’ character and actions are all 
understandable without the prelude of Diodorus. When viewed in this light, the connection to 
herdsmen and Italians, which we have seen was engineered through the use of an 
anachronism, becomes yet more removed from the true causation of the Insurrection: it 
becomes a rhetorical connective gloss for the character of Damophilus, and nothing more. It 
appears that we have two separate narrative items: the αἰτία that ends our anachronism, and 
the ἀρχὴ that details Damophilus. 
 
Conclusion 
 
If we accept the above conclusion, there remains a final question: why was the artifice 
necessary? The answer lies in the bigger idea that the narrative was aiming to discuss. It is 
implied in a Constantinian excerpt that the whole narrative was used as a microcosmic 
example of the larger problem of how to organise civil society and avoid strife (34/5.2.33): 
 
Ὅτι οὐ µόνον κατὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς δυναστείας τοὺς ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ὄντας ἐπιεικῶς χρὴ 
προσφέρεσθαι τοῖς ταπεινοτέροις, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἰδιωτικοὺς βίους πρᾴως προσενεκτέον 
τοῖς οἰκέταις τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας. ἡ γὰρ ὑπερηφανία καὶ βαρύτης ἐν µὲν ταῖς πόλεσιν 
ἀπεργάζεται στάσεις ἐµφυλίους τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ µέρος τῶν ἰδιωτῶν οἴκοις 
δούλων ἐπιβουλὰς τοῖς δεσπόταις καὶ ἀπο στάσεις φοβερὰς κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι κατασκευάζει. 
ὅσῳ δ΄ ἂν τὰ τῆς ἐξουσίας εἰς ὠµότητα καὶ παρα νοµίαν ἐκτρέπηται, τοσούτῳ µᾶλλον καὶ τὰ 
τῶν ὑποτεταγµένων ἤθη πρὸς ἀπόνοιαν ἀποθηριοῦται· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ τῇ τύχῃ ταπεινὸς τοῦ µὲν 
καλοῦ καὶ τῆς δόξης ἑκουσίως ἐκχωρεῖ τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι, τῆς δὲ καθηκούσης φιλανθρωπίας 
στερισκόµενος πολέµιος γίνεται τῶν ἀνηµέρως δεσποζόντων. 
 
Not only in the exercise of political power should prominent men behave moderately to those who are 
humble, but also in their private lives, if they are wise, they should attend gently to their slaves. For 
just as arrogance and a heavy hand in cities produces civil conflicts among the free citizens, so in 
private homes it produces slave plots against their masters, and terrible revolts in common against 
cities. The more the powers that be might be changed into savagery and lawlessness, so much more are 
the characters of those subject to that power made savage to the point of despair: for all who chance 
has made humble willingly yield to those in power for virtue and good repute, but when deprived of 
good treatment become an enemy of those who savagely lord it over him. 
 
This excerpt comes immediately before the account of Damophilus, which would suggest that 
his story was, moreover, one designed to demonstrate the moralistic lesson outlined in this 
passage (see also Sacks 1990: 144-5). However, this passage’s relevance extends further. The 
anachronism, by amplifying the problem of the herdsmen through implications of 
administrative corruption, also fits the purpose outlined in the passage above, making the 
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whole narrative about a subject greater than the limited scope of a ‘slave war’. It would 
appear that the author of this narrative had a problem with how to present the events in 
question: unsure of why Sicily suddenly exploded into revolt in a wider sense, the author 
plausibly suggested an αἰτία grounded in tales of administrative mismanagement.227 The 
narrative demonstrates the benefits of healthy political practice through the example of an 
island that fell into a slave war through upper-class arrogance and greed. This αἰτία, 
moreover, then draws the ἀρχὴ involving Damophilus into the bigger debate: Italian greed 
and vice seeps beyond administrative misconduct and corrupts the practices of the Sicilians 
themselves, causing, indirectly, the ἀρχὴ of the revolt. Once this is made clear, the narratorial 
edifice falls apart: historically the explanation does not work. If we consider that even the 
introduction of Eunus into the narrative is tied to the anachronistic αἰτία,228 it is clear that we 
require a new context in which to interpret the remaining evidence. In the following section I 
will discuss how we can understand the narrative’s details once we discard the context 
provided in the narrative. 
                                                 
227 Verbrugghe (1975), 197-204, building on the work of Strasburger (1965), 43, argued this tale of 
administrative mismanagement was a narrative template that ‘Posidonius’ used to understand a conflict about 
which he only knew (Verbrugghe (1975), 192) ‘episodic adventure stories’. Verbrugghe (1975), 198-201, 
argued that this template was based jointly on what he called the latifundia of Italy in the 70s B.C. and the rise 
of piracy in the first century B.C. While this may well be the origin of the overall frame developed, this thesis is 
overly reliant on two hypotheses: first, that the source underlying Diodorus’ account is uncomplicatedly 
Posidonius; second, that the general details of the narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection appear to be disconnected 
from each other because they actually were disconnected details. On the first point, see Appendix 6: Merely a 
Slavish Copyist?; on the second point, it should be noted that with an account as fragmentary as that of the 
Sicilian Insurrection, it is impossible to tell, for the most part, if the disconnection of narrative details was the 
case in the original narrative, or merely the result of the process of epitomisation and excerption. The only point 
of clear disconnection in the narrative is between the αἰτία and the ἀρχὴ of the conflict, as outlined above. 
228 In the Photian epitome, as we will see, the anachronism is immediately followed by a general summation of 
the condition of the slaves in Sicily, and then a long introduction of Eunus (34/5.2.4-11). The Constantinian 
excerpts do not provide the long introduction of Eunus given in the Photian version (34/5.2.5-9), but jump 
almost directly to Damophilus, who would appear to be somewhat later in the narrative. 
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III. Understanding An Anachronism in Diodorus’ Narrative 3: 
Eunus and the Sicilian Insurrection 
 
 
‘Così finì questa guerra, che la tradizione posidoniana ha definito «servile» 
solo perché in essa ebbero un ruolo essenziale elementi servili: in realtà a fianco 
di questi avevano combatutto cittadini nullatenenti, solidali nella aspirazione alla 
libertà dal dominio di Roma.’ Manganaro (1980), 439. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
We have seen in the previous two sections of this chapter that Diodorus’ prelude to the 
narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection was connected to the main part of the narrative by means 
of an anachronistic αἰτία in which praetorian inaction was explained through Romano-Italian 
intervention. Furthermore, without this connection there is no explicit narratological link 
between the rise of banditry in Sicily concluded by the anachronism and the ἀρχὴ of the 
Sicilian Insurrection. The aim of this section will be to analyse the remaining narrative of 
Diodorus based on the new understanding of the narratological separation that exists within 
his account, and to suggest a new context in which to place the passages under consideration. 
 
I will argue that events central to the account of the Sicilian Insurrection can only be 
superficially linked to the prelude provided for the conflict. First, the account of Eunus, 
which is so central to the majority of the events of the war, and which provides the 
framework to connect all the events, will be shown to be completely explicable outwith the 
specific context provided by Diodorus. Indeed for Eunus, as for Damophilus in the previous 
section, it will be demonstrated that the material that connected him to the prelude in the 
narrative was merely a rhetorical connective gloss that should not affect our interpretation of 
Eunus’ purpose in the narrative. With these conclusions, it will then be necessary to consider 
– if the context provided in Diodorus is incorrect – what alternate context we can find. The 
new understanding of Eunus’ story gained in Chapter II means that we cannot use the 
narrative of Eunus to construct an accurate context for Diodorus’ narrative, and so we must 
turn to the context drawn out in Chapter I from the coinage of King Antiochus to create a 
more accurate analysis of Diodorus’ narrative within Sicilian history. Finally, it will be 
concluded that to label a conflict a ‘slave war’ which so clearly includes a wider range of 
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participants than merely slaves is a gross over-simplification that we must avoid, even if the 
ancient literary sources (as many modern authorities) were apt to use the term themselves. 
 
I. A Return to Eunus 
 
As I noted in the conclusion to the previous section of this chapter, one of the functions of the 
anachronism was to provide a method for introducing Eunus into the narrative. From this 
point on, with the notable exception of the section about Damophilus, the whole narrative 
revolves around the figure of Eunus discussed in Chapter II. In the Photian epitome of 
Diodorus, after Eunus is introduced at 34/5.2.5, he features in every section of the narrative 
apart from 34/5.2.19-20. He is the active agent at each critical juncture throughout, with the 
exception of 34/5.2.18 when Photius refers to the rebels as a whole in battle. It is also notable 
that Eunus is the very last rebel captured, and with his capture the narrative is wrapped up 
quite perfunctorily. In the Constantinian excerpts Eunus first appears at 34/5.2.24b when 
Damophilus’ slaves approach him. From here he does not feature as prominently as in the 
Photian epitome, but this could be because the Constantinian excerpts have a large number of 
moralising passages in them (34/5.2.33; 39; 40; 47). Otherwise, in the passages detailing 
actions taken by the rebels, Eunus appears as the active agent in five out of six passages.229 
How Diodorus introduces Eunus into the narrative is therefore important to understanding 
how he sought to integrate Eunus into the prelude provided. The specific question I want to 
address here is this: how does Eunus relate to the disconnected prelude given by Diodorus? 
 
I.i. Eunus’ Entry 
 
Immediately after rounding off his prelude with the law-courts anachronism, Diodorus 
provides a brief recapitulation of slave conditions before introducing Eunus. The passage is 
quite short, although it is unclear if this is because Photius compressed the passage (34/5.2.4): 
 
Πιεζόµενοι δὲ οἱ δοῦλοι ταῖς ταλαιπωρίαις καὶ πληγαῖς τὰ πολλὰ παραλόγως ὑβριζόµενοι, 
οὐχ ὑπέµενον. συνιόντες οὖν ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὰς εὐκαιρίας συνελάλουν περὶ ἀποστάσεως, 
ἕως εἰς ἔργον τὴν βουλὴν ἤγαγον. 
 
                                                 
229 Eunus appears actively in Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.24b, 41, 42, 43, and 46. The only other passage is Diod. Sic. 
34/5.2.40. 
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The slaves, oppressed by their hardships, and frequently ill-treated with blows beyond reason, could 
not endure. Therefore, meeting with each other as opportunity allowed, they talked together about 
revolt, until they put their plan into action. 
 
Following on from this is the long introduction of Eunus discussed in Chapter II (34/5.2.5-9) 
in which Eunus’ position as a domestic slave of Antigenes is established, as is his claim to be 
a wonder-worker (τερατευόµενος). The juxtaposition of these two passages would seem to 
make a clear suggestion: while the slaves were oppressed and chose to revolt, Eunus was a 
central part of the plan that they decided to put into action. The connection between the 
prelude and Eunus has been made; but as we have seen in the previous section, we need to 
question whether these connections between important events and the prelude are authorial 
artifice rather than a true reflection of historical causality. To answer this question, we have 
to again find the actual moment in the narrative at which Eunus enters as an active participant 
and how this is presented as fitting into the narrative. 
 
 In fact Eunus’ first active participation in the revolt, as opposed to his early 
interactions with his master and his master’s friends at dinner parties described in Diodorus’ 
introduction of Eunus (34/5.2.5-9), comes just after Damophilus had sparked the revolt as 
discussed in the previous section. I have already explored the passage in Chapter II when 
analysing the rhetorical and narratological strategies employed in the text to slander the 
character of Eunus, but here I would like to consider the passage in a narrative setting 
(34/5.2.37+24b):230 
 
καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀµφοτέρων ὕβριν καὶ τιµωρίαν ἀπεθηριώθησαν οἱ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς κυρίους, 
καὶ διαλαβόντες µηδὲν ἔτι χεῖρον τῶν παρόντων αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἀπαντήσεσθαι...  
 
Ὅτι συνετίθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ δοῦλοι περὶ ἀποστάσεως καὶ φόνου τῶν κυρίων. 
παρελθόντες δὲ πρὸς τὸν Εὔνουν οὐκ ἄπωθεν διατρίβοντα ἠρώτων εἰ συγχωρεῖται παρὰ τῶν 
θεῶν αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευµένον. ὁ δὲ τερατευόµενος µετ΄ ἐνθουσιασµοῦ καὶ περὶ τίνων 
ἥκουσι ἀκούσας διεσάφησεν ὅτι διδόασιν αὐτοῖς οἱ θεοὶ τὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἐὰν µηδεµίαν 
ὑπερβολὴν ποιησάµενοι παραχρῆµα µὲν ἐγχειρήσωσι ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς· ὑπὸ γὰρ τῆς 
πεπρωµένης αὐτοῖς κεκυρῶσθαι πατρίδα τὴν Ἔνναν, οὖσαν ἀκρόπολιν ὅλης τῆς νήσου. 
τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούσαντες καὶ διαλαβόντες ὅτι τὸ δαιµόνιον αὐτοῖς συνεπιλαµβάνεται τῆς 
προαιρέσεως, οὕτως παρέστησαν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν ὥστε µηδεµίαν ἀναβολὴν 
τῶν δεδογµένων ποιεῖσθαι…καὶ τούτων ἀφηγεῖτο Εὔνους. 
 
Because of the outrages and punishments from both of them, the slaves became brutal towards their 
masters, and believing that nothing worse than the present evils could come to them... 
 
                                                 
230 A similar passage is preserved in the Photian epitome, but it is heavily compressed by comparison; see Diod. 
Sic. 34/5.2.10-1. 
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The slaves agreed with one another about revolt and the murder of their masters. They came to Eunus, 
who was spending time not far away, and they asked if their decision was approved by the gods. He 
began working wonders in a frenzy, and when he heard why they had come he made clear that the gods 
gave them permission to revolt, so long as they did not delay but immediately undertook their 
enterprise: for it was fated that Enna, the citadel of the whole island, was fixed as their homeland. 
Since they had heard these words and believed that the divine power was assisting them in their plan, 
they were so disposed in their minds for revolt that they made no delay in what they had decided…and 
Eunus was their leader. 
 
The narrative here clearly assumes a prior knowledge of who Eunus was and how we are 
meant to react to his wonder-working, information provided earlier in the narrative by his 
introduction (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.5-9).231 We saw above that the rise of the Insurrection among 
Damophilus’ slaves had no clear link to the prelude provided by Diodorus, indeed any link 
suggested in the text was merely a rhetorical connective gloss because the connection related 
so superficially to what was actually important in the story of Damophilus. Likewise, it is 
only at this point in the account that Eunus becomes integrated firmly into the events: his 
earlier introduction, despite its connection to the prelude, was there merely to provide the 
essentials of Eunus’ character once he became important. However, the mere fact that the 
connection had been made before in Eunus’ introduction would mean that an unaware reader 
would proceed with reading the passage above without divesting it of the context implied 
through both the introduction of Eunus and the story of Damophilus: the Italians and the 
banditry would lurk at the back of their minds, as indeed they have for modern readers.232 
Understood correctly, there is no need for a link to Diodorus’ prelude: the presence of Eunus 
makes sense in the context of a small scale rising of slaves driven to despair by their 
individual master. The passage describes at best an episodic moment, an exemplum of how 
not to treat slaves for otherwise they will rise in outright revolt, and into this exemplum is 
drawn a larger-than-life character of a cowardly slave wonder-worker. A massive rise in 
banditry, the complicity of the Italians and Romans in the inaction of praetores, even the 
widespread inhumane treatment of slaves described in Sicily is unnecessary in order to 
understand this passage.233 It is now clear that even the subtle strands linking Eunus to the 
                                                 
231 This also confirms that the layout of the narrative given in Photius is accurate: it is very difficult to forge an 
understanding of how the narrative was structured from the Constantinian excerpts alone. 
232 Farrington (1936), 21-2; Green (1961), 10; Vogt (1965), 24-7; Manganaro (1967), 211-2; Finley (1968), 137-
9; Verbrugghe (1972), 540-58; Goldsberry (1973), 241-2; Manganaro (1980), 437; Dumont (1987), 233-9; 
Bradley (1989), 47-55; Sacks (1990), 147-9; Shaw (2000), 11-2; Urbainczyk (2008a), 11-2, 41-2. 
233 In this interpretation I go against nearly every modern scholar to have written on the subject, in which the 
inhumanity toward slaves generally, the complicity of Italians and Romans in the inaction of praetores 
(however this is realised) and the rise in banditry is typically foregrounded as the only explicable context for 
these events. See Farrington (1936), 20-3; Green (1961), 10; Vogt (1965), 25- 7; Manganaro (1967), 211-3; 
Finley (1968), 138-40; Forte (1972), 98-9; Goldsberry (1973), 241-3; Manganaro (1980), 436-8; Dumont 
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αἰτία that the text gave for the whole revolt, understood as authorial artifice because of the 
clear anachronism present in the connection, can now be left aside for what they are: tenuous, 
unnecessary and unhistorical. 
 
II. A New Context 
 
Understanding fully the purpose of the anachronism in the narrative presents an additional 
problem. If we cannot rely on the background context provided by Diodorus, we are left with 
the character of Eunus to bind together the disparate strands of the narrative, and give it 
shape. We have seen, however, that Eunus’ character in the narrative was not constructed 
along lines of strict historiographical ‘truth’, but had many layers of rhetorical meaning put 
into it. With every event in the narrative tied to his character and influenced by his presence, 
and his description so tied into rhetorical and narratological ends, we must be extremely 
careful when using Eunus’ story to reconstruct events; but without the structural context 
provided by Eunus’ story the events described in Diodorus become disconnected, and mean 
very little. 
 
All that remains is a notice that in Sicily, in 136 B.C., a conflict arose. This conflict 
took several years to be fully resolved, and only through the intervention of the highest level 
of Roman magistrates.234 At this point, the island was undergoing considerable internal 
turmoil, with the free poor of Sicily engaging in opportunistic looting (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.48). 
There is, nonetheless, another context in which to reconstruct the Sicilian Insurrection, one 
already shown in Chapter I, and reiterated in Chapter II. There I argued that another form of 
evidence, the coinage from the kingdom of King Antiochus, can best be understood as part of 
a Sicilian insurrection against the Roman dominance of the island, and the situation that 
Rome had created there. Not only was the coinage of King Antiochus most explicable in the 
context of an eastern Sicilian Hellenistic kingdom, but furthermore the island of Sicily was, 
in the period, a vibrant Hellenistic culture with strong civic identities throughout the island. 
With a declining interior, notably former Sicilian centres like Enna and Morgantina, and a 
burgeoning coast, represented by towns such as Catana, Syracuse and Messana, Sicily was an 
island divided in its fortunes, but King Antiochus’ kingdom, the same as that of Eunus, 
                                                                                                                                                        
(1987), 228-9, 241-8; Bradley (1989), 47-55; Sacks (1990), 144-9; Matsubara (1998); 157; Shaw (2000), 11-2; 
Urbainczyk (2008a), 11-3. 
234 Cic. Verr. 2.4.112; Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.20-3; Flor. 2.7.7-8; Liv. Per. 56, 58-9; Oros. 5.9.4-8; Val. Max. 2.7.3, 9; 
4.3.10; 6.9.8; 9.12.1. 
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represented the last efforts of the people of inland Sicily to redefine their futures. The 
disorder of the free poor I have argued reflected the divides present among the Sicilians. 
These divides were linked to Rome’s economic exploitation of the island, and the collusion in 
that exploitation by some among the ruling classes of Sicily. In short, the one detail that we 
know for certain about the conflict was that it was much more complex than simply what the 
label of a ‘slave rebellion’ implies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
So where do the slaves come from, if the narrative is incorrect? From where do the ancient 
authors drag out the spectre of a slave uprising with which to tar the actions of a significant 
portion of the free people of Sicily? I think we would do best to refrain from such absolute 
questions: perhaps the slaves were always there, fighting in the war, but only in the write-up 
did they become the most important aspect of the war. It is also highly probable that there 
was indeed servile unrest: I would argue that one reason that King Antiochus was so closely 
linked with a ‘slave rebellion’ was because he, like so many in the ancient world,235 freed 
slaves, or welcomed runaways from his enemies, in order to fight in his army.236 We can 
detect subtle hints of this in a passage of Diodorus preserved in the Constantinian excerpts. In 
a short, unconnected passage recounting the details of a siege,237 the rebels taunt in turn the 
Roman soldiers and the Sicilian inhabitants of the city they are besieging. The passage runs 
as follows (34/5.2.46): 
 
Ὅτι ὁ Εὔνους ἐκτὸς βέλους ἐπιστήσας τὴν δύναµιν ἐβλασφήµει τοὺς Ῥωµαίους, 
ἀποφαινόµενος οὐχ ἑαυτοὺς ἀλλ΄ ἐκείνους εἶναι δραπέτας τῶν κινδύνων. µίµους δὲ ἐξ 
ἀποστάσεως τοῖς ἔνδον ἐπεδείκνυτο, δι΄ ὧν οἱ δοῦλοι τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κυρίων ἀποστασίας 
ἐξεθεάτριζον, ὀνειδίζοντες αὐτῶν τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εἰς τὸν ὄλεθρον 
προαγούσης ὕβρεως. 
 
Eunus, having stationed his force beyond the range of the missiles, taunted the Romans, declaring that 
it was not his men, but they who were running away from danger. He displayed mimes from the revolt 
                                                 
235 Slaves were regularly freed in order to fight in ancient conflicts. See Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient Warfare 
for examples of the practice. 
236 There are a number of slingshots attributed to the Sicilian Insurrection; see Manganaro (2000) for the details. 
These appear to give the individual communities and sub-divisions in which Sicilian citizens were serving. 
However, interpretations that place these slingshots in the context of forces fighting for Rome assume, a priori, 
that this is the only capacity under which Sicilian citizens would fight: for this interpretation see Shaw (2000), 
105-6, 128-9, and Prag (2007a), 98-9. Bearing in mind the conclusions of this chapter, and the two preceding, it 
is equally plausible that these forces fought for King Antiochus. 
237 The siege of which city is unspecified; at the very least it is not that of Enna, as chronologically and 
narratologically that would not work, but it is perhaps that of Morgantina, the town recovered by L. Calpurnius 
Piso Frugi in 133 B.C.; see Brennan (1993), 184, for the chronology. 
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for those within the city, through which the slaves made a public show of the revolts from their 
individual masters, casting in their teeth the arrogance and excessive violence that had led to their ruin. 
 
The taunting of the Romans is completely explicable in any warfare context involving Rome, 
but perhaps the taunting of those within the city also took place, in which runaway slaves 
from the city in Antiochus’ army taunted the owners in the city they were later hoping to kill 
after a successful siege. This interpretation of why slaves feature so prominently in the 
ancient sources would also explain how stories about slave-owners like Damophilus rose out 
of the war (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.10, 34-8): we can reinterpret this story as one in which a brutal 
slave-owner was murdered by his slaves, who then fled to King Antiochus and joined his 
cause. There is no inherent problem in having slaves involved in the conflict; indeed I think it 
perfectly sensible for King Antiochus to have actively encouraged slaves to join him. During 
the American War of Independence the British colonial army actively encouraged the slaves 
in the colonies to abandon their masters with the promise of freedom if the slaves fought in 
the British army. The hope was that in this way the undermanned armies of the British 
colonial forces might be bolstered, and that the rebelling plantation owners would have to 
deal with a spread of servile insurrections throughout the colonies.238 It seems reasonable to 
suggest, fully aware of the different historical contexts, a similar strategy for King Antiochus. 
 
However, to label a movement so clearly steeped in Sicilian culture and history, a 
movement so clearly designed to appeal to the free people of Sicily, and one that succeeded 
in this effort, in short, to label a movement such as this as a ‘slave rebellion’ merely because 
slaves were involved is ironically to deny the voices of the people of Sicily their own 
legitimacy: the failure of scholarship in the past has been to focus so narrowly on giving the 
voice back to the slaves that they have denied it to the free people of Sicily. We would never 
label the Second Punic War a ‘slave war’ merely because Rome freed slaves in order to form 
legions when under extreme duress.239 The ancient sources were not so scientific in their use 
of the label. In Diodorus alone there are several examples of this confusion. When providing 
a proem to the Sicilian Insurrection, Diodorus noted that (34/5.2.26) 
 
                                                 
238 See Schama (2006), 17-8, 59-70, and 84-5, for details and bibliography. 
239 Liv. 22.57 records that the Romans enlisted eight thousand slaves, freeing them on the understanding that 
they had to fight in the war. To this point could be added any of the wars mentioned in Appendix 9: Slaves in 
Ancient Warfare. This does not preclude our unscientific use of the label about conflicts that the ancients saw 
first as slave revolts: see Appendix 10: The Definition of a Slave Revolt. 
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τὸ παραπλήσιον δὲ γέγονε καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιρούς, Ἀριστονίκου µὲν 
ἀντιποιησαµένου τῆς µὴ προσηκούσης βασιλείας, τῶν δὲ δούλων διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν δεσποτῶν 
κακουχίας συναπονοησαµένων ἐκείνῳ καὶ µεγάλοις ἀτυχήµασι πολλὰς πόλεις περιβαλόντων. 
 
(a) similar thing happened in Asia during the same period, when Aristonicus laid claim to a kingdom 
that did not belong to him, and the slaves, because of mistreatment by their masters, shared in this 
man’s folly and encompassed many cities in great misfortunes. 
 
Similarly, Diodorus considered the uprising lead by T. Vettius (36.2.2-6 and 2a) to be part of 
a trio of slave uprisings, despite the fact that all of the impetus in the event arose from a free 
man trying to escape debt. In both cases Diodorus saw an event involving slaves and 
considered it to be in the bracket of a ‘slave rebellion’ despite its more complex nature.  
These conflicts had little to do with slavery in their core issues and yet were often slandered 
with the label;240 however, we need not be so imprecise ourselves.241 The Insurrection 
discussed here was a major threat not only to Rome’s control over Sicily in general terms, but 
also to their first and most famous effort at provincial control.242 For this effort to fail so 
spectacularly would not be an option: how much more palatable was a slave rebellion that the 
ancient sources agreed was not only outwith the normal nature of slaves (Diod. Sic. 
34/5.2.13, 26, 33, 37, 40), but also by inference easily avoidable in future, than admitting that 
Sicily, the oldest of Rome’s overseas provinces, was deeply unhappy with Roman rule, and 
capable of fighting to change it? When viewed in this light, it is little wonder that Eunus was 
so carefully attacked throughout the narrative: by downplaying his abilities, Diodorus also 
directly reduced the appearance of threat from the conflict to the Roman status quo. Whoever 
the final author was of the text we call Diodorus’ (see Appendix 6: King Antiochus’ title in 
Diodorus for Posidonius’ pro-Roman bias and Sacks 1990: 122 no. 22; 151-3), and however 
exactly over the years in which this text was created the sources were employed, I wonder 
whether Diodorus, Posidonius, or whoever else, may not have regarded the reconstruction of 
events given in the first three chapters of this thesis to be substantially closer to the historical 
truth than the Diodoran account that has haunted the imagination of both historians of ancient 
Sicily and Rome, and scholars of Roman slavery alike for centuries now. 
                                                 
240 King Eumenes III (Aristonicus): Just. Epit. 36.4.5-12, 37.1.1-3; Strabo 13.4.2, 14.1.38; Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.26, 
34/5.3; Sall. His. 4.69.8-9; Cic. Phil. 11.8.18; Laelius, De Amicitia 11.37; Livy, Per. 59; Oros. 5.10.1-5; Eutr. 
4.8.21-9, 4.9.1-23; Val. Max. 3.2.12; Vel. Pat. 2.4.1; Plut. Vit. Flam. 21.6; Flor. 1.35.1-7. Sextus Pompeius: Res 
Ges.  27.3. 
241 In any case, we must be careful when using the terms ‘slave revolt’, ‘slave war’, ‘slave rebellion’, 
‘sklavenaufstände’ or ‘guerre servili’ to be completely upfront about what we actually mean: see Appendix 10: 
The Definition of a Slave Revolt for a discussion of the imprecise use of these terms, and for an effort at a new 
definition. 
242 In the following chapters I discuss Cicero’s representation of Sicily as a peaceful and loyal province of 
Rome, and this description’s relationship to reality. 
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IV. Antiquus socius fidelissimus 1: 
Athenion, Verres and Cicero 
 
 
Itaque in Sicilia non Athenionem, qui nullum oppidum cepit, sed Timarchidem 
fugitivum omnibus oppidis per triennium scitote regnasse 
 
‘You will easily see, therefore, that, for three years, not Athenion, who captured no town, 
but Timarchides was king of the runaways over all towns in Sicily.’ Cic. Verr. 2.2.136. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The three previous chapters have demonstrated that the event typically known as the First 
Sicilian Slave War can be better understood as a Sicilian Insurrection based in the east of the 
island, and aimed against the Roman domination of the island. Leaving aside for the moment 
the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, which will be discussed in later chapters, the only 
other time that Sicily featured in the literary record of the Roman Republic occurred during 
the repentundae case against C. Verres. Cicero’s prosecution speech against Verres was a 
wide-ranging attack on Verres’ actions as governor in a variety of fields. Out of necessity, 
therefore, Cicero drew on the history of Sicily including the two Sicilian ‘Slave Wars’ 
throughout the Verrine Orations. This chapter aims to assess how Cicero’s engagement in his 
Verrine Orations with these two events can be utilised for our understanding of what he 
called the ‘Slave Wars’, and furthermore to assess if his rhetoric about Sicily can be 
deconstructed in order to gauge the island’s reputation as a source of allies among the 
Romans of the first century B.C. This understanding, in turn, will demonstrate that Cicero 
differed in his engagement with the two ‘Slave Wars’, and that this difference can only be 
explained by their very different nature. As a result, Cicero’s ‘use’ of the ‘Slave Wars’ allows 
us to separate their natures, too. 
 
I. Cicero and the ‘Slave Wars’ 
 
We will start our investigation of Cicero’s role in understanding the two Sicilian ‘Slave 
Wars’ by assessing how he used these events in his Verrine Orations. On the few occasions 
when Cicero actually evokes the memory of the two ‘Slave Wars’, he does so in a manner 
that suggests a complex interaction of events, the mention alone of which seems to have 
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caused him some discomfort.243 We will also see that Cicero’s engagement with the Sicilian 
Insurrection differs markedly from that with the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. I will 
concentrate first on Cicero’s straightforward statements regarding the history of the ‘Slave 
Wars’ before moving on to his more veiled references. 
 
I.i. Athenion as a Comparative 
 
Cicero’s most important and direct tactic when using the ‘Slave Wars’ in his Verrine 
Orations manifested itself in explicit comparatives within his invective against Verres and his 
accomplices. As his method of comparison varied, each case must be dealt with individually. 
The simplest comparison Cicero used compared the actions of Verres, Timarchides or 
Apronius unambiguously to the leaders’ of the ‘slave revolts’; or perhaps, I should say, to 
Athenion, since in the entirety of the Verrine Orations no other ‘slave’ leader is mentioned.244 
Despite being the only ‘slave’ leader exploited in the Verrine Orations, Athenion is still used 
sparingly by Cicero: he is brought up only three times throughout the orations (2.2.136; 
2.3.66; 2.3.125). Each comparison will be introduced in turn and briefly considered, thus 
yielding wider conclusions from the work as a whole. I will discuss the comparison between 
Athenion and both Apronius and Verres first, for this comparison is the least problematic. 
  
 The first mention of Apronius in the speech is a lengthy character sketch, which 
ostensibly was meant to turn the audience against him. In this sketch (2.3.23) we learn that 
Apronius was the equal of Verres in his ‘mores improbos impurosque’ ‘foul and wicked 
character’, as well as that he was ‘gurges vitiorum turpitudinumque omnium’ ‘an abyss of all 
vices and abominations’. When Cicero finally draws on the comparison between Athenion 
and Apronius, it is to demonstrate the outright excesses of Apronius, a man whom the 
audience has already been informed was an ‘inhumanus…barbarus’ ‘savage barbarian’. He 
then brings Verres into the comparison as the man in charge of the province as a whole 
(2.3.65-6): 
 
Tantum apud te quaestus Aproni, tantum eius sermo inquinatissimus et blanditiae flagitiosae 
valuerunt ut numquam animum tuum cura tuarum fortunarum cogitatioque tangeret? 
                                                 
243 Even including very oblique references, Cicero refers to the two ‘Slave Wars’ only nine times: the Sicilian 
Insurrection four times (2.2.32; 2.2.125; 2.4.108; 2.4.112); the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War four times 
(2.2.136; 2.3.66; 2.5.2-3; 2.5.7-8); and both together once (2.3.125). 
244 The significance of the absence of the name of any other ‘slave’ leader will be discussed further in what 
follows. 
125 
 
Cernitis, iudices, quod et quantum incendium decumanorum impetu non solum per agros sed 
etiam per reliquas fortunas aratorum, neque solum per bona sed etiam per iura libertatis et 
civitatis isto praetore pervaserit…Quid est hoc? populi Romani imperium, praetoriae leges, 
iudicia in socios fidelis, provincia suburbana? Nonne omnia potius eius modi sunt quae, si 
Athenio rex fugitivorum vicisset, in Sicilia non fecisset? Non, inquam, iudices, esset ullam 
partem istius nequitiae  fugitivorum insolentia consecuta. 
 
Did Apronius’ profit, his filthy conversation and his disgraceful flatteries have such power over you 
[Verres] that consideration and care for your fortunes never took hold of your mind? You perceive, 
judges, how a conflagration of collectors, like an attack, swept through, not only the fields, but even 
the remaining property of the farmers; nor only through their wealth, but even through their rights of 
freedom and citizenship, when this man was praetor…What is this? Is this the command of the Roman 
people? Are these the laws of a praetor? Are these the trials for your trusted allies? Wouldn’t 
everything be better in Sicily, if Athenion the king of the runaways had won, for he would not have 
done these things in this manner? I say, judges, that with their insolence, the runaways would not copy 
any part of this man’s vileness. 
 
Ignoring the hyperbole engaged in here by Cicero, the comparison is unmistakable: the 
actions of Apronius, and by association the complicity of Verres in those actions, was, to 
Cicero, a greater threat to Sicily than even the victory of Athenion in the so-called Second 
Sicilian Slave War could have been. Given the widespread nature of Apronius’ actions in this 
comparison, ranging over the whole island, Cicero has clearly chosen the comparison of 
Athenion in order to play on the island-wide danger that Apronius posed. In context, Cicero 
has just finished at this stage relating Apronius’ crimes in extorting grain, money and 
property from wealthy landowners, and in a later speech Cicero admits that the richest men 
stood to lose most to a slave revolt (2.5.20), causing his comparison to be all the more 
striking: losing property to Apronius and Verres was worse than any other disaster that could 
have otherwise befallen them. Cicero also used the figure of Athenion for another comparison 
with a despoiler of the richest landowners’ property, Timarchides, this time through judicial 
extortion. 
 
 This comparison is more problematic than the last, for Cicero’s choice of Athenion is 
not necessarily the best. Athenion is incorporated at the end of a passage, which relates the 
character of Timarchides, a thoroughly despicable individual (2.2.134-6). Among his many 
vices – including a penchant for thievery and a licentious ability to corrupt women – Cicero 
noted his (135) ‘ars et malitia miranda’ ‘amazing skill and malice’. Finally concluding the 
attack on Timarchides, Cicero noted that (2.2.136) 
 
(i)taque in Sicilia non Athenionem, qui nullum oppidum cepit, sed Timarchidem fugitivum 
omnibus oppidis per triennium scitote regnasse; in Timarchidi potestate sociorum populi 
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Romani antiquissimorum atque amicissimorum liberos, matres familias, bona fortunasque 
omnis fuisse. 
 
(y)ou will easily see, therefore, that for three years, not Athenion who captured no town, but 
Timarchides was king of the runaways over all the towns in Sicily; that all the children, wives, 
households, goods and money of the oldest and closest allies of the Roman people were in the power of 
Timarchides. 
 
The point of the comparison is quite clear: Timarchides’ dominion over Sicily was so 
destructive, and so abusive that it must have appeared, Cicero suggests, that Athenion was in 
control of all Sicily. It would seem to be a perfectly rational link to make, except for Cicero’s 
own admission: Athenion ‘nullum oppidum cepit’ ‘captured no town’. A more vivid 
comparison would have been between Timarchides, the man who ostensibly controlled all the 
towns of Sicily for three years, and King Antiochus (or Eunus), the man who, by capturing 
several towns in Sicily for several years, came much closer to matching, and perhaps even 
surpassing the achievements of Timarchides than Athenion ever managed. That this 
comparison was not used is significant, as we shall see in Cicero’s final mention of Athenion. 
 
 In the course of the third oration of the second Actio, Cicero drew on a letter of the 
new governor of Sicily, L. Marcellus, which had been written to the senate.245 In the letter 
Marcellus outlined all his actions in Sicily, which ensured that the remaining farmers returned 
to their land and began working again. Cicero seized this opportunity to point out the contrast 
between the results of Verres and Apronius’ actions and the aftermath of the three great 
disasters that had previously befallen Sicily one hundred and fifty years ago (2.3.125): 
 
Cum bellis Carthaginiensibus Sicilia vexata est, et post nostra patrumque memoria cum bis 
in ea provincia magnae fugitivorum copiae versatae sunt, tamen aratorum interitio facta 
nulla est. Tum sementi prohibita aut messe amissa fructus annuus interibat; tamen incolumis 
numerus manebat dominorum atque aratorum; tum qui M. Laevino aut P. Rupilio aut M'. 
Aquilio praetores in eam provinciam successerant aratores reliquos non colligebant. Tantone 
plus Verres cum Apronio provinciae Siciliae calamitatis importavit quam aut Hasdrubal cum 
Poenorum exercitu, aut Athenio cum fugitivorum maximis copiis, ut temporibus illis, simul 
atque hostis superatus esset, ager araretur omnis neque aratori praetor per litteras 
supplicaret neque eum praesens oraret ut quam plurimum sereret; nunc autem ne post abitum 
quidem huius importunissimae pestis quisquam reperiretur qui sua voluntate araret, pauci 
essent reliqui qui L. Metelli auctoritate in agros atque ad suum larem familiarem redirent? 
 
When Sicily was plagued by the Carthaginian war, and after, in our memories and those of our fathers, 
great numbers of runaways moved around the province, nevertheless there was no ruin of farmers. 
Then a year’s fruits were lost by a prevented sowing or a missed harvest; nevertheless the number of 
                                                 
245 It is unimportant here that it is likely that Cicero carefully misrepresented the letter of L. Marcellus to be 
more damning than it was for Verres, since the issue here is the rhetoric deployed, not the technical meaning of 
Marcellus’ letter: for a discussion of the letter’s potential ‘real’ meaning see Frazel (2009), 202-7. 
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households and farms remained intact; then the praetors who were succeeding M. Laevinus, or P. 
Rupilius, or M’. Aquilius did not draw together the surviving farmers. Did Verres, with Apronius, 
bring to the province of Sicily so many more injuries than Hasdrubal with his Carthaginian army, or 
Athenion with his enormous forces of runaways, so that, while in those times, as soon as the enemy 
was overcome, land was tilled everywhere, and the praetor neither implored the farmer through letters 
nor entreated him in person to sow as much as possible; yet now, not even after the departure of this 
dangerous pest was anyone found who tilled on his own accord, and there were few survivors who 
came back, by the authority of L. Metellus, to the fields and to their hearths and homes? 
 
The contrast drawn here is quite striking, especially as Cicero narrates it. Verres’ predations 
caused more harm than rampaging fugitives or a Carthaginian army, but it is not this element 
that should pique interest here. Cicero is careful to mention each of the Roman governors 
who concluded every episode in Sicily, but only explicitly names Hasdrubal and Athenion 
among the enemy generals who ravaged the island. The Sicilian Insurrection is referred to 
only implicitly by the naming of P. Rupilius as the Roman governor who ended the war. 
Much like the passage discussed above (2.2.136), Cicero appears to be avoiding any explicit 
mention of the Sicilian Insurrection when he delves into the history of Sicily. In this he 
differs from his treatment of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War: Athenion is openly 
mentioned by name, and used as an example of the worst fate a province can suffer, with the 
exception of Verres himself.246 What is perhaps most striking is that even when Cicero 
cannot avoid mentioning the Sicilian Insurrection, he is very careful in his use of the event, as 
the following discussion demonstrates. 
 
I.ii. The Sicilian Insurrection in Cicero 
 
Cicero’s discretion regarding the Sicilian Insurrection is best illustrated in his passage 
concerning the town of Enna, along with the story of Verres’ attempts to steal the sacred 
statuary of the town in the fourth oration of the second Actio (2.4.106-15).247 In this passage 
                                                 
246 Cicero’s invective against Verres develops throughout the Orations. What follows is only a brief sketch, but 
annotates the relevant developments. In the early speeches Verres is called a madman (1.15), accused of 
engaging in orgies and drunkenness (2.1.32-3), and even, in one passage, called licentious, lazy, cowardly, rude 
and feminine (2.2.192). However, by the end of the Orations he is at first compared to the ‘slaves’ at Enna 
(2.4.112); then progressively, throughout the fifth speech of the second Actio, called a king (2.5.27); a catamite 
(2.5.33-4); a pirate (2.5.54); a woman (2.5.81); a wild beast (2.5.109); until finally he is compared to Charybidis 
and Scylla, and called a second Cyclops (2.5.146). For Verres’ underlings, comparison with Athenion and an 
exclamation that they were worse than Athenion was a typical method of concluding an invective on their 
characters: see 2.2.136 for Timarchides; and 2.3.66 for Apronius. Apronius is inveighed against with the 
harshest censure among the lieutenants, at one point even being described as worse than Verres (2.3.23), but 
also called a semi-slave (2.3.134) and a pirate (2.5.70). Frazel (2009), 125-86, argued that the entire fifth speech 
of the second Actio aimed to portray Verres as a tyrant. 
247 In spite of the fact that the second Actio was never delivered, it is still nonetheless important for study. While 
Cicero, in publishing this speech after having already driven Verres from Rome with the first Actio, avoided 
having to present all his evidence completely accurately, he nevertheless had to publish a text displaying his 
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Cicero had no choice other than to make a reference to the town’s history during the Sicilian 
Insurrection, but the way in which he engages with this history is cautious at best. He openly 
mentions the town’s supposed capture by the ‘slaves’ of the Sicilian Insurrection only once, 
after narrating the whole episode in which Verres’ men stole some statuary from the shrine to 
Demeter (2.4.112): 
 
Henna tu simulacrum Cereris tollere audebas, Henna tu de manu Cereris Victoriam eripere 
et deam deae detrahere conatus es? quorum nihil violare, nihil attingere ausi sunt in quibus 
erant omnia quae sceleri propiora sunt quam religioni. Tenuerunt enim P. Popilio P. Rupilio 
consulibus illum locum servi, fugitivi, barbari, hostes; sed neque tam servi illi dominorum 
quam tu libidinum, neque tam fugitivi illi ab dominis quam tu ab iure et ab legibus, neque 
tam barbari lingua et natione illi quam tu natura et moribus, neque tam illi hostes hominibus 
quam tu dis immortalibus. Quae deprecatio est igitur ei reliqua qui indignitate servos, 
temeritate fugitivos, scelere barbaros, crudelitate hostes vicerit? 
 
It was from Enna that you [Verres] dared to remove the image of Ceres, from Enna that you attempted 
to snatch a victory from her hand, and to withdraw one goddess from another? Of these things they 
dared to violate and touch nothing, those in whom there was everything closer to wickedness than 
piety. Indeed, in the consulship of P. Popilius and P. Rupilius, this place was held by slaves, runaways, 
barbarians, enemies; but they were less slaves of their masters than you of your desires, less runaways 
from their masters than you from justice and laws, less barbarians in speech and nation than you in 
nature and customs, less enemies of man than you of the immortal gods. What plea, therefore, is left to 
him who overcomes a slave in unworthiness, a runaway in foolhardiness, a barbarian in wickedness 
and an enemy in cruelty?  
 
Cicero is clear about his subject’s statuses, and it is also obvious that he uses the positions of 
all four reprobates to paint as cruel and degenerate a picture as possible of Verres by 
comparison. However, despite the glaring opportunity to incorporate a(ny) leader from the 
Sicilian Insurrection to make a direct comparison to Verres as an individual, leaders whom 
we have elsewhere seen effectively and comprehensively inveighed against in other historical 
sources, Cicero fails to embrace this opportunity.248 If we consider that, with the so-called 
Second Sicilian Slave War, Cicero always referred to Athenion, either directly by name or by 
inference,249 the avoidance of King Antiochus/Eunus or Kleon is doubly unusual. Where 
Cicero could have made a very persuasive comparison between a leader of degenerate, 
savage runaways who nonetheless held them back from sacrilegious plunder, and Verres’ 
own orders to plunder at will, he checks himself and presents a clumsier comparison. In other 
                                                                                                                                                        
skill as an orator. He would therefore have striven to produce a text that related closely, although naturally not 
exactly, to what a true second Actio may have been. Furthermore, it would defeat the purpose for him to produce 
a speech that lacked persuasive force: for these reasons we may fruitfully study the second Actio for how Cicero 
may have pursued his invective against Verres. 
248 Frazel (2009), 85-6, despite noting the intention of this passage to set up a comparison between Verres and 
the actions of the ‘slaves’, did not note the missed opportunity. 
249 At 2.5.3 Athenion is the unnamed enemy general killed by Manius Aquilius in single combat. 
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instances of similar contrast elsewhere in the Verrine Orations, Cicero typically makes the 
distinction more directly: individual to individual.250 
 
 This apparent difficulty in fully exploiting the potential comparison offered by the 
Sicilian Insurrection is also evident earlier in the passage on Enna. In his prologue to Verres’ 
attempts to raid the sanctuary at Enna, Cicero presents an example of the outstanding 
antiquity and reputation of the sanctuary, even in the minds of the Romans (2.4.108): 
 
Itaque apud patres nostros atroci ac difficili rei publicae tempore, cum Tiberio Graccho 
occiso magnorum periculorum metus ex ostentis portenderetur, P. Mucio L. Calpurnio 
consulibus aditum est ad libros Sibyllinos; ex quibus inventum est Cererem antiquissimam 
placari oportere. Tum ex amplissimo collegio decemvirali sacerdotes populi Romani, cum 
 esset in urbe nostra Cereris pulcherrimum et magnificentissimum templum, tamen usque 
Hennam profecti sunt. Tanta enim erat auctoritas et vetustas illius religionis ut, cum illuc 
irent, non ad aedem Cereris sed ad ipsam Cererem proficisci viderentur. 
 
In this way, in the time of our fathers, a dreadful and dark state, when Tiberius Gracchus had been 
killed, a fear of great dangers was indicated by the prodigies. In the consulship of P. Mucius and L. 
Calpurnius the Sibylline books were consulted; from them it was discovered that it was necessary to 
placate most ancient Ceres. Then priests of Rome, from the renowned college of Decemvirs, although 
there was in our city a most beautiful and magnificent temple of Ceres, nevertheless travelled all the 
way to Enna. So ancient and mighty was that cult that, since they went there, it seemed they travelled 
not to her dwelling, but to Ceres herself. 
 
The date for this episode is 133 B.C. Regardless of the actual or purported reason for this 
embassy to the shrine of Demeter,251 it nonetheless remains that at this time the town of Enna, 
although not the sanctuary to Demeter,252 was in the hands of the rebels of the men behind the 
Sicilian Insurrection. Yet, Cicero fails to mention this detail. This would not be noteworthy if 
there were no rhetorical gain to made by the mention, but in this case, as in the examples 
discussed previously, the benefit of including this fact is evident: Cicero could have noted 
                                                 
250 Seager (2007), 39, noted two other instances of this type, in which Verres is differentiated unfavourably from 
Mithridates (Verr. 2.2.51-2) and Massinissa (Verr. 2.4.103-4), at the same time as commenting on the passage in 
question above; he did not, however, remark on the absence of such a direct, individual contrast/comparison 
where it was possible for the episode at Enna. The other important parallel drawn with a single figure is of 
course the continual dichotomy drawn by Cicero between M. Claudius Marcellus and Verres, discussed in the 
following section of this chapter. 
251 Bradley (1989), 62 no. 28, did not think, following Verbrugghe (1974), 55, that the delegation had anything 
to do with the Sicilian Insurrection, and considered Cicero’s explanation to be accurate. White (1964), 278, 
however, argued that the embassy was also inspired by a desire to expiate the goddess because of the Sicilian 
Insurrection (for this see also Manganaro (1967), 216). Vogt (1965), 40, also argued that the embassy had a link 
to the Sicilian Insurrection. 
252 If we accept the argument of Brennan (1993), 168-73, that M. Perperna won his ovatio for regaining control 
of the sanctuary of Demeter atop the plateau of Enna, and that the war was subsequently concluded by P. 
Rupilius when he captured the town of Enna itself, then the sanctuary would have been free of rebels in time for 
the delegation of priests sent by the Romans. 
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that despite there being a temple of Ceres in Rome which was not under threat from hostile 
rebels, the priests still travelled to Sicily, such was the sanctuary’s reputation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
What are we to glean from Cicero’s reticence? We cannot claim that Cicero does not exploit 
the two ‘Slave Wars’ for rhetorical effect, even if his use of them differs distinctly. For the 
moment, the following conclusion remains: when searching for a suitably wicked comparison 
for Verres, or his lieutenants, Cicero on occasion openly utilises Athenion as a comparative, 
although never Salvius/Tryphon, the other leader in that conflict. However, when forced by 
the necessity of subject matter to engage with the Sicilian Insurrection, Cicero carefully 
avoided any mention of the conflict’s leaders, even where there might have been a positive 
gain in rhetorical effect. The conclusion reached here can only be furthered when placed into 
the context of Cicero’s exploitation of history, which will be discussed in the next section of 
this chapter. 
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IV. Antiquus socius fidelissimus 2: 
Sicily in the Verrine Orations 
 
 
‘…but oratorical texts do not present a direct and straightforward representation 
of the world; they are products of a highly sophisticated technical system, 
central to which is the need to subordinate facts to the argument which 
the speaker is propounding.’ Steel (2001), 12. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous section of this chapter I demonstrated that Cicero’s engagement with the 
‘Slave Wars’ differed markedly between the two events. The answer to why this is the case 
lies, I suggest, in how Cicero typically employed history throughout his Verrine Orations 
above and beyond the ‘Slave Wars’, in passages more generally concerning Sicily as a 
provincia and socius of Rome. The aim here, therefore, will be to construct a context in 
which to understand the conclusion outlined above: Cicero’s use of history throughout the 
Verrine Orations. In two of his speeches in favour of provincial governors, both delivered 
after the Verrine Orations, Cicero drew on Roman stereotypes of provincial peoples in order 
to discredit their evidence: in the pro M. Fonteio Cicero drew on Roman prejudices against 
the Gauls on grounds of their duplicity, while in the pro Flacco he impugned the Greeks of 
Asia for their base morals. Cicero’s ready use of clichéd conventions about provincials, and 
his apparent success in defending a likely guilty man with the strength of these ideas,253 
implies that he would have expected a similar defence to have been employed by Hortensius 
for the benefit of Verres. 
 
I. The Verrine Orations and History 
 
Since it is clear throughout the Verrine Orations that Cicero wanted to neutralise the 
defence’s argument, the purpose here will not be to demonstrate Cicero’s deflection of that 
defence, but to analyse how his treatment of various Sicilian towns interacts with their 
histories relative to Rome. While other towns will be mentioned where appropriate, the focus 
                                                 
253 Throughout the pro Flacco Cicero avoided answering the specific accusations levelled at his client, but 
instead defended Flaccus as a saviour of the state (1-5; 94-106) and impugned the credibility of the witnesses 
(66); see also Classen (1982); Classen (1985), 180-217; Vasaly (1993), 198-9, 203; Steel (2001), 53. 
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will be on the use of Syracuse in Cicero’s oration. Cicero’s rhetorical manipulation of this 
town is indicative of his willingness to engage with, twist and exploit history to suit his 
purposes and to avoid potentially embarrassing admissions of past hostility between Rome 
and certain Sicilian towns.254 Before commencing with the discussion of Cicero’s 
exploitation of Syracuse, however, it will be of some interest to discuss Cicero’s presentation 
of the Sicilian people.255 
 
I.i. Sicily and the Sicilians 
 
In the second speech of the second Actio, Cicero finally engages with Verres’ crimes in 
Sicily. Having spent the first speech of the second Actio detailing Verres’ career until his time 
in Sicily, Cicero opens the second speech with a passionate endorsement of Sicily, its people, 
and why they deserved the favour of the court.256 He starts the defence with comments on 
Sicily itself, noting the island’s unique place among Rome’s imperial acquisitions (2.2.2) 
 
…plurimis iustissimisque de causis, primum quod omnium nationum exterarum princeps 
Sicilia se ad amicitiam fidemque populi Romani adplicavit. Prima omnium, id quod 
ornamentum imperi est, provincia est appellata…sola fuit ea fide benivolentiaque erga 
populum Romanum ut civitates eius insulae, quae semel in amicitiam nostram venissent, 
numquam postea deficerent, pleraeque autem et maxime inlustres in amicitia perpetuo 
manerent. 
 
                                                 
254 Steel (2004) has demonstrated that Cicero was willing in the Verrine Orations to report selectively, or at 
worst misleadingly, in order to turn an anecdote against Verres. She argued that the episode Cicero narrated of 
the death of a Roman lictor in Lampsacus (Verr. 2.1.63-7) was carefully constructed to make it appear as though 
Verres was more at fault than he actually was, and that Cicero was attempting to cover for the far greater 
problem of the structural tendencies of Roman provincial administration to exploit the provincials. The 
following discussion owes much to Steel’s conviction in demonstrating the exploitation of history by Cicero. 
255 The problem of defining a supposed ‘national’ identity, such as ‘Punic’ or ‘Sicilian’, has been explored in 
two studies by Prag (2006a; 2009b). In the former, Prag concluded that the term ‘Punic’ was a purely literary 
construct that was defined by outside forces, that is hostile Greek and Roman literary traditions, and was not 
representative of the heterogeneous group involved, of whom he said that (2006), 30, ‘…we do not know how 
far they thought of themselves as in any way unified.’ Furthermore, he argued that ‘…Punic identity, as it is 
presented in the Republican period, cannot be understood to inform us about anything other than Roman 
attitudes and self-definition.’ In the second work, Prag (2009b), 87-8 and 90-1, argued that the self-definition of 
a person as Sicilian, and the acceptance of a unified and homogeneous identity that was held alongside that of a 
polis identity across Sicily, was one of the features that enabled Sicily to unify itself against outside aggressors, 
and also contributed to Rome’s own adoption of Sicilian imagery such as the triskeles on their coinage 
pertaining to Sicily. Regardless of whether it was correct to talk of a ‘Sicilian’ identity in the time of Cicero, 
nonetheless it is important to understand the manner in which Cicero depicted the Sicilians, regardless of the 
historicity of the account, but in relation to his rhetoric. 
256 This endorsement could be seen, rhetorically, as a digression from the narratio of the speech, which 
demonstrates the suitability of the location for what Cicero was about to describe, a suitability in this case for 
the sympathy of the Roman audience; for this rhetorical concept in Cicero’s own work see Inv. rhet. 1.29, but 
also Quint. Inst. 4.3.12 and Woodman (1988), 58. 
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…for many just reasons, first that of all foreign nations Sicily first devoted itself to the loyalty and 
friendship of the Roman people. The first of all, this that is the jewel of our empire, to be called 
province…it was alone in its loyalty and goodwill towards the Roman people so that the states of this 
island, which once had obtained our friendship, hereafter never abandoned us, and moreover the 
majority, and the most illustrious, remained perpetually our friends. 
 
The exhortation to the jurors in the trial is aimed very carefully by Cicero to drive home 
Sicily’s unique nature. He singles out the island for its ‘fide benivolentiaque’ ‘loyalty and 
goodwill’, among all other nations, as well as its exceptional antiquity in devoting itself to 
Rome’s ‘amicitiam fidemque’ ‘loyalty and friendship’.257 With this one passage Cicero sets 
the tone for the majority of his future laus of the Sicilian people and Sicilian towns. In 
particular, Cicero regularly throughout the Verrine Orations draws on the importance of 
Sicily’s ‘fides’ ‘loyalty’ to Rome: the term258 is used thirty-two times in total with reference 
to Sicily, its towns or their citizens and only once in the negative about Syracuse.259 This 
fides is combined, on eight occasions, by a reference to the age of Sicily’s loyalty, presented 
in a variety of forms but typically specified with the adjective ‘antiquus’ ‘ancient’.260 This 
initial portrayal of Sicily, which has laid the groundwork for most of Cicero’s subsequent 
sponsorship, is then expanded upon by his description of the Sicilian populace. 
 
 Having set the tone for his impassioned support of Sicily, Cicero moves, after some 
brief comments on Sicily’s place as an important military asset and an island of economic 
opportunity for Roman entrepreneurs (2.2.3-7),261 to detailing the character of the Sicilian 
people (2.2.7): 
 
                                                 
257 Frazel (2009), 188-9, noted that this initial description of Sicily is uniquely ‘Roman’, inasmuch as Sicily is 
described as worthy of the jury’s sympathy specifically in terms of its status as a Roman province. 
258 Either in the noun form fides or the adjectival form fidelis. The term fides is important in Ciceronian oratory 
concerning the status of various foreign peoples. In both the pro Fonteio and the pro Scauro Cicero attacks the 
lack of fides among the Gauls and Sardinians as a reason to doubt their testimony; see Vasaly (1993), 195-7. For 
fides in respect to international relationships see Badian (1958), and for definitions of fides regarding trust 
especially see: Fraenkel (1916), 187-99; Heinze (1929), 140-66; Latte (1960), 237 and 273; Earl (1967), 33. 
259 For Sicily in general eighteen times: 1.1.13; 2.2.2 (twice); 2.2.6; 2.2.14; 2.3.12; 2.3.24; 2.3.64; 2.3.66; 
2.3.127; 2.3.211; 2.3.228; 2.5.83; 2.5.115; 2.5.127 (twice); 2.5.137; 2.5.157. The other fourteen are each for 
different cities of Sicily: Thermae: 2.2.90; Halaesa: 2.2.122 and 2.3.170; Centuripae: 2.2.163 (twice); Agyrium: 
2.3.67 and 2.3.74; Tyndaris: 2.4.84 and 2.5.124; Assorus: 2.4.96; Syracuse: 2.4.122 and 2.5.84 (although in the 
latter case it is given in the negative ‘non fidelissimis’); Segesta and Centuripae: 2.5.84; Segesta: 2.5.125. 
260 The antiquity is implied at 2.2.2 by Sicily’s position as the first of Rome’s foreign allies. The adjective 
antiquus is used four times about Sicily generally (2.2.14; 2.3.64; 2.3.228; 2.5.115) and once about the town of 
Halaesa (2.2.122). Thermae’s ‘amicitia fideque’, ‘friendship and loyalty’, is considered to have existed ‘semper’ 
‘always’ at 2.2.90. Finally, Cicero asks at 2.5.83 if, with no Roman citizen to command the fleets of Sicily, 
‘quid civitates quae in amicitia fideque populi Romani perpetuo manserant?’ ‘what about the communities who 
had remained constantly in the loyalty and friendship of the Roman people?’. 
261 Frazel (2009). 188-9, well noted that Cicero’s stress was often on Sicily’s profitability for Romans and the 
Roman state. 
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Iam vero hominum ipsorum, iudices, ea patientia virtus frugalitasque est ut proxime ad 
nostram disciplinam illam veterem, non ad hanc quae nunc increbruit videantur accedere: 
nihil ceterorum simile Graecorum, nulla desidia, nulla luxuries, contra summus labor in 
publicis privatisque rebus, summa parsimonia, summa diligentia.  
 
Now in truth the virtue of these men, judges, is their endurance and frugality, so close is it to our 
custom of old, not to that which now seems to have come to prevail; they are nothing like other 
Greeks, neither slothful nor excessive, on the contrary they are hard working in both private and public 
affairs, very frugal and diligent. 
 
Here Cicero is clearly aiming at an assimilation of Sicilians to Romans. Roman virtues 
function as the cornerstone of the description thus supporting two of his rhetorical aims: the 
first is to admonish the Romans around him for their failure to live up to their own heritage 
when even Sicilians are capable of doing so; the second is to compel the jurors to view the 
case as a whole as one in which the Sicilians are, in essence, part of the Roman state.262 The 
second part of the passage serves to neutralize the counter-argument that we might expect 
Cicero’s opposition to have made, which may have emphasised typical Greek stereotypes for 
the Roman jurors:263 Cicero deftly disarms this line of attack and sets a default declaration of 
Sicilian virtue upon which the rest of his speeches will be based. This is a clever technique 
considering this virtue has yet to be proven concretely.264 Finally, he delivers the encomium’s 
conclusion with the following proclamation of Sicilian loyalty to Rome (2.2.8): 
 
Magistratuum autem nostrorum iniurias ita multorum tulerunt ut numquam ante hoc tempus 
ad aram legum praesidiumque vestrum publico consilio confugerint…Sic a maioribus suis 
acceperant, tanta populi Romani in Siculos esse beneficia ut etiam iniurias nostrorum 
hominum perferendas putarent. 
 
The injustices of our many magistrates, nevertheless, they have borne so that never before this time 
have they, by public consent, taken refuge in the sanctuary of the law and your assistance...So they 
accept by tradition, as much as the people of Rome are a benefit in Sicily, so likewise they account the 
injuries caused by us must be borne. 
 
This passage is followed by an exclamation that Sicily was only driven to legal recourse due 
to Verres’ inconceivable excess, which transcended that of any previous governor (2.2.9). For 
Cicero, Sicily was the oldest and most loyal province of Rome, a faithful ally despite Rome’s 
                                                 
262 This recalls Aristotle’s (Rh. 1.9.30-1) proclamation that it is easy to praise Athenians in Athens, and Scythian 
virtues amongst Scythians: here Cicero praises the Sicilians in distinctly Roman terms, and so creates the 
identification between not only the jurors and his argument, but also the jurors and the people of Sicily 
themselves. 
263 Vasaly (1993), 212-3, noted that Cicero anticipated ‘the thrust of the defense’s attack’ and therefore ‘turned 
it back against his opponents’.  
264 Nonetheless, there is evidence in the Verrine Orations that Cicero was well aware that the jurors had no pity 
for the Sicilians: at 2.3.58-60 Cicero laments Verres’ treatment of the Sicilians, and yet turns to his mistreatment 
of Romans to draw out the full indignation of his listener. 
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mistreatment, and essentially populated by Roman equals. Cicero constructs his image of 
Sicily throughout the Verrine Orations on this foundation. His repeated use of fides when 
describing Sicilian towns and his stress on the hardy character of Sicilian people reinforce his 
portrayal for the jurors until almost the very end of the orations. How Cicero’s portrayal of 
Sicily relates to reality is a more challenging matter to assess. In the next section, I will 
analyse Cicero’s interactions with Syracuse, and how they are indicative of his difficulties in 
the Verrine Orations. 
 
II. Marcellus, Verres and Syracuse 
 
In keeping with the general attitude developed toward Sicily in the Verrine Orations, Cicero 
attempted to cultivate a positive image of Syracuse for his jurors, principally in order to 
ensure the censure of Verres’ actions against the city. As a point of interest specific to 
Syracuse, Cicero contrasted Verres’ plundering during peace with the (supposed) prudence of 
M. Claudius Marcellus on the capture of Syracuse during the Second Punic War.265 The 
difficulty with Cicero’s treatment of Syracuse is twofold: the first issue involves his use of 
the actions of M. Claudius Marcellus as exempla; the second concerns Syracuse’s history 
with Rome, although it is worth noting that Cicero barely mentions Syracuse’s history 
without reference to Marcellus. On both counts Cicero’s version of events can be compared 
unfavourably with accounts from other authors, and this will allow us to understand better 
Cicero’s own relationship with ‘history’ in the Verrine Orations. I wish, first, to study his 
engagement with the memory of Marcellus. 
 
II.i. Marcellus and Verres 
 
Syracuse first appears, beyond three brief asides in the first speech of the second Actio 
(2.1.14; 2.1.55; 2.1.113), early in the second speech of the second Actio, and is mentioned in 
                                                 
265 Vasaly (1993), 119, noted, when discussing Cicero’s use of Republican exempla, the following: ‘(u)sing the 
image – but surely not the reality – of past heroes of the Republic as exempla, Cicero points to the supposed 
religious scrupulosity of a Mummius, the restraint, generosity and humanitas of a Marcellus, and the generosity 
of a Scipio Aemilianus as a justification for Roman rule.’ It is with the opening of this statement, the assertion 
of unreality in Cicero’s exploitation of Republican exempla, that the following discussion proceeds. On 
Ciceronian use of exemplars see van der Blom (2010), and on their potential for manipulation see 107-17.  
Finley (1968), 122, is rather disparaging of Cicero’s choice of comparison, commenting that Marcellus was 
‘widely condemned by earlier writers and characterized by Appian, a late but by no means stupid historian, as a 
man “nobody would trust except under oath”, whom even the Roman Senate had agreed to withdraw from Sicily 
because he was intolerable to the Sicilians.’; see App. Sic. 1.3 for this piece of information. 
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the context of its capture by Marcellus. At this stage Cicero is still constructing his general 
image of Sicily, and so the purpose of the reference to Syracuse is to demonstrate the respect 
that Sicily commanded even from conquering Romans (2.2.4): 
 
Urbem pulcherrimam Syracusas, quae cum manu munitissima esset tum loci natura terra ac 
mari clauderetur cum vi consilioque cepisset, non solum incolumem passus est esse, sed ita 
reliquit ornatam ut esset idem monumentum victoriae, mansuetudinis, continentiae, cum 
homines viderent et quid expugnasset et quibus pepercisset et quae reliquisset. Tantum ille 
honorem habendum Siciliae putavit ut ne hostium quidem urbem ex sociorum insula 
tollendam arbitraretur. 
 
The most beautiful city of Syracuse, which was, with most strong walls, enclosed by the nature of its 
location by land and sea from attack, when [Marcellus] by force and stratagem captured it, he not only 
suffered it to be uninjured, but left it so adorned that it was a monument alike to his victory, his 
clemency and his temperance, since men saw what he had taken, those whom he had spared, and what 
he had left. So much honour did he think Sicily must have that he believed not even the city of our 
enemies must be removed from the island of our allies. 
 
The subsequent mentions of Marcellus’ attitude towards Syracuse further the impression of 
his respect for the city given in this passage, although in the second speech the town is 
mentioned only once more to record Marcellus’ largesse to Syracuse in not disbanding their 
senate (2.2.50).266 Here, then, we have the initial establishment of what becomes, in the 
fourth speech of the second Actio, an important contrast for Cicero to exploit. It is not until 
the fourth speech that this groundwork is built upon, for Syracuse is mentioned only briefly in 
passing as the backdrop of legal events in the third speech concerning the charges of grain 
extortion against Verres. 
 
 In the fourth oration of the second Actio, having detailed Verres’ thefts throughout 
Sicily, Cicero returns to Syracuse; and the city, along with Marcellus’ relationship to it, 
essentially dominates the speech from this point onwards. To start, Cicero appeals to the 
common knowledge about the capture of Syracuse by Marcellus (2.4.115):267 
 
Nemo fere vestrum est quin quem ad modum captae sint a M. Marcello Syracusae saepe 
audierit, non numquam etiam in annalibus legerit. Conferte hanc pacem cum illo bello, huius 
praetoris adventum cum illius imperatoris Victoria, huius cohortem impuram cum illius 
                                                 
266 Even in this context, however, the town is still mentioned in order to aid a contrast between Marcellus, 
whose apparent benevolence allowed the retention of the senate house, and Verres, whose cupidity had led to 
the disbandment of the festival of Marcellus in Sicily (2.2.50-1).  
267 Cicero’s appeal to the knowledge of the audience is itself a rhetorical strategy. By appealing to an implied 
common knowledge, Cicero flattered the audience, and thereby improved the likelihood of their agreeing with 
his interpretation. On this strategy see van der Blom (2010), 120-2, who stressed that this strategy enabled the 
orator to potentially omit (121) ‘…details which did not support the argument’.  
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exercitu invicto, huius libidines cum illius continentia: ab illo qui cepit conditas, ab hoc qui 
constitutas accepit captas dicetis Syracusas. 
 
There are almost none among you who has not often heard, and also read in the annals, the manner of 
Syracuse’s capture by M. Marcellus. Compare this peace with that war, the arrival of this praetor with 
the victory of that imperator, this man’s vile retinue with that man’s unconquered army, this man’s 
inordinate desire with that man’s temperance: and you will say that Syracuse was founded by the man 
who captured it, and captured by the man who received it already settled. 
 
Cicero continues this hyperbolic account of Marcellus’ capture of Syracuse in the next 
section of the speech, and continues the comparison with Verres that was implicit in the 
above passage (2.4.116): the marketplace was spared bloodshed under Marcellus, but ran 
with blood under Verres; the harbour, closed off even to the fleets of Rome in the Punic 
Wars, was open to pirates under Verres; when they captured the city, Marcellus’ army 
showed ‘restraint’ in not raping both single free-born women and married women, while 
Verres freely did as he pleased with anyone. This passage operates on an inversion of roles 
between Verres and Marcellus, and, as we will see, relies on the listener agreeing with 
Cicero’s version of Marcellus’ capture of Syracuse. For the moment, it is critical to note the 
inversion at work. 
 
 After briefly describing the city for the benefit of the jury (2.4.117-9) Cicero 
maintains his praise for Marcellus, in direct contrast to Verres, by again commenting on 
Marcellus’ self-control when seizing the city. This extended passage ends with an explicit 
command from Cicero to compare the two men (2.4.120-1): 
 
Nunc ad Marcellum revertar…Qui cum tam praeclaram urbem vi copiisque cepisset, non 
putavit ad laudem populi Romani hoc pertinere, hanc pulchritudinem, ex qua praesertim 
periculi nihil ostenderetur, delere et exstinguere. Itaque aedificiis omnibus, publicis privatis, 
sacris profanes, sic pepercit quasi ad ea defendenda cum exercitu, non oppugnanda venisset. 
In ornatu urbis habuit victoriae rationem, habuit humanitatis; victoriae putabat esse multa 
Romam deportare quae ornamento urbi esse possent, humanitatis non plane exspoliare 
urbem, praesertim quam conservare voluisset. In hac partitione ornatus non plus Victoria 
Marcelli populo Romano appetivit quam humanitas Syracusanis reservavit…Conferte 
Verrem…ut pacem cum bello, leges cum vi, forum et iuris dictionem cum ferro et armis, 
adventum et comitatum cum exercitu et Victoria conferatis. 
 
Now I will return to Marcellus...When he captured so famous a city by force and his army, he did not 
think it suitable to the Roman people’s glory to destroy and extinguish this beauty, particularly since it 
exhibited no danger. Therefore he spared the buildings, public and private, sacred and secular, as if he 
had come to its defence with his army, not to attack. In regard to the adornment of the city he kept his 
consideration of victory, and his humanity; in victory he thought to take many objects which could 
adorn the city, by his humanity he thought not to wholly plunder the city, which he had principally 
wished to conserve. In this distribution the victory of Marcellus seized no more adornments for the 
people of Rome than his humanity preserved for Syracuse...Compare Verres...you compare peace with 
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war, law with force, the oratory of the forum and courts with swords and arms, the coming [of the 
praetor] and his retinue with the army and victory [of Marcellus]. 
 
This passage, which once again inverts the expected roles of Verres and Marcellus, is one of 
the last few that directly involves the latter. Cicero rounds off his exploitation of Marcellus’ 
memory with a final exclamation that under Verres the Syracusans mourned the loss of more 
gods than they lost men through the victory of Marcellus (2.4.131).268 Taken together, these 
passages form a powerful rhetorical feature of Cicero’s invective, and the juxtaposition of the 
exemplum of Marcellus with Verres skilfully draws the audience into agreement with a 
condemnation of Verres’ predations in Syracuse. Yet the question remains: does Cicero’s 
version of Marcellus’ actions accord with that presented in other sources? 
 
This question raises problems regarding the historical accuracy of Cicero’s account. 
Marcellus is presented by Cicero as a man shaped by his moderation and care regarding both 
Syracusan property and the people themselves: this is perhaps best symbolised by Cicero’s 
admittedly hyperbolic assertion that Syracuse mourned the loss of more gods under Verres 
than men under Marcellus. In spite of Marcellus’ reputation throughout antiquity – 
exemplified in many ways by Cicero’s account of his actions – of benevolence to 
Syracuse,269 Livy’s account demonstrates the difficulty of this view on several counts. First, 
Marcellus only instructed his men to spare the lives of free people (specifically commented 
on by Cicero at Verr. 2.4.116) in the initial phase of sacking the city (25.25.7-9). On the 
eventual capture of Achradina, Marcellus handed over that section of the city to his troops to 
plunder (25.31.8-9), resulting in ‘multa irae, multa avaritiae foeda exempla’ ‘many infamous 
examples of anger and greed’.  In a later passage Livy records a Sicilian embassy that 
complained of Marcellus’ treatment, accusing him of slaughtering the people of Syracuse 
                                                 
268 Cic. Verr. 2.4.131: ‘Ut saepius ad Marcellum revertar, iudices, sic habetote, plures esse a Syracusanis istius 
adventu deos quam Victoria Marcelli homines desideratos.’ ‘If I may again return to Marcellus, judges, you will 
know that more gods were lost by the Syracusans through visits of [Verres] than men through the victory of 
Marcellus’. We might note that Marcellus’ reputation, discussed below, of having looted an unprecedented 
number of statues from Syracuse most likely prevented Cicero’s turning to that direct comparison of Verres’ 
actions in stealing statues with Marcellus’ ‘restraint’.  
269 Plutarch (Vit. Marc. 19-20) records an image of Marcellus as a moderate conqueror whose personal anguish 
at the destruction of the city demonstrated his temperance: Plutarch therefore notes Marcellus’ initial – and as 
can be seen from Livy’s account noted below, it was only initial – instructions not to kill free people in 
Syracuse, and also his beneficence to the people of Engyium in sparing their lives when entreated by a 
Romanophile leading citizen, Nicias, who was himself to be spared. There is a feature of import in the latter 
anecdote: Marcellus had, in the first instance, decided to enslave the entire town, and it was only the 
supplication of Nicias on the town’s behalf that stayed his hand. It follows that if Nicias had not been struck by 
a moment of conscience, then Marcellus would have proceeded with the mass enslavement. The same 
conception of the exemplum of Marcellus is found in Silius Italicus (14.665-78), Valerius Maximus (5.1.4), and 
Florus (1.22.33-4), all authors later than Cicero. 
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(26.30.6). Furthermore, his reputation for restraint in regard to the wealth of Syracuse, a 
factor that Cicero took great pains to stress when comparing the two men, is even less 
accurate upon scrutiny of other historical records. 
 
Given the fragmentary nature of Polybius’ account of the capture of Syracuse, we 
must again rely on Livy for the most part, although the remarks of Plutarch will also be of 
use. As we saw above, if we believe Cicero, Marcellus left Syracuse adorned following his 
victory (Verr. 2.2.4). Additionally, in this context, Cicero’s engagement with history is 
selective at best, and when deconstructed carefully, intentionally misleading. We should first 
consider the enduring reputation of Marcellus as the man who introduced Rome to the 
wonders of Greek art: Plutarch (Vit. Marc. 21.5) records an anecdote in which Marcellus 
boasts of teaching the ignorant Romans to admire the arts and works of Greece.270 Earlier in 
his narrative, Plutarch records that Marcellus’ men had plundered as much wealth from 
Syracuse as was later taken from Carthage, since the whole city had been despoiled (19.3).271 
But it is Livy who lays out the sack of Syracuse most clearly. In the first instance, as noted 
above, Livy disclosed Marcellus’ orders to spare the free born when initially sacking the city 
(25.25.7); however, despite the lack of bloodshed the actual plundering of the city on this 
occasion was complete (25.25.9): ‘…rapinis nullus ante modus fuit quam omnia diuturna 
felicitate cumulata bona egesserunt’ ‘to plundering there was no restriction until [Marcellus’ 
soldiers] had carried off all the goods accumulated by a long-lasting prosperity’. 
 
In the final sack of Achradina the plunder was on a greater scale still, leading Livy to 
remark the following (25.31.11): 
 
Hoc maxume modo Syracusae captae; in quibus praedae tantum fuit, quantum vix capta 
Carthagine tum fuisset, cum qua viribus aequis certabatur. 
 
Syracuse was captured on the whole in this manner, in which there was booty in such quantity as there 
would scarcely have been if Carthage, with which the conflict was evenly matched, had then been 
captured. 
 
                                                 
270 Furthermore, Livy (34.4.4) records a speech of Cato the Elder against the repeal of the lex Oppia in which he 
traced the Roman love of luxuries to the spoils of Syracuse plundered by Marcellus. 
271 λέγεται γὰρ οὐκ ἐλάττονα τοῦτον ἢ τὸν ὕστερον ἀπὸ Καρχηδόνος διαφορηθέντα πλοῦτον γενέσθαι· καὶ γὰρ 
τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οὐ µετὰ πολὺν χρόνον ἁλοῦσαν ἐκ προδοσίας ἐβιάσαντο διαρπάσαι, πλὴν τῶν βασιλικῶν 
χρηµάτων· ταῦτα δ' εἰς τὸ δηµόσιον ἐξῃρέθη. ‘For it is said that no less wealth was carried away from Syracuse 
now than at a later time from Carthage; for not long afterwards the rest of the city was betrayed and taken and 
subjected to pillage, excepting the royal treasure; this was converted into the public treasury.’ 
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There was in fact a long-standing tradition of Marcellus’ reputation for adorning Rome in a 
manner hitherto unheard of. This tradition included Cicero himself, who commented on the 
fact that Marcellus adorned Rome, not his house (Verr. 2.4.121),272 but also Polybius, who 
censured the Romans for taking the riches of Syracuse back to Rome (9.10). These accounts, 
including those of Livy and Plutarch noted above, very urgently suggest that the sack of 
Syracuse was, in material terms, unprecedented, and in many respects quite brutal.273 Perhaps 
most incriminating of all, following Marcellus’ drawing of the consular lot for Sicily in 210 
B.C., the delegation of Sicilians present in Rome assiduously petitioned for his removal from 
the provincia (Liv. 26.29.1-10).274  This same delegation later accused Marcellus of sacking 
the city so thoroughly that, aside from their city walls, empty homes and despoiled 
sanctuaries, the people of Syracuse had absolutely nothing (26.30.9-10). Livy, or perhaps the 
delegation, is naturally embracing the technique of exaggeration, but it is untenable to 
suggest that Cicero’s account of a Syracuse humanely deprived of some of its riches by 
Marcellus for Rome’s gain (Verr. 2.4.121) is comparable with antiquity’s general consensus 
that his exemplary sack of Syracuse was by any standards thorough,275 and to an extent 
unrivalled at that time.276 Cicero’s use of Marcellus’ exemplum is to underscore his invective 
against Verres whom he depicts as worse than the conqueror of the city, and this enables him 
to accentuate the inversion of a Syracuse more devastated in peace than at its lowest moment: 
in this schema historical accuracy was a secondary concern. 
 
II.ii. Syracuse Revisited 
 
Cicero’s constant praise of Marcellus and his attitude towards Syracuse could only succeed, 
however, if Cicero’s jurors sympathised with the city: had the defence actually presented a 
case in the second Actio it is probable that they would have engaged in drawing sympathy 
                                                 
272 In de re Publica (1.21), Cicero states that Marcellus only took one item into his house, a bronze globe 
designed by Archimedes out of a large haul from the city. Frazel (2009), 82, argues that this line of argument, 
that Marcellus adorned Rome and not his house, was Cicero’s rhetorical method of excusing Marcellus’ looting. 
273 When reporting Marcellus’ ovation, Livy (26.21.7-8) noted the quantity of plunder on display, especially the 
statuary of Syracuse. Marcellus’ actions in Sicily otherwise, or at least those employed by his subordinates and 
then approved by him, were typically brutal in most cases. See, for example, the brutal sack of Leontini (Liv. 
24.4-7, 29-32; Poly. 7.2-8) and the pre-emptive massacre at Enna, which resulted in a widespread uprising of 
Sicilian towns (Liv. 24-37-9). The sack of Leontini was allegedly also used by the Sicilian envoys attacking the 
conduct of Marcellus as an excuse for Syracuse’s betrayal of Roman interest (Liv. 26.30.5). 
274 Appian (Sic. 1.3) records the mass distrust of Marcellus in Sicily during his campaign there. 
275 Livy records (27.16.6-8) that the sack of Tarentum, which was thorough according to Livy, was notable 
because Fabius showed greater magnanimity than Marcellus in refraining from taking statuary from Tarentum. 
276 We may do well to note Cicero’s statement in the fifth oration of the second Actio (2.5.127), in which he 
admits, albeit obtusely, that Rome had, through warfare, plundered the wealth of Athens, Pergamum, Cyzicus, 
Miletus, Chios, Samos, all Asia and Achaea, all Greece and all Sicily. 
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away from the Sicilians, much as Cicero did later in the pro Flacco and the pro M. Fonteio. 
Cicero had the greatest difficulty in evoking sympathy from his listeners towards Syracuse, 
because his objectives were conflicting: in the fourth speech the city had to be portrayed as a 
loyal friend, treated well even in defeat, in order that Verres’ depredations might provoke the 
desired opprobrium in the jurors. In the fifth speech Cicero, when expounding on Verres’ 
critical failures as a military leader, had to confess to Syracuse’s chequered history in relation 
to Rome. This tension will again demonstrate how Cicero’s manipulation of historical ‘facts’ 
and exempla served a rhetorical purpose in his oration, and that ‘history’ functioned as a 
malleable construct in the Verrine Orations as a whole. 
 
 As we saw above, Syracuse is initially introduced into the orations in the context of 
Marcellus’ ‘sparing’ of the city (2.2.4). In this first instance, Syracuse is described as ‘urbs 
pulcherrima’ ‘the most beautiful city’, despite Cicero’s admission that it was also 
‘hostium…urbem’ ‘the city of our enemies’. When Syracuse is next commented on by 
Cicero, he immediately stresses the city’s wealth and beauty (2.4.115). In an extended 
description of the city (2.4.117-9), Cicero relates that Syracuse lives up to its reputation as the 
most beautiful of all Greek cities, and goes into great detail about its beauty and strength. The 
purpose of the description is clear; in what follows, Cicero recounts the plundering of Verres 
(2.4.122-33), and this is far more vivid as he had already created an image of Syracuse to be 
despoiled in his listeners’ minds. Immediately at the start of the description outlining Verres’ 
offenses, Cicero delivers his final encomium to Syracuse. As he describes paintings of 
Agathocles, which Marcellus had left in a temple untouched (2.4.122), Cicero explains that 
they had been changed into ‘…sacra religiosaque…’ ‘…sacred and holy things…’, 
transformed ‘…propter diuturnam pacem fidelitatemque populi Syracusani…’ ‘…because of 
the long peace and loyalty of the Syracusan people…’ The inclusion of fidelitas in this 
description draws Syracuse into the general praise of Sicily and Sicilian towns given by 
Cicero throughout the Verrine Orations (see note 259 above). Here we can see Cicero 
presenting a very clear picture of Syracuse as a beautiful and loyal city, deliberately so that 
the following narrative of Verres has a more graphic context in which to condemn him. 
Problems arise once we turn to Cicero’s fifth speech in the second Actio. 
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 The fifth speech of the second Actio serves several functions, one of which aims to 
destroy Verres’ reputation as a military leader of importance.277 Among the strategies 
employed by Cicero to achieve this aim is an attack on Verres’ handling of the fleet in Sicily, 
especially regarding his actions allowing a group of pirates to rout his fleet and sail into the 
harbour of Syracuse. One important aspect of this debacle was Verres’ decision to appoint a 
Syracusan, Cleomenes, to command the fleet (2.5.82). Despite this being in itself an unusual 
act, and Cicero essentially calls the selection illegal (2.5.83), he focussed on one aspect in 
particular: that Verres chose a Syracusan to command the fleet. It would seem, despite 
Cicero’s assertions of Syracusan loyalty (2.4.122), that this was not something Rome could 
rely on. He begins by rhetorically questioning Verres as to whether there were other 
commanders he could have appointed. He first suggests the junior officers on the island, then 
Roman citizens and finally puts forward (2.5.83) ‘…civitates quae in amicitia fideque populi 
Romani perpetuo manserant’ ‘…communities who had remained constantly in the loyalty and 
friendship of the Roman people’. He places Segesta and Centuripae in this category due to 
their fides and blood ties to Rome.278 
 
 Following these rhetorical suggestions, Cicero compares Verres’ choice of a 
Syracusan by stressing Syracuse’s history of antagonism with Rome. He notes (2.5.84): 
 
Si harum istarum civitatum militibus, navibus, nauarchis Syracusanus Cleomenes iussus est 
imperare, non omnis honos ab isto dignitatis aequitatis officiique sublatus est? Ecquod in 
Sicilia bellum gessimus, quin Centurpinis sociis, Syracusanis hostibus uteremur? Atque haec 
ego ad memoriam vetustatis, non ad contumeliam civitatis referri volo. 
 
If Cleomenes of Syracuse was ordered [by Verres] to command the soldiers, ships and captains of 
these same communities [who had remained loyal], was not every consideration of merit, equity and 
obligation cast down by this man? Is there anyone against whom we fought in Sicily without having 
Centuripe as an ally and Syracuse as an enemy? And also, I intend, by these things, to refer to old 
memories, not the abuse of a city. 
 
                                                 
277 Frazel (2009), 126-30, argues that we must take the likely defence of Verres seriously: that he was a good 
commander. The fifth speech of the second Actio deals with a great range of attacks on Verres. It starts with a 
reference to a defence Cicero expected from Verres that he was a good general (2.5.1-4) and from there 
proceeds to detail Verres’ actions in putting down ‘slave revolts’ in Sicily until 2.5.25. From 2.5.26 to 2.5.37 
Cicero described Verres’ typical habits throughout the year of government, in contrast to that expected of a 
governor. He then briefly (2.5.38-41) detailed Verres’ failure to deal with a situation in Tempsa, which then led 
to a long narrative (2.5.42-138) which included all of Verres’ extortions and mismanagements relating to naval 
matters in the province, incorporating the narration of the execution of some Roman citizens. With the 
conclusion of this passage Cicero had finished with the people of Sicily, and from 2.5.139 until the end 
(2.5.189) proceeded to conclude the entire of the Orations with matters pertaining to Roman citizens directly. 
278 Segesta, according to Cicero, drew a common heritage with Rome from Aeneas (2.4.72), and had supported 
Rome throughout their wars with Carthage (2.5.125); Centuripae is noted as having been such a loyal ally of 
Rome that it was a by-word for devoted allies (2.2.163-4). 
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As much as Cicero tries to diminish the implications of this statement by referring to it as old 
memories, he nonetheless is acutely aware that his line of argument undermines the image he 
had constructed of Syracuse as a mistakenly undervalued town that ought to be pitied. For 
while he dismisses the history as outdated, it follows that he selected this method of 
prosecution as he expected this appeal to the history of Syracuse to assist in condemning 
Verres.279 Cicero then develops the argument in the lines immediately following those above 
(2.5.84): 
 
Itaque ille vir clarissimus summusque imperator, M. Marcellus…habitare in ea parte urbis 
quae in Insula est Syracusanum neminem voluit; hodie, inquam, Syracusanum in ea parte 
habitare non licet; est enim locus quem vel pauci possent defendere. Committere igitur eum 
non fidelissimis hominibus noluit… 
 
Therefore this most famous and great man, M. Marcellus...did not allow any of the Syracusans to live 
in that part of city which is on the Island; today, I say, it is not permitted for any Syracusan to live in 
that part; it is, indeed, a place which even a few men can defend. Therefore Marcellus was not willing 
to trust it to men who were not the most trustworthy... 
 
In this construction, Syracuse becomes the only town, in the entirety of the Verrine Orations, 
to be described in terms of negative fides. Such is their failure in this regard, a portion of their 
city was barred to them, and Cicero reveals the full import of this detail (2.5.85): 
 
Vide quid intersit inter tuam libidinem maiorumque auctoritatem, inter amorem furoremque 
tuum et illorum consilium atque prudentiam. Illi adytum litoris Syracusanis ademerunt, tu 
imperium maritimum concessisti; illi habitare in eo loco Syracusanum, qua naves accedere 
possent, noluerunt, tu classi et navibus Syracusanum praeesse voluisti; quibus illi urbis suae 
partem ademerunt, iis tu nostri imperii partem dedisti, et quorum sociorum opera Syracusani 
nobis dicto audientes sunt, eos Syracusano dicto audientes esse iussisti. 
 
Observe the contrast, Verres, between your wantonness and your ancestors’ judgement, between your 
raging passion and their resolution and prudence. They deprived the Syracusans of the sanctuary of the 
shore, you yielded them the command of the sea; they did not allow the Syracusans to live in the place 
where the ships were able to land, you wished them to command the fleet and the ships; to those they 
deprived of part of their city, you gave a part of our power, and you ordered those allies, because of 
whose help the Syracusans are obedient to our order, to be obedient to the Syracusans. 
 
We can see, in full now, the problem that Cicero faced with Syracuse. Rhetorically this 
passage works very well, as the opportunity to contrast Verres’ actions with every Roman 
governor or magistrate in Sicily after and including Marcellus is a powerful rejoinder to any 
claim of martial prowess on Verres’ part. For this argument to work, however, Cicero must 
have counted on an undercurrent of antipathy toward Syracuse, even in the 70s B.C. 
                                                 
279 Frazel (2009), 152-3, noted that this attack on Syracuse as forever Rome’s enemy in wars in Sicily is, at best, 
an exaggeration. 
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Otherwise his casual dismissal of ‘facts’ as old memories would also weaken his argument. 
The placement of this episode in the fifth and last oration was vitally important: as it comes 
after any passage attempting to evoke sympathy for Syracuse, its deliberate reference to 
antipathy between Rome and Syracuse does not undercut any argument to come. 
 
What should be very clear now is that Cicero’s use of historical ‘fact’ concerning 
Syracuse was malleable enough that it could suit one or other of two purposes: denigration or 
adulation of the town. In a manner similar to his manipulation of Marcellus’ exemplum, 
Cicero used Syracuse’s history and reputation for whatever purpose was required in order to 
win the case. It is this conclusion about the purpose of history in the context of juridical 
oratory that we must bear in mind when assessing Cicero’s use of historical exempla or 
comparisons elsewhere. Before returning to the Sicilian Insurrection and the so-called Second 
Sicilian Slave War, some final remarks will be made regarding Sicily generally in Cicero’s 
writing. 
 
III. A Return to Sicily and the ‘Slave Wars’ 
 
Powell (2009: 18) argued that when an ideal is expressed we, as historians, ought to 
investigate the underlying fear that the ideal counsels against. In Cicero’s manipulation of the 
memories of Syracuse and Marcellus we saw that his pronouncements respectively on their 
loyalty and mercy principally served to draw attention away from their alternative reputations 
as either a staunch enemy or violent despoiler. Few cities or individuals in the Verrine 
Orations receive the attention that Syracuse and Marcellus garnered. Therefore, in what 
follows, I shall judge Cicero’s collective depiction of Sicily, noting especially those towns 
that diverge from the typical description given of a Sicilian town. The purpose here will be to 
assess if Cicero’s depiction of other Sicilian towns coincides with reality, or if there is 
evidence that he utilises rhetorical strategies to convince his listeners. 
 
III.i. Sicily – A Patient Province? 
 
We saw earlier that Cicero describes Sicily, along with many of the towns in Sicily, as firm 
allies of Rome. This emphasis on fides is coupled, as we saw, with a stress on the hardiness 
of the Sicilians (2.2.7). Throughout the Verrine Orations several different towns are praised 
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for these features, building up a firm impression of Sicily as an island of worthy allies.280  
Cicero also stresses Sicily’s patience enduring exploitation, which appears to illuminate an 
unspoken fear that the jurors may have felt concerning Sicily.281 The following example 
taken from a direct address to Verres (2.3.96) demonstrates the typical form this expression 
might take: 
 
Spoliasti Siculos; solent enim muti esse in iniuriis suis. 
 
You have despoiled the Sicilians: indeed they are accustomed to being silent about their injuries. 
 
I noted a similar sentiment when Cicero first detailed his view of the Sicilian people, in 
which he stated that they bore acts of oppression patiently (2.2.8). As a corollary to this, 
Cicero notes that the people of Sicily actively benefited from peace and Roman rule, although 
the context of this assertion is important: he is considering the likelihood of the war we often 
call the Spartacus War spreading to Sicily. Cicero affirms that even during the Social War no 
troubles affected Sicily (2.5.8): 
 
Ergo his institutis provinciae iam tum, cum bello sociorum tota Italia arderet, homo non 
acerrimus nec fortissimus, C. Norbanus, in summo otio fuit: perfacile enim sese Sicilia iam 
tuebatur, ut ne quod ex ipsa bellum posset exsistere. Etenim cum nihil tam coniunctum sit 
quam negotiatores nostri cum Siculis usu, re, ratione, concordia, et cum ipsi Siculi res suas 
ita constitutas habeant ut iis pacem expediat esse, imperium autem populi Romani sic 
diligant ut id imminui aut commutari minime velint, cumque haec a servorum bello pericula 
et praetorum institutis et dominorum disciplina provisa sint, nullum est malum domesticum 
quod ex ipsa provincia nasci possit.  
 
Because of these regulations for the province, even during the time when all Italy was blazing with the 
Social War, that not very active nor powerful man, C. Norbanus, was in the greatest peace; so easily, in 
fact, Sicily now upholds itself, from whatever conflict is able to spring forth internally. Indeed, since 
there is nothing so joined as our business men with the Sicilians by familiarity, commercial matters and 
harmony, and since these same Sicilians have a situation so settled that peace is expedient, while they 
esteem the power of the Roman people so much that they hardly wish it to be lessened or changed at 
all, and since they are provided for against the dangers of a slave war by the regulations of the praetors 
and the strictness of the slaves’ individual masters, there is no internal calamity that is able to arise 
from the province itself. 
 
Leaving aside for the moment the regulations referred to in the first line, the main concern 
here is clear. If we judge this passage by what it argues against, then it is conceivable that a 
                                                 
280 See note 258 for a list of the uses of fides or fidelis when describing Sicilian towns. Other virtues noted are: 
prosperous and efficient farmers (Agyrium: 2.3.67); reputable and prosperous (Herbita: 2.3.75); honest and 
industrious (Tissa: 2.3.86); fine, hard-working farmers (Agrigentum: 2.3.103); strenuous and hard-working 
(Entella: 2.3.103); friendly and prosperous (Catana: 2.3.103); mindful of obligations, abundant (Halaesa: 
2.3.170); friends and allies (Segesta: 2.4.72); numerous and stout-hearted (Agrigentum: 2.4.93); stout and 
trustworthy people (Assorus: 2.3.96). 
281 The unspoken fear being of an impatience with exploitation. 
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strong line of argument existed in favour of Verres’ suggestion that he prevented Sicily, with 
its troubled history, from again collapsing into a similar state. We should also note Cicero’s 
efforts in making this passage convincing: he cannot merely say that Sicily has no wish for an 
end to Roman rule, but instead needs to give a variety of reasons for Sicily’s strength of 
constancy. 
 
 The regulations mentioned are also noteworthy, because they reveal an unusual piece 
of Ciceronian logic in his depiction of Sicily as an island free from internal problems. In the 
course of criticising Verres’ claim that he prevented the problems in Italy in the 70s B.C. 
from spreading into Sicily, Cicero asserts that since Sicily had problems in the past with 
revolting slaves, there was no reason for this issue to arise again, as (2.5.7)282 
 
posteaquam illinc M'. Aquilius decessit, omnium instituta atque edicta praetorum fuerunt eius 
modi ut ne quis cum telo servus esset. 
 
(e)ver since M’. Aquilius left [Sicily], all regulations and edicts of the praetors were framed so as to 
permit no slave to carry arms. 
 
He then relates a story about L. Domitius, who, as governor, put to death a slave who 
admitted to hunting a boar with a spear. The purpose of the story was to demonstrate that 
governors endeavoured to be seen as strictly adhering to the policy, even if its execution was 
unduly harsh. This is immediately followed by the passage discussed above (2.5.8). What is 
unusual is that Cicero appears to be suggesting that the regulations about slave armament 
prevented something similar to the Social War from taking place in Sicily: ‘Ergo his institutis 
provinciae…’ ‘Because of these regulations for the province…’ Regardless of how logical 
this assessment is, it does at least demonstrate one point: Sicily had become a province secure 
from internal outbreaks (of any kind) in the Roman mind only after the so-called Second 
Sicilian Slave War. We can go further. I have argued (see Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient 
Warfare) that the arming of slaves to fight in wars was a typical aspect of ancient warfare. 
The regulation mentioned by Cicero thereby also prevents the arming of slaves by their 
masters, and therefore can also be seen as a preventative of this typical ancient occurrence. 
This also means that Cicero viewed, by the logical connection shown above, that the practice 
of arming slaves was also part of the problem of the Social War. Prior to this, from Cicero’s 
                                                 
282 Manganaro (1980), 441, considered the law to be aimed at distinguishing trustworthy slaves; Bradley (1989), 
48, 130, notes the law, but only comments on how it displays Roman legal coercion to prevent slave unrest; 
Vogt (1965), Manganaro (1967), Rubinsohn (1982), Canfora (1985), and Urbainczyk (2008a) do not mention 
this passage of Cicero. 
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evidence, we can assume the Romans felt that Sicily had to fear internal outbreaks of not only 
slaves, but also those who campaigned for either the weakening or transformation of the 
Roman government and sought to arm their slaves to further this objective. Finally, this 
regulation prevented anyone in Sicily from arming any slave, and apparently prevented any 
further internal problems in Sicily. This is strongly suggestive that the presence of armed 
slaves in Sicily in the periods prior to this regulation cannot be taken to indicate a priori that 
these slaves had armed themselves and rebelled without the backing of the free or indeed the 
actions of the free: the Roman regulations after two major conflicts in Sicily involving armed 
slaves suggest that they saw a link between this practice and social upheaval, and sought to 
prevent it. There is a tension between this brief allusion to Sicily’s troubled past (as recently 
as thirty years prior to Verres), and Cicero’s constant assertions that Sicily was generally 
antiquus socius fidelissimus.283 That Cicero almost avoided demonstrating this tension in his 
speeches is a testimony to the skill of his oratory; that he had to deal with this anxiety about 
Sicily is testimony to the complexity of the island’s relationship with Rome. 
 
III.ii. Cicero and the ‘Slave Wars’ 
 
We have now seen how Cicero alters his implementation of history and historical exempla 
concerning Sicily depending upon the rhetorical requirements. When dealing with the general 
subject matter of Syracuse, Marcellus and the people of Sicily, Cicero delicately balanced his 
oratory between acknowledging certain opinions which he believed would harmonise with 
those of his listeners, and asserting his own assessment of Sicily’s unique and important role 
in the Roman ‘empire’. In this negotiation between Cicero and the jurors, history played a 
subordinate role, utilised when necessary, but ignored or circumnavigated when deleterious 
                                                 
283 Not all Sicilian cities were treated to the strident praise that stressed their fides. Perhaps most strikingly Enna, 
throughout Cicero’s long description and narrative of Verres’ plundering of the shrine of Demeter (2.4.106-13), 
is never referred to in the terms typical of Cicero’s account of Sicily: the people of the town are never described 
as fidelis, nor is the town itself a socius. Instead, Cicero had to resort to a somewhat hackneyed exclamation that 
the people of Enna could be considered (2.4.111) ‘non cives illius civitatis, sed omnes sacerdotes, omnes 
accolae atque antistites Cereris…’, ‘not…citizens of a city, but all of them…priests, all of them…the servants 
and ministers of Ceres…’. Moreover Cicero, apparently aware of the town’s history regarding Rome and 
especially Rome’s previous misjudgement of the religious importance of Enna to Sicily, urges the jurors not to 
sneer at the Sicilian regard for the cult of Demeter at Enna. As I noted in Chapter I, under Marcellus the Romans 
sought to prevent Enna from rebelling by pre-emptively massacring the populace (Liv. 24.37-9). This action 
caused widespread revolt across Sicily because, as Livy tells us, the Sicilians felt that the town of Enna was 
sacred to Demeter and this act was therefore sacrilegious (24.39). Frazel (2009), 217-9, also noted that this past 
history between Marcellus and Enna was problematic for Cicero’s argument, and suggested that Cicero’s 
method of avoiding this problem was to stress Enna’s sanctity. 
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to the rhetoric being employed. Bearing these conclusions in mind, how does this affect our 
reading of Cicero’s engagement with the Sicilian ‘slave wars’? 
 
 If we accept the argument put forward in the first three chapters of this thesis 
concerning the Sicilian Insurrection, namely that it was an Insurrection that drew on the 
support of and represented the people of eastern Sicily against Rome, then this has important 
conclusions for how we view Cicero’s evidence. His view of Sicily, which has been outlined 
above, is quite clear. He conceived of the island as a socius fidelissimus, which had, since the 
time of Marcellus’ capture of Syracuse, been a loyal ally and provider for Rome. 
Furthermore, with the conclusion of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, new legislation 
provided for the island not only ended the threat of internal outbreaks that had plagued the 
island with the ‘slave wars’, but also ensured the island’s solidarity throughout the Social 
War. The arrival of Verres as governor, therefore, resulted in the worst depredations that the 
island had ever faced: worse than the Greek tyrants; the wars with Carthage; the island’s 
subjugation by Rome; or even the two ‘slave wars’. In this schema there is no place for an 
event like the Sicilian Insurrection, especially given Cicero’s insistence that Sicily was 
capable of overlooking almost any Roman exploitation or excess without complaint. This 
could hardly be argued if King Antiochus’ kingdom was indeed a reflection of Sicilian 
discontent with Roman dominance, and for this reason Cicero had to be mute on the matter, 
or present it in a way suited to his larger argument. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We can now provide a tentative answer to the question left unanswered in the previous 
section of this chapter: why did Cicero handle references to the Sicilian Insurrection so 
cautiously, when the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War was presented more directly? King 
Antiochus represented too problematic a figure to blend into the imagined picture of Sicily’s 
history. Instead Cicero focussed on the slaves involved in the conflict, in much the same 
manner that Diodorus foregrounded the slaves in his account. In a sense Cicero’s 
representation of the Sicilian Insurrection was accurate, as it is impossible to deny the 
presence of slaves in the army of King Antiochus. When viewed with that in mind, the island 
seemingly was held by slaves. Had Cicero engaged more directly with the history of the 
Sicilian Insurrection, as I have argued he had the potential to do, then while the individual 
rhetorical passages might have been more persuasive, his overall thesis regarding Sicily’s 
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history would have suffered, along with the hyperbolic vitriol directed towards Verres. 
Moreover the Sicilian Insurrection was an older exemplum to draw on, and one better suited 
to exploring ideas surrounding Hellenistic kingship, as we have seen in Chapter II. The 
sympathy for the Sicilians would have been more difficult to maintain had the reality been 
described, and indeed this is true of Enna’s history generally (see note 283 above). Athenion, 
it would seem, was a more palatable, more recent and less complex exemplum to draw on: in 
essence, he was more rhetorically suitable. We now, therefore, have several different 
questions, although no less important: why was Cicero, by contrast, so freely able to draw on 
Athenion as a comparison with Verres and his lieutenants? What does this say about the 
difference between Athenion and the other, unmentioned leader of the later conflict, 
Salvius/Tryphon? Furthermore, does this exploitation of Athenion reflect the dissimilarities, 
social, historical or otherwise, between the Sicilian Insurrection and the so-called Second 
Sicilian Slave War? The answers to these questions lie beyond Cicero, and in the study of 
Diodorus’ account of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, to which we now turn. 
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V. Divination, Astrology and Discord 
The Characters of Salvius and Athenion 
 
 
τότε δὴ καὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίαν συνελθόντες καὶ βουλῆς προτεθείσης πρῶτον 
µὲν εἵλαντο βασιλέα τὸν ὀνοµαζόµενον Σάλουιον, δοκοῦντα τῆς ἱεροσκοπίας 
ἔµπειρον εἶναι καὶ ταῖς γυναικείαις θέαις αὐλοµανοῦντα. 
 
‘At that time, then, they gathered in an assembly and when the proposal was put before them they 
first chose as king one named Salvius, who was reputed to be practised in divination and a 
flute player in mystic orgies for women.’ Diod. Sic. 36.4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
We saw in the previous chapters that throughout his Verrine Orations Cicero engaged quite 
differently with aspects of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, than he did when he was 
forced into discussing similar elements of the Sicilian Insurrection. The answer to why this is 
the case lies beyond Cicero, and in a comparison of the two events in question. They are, in 
both modern and ancient accounts, typically considered together, and at first glance this is 
explicable. For the ancients, concerned in historiographical works primarily with events of 
military and political significance, Sicily only ever became part of their narratives when 
significant events of these kinds took place there; and those occasions were only rare: the 
Sicilian Insurrection; the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War; the pacification of the Marians 
by Gn. Pompey Magnus; the governorship of Verres; and the resistance of the island against 
C. Octavian under S. Pompeius. Of these events, only the two ‘slave wars’ involved active 
military forces that were not dependent on Rome in some form. In this way, they are unique 
in Sicilian history after the Second Punic War. 
 
The ancient authors certainly connected in their works the two ‘slave revolts’, and 
dealt with them as mutually relevant episodes; but is the narratological link necessarily borne 
out by the events themselves?284 Modern scholarship has followed the approach of linking the 
two episodes, albeit for quite different reasons. Whilst Appian saw two wars taking place in 
the same geographical location and Florus saw the maintenance of a vendetta amongst 
                                                 
284 See, for example, Appian (Hisp. 99) and Athenaeus (6.104), as well as the linking of both conflicts in Florus’ 
work (2.7). 
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Sicilian slaves across two generations (2.7.10), we link them through the topic of slavery; in 
particular through the fact that in forty years two seemingly unique ‘slave revolts’ ripped 
through Sicily, revolts that were unheralded and without sequel.285 Yet we have seen that the 
evidence from the Verrine Orations sounds a note of caution in regard to this ‘obvious’ link: 
it is possible that social or historical differences of some kind stood between the two 
conflicts, forcing a different approach to each on Cicero. We cannot immediately assess the 
presence of these differences without first considering whether Diodorus’ narrative of the 
second conflict can be understood without complications. For the Sicilian Insurrection, the 
depiction of the leaders in Diodorus has been shown to have a strong rhetorical framework 
that sought to define a context for the reader in which to interpret all of the actions of Eunus. 
This meant that we could not simply use the evidence of Diodorus to reconstruct the 
character of the insurgency. A similar analysis will be engaged in here for the lead characters 
of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. 
 
The depiction of the two leaders in the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War has 
typically been accepted without question by modern accounts: Salvius/Tryphon is 
uncomplicatedly seen as a religious leader,286 while Athenion has been regarded as a brave 
leader whose exploitation of his perceived prophetic abilities demonstrated his leadership 
qualities.287 These straightforward readings of Diodorus’ text must be examined more 
carefully in light of the discussion in Chapter II. Unfortunately, and in contrast with the 
Sicilian Insurrection, there is no independent body of evidence for the so-called Second 
Sicilian Slave War against which to compare Diodorus’ account. The forces of 
Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion never minted coinage,288 and the sum of the evidence to come 
directly from the rebels is the few slingshots discussed in Appendix 11: Athenion’s 
Slingshots. In the absence of comparable data, a different comparison will be made: we will 
investigate whether the same ideas and narrative techniques that we saw were typical of 
Diodorus’ depiction of Eunus and Kleon are also employed in describing Salvius/Tryphon 
                                                 
285 Green (1961), 10; Toynbee (1965), 316; Vogt (1965), 20; Dumont (1987), 197, 291-2; Bradley (1989), xi; 
Callahan and Horsley (1998), 143 and 145; Shaw (2001), 1-2; Martínez-Lacy (2007), 35; Urbainczyk (2008a), 
102-3; Strauss (2009), 180; Strauss (2010), 185, 189. The revolt of Spartacus in Italy can also be seen as part of 
this period, extending it to seventy years. 
286 Toynbee (1965), 407; Vogt (1965), 33; Goldsberry (1973), 256; Manganaro (1980), 440; Dumont (1987), 
264; Bradley (1989), 74, 114; Callahan and Horsley (1998), 147; Wirth (2004), 283-4; Urbainczyk (2008a), 54; 
Strauss (2010), 194. 
287 As a brave leader: Vogt (1965), 33-4; Manganaro (1967), 221; Urbainczyk (2008a), 57. Exploitation of 
prophetic abilities: Bradley (1989), 114. 
288 Or at least, if they did, it has not survived. 
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and Athenion. If this is the case, we can postulate that the same interpretative problems exist 
for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War as for the Sicilian Insurrection. This, in turn, will 
allow us to analyse the social movements behind the former event with a clearer idea of the 
methodological problems involved. Before either analysis, however, a brief chronology of the 
so-called Second Sicilian Slave War will provide a context for the following discussion.  In 
this I will follow the sources closely, and no attempt will be made at any significant 
interpretation of their accounts.289 
 
I. A Brief Chronology 
 
The so-called Second Sicilian Slave War started290 in the vicinity of the town of Heraclea 
Minoa, with the murder by a group of slaves of a certain P. Clonius, their owner (36.4.1-2). 
This murder closely followed a failed outbreak near Halicyae which had been put down by 
the governor, P. Licinius Nerva (36.3.4-6). The revolt near Heraclea rapidly grew following 
the governor’s initial failure to destroy it with a garrison drawn from Enna (36.4.2-3), and so 
the rebels elected Salvius, later to be called Tryphon, to become their leader. He, in turn, 
marched his forces on the city of Morgantina – why he marched on this city is unclear from 
the narrative. In the process of the siege, which was unsuccessful, Salvius/Tryphon and his 
men defeated a force of ten thousand Sicilians and Italian Greeks led by Nerva (36.4.5-8). 
Meanwhile a second revolt started near Segesta and Lilybaeum, led from the start by 
Athenion. These rebels briefly besieged Lilybaeum, and following a failure there withdrew 
(36.5). By this time, Salvius/Tryphon’s forces had broken off the siege at Morgantina, and 
following a sacrifice of a toga at the shrine of the Palici, proceeded to seize Triocala in the 
west of the island in order to build a palace there (36.7). At this point, Salvius/Tryphon 
summoned Athenion and the two groups united. In response Rome assigned L. Licinius 
Lucullus to the command against them, and he attacked the rebels in open battle with sixteen 
thousand troops, winning comfortably, although he then failed to follow up his victory (36.8). 
In a desire to discredit his successor and prevent prosecution for his actions, Lucullus burned 
his camp and disbanded his army; this then caused the next praetor, C. Servilius, to achieve 
nothing of note in his praetorship, during which time the rebels gained the ascendancy (36.9). 
Finally, M’. Aquilius was assigned as consul to the command, and in a single engagement 
                                                 
289 For the full text and translation of Diodorus’ account of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War see 
Appendix 12: Text and Translation of Diodorus’ Account of the Sicilian Stasis.  
290 For a discussion of Diodorus’ introduction to the war, including his argument for why it took place, see 
Chapter VI. 
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crushed the rebels and killed Athenion, who was by this time king (36.10). Subsequently, 
Aquilius cleared the province of pockets of resistance and celebrated an ovation on his return 
to Rome.291 
 
II. Entrances 
 
As we saw in Chapter II, Eunus’ character was carefully introduced into his narrative with an 
opening that defined the reception of his character for the rest of the narrative. Moreover, we 
saw that these facets of Eunus were not all demonstrated to us through his actions, but also 
through the covert intrusions of the narrator. In this way, the entire story of Eunus in 
Diodorus was coloured from the initial phrases of his entrance, and since his character 
subsequently dominated the narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection, the colourings applied in 
the first lines of his character served to alter the reading of the entire Insurrection. This 
centripetal force exerted by Eunus was also present in the only other ancient account to give a 
narrative of the events beyond a brief summary or anecdote: Florus. While it could be 
attributed to the manner of Diodorus’ preservation and Florus’ own adaptation of Livy, in the 
so-called Second Sicilian Slave War the leaders, Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion, do not 
dominate the narrative in nearly the same manner. For Salvius/Tryphon in particular, his 
demise during the narrative naturally lessens his impact; nonetheless the ways they are 
introduced into the narrative contain the seeds of their characterisations and the start of a 
better understanding of their roles in Diodorus. 
 
II.i. Salvius/Tryphon 
 
We first hear of Salvius/Tryphon at the start of the last uprising in the sequence that opens 
Diodorus’ narrative of the conflict.292 Unlike in the Sicilian Insurrection, it is only after the 
initial successful engagements that the rebels select their leader (36.4.4): 
 
καὶ πολλῶν καθ΄ ἡµέραν ἀφισταµένων σύντοµον καὶ παράδοξον ἐλάµβανον αὔξησιν, ὡς ἐν 
ὀλίγαις ἡµέραις πλείους γενέσθαι τῶν ἑξακισχιλίων. τότε δὴ καὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίαν συνελθόντες 
καὶ βουλῆς προτεθείσης πρῶτον µὲν εἵλαντο βασιλέα τὸν ὀνοµαζόµενον Σάλουιον, δοκοῦντα 
τῆς ἱεροσκοπίας ἔµπειρον εἶναι καὶ ταῖς γυναικείαις θέαις αὐλοµανοῦντα. οὗτος βασιλεύσας 
τὰς µὲν πόλεις ἀργίας αἰτίας καὶ τρυφῆς νοµίζων ἐξέκλινεν, εἰς τρία δὲ µερίσας τοὺς 
                                                 
291 Ath. 5.213b; Cic. De or. 2.195. For a discussion of the awarding of honours for both conflicts, see Appendix 
13: Honours for Victory?. 
292 Unusually, Salvius/Tryphon appears in no other narrative of the war, for Florus only ever mentions Athenion. 
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ἀποστάτας καὶ ἴσους ἡγεµόνας ἐγκαταστήσας ταῖς µερίσι προσέταξεν ἐπιέναι τὴν χώραν καὶ 
πρὸς ἕνα τόπον καὶ καιρὸν ἅπαντας ἀπαντᾶν. 
 
Since every day many revolted, they built up their force quickly and contrary to expectations, so that in 
a few days they were more than six thousand. At that time, then, they gathered in an assembly and 
when the proposal was put before them they first chose as king one named Salvius, who was reputed to 
be practised in divination and a flute player in mystic orgies for women. He, on becoming king, 
avoided cities, considering them to be the cause of idleness and luxury, but divided the rebels into three 
parts and established equal commanders for the parts, and he ordered them to pillage the countryside 
and to meet in full at one place and time. 
 
There is one important link between this characterisation of Salvius/Tryphon and the earlier 
(narratological) characterisation of Eunus: they both contain an element of the feminine. For 
Eunus it was directly applied by describing him as lacking in ἀνδρεία, ‘bravery’ (Diod. Sic. 
34/5.2.14), behaving ἀνάνδρως, ‘in an unmanly fashion’, and fleeing διὰ δειλίαν, ‘through 
cowardice’ (34/5.2.22). For Salvius/Tryphon, the slur is rather more subtle. He was known 
for only two reasons: first, his skills in ἱεροσκοπία, ‘divination’; second, his role as ταῖς 
γυναικείαις θέαις αὐλοµανοῦντα, ‘a flute player in mystic orgies for women’.293 Indeed, we 
are only ever told these two details of Salvius/Tryphon, never shown them. Furthermore for 
the rest of the narrative both these suggestions lie dormant, but the implications of the latter 
remain important: by having access to an expressly female religious rite, Salvius/Tryphon’s 
own masculinity would be questioned, and, as we saw in Chapter II, Hellenistic kingship and 
warfare was a masculine sphere in which failure was linked to feminine tendencies (see 
Beston 2000: 316-7 and Poly. 28.21.3).294 Yet, there remain some differences between this 
account, and that of Eunus’ acclamation. In this passage, the narrator does not give any 
opinion as to why Salvius/Tryphon was chosen. It is implied that it was because of his 
reputation in divination, but not stated explicitly. There is a further difference: unlike both 
Athenion and Eunus, Salvius/Tryphon is never shown in the narrative to demonstrate his 
                                                 
293 This religious element, especially the divination, is typically noted, but not discussed by modern studies; see 
Toynbee (1965), 407; Vogt (1965), 33; Goldsberry (1973), 256; Manganaro (1980), 440; Bradley (1989), 74, 
114; Callahan and Horsley (1998), 147; Wirth (2004), 283-4; Urbainczyk (2008a), 54. Dumont (1987), 264, 
followed by Strauss (2010), 194, argued that this passage demonstrates the importance of the cult of Dionysus to 
the rebellion. There is little reason to assume that his flute-playing singled out Salvius/Tryphon as a slave, 
domestic or rural: Bradley (1989), 74, argued for a domestic identification from this evidence. 
Salvius/Tryphon’s nationality is not specified, though Finley (1968), 144, suggested that he could have been 
Italian, and perhaps even not a slave. 
294 The aulos was, during the fifth century and into the fourth century B.C., disliked among some Greek authors 
for weakening the control of the physique: see Wilson (1999), 65; Theophr. Fr. 92W; Paus. 9.12.5-6; Arist. Pol. 
ch. 26; Dio. Chrys. Or. 78 (2.281 Dind.). Moreover, the role of aulos players in the symposium often overlapped 
with their ‘sexual use-value’, in Wilson’s words (1999), 84-5. Aristotle (Pol. 1342a20) also considered it 
unmanly to perform music except when drunk or for fun. Finally, in Aristophanes’ Nicophon (17), the verb 
προσαυλεῖν is used in a punning phrase describing the act of fellatio (see also Henderson (1975), 184-5). While 
the context outlined here is not necessarily directly relevant to Salvius, it is important to note the literary context 
in which the aulos was considered. Furthermore, the placing of Salvius’ use of the aulos into a principally 
female space could potentially activate these latent meanings behind the expression. 
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skills, nor use them to his or the rebels’ advantage. While these elements of Salvius/Tryphon 
are not immediately developed, they are, nonetheless, the only two elements to his character 
in his initial introduction: what remains to be seen is how this introduction underpins his 
character throughout the rest of the narrative. 
 
II.ii. The Battle of Morgantina 
 
Despite Salvius/Tryphon’s introduction as a subtly effeminate leader, he in fact had a major 
success against a force commanded by Rome. Yet, his success is not uncomplicated, even if it 
does draw some grudging praise in the narrative. In the course of his siege at Morgantina, 
Salvius/Tryphon’s forces were attacked by the praetor, P. Licinius Nerva, but through a 
combination of cowardice among Nerva’s men and Salvius/Tryphon’s cunning, the rebels 
seized the day (Diod. Sic. 36.4.6-8): 
 
ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ὡς βοηθήσων τῇ πόλει ἐπελθών, νυκτοπορίᾳ χρησάµενος, ἔχων µεθ΄ ἑαυτοῦ 
Ἰταλιώτας τε καὶ ἐκ Σικελίας σχεδὸν στρατιώτας µυρίους, κατέλαβε τοὺς ἀποστάτας 
ἀσχολουµένους περὶ τὴν πολιορκίαν, καὶ ἐπιθέµενος αὐτῶν τῇ παρεµβολῇ καὶ εὑρὼν ὀλίγους 
µὲν τοὺς φυλάττοντας, πλῆθος δὲ γυναικῶν αἰχµαλώτων καὶ λείας ἄλλης παντοδαποῦς, 
ῥᾳδίως ἐξεῖλε τὴν στρατοπεδείαν. καὶ ταύτην µὲν διήρπασεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Μοργαντίνην ἦγεν. 
οἱ δ΄ ἀποστάται ἐξαίφνης ἀντεπιθέµενοι, καὶ ὑπερδέξιον τὴν στάσιν ἔχοντες βιαίως τε 
ἐπιρράξαντες εὐθὺς ἐπὶ προτερήµατος ἦσαν· οἱ δὲ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἐτράπησαν πρὸς φυγήν. 
τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως τῶν ἀποστατῶν κήρυγµα ποιησαµένου µηδένα κτείνειν τῶν τὰ ὅπλα 
ῥιπτούντων, οἱ πλεῖστοι ῥιπτοῦντες ἔφευγον. καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ καταστρατηγήσας τοὺς 
πολεµίους ὁ Σάλουιος τήν τε παρεµβολὴν ἀνεκτήσατο καὶ περιβόητον νίκην ἀπενεγκάµενος 
πολλῶν ὅπλων ἐκυρίευσεν. ἀπέθανον δὲ ἐν τῇ µάχῃ τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν τε καὶ Σικελῶν οὐ 
πλείους ἑξακοσίων διὰ τὴν τοῦ κηρύγµατος φιλανθρωπίαν, ἑάλωσαν δὲ περὶ τετρακισχιλίους. 
 
The governor, in order to come to aid the city, made a night march, having with him about ten 
thousand soldiers from Sicily and the Italian Greeks; he discovered that the rebels were engaged in the 
siege and attacked their encampment, and finding that there were few guards, and many captive 
women and other forms of booty, he took the encampment easily. He sacked this, and went on to 
Morgantina. The rebels all of a sudden counter-attacked, and since they had a commanding position 
above, and attacked forcibly, they immediately were in the ascendancy: the forces of the governor were 
turned to flight. When the king of the rebels made a proclamation to kill none of those who threw 
down their arms, the majority fled dropping their weapons. Having outwitted the enemy in this fashion, 
Salvius both regained the camp and, having obtained a famous victory, got possession of many 
weapons. Not more than six hundred Italian Greeks and Sicilians died in the battle because of the 
humanity of the proclamation, but about four thousand were taken. 
 
Urbainczyk (2008a: 45) described this as ‘a very favourable account of the behaviour of the 
slaves’; however, it is not favourable in all respects.295 The offer to spare the soldiers if they 
                                                 
295 Finley (1968), 144-5, commented that Salvius/Tryphon ‘had more military skill than any other slave 
commander in either revolt’, although from what evidence is unclear. It is certainly the case that he could be 
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dropped their weapons came after they had fled, and while it was certainly shrewd, and 
elicited praise for its φιλανθρωπία, ‘humanity’, it did not win the battle by itself. The 
principal cause of the defeat, in the text, was the higher ground that the rebels held and the 
Roman army’s cowardice.296 Moreover, Salvius/Tryphon had in the early stages of the battle 
lost his camp, and the impression given from the narrative is that P. Licinius Nerva made the 
mistake of attacking a larger force holding a raised position. Even so, despite downplaying 
Salvius/Tryphon’s success through its attribution to the cowardice of Nerva’s force, the 
narrative still records a significant victory for Salvius/Tryphon, even if he could not follow it 
up with the capture of Morgantina. Before exploring this dichotomy between a military 
success and Salvius/Tryphon’s effeminacy, we have to deal with the second leader, Athenion, 
whose narrative quickly becomes intertwined with that of Salvius/Tryphon. 
 
II.iii. Athenion 
 
Athenion’s rise in the narrative, unlike Salvius/Tryphon’s, is both more detailed and active. 
At the point of his introducation, we are given the following characterisation (36.5.1): 
 
Περὶ δὲ τὴν Αἰγεσταίων καὶ Λιλυβαϊτῶν χώραν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πλησιοχώρων, ἐνόσει 
πρὸς ἀπόστασιν τὰ πλήθη τῶν οἰκετῶν. γίνεται δὲ τούτων ἀρχηγὸς Ἀθηνίων ὄνοµα, ἀνὴρ 
ἀνδρείᾳ διαφέρων, Κίλιξ τὸ γένος. οὗτος οἰκονόµος ὢν δυοῖν ἀδελφῶν µεγαλοπλούτων, καὶ 
τῆς ἀστροµαντικῆς πολλὴν ἔχων ἐµπειρίαν, ἔπεισε τῶν οἰκετῶν πρῶτον µὲν τοὺς ὑφ΄ ἑαυτὸν 
τεταγµένους περὶ διακοσίους ὄντας, ἔπειτα τοὺς γειτνιῶντας, ὥστε ἐν πέντε ἡµέραις 
συναχθῆναι πλείους τῶν χιλίων. 
 
In the territory of Segesta and Lilybaeum, and yet others adjacent, the multitude of slaves were sick for 
revolt. The chief of these was one named Athenion, a man excelling in courage, a Cilician by birth. He 
was the steward of two exceedingly wealthy brothers, and having great experience of astrology, he first 
persuaded those of the slaves formed up under him, about two hundred, then those in the vicinity, so 
that in five days more than a thousand had been brought together. 
 
In this first instance we have a remarkable characteristic attributed immediately to Athenion, 
for he is described as ἀνδρείᾳ διαφέρων, ‘excelling in courage’. In his case it also appears 
that his skill in astrology was directly relevant to his subsequent leadership, indeed the text is 
adamant that this was the principal cause of his ability to persuade his fellow slaves to revolt. 
Furthermore, Athenion is depicted as centrally active in beginning his revolt, rather than 
becoming leader on its initial success: in this respect Athenion is much more like Eunus and 
                                                                                                                                                        
demonstrated from what we are shown in the narrative to have been a reasonable commander, but at no point in 
the narrative are we ever told he was. 
296 Noted by Finley (1968), 145. Bradley (1989), 75, appears to imply that Salvius/Tryphon’s proclamation was 
the ‘master stroke’ that pulled off the victory. 
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Kleon. We should also note, at this stage, that the portrayal is not openly hostile: unlike 
Kleon, who was not only Cilician but also a bandit, rendering the connection between the two 
evident, Athenion has no such stigma so explicitly stated for his Cilician origins.297 
 
 Yet this positive portrayal does not remain for long. Immediately after his initial 
recruitment of followers he proclaimed a divine right to the island, and proceeded to besiege 
Lilybaeum, told as follows (36.5.3-4): 
 
προσεποιεῖτο δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτῷ διὰ τῶν ἄστρων προσηµαίνειν ὡς ἔσοιτο τῆς Σικελίας 
συµπάσης βασιλεύς· διὸ δεῖν αὐτῆς τε τῆς χώρας καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ζῴων τε καὶ καρπῶν ὡς 
ἰδίων φείδεσθαι. τέλος ἀθροίσας ὑπὲρ τοὺς µυρίους ἐτόλµησε πόλιν ἀπόρθητον τὸ Λιλύβαιον 
πολιορκεῖν. µηδὲν δὲ ἀνύων µετανίστατο αὐτῆς, εἰπὼν αὐτῷ τοὺς θεοὺς τοῦτο ἐπιτάττειν· 
ἐπιµένοντας γὰρ ἂν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ δυστυχήµατος πειραθῆναι. παρασκευαζοµένου δὲ αὐτοῦ 
τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀναχώρησιν, κατέπλευσάν τινες ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ κοµίζοντες ἐπιλέκτους 
Μαυρουσίους, οἳ ἐπὶ βοήθειαν ἦσαν ἀπεσταλµένοι τοῖς Λιλυβαΐταις, ἔχοντες ἡγούµενον ὃς 
ὠνοµάζετο Γόµων. οὗτος σὺν τοῖς ἅµ΄ αὐτῷ κατὰ νύκτα καὶ ἀνελπίστως ἐπιθέµενος τοὺς περὶ 
Ἀθηνίωνα ὁδοιποροῦντας, πολλοὺς καταβαλόντες, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ τραυµατίσαντες, εἰς τὴν 
πόλιν ἐπανῆλθον. διόπερ οἱ ἀποστάται τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀστροµαντείας πρόρρησιν ἐθαύµαζον. 
 
He pretended that the gods foretold to him through the stars that he would be king of all Sicily: 
therefore there was a need to spare the land itself, the animals on it and the crops as his own. Finally, 
having gathered more than ten thousand, he undertook to besiege the city of Lilybaeum, which had 
never been captured. After accomplishing nothing he removed himself from it, saying that the gods 
ordered this: for were they to continue the siege they would experience misfortune. While he was 
preparing to retreat from the city, some ships put in carrying Mauretanian auxiliaries, who had been 
sent to help Lilybaeum, having as leader one called Gomon. He, with his men, unexpectedly attacked 
those walking with Athenion in the night, killing many, wounding not a few, and returned to the city. 
As a result, the rebels wondered at the prediction from the stars. 
 
There is an immediate verbal similarity here with the description of Eunus. Diodorus 
recorded about Eunus that (34/5.2.5) οὗτος προσεποιεῖτο θεῶν ἐπιτάγµασι καθ΄ ὕπνον 
προλέγειν τὰ µέλλοντα, ‘(t)his man claimed by divine commands to foretell the future 
through dreams and because of his talent in this direction he fooled many.’ While the 
specifics differ, nonetheless, like Eunus, Athenion προσεποιεῖτο, ‘pretended’, that the gods 
foretold to him. Astrologers were not uniformly acceptable, and in 139 B.C. had been 
expelled from the city of Rome by the praetor Cn. Cornelius Hispalus for spreading false 
interpretations of the stars (Val. Max. 1.3.3).298 In this respect, the narrator’s statement that 
Athenion was pretending to read the stars places him firmly in this category of astrologers, 
                                                 
297 Although, undoubtedly, the negative associations of being Cilician were still important: for these see De 
Souza (1999), 97; Strabo 14.3.2; Appian Mith. 92; Dio 36.20-3; and Plutarch Vit. Pomp. 24. 
298 See also Cramer (1954), 58-60, 234-5, for a discussion of astrology in the period of the mid-Republic, and 
measures taken against astrologers. 
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and therefore draws in the relevant associations.299 This clear narratorial intervention, by 
commentating on the veracity of Athenion’s abilities, compels us to question the episode that 
follows.300 Athenion’s retreat from Lilybaeum, leading him to abandon his efforts at 
organising the west of the island,301 was a major tactical failure, especially considering the 
casualties that his forces received when attacked while on the march. Yet owing to 
Athenion’s prior prediction, this retreat became a major success for his leadership. Much as 
for Eunus, whose abilities at wonder-working secured his position at the head of the Sicilian 
Insurrection and who by verbal similarities is evoked in this passage, Athenion’s success is 
undeniable, but this does not mean that this reflects well on his followers; indeed, I would 
argue the opposite. There is, then, a similar style of characterisation here in relation to Eunus, 
much as we saw above with Salvius/Tryphon, but just as with Salvius/Tryphon, it is not as 
heavily pressed as it was for Eunus. Furthermore, beyond this brief mention, we hear no more 
of Athenion’s astrology.302  
 
III. The Soldier and the King 
 
At this stage in their narratives, both Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion are being introduced by 
the same basic matrix of ideas as Eunus and Kleon. The parameters of these character traits 
are not identical; yet, implications of effeminacy, charlatan wonder-working and authorial 
interventions have all resurfaced in these passages. Moreover, the same narrative gaps exist 
between what the narrator sought for us to know and what he had shown us. We have not 
explored all the aspects of the characterisation of the two leaders, for their roles continued 
                                                 
299 Both Cato (De Agricultura 5.4) and Columella (Res Rusticae 1.8.6) recommended that either the vilicus of a 
farm should not consult astrologers and fortune-tellers, or that these people should not be allowed onto the farm 
in the first instance. 
300 Vogt (1965), 33-4, gives a very positive portrayal of Athenion as a brave leader; see also Manganaro (1967), 
221, for Athenion’s bravery. Urbainczyk (2008a), 57, does not note the movement away from the very 
beginning of Athenion’s description, concluding that ‘here we have a positive portrayal of a rebel leader’; 
likewise Callahan and Horsley (1998), 147; Bradley (1989), 114, is right that we should not necessarily regard 
Athenion as a charlatan, but his argument misses a vital point: we are never shown that Athenion was a 
charlatan, we are told. Therefore, before we simply dismiss this as a negative source tradition, we need to 
consider why the narrator thought to tell us that Athenion was engaging in false prophecy. 
301 Diodorus reports that Athenion did not accept all the runaway slaves into his army, but made some remain 
working the land in order to furnish his army with supplies (36.5.2). This is typically taken as demonstrating 
Athenion’s care in maintaining rebellion: see Toynbee (1965), 329; Vogt (1965), 34-5; Bradley (1989), 76-7; 
Wirth (2004), 284; Urbainczyk (2008a), 57. Bradley (1989), 110, stressed, moreover, that this reflected ‘a 
rational, even sensible and enlightened, character in the slaves’ actions’. Yet, by withdrawing from the area after 
his failure at Lilybaeum, and moving east to Triocala, Athenion effectively abandoned this strategy: his 
subsequent actions betray his lack of foresight in this regard. 
302 In Florus, this aspect of Athenion’s character is not recorded at all (2.7.9-12), nor is there any indication of 
this aspect in any of the mentions of Athenion in Cicero’s Verrine Orations. 
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through the rest of the narrative, and we still need to see if, like Eunus, the early foundations 
laid for their characters then affect the reading of their subsequent narrative. 
 
III.i. First Encounters 
 
The first time we see the two characters interacting in the narrative, the initial 
characterisations immediately assume a unique importance. Once Salvius/Tryphon had 
decided to set his base at Triocala, he then summoned Athenion to join him (Diod. Sic. 
36.7.1-2). It is at some point after their unification that we are given an indication of 
differences at play between the two men (36.7.2): 
 
διανοούµενος δὲ τὰ Τριόκαλα καταλαβέσθαι καὶ κατασκευάσαι βασίλεια πέµπει καὶ πρὸς 
Ἀθηνίωνα, µεταπεµπόµενος αὐτὸν ὡς στρατηγὸν βασιλεύς. πάντες µὲν οὖν ὑπελάµβανον τὸν 
Ἀθηνίωνα τῶν πρωτείων ἀντιποιήσεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὴν στάσιν τῶν ἀποστατῶν ῥᾳδίως 
καταλυθήσεσθαι τὸν πόλεµον· ἡ δὲ τύχη καθάπερ ἐπίτηδες αὔξουσα τὰς τῶν δραπετῶν 
δυνάµεις ὁµονοῆσαι τοὺς τούτων ἡγεµόνας ἐποίησεν. ἧκε µὲν γὰρ συντόµως µετὰ τῆς 
δυνάµεως ἐπὶ τὰ Τριόκαλα ὁ Τρύφων, ἧκε δὲ καὶ Ἀθηνίων µετὰ τρισχιλίων, ὑπακούων ὡς 
στρατηγὸς βασιλεῖ τῷ Τρύφωνι, τὴν ἄλλην αὑτοῦ δύναµιν κατατρέχειν τὴν χώραν καὶ 
ἀνασείειν πρὸς ἀπόστασιν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπεσταλκώς. µετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὑπονοήσας ὁ Τρύφων 
τὸν Ἀθηνίωνα ἐπιθήσεσθαι ἐν καιρῷ παρέδωκεν εἰς φυλακήν. 
 
Intending to seize Triocala and build a palace, [Tryphon] sent to Athenion as king to a general. 
Therefore everyone expected that Athenion would lay claim to the first place, and that because of the 
sedition among the slaves the war would collapse easily: but fortune, as if on purpose to increase the 
power of the runaways, made their leaders to be of one mind. For Tryphon came directly to Triocala 
with his army, and likewise Athenion came with three thousand, complying as a general to King 
Tryphon, having sent the rest of his army to overrun the country, and to stir up the slaves for revolt. 
After this Tryphon, suspecting that Athenion would attack given the opportunity, threw him in jail. 
 
From the passage above it is altogether unclear exactly why Salvius/Tryphon suspected 
Athenion.303 In any case, the Athenion’s imprisonment did not last, and he was released 
within the year to give counsel before the battle of Scirthaea. By this point, Salvius/Tryphon 
had won an engagement with the Roman forces under P. Licinius Nerva at Morgantina, a 
victory that owed as much to Salvius/Tryphon’s cunning as to the cowardice of Nerva’s men 
(Diod. Sic. 36.4.6-8), as we have seen. This presents an interesting situation in the narrative: 
Athenion, who we have been told was ἀνδρείᾳ διαφέρων, ‘excelling in courage’, has not been 
shown to be a good leader: the retreat from Lilybaeum had been a tactical disaster. By 
contrast, Salvius/Tryphon, implicitly called effeminate by the covert narrator through his 
                                                 
303 Toynbee (1965), 329, and Finley (1968), 145, completely ignore the details of the problem despite 
mentioning the imprisonment. Bradley (1989), 80, implies that the friction between the two leaders may have 
been caused by a difference in opinion over strategy. 
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status as ταῖς γυναικείαις θέαις αὐλοµανοῦντα, ‘a flute player in mystic orgies for women’, 
actually had a major success against a force commanded by Rome. 
 
In short, there is a tension between what the narrator has told us, and what he has been 
able to show us. If we only follow what we have been told, then there is an uncomfortable 
inversion at play: the brave general is subordinate to the effeminate yet cunning king, much 
as in the Sicilian Insurrection. While this does not accord with what we have been shown in 
the narrative, there is an implicit expectation that it was unexpected for Athenion, the 
superior man in how he was described, to subordinate himself willingly to Salvius/Tryphon. 
Moreover, it suggests that the narrator, regardless of the details he was able to demonstrate 
openly, aimed for a negative characterisation of Salvius/Tryphon. At this stage in the 
narrative the tension is problematic. Yet, in the following narrative of the battle of Scirthaea 
the latent characters ascribed to the two men once again break through the surface, and finally 
solidify the two roles credited to Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion. 
 
III.ii. The Battle of Scirthaea 
 
Following Salvius/Tryphon’s erection of the palace, walls and agora at Triocala (36.7.3-4), 
Rome sent out the propraetor L. Licinius Lucullus to oppose the rebels (36.8.1). In what 
appears to be a reaction to this development, Salvius/Tryphon then released Athenion, and 
was beginning to plan for the campaign. At this stage, the freshly released Athenion 
convinced Salvius/Tryphon that an open battle was a better plan than withstanding a siege 
(for Salvius/Tryphon’s initial desire, see 36.8.2), and so the two forces engaged at Scirthaea 
(Diod. Sic. 36.8.3-4):  
 
τὸ µὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐγίνοντο συνεχεῖς ἀκροβολισµοί· εἶτα παραταξαµένων ἑκατέρων καὶ τῆς 
µάχης ὧδε κἀκεῖσε ῥεπούσης καὶ πολλῶν ἑκατέρωθεν πιπτόντων, ὁ µὲν Ἀθηνίων ἔχων 
συναγωνιζοµένους διακοσίους ἱππεῖς, ἐπικρατῶν πάντα τὸν περὶ αὑτὸν τόπον νεκρῶν 
ἐπλήρωσε, τρωθεὶς δ΄ εἰς ἀµφότερα τὰ γόνατα καὶ τρίτην λαβὼν ἄχρηστος ἐγένετο πρὸς τὴν 
µάχην· ἐξ οὗ οἱ δραπέται ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσόντες πρὸς φυγὴν ἐτράπησαν. ὁ δὲ Ἀθηνίων ὡς 
νεκρὸς ὢν ἔλαθε, καὶ προσποιηθεὶς τετελευτηκέναι τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιλαβούσης διεσώθη. 
ἐπεκράτησαν δὲ λαµπρῶς οἱ Ῥωµαῖοι, φυγόντων καὶ τῶν µετὰ Τρύφωνος καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου· 
καὶ πολλῶν κατὰ τὴν φυγὴν κοπέντων τέλος οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν δισµυρίων ἀνῃρέθησαν. 
 
First there was constant skirmishing. Next, after the two armies had drawn up opposite each other, the 
battle swung this way and that, with many dead on both sides. Athenion, who had a force of two 
hundred cavalry fighting with him, was victorious and filled the area around him with corpses. He was, 
however, wounded in both knees, and taking a third injury was useless to the battle: because of this the 
runaways, losing spirit, were turned to flight. Athenion escaped detection as being a corpse, and by 
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pretending to be dead came through safely in the night. The Romans won a magnificent victory, since 
those with Tryphon, and Tryphon himself, fled; many were cut down in flight, and not less than twenty 
thousand died. 
 
Here we see, in a direct and open comparison, the two originally defined characters of the 
two men presenting a striking contrast. Athenion, who was introduced as renowned for his 
bravery, was a success in the battle, only withdrawing once wounded three times, and with 
him the rebel cause is apparently lost. Salvius/Tryphon, by contrast, who was inculpated in 
being part of feminine orgiastic rituals, himself fled from the battle. Regardless of whether 
we believe this analysis of the battle (and it is, at best, impressionistic), it reinforces their 
characters further, and draws a parallel with the narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection, in 
which the brave Kleon balanced the cowardly Eunus, eventually dying in battle, while Eunus 
fled and was captured. The tension created in the gap between what we have been shown and 
what we have been told is here released, as both men revert to character. 
 
 Furthermore, this event is the crux of the whole relationship between the two men. 
Shortly after, Salvius/Tryphon dies (36.9.1). It is from the battle of Scirthaea onwards that the 
initial leadership of the rebels is shown to have been poorly chosen: it is only whilst Athenion 
holds the field at Scirthaea that the rebels prevail, and, on his assumption of command, they 
overran large portions of the island (36.9; it was most likely, in this period, that they made an 
attempt on Messana: see Dio 27.93.4 and the Chapter VII). Moreover, Athenion’s death, in 
sole combat against the heroic consul M’. Aquilius, is at least implicitly brave (Diod. Sic. 
36.10.1): the killing of Athenion defines Aquilius’ glory more finely than ending the war, and 
was the achievement that later enabled his acquittal on charges of extortion (Cic. Flac. 39.98; 
De or. 2.195; Verr. 2.5.3). Aquilius’ glory in turn defines Athenion’s character. Finally, the 
narrative sets up Salvius/Tryphon as a poor choice of leader. This impression, there from the 
beginning, served to mitigate any successes he had, most notably outside the walls of 
Morgantina, when he defeated the Roman praetor P. Licinius Nerva. It is notable that in the 
authors that record the narrative of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War after Diodorus, 
none mention Salvius/Tryphon; we have already seen this for Cicero. Why this was the case 
cannot be answered here, but I would suggest, as will be argued in the Chapter VII, that it 
was because Salvius/Tryphon, like King Antiochus before him, was a more difficult enemy to 
stomach than Athenion.304 
                                                 
304 Vogt (1965), 49, noted that Athenion’s brave death would have helped future generations tolerate him as a 
champion of the two insurrections in Sicily. 
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Conclusion 
 
Diodorus’ narrative preserves no other details about either man. Neither man warranted a 
grand entrance, and it is this that should suggest that their characters were not well fleshed 
out: in the Sicilian Insurrection it is the introduction of both Eunus and Kleon that provided 
the firm platform for their later, continued denigration. In contrast, Salvius/Tryphon enters 
with a single line of introduction, and Athenion with a somewhat longer introduction that still 
lacks in the colour and depth of the attack on Eunus. However, the ideas employed to 
disparage both Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion are similar to those used for Eunus and Kleon, 
even if neither man in the latter event warranted the vicious attack on their deaths that Eunus 
received in Diodorus. The narrative itself, and the covert narrator, deal with the two leaders 
of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War in much the same manner that they dealt with 
Eunus and Kleon: a matrix of assumptions was created for both Salvius/Tryphon and 
Athenion, which then dictated the reader’s reaction to their later actions. For Salvius/Tryphon 
especially, there is never any explicit proof given of his skills at divination, nor is his implied 
effeminacy ever confirmed. His retreat from Scirthaea acquired the connotations with 
cowardice from the earlier statement of his effeminacy. In short, the same narratorial 
problems are present for the narrative of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War as for the 
narrative of the Sicilian Insurrection. While we cannot compare the evidence of Diodorus 
against meaningful evidence from either Salvius/Tryphon or Athenion, it is important to note, 
as we pursue an understanding of the social movements behind the so-called Second Sicilian 
Slave War that for this conflict also we cannot take the details given by Diodorus at face-
value. It is time to work out, as far as this is possible, what we can say about this war. 
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VI. Nicomedes, P. Licinius Nerva and Sicily: 
The Origin(s) of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War? 
 
 
ἐκεῖθεν ἐν πολλοῖς τόποις τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν τόλµης 
ἐκδήλου γινοµένης. 
 
‘From then on the boldness of the slaves was made plain in 
many places.’ Diod. Sic. 36.3.4. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When analysing the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, scholars have faced a peculiar 
problem. Unlike the Sicilian Insurrection, which had in Diodorus’ narrative a clearly defined 
point of origin among the slaves of Damophilus, the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War 
does not have such an origin. No single anecdote is presented as the key to the start of the 
war, and the backdrops provided in Diodorus’ narrative of servile unrest in Italy and 
administrative incompetence in Sicily are only loosely linked to the first stirrings of disorder. 
Hence, each modern author identifies a different moment from Diodorus’ long preamble to 
the revolt as indicative of the event. By way of example, Bradley (1989: 66-7) opens his 
account of the episode with the revolt of Varius in west Sicily, while Urbainczyk (2008a: 16-
7) starts with the three revolts that Diodorus described as taking place in Italy before the so-
called Second Sicilian Slave War. In these two approaches we find the crux of the problem: 
out of all the episodes that Diodorus uses to introduce his main narrative, it is unclear which 
are the ones stressed by Diodorus as the salient episodes and which are merely included 
because of their chronological coincidence. The aim of this chapter is to address this problem, 
and to determine whether Diodorus’ account provides nonetheless a structure that aids a clear 
understanding of the cause(s) of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, or if we must look 
beyond the reasons given in Diodorus’ text in our own investigation independent from 
Diodorus. 
 
I. The (Many) Beginning(s) of the War 
 
As we saw with the Sicilian Insurrection, Diodorus’ account of why an event took place or 
even the order and connection of events leading to an episode are not to be taken entirely at 
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face value. In the following, I will show that a thorough analysis of the account of how the 
so-called Second Sicilian Slave War arose will also demonstrate that the account preserved 
by Diodorus, and to a lesser extent Dio, do not provide a useful context for understanding the 
events of the conflict. Diodorus’ account of the inception of the war divides into three parts: 
first, a description of three ‘slave revolts’ in Italy in the years preceding, including the T. 
Vettius episode discussed in Appendix 10; second, an explanatory passage that documents 
the indecision of the praetor in Sicily over whether to follow a senatorial decree to free allies 
enslaved in the provinces which concluded with a group of slaves withdrawing to the shrine 
of the Palici and discussing revolt; finally, the start of the war in two slave revolts in the west 
of the island.305 Owing to Diodorus’ own disconnection of the events in Italy preceding the 
start of the revolt in Sicily, and because I have discussed the most important episode in 
Appendix 10, I will not engage in a discussion of the three ‘slave revolts’ in Italy here: it is 
enough to note that they were most likely recorded by Diodorus only because of their 
chronological coincidence with the larger revolt in Sicily at this time.306 
 
I.i. Ἡ ἀρχή 
 
We start, then, with what Diodorus (36.2.6) describes as ἡ ἀρχή, ‘the beginning’, of the larger 
revolt in Sicily: the problems with allies being enslaved in the Roman provinces.307 For this 
narrative we have two parallel accounts, one in Diodorus (36.3.1-3) and one in Cassius Dio 
(27.93.1-3), but for the moment I wish to concentrate on Diodorus’ account in order to focus 
on how he conceives the rise of the revolt, before then contrasting his conception with that of 
Dio. Diodorus presents the origin of the revolt as part of the wider Roman problems of the 
period, resting essentially in a requirement for manpower to fight the Cimbri. In response to 
this requirement Marius sent to Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, and requested assistance: 
                                                 
305 Although it will be shown that there is not necessarily a link between the uprising of Varius and that of the 
slaves of P. Clonius that seem to jointly represent the start of the revolt. 
306 Diodorus (36.2.6) concludes about the three ‘slave revolts’ in Italy as follows: καὶ ταῦτα µὲν πρὸ τῆς κατὰ 
Σικελίαν͵ ὥσπερ προοιµιαζόµενα ταύτῃ͵ µεγίστης ἀποστάσεως, ‘these events took place before the great revolt 
in Sicily, as if making a prelude for it’. It is clear that he does not see a direct connection between these events 
and the eventual revolt in Sicily, but recorded them according to their apparent role as a prelude, and their 
chronological coincidence. It has been suggested that T. Vettius’ uprising most likely reflected a perceived 
weakness in Roman control of Italy in this period, rather than any real madness on his part; see Vogt (1965), 27-
8, Rubinsohn (1971), 447, and Chapter VII. 
307 It is noteworthy in itself that Diodorus considers the problems with the allies enslaved in provinces to be the 
ἀρχή of the larger rebellion, rather than the αἰτία. This represents an important break from the manner in which 
the Sicilian Insurrection was narrated by Diodorus, in which he distinguished between the ἀρχή and the αἰτία of 
the conflict. In a sense Diodorus does not give an αἰτία for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, and this 
could reflect a weaker conception of why it came about, or simply the conflation of the both ἀρχή and αἰτία in 
the problems with allies. 
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Diodorus then records that (36.3.1) ὁ δὲ ἀπόκρισιν ἔδωκε τοὺς πλείους τῶν Βιθυνῶν ὑπὸ τῶν 
δηµοσιωνῶν διαρπαγέντας δουλεύειν ἐν ταῖς ἐπαρχίαις, ‘(Nicomedes) responded that the 
majority of the Bithynians had been seized by the tax farmers to be slaves in the provinces.’ 
The senatorial response to this was, as Rubinsohn (1971: 445) put it, ‘[to play] injured 
innocence…to the hilt’: they declared all allies enslaved in provinces to be freed, but went no 
further (Diod. Sic. 36.3.2); indeed within the year Bithynian soldiers are recorded fighting as 
allies for Rome (Diod. Sic. 36.5.4, 8.1) and had also been fighting in Paphlagonia the year 
before the request was sent (Just. Epit. 37.4.3), which implies that the senate’s gesture was 
successful.308 
 
The narrative at this point finally comes to Sicily, the only province mentioned by 
Diodorus in response to the senate’s decree. The actions of the governor of the province are 
noted as follows (36.3.2-4): 
 
…τότε κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὢν στρατηγὸς Λικίνιος Νέρουας ἀκολούθως τῷ δόγµατι συχνοὺς 
τῶν δούλων ἠλευθέρωσε, κρίσεις προθείς, ὡς ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡµέραις πλείους τῶν ὀκτακοσίων 
τυχεῖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας. καὶ ἦσαν πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν νῆσον δουλεύοντες µετέωροι πρὸς τὴν 
ἐλευθερίαν.  
 
οἱ δ΄ ἐν ἀξιώµασι συνδραµόντες παρεκάλουν τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀποστῆναι ταύτης τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. 
ὁ δ΄ εἴτε χρήµασι πεισθεὶς εἴτε χάριτι δουλεύσας τῆς µὲν τῶν κριτηρίων τούτων σπουδῆς 
ἀπέστη, καὶ τοὺς προσιόντας ἐπὶ τῷ τυχεῖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐπιπλήττων εἰς τοὺς ἰδίους κυρίους 
προσέταττεν ἐπαναστρέφειν. οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι συστραφέντες καὶ τῶν Συρακουσῶν ἀπαλλαγέντες 
καὶ καταφυγόντες εἰς τὸ τῶν Παλικῶν τέµενος διελάλουν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ ἀποστάσεως. 
ἐκεῖθεν ἐν πολλοῖς τόποις τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν τόλµης ἐκδήλου γινοµένης 
 
…Licinius Nerva, who was governor in Sicily at that time, and following the decree, set free many of 
the slaves, setting up a court, so that in a few days more than eight hundred obtained their freedom. 
And all those in slavery on the island were buoyed up at the thought of freedom. 
 
The authorities assembled, and exhorted the governor to desist from this enterprise. He, either because 
he was bribed, or slavishly to honour them, gave up interest in these courts, and when men approached 
to win freedom, he rebuked them and ordered them to return each to his own master. The slaves, 
collecting together, departed from Syracuse and took refuge in the shrine to the Palici, and discussed 
with one another about revolt. From then on the boldness of the slaves was made plain in many places. 
 
                                                 
308 Rubinsohn (1982), 444-7, has discussed the relative chronology of the embassy to Nicomedes and the 
political backdrop against which Nicomedes’ response to Rome ought to be viewed. He argued that in light of 
the general state of chaos across the Roman empire, and the apparently dire straits in which the city found itself, 
allied kings, among others, were more willing to negotiate boundaries of power with Rome, and therefore were 
more willing to lie to Rome for their own benefit. We need not be detained here in considering if indeed large 
scale enslavement of Bithynians had taken place, as the purpose is to assess how Diodorus constructed his 
narrative as a series of causal links. Toynbee (1965), 328, likewise doubts the story, although does not go so far 
as to dismiss it completely. 
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Immediately after this passage Diodorus proceeds to describe the initial outbreaks of servile 
violence, but they are strictly in the west of the island near Halicyae and Heraclea (36.3.4-6 
and 4.1-3 respectively). Through this passage of narrative Diodorus linked the matters 
concerning allied citizens enslaved in Roman provinces and the problems this caused for the 
governor of Sicily, with the first of this new wave of ‘slave revolts’ in Sicily, a link largely 
accepted in modern scholarship.309 Perhaps, however, we ought not to accept this link in 
Diodorus so readily. 
 
Diodorus records that the disappointed slaves τῶν Συρακουσῶν ἀπαλλαγέντες καὶ 
καταφυγόντες εἰς τὸ τῶν Παλικῶν τέµενος διελάλουν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ ἀποστάσεως, 
‘departed from Syracuse and took refuge in the shrine to the Palici, and discussed with one 
another about revolt.’ I have argued in Chapter II that Diodorus, in the account of the Sicilian 
Insurrection, at times acted as a covert external narrator, and here again we have evidence of 
this activity. It is not as obvious here as it was in the Sicilian Insurrection, but with additional 
context it becomes clear. The slaves fled to the shrine of the Palici. This shrine, as Diodorus 
records, had several functions (11.89): people swore oaths at the shrine on pain of being 
struck blind for lying; this extended the use of the shrine so that legal claims could be 
disputed there; finally it was viewed as a place of sanctuary for slaves. This final use is, 
clearly, the most pertinent here. According to Diodorus, slaves who had abusive masters 
could seek sanctuary in the shrine, and their masters could only remove them after having 
sworn to conditions of humane treatment: Diodorus adds that history records no case of this 
pledge ever being violated. In this context the refuge taken by the slaves is more explicable as 
a typical, or at least an understandable recourse that is absolutely within the bounds of 
Sicilian culture in this period. Whereas later in the revolt Salvius appears to be using the 
shrine for explicitly political purposes (see Diod. Sic. 36.7.1 and Chapter VII), the slaves in 
the passage under discussion are better understood as striving to voice their concerns through 
acceptable and well tested means: our only reason to view their actions as a precursor, and 
indeed initial cause of the later revolts is that Diodorus, as a covert narrator, tells us this was 
the purpose of the retreat.310 
                                                 
309 This connection was accepted by Toynbee (1965), 328; Vogt (1965), 27; Manganaro (1967), 219;  
Goldsberry (1973), 255; Manganaro (1980), 440; Dumont (1987), 229-31, 250; Bradley (1989), 67-8; 
Matsubara (1998), 174-5; Urbainczyk (2008a), 19; Strauss (2010), 192. Rubinsohn (1982), 441-2, did not think 
that there was a link because of the geographical differences. 
310 Bradley’s contention (1989), 72, that ‘for slaves who simply refused to obey their masters and…withdrew to 
the shrine of the Palici for asylum, there was little other alternative for survival than banditry’ is, in the context 
of Diodorus’ passage, untenable: Diodorus is describing actions of slaves that perfectly fit an attempt to 
167 
 
 
I.ii. Dio and Diodorus 
 
At this point we should return to the passage of Dio that I left aside before. As the only other 
source that records the basis of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, Dio is an important 
source to compare against Diodorus’ account. Dio’s account runs as follows (27.93.1-3): 
 
ὅτι Πούπλιος Λικίννιος Νέρουας στρατηγῶν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, καὶ µαθὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ τινὰ περὶ 
τοὺς δούλους γίγνοιτο, ἢ καὶ ληµµάτων ἀφορµὰς ζητῶν (καὶ γὰρ ἦν οὐκ ἄδωρος), 
περιήγγειλεν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν πάντας τοὺς αἰτιωµένους τι τοὺς δεσπότας σφῶν, ὡς 
καὶ βοηθήσων αὐτοῖς. ἐξ οὖν τούτου [καὶ] ἐκείνων τε πολλοὶ συνιστάµενοι οἱ µὲν ἀδικεῖσθαί 
τι ἔλεγον, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τι τοῖς δεσπόταις ἐνεκάλουν, νοµίζοντες καιρὸν εἰληφέναι τοῦ 
πάντα ὅσα ἐβούλοντο πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀναιµωτὶ διαπράξασθαι· καὶ οἱ ἐλεύθεροι 
συµφρονήσαντες ἀνθίσταντό σφισι καὶ οὐδαµῇ ὑφίεντο. φοβηθεὶς οὖν ὁ Λικίννιος τὴν 
σύστασιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρων, µὴ καὶ µέγα τι δεινὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐλαττωθέντων γένηται, οὐδένα τῶν 
δούλων προσεδέξατο, ἀλλ΄ ἀπέπεµψεν αὐτοὺς ὡς µηδὲν κακὸν πεισοµένους ἢ µηδέν γε ἔτι 
ταράξαι τῷ διασκεδασθῆναι δυνησοµένους. οἱ δὲ δείσαντες τοὺς δεσπότας, ὅτι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν 
ἐπικαλέσαι τι αὐτοῖς ἐτόλµησαν, συνεστράφησαν καὶ κοινολογησάµενοι πρὸς λῃστείας 
ἐτράποντο. 
 
Publius Licinius Nerva, who was governor in the island, on learning that the slaves were not justly 
treated in some manner, or because he sought a pretext for profit (for he was not incorruptible), sent  
round a message that all who had some complaint against their masters should come to him, so that he 
might help them. Therefore, of these many banded together and some said that they were being 
wronged, while others brought charges against their masters, thinking that they had seized an 
opportunity to accomplish everything they wished against them without bloodshed: the freemen, after 
conspiring together, set themselves against the slaves and surrendered nothing. Therefore Licinius, 
seized with fear of a conflict311 between the two sides, and lest some great suffering be caused by those 
worsted, admitted none of the slaves, but sent them away, so that they would suffer no harm, or at least 
be unable to agitate as they would be scattered. They, since they feared their masters, as they had dared 
to accuse them to begin with, gathered and by common consent turned to robbery. 
 
There are a great many agreements between the two versions. For example, it is clear that the 
tradition definitely recorded pressure from the slaveowners of the island on Licinius Nerva, 
and that he bowed to their pressure. However, other details differ. Rubinsohn (1982: 443 no. 
26) argued that Dio and Diodorus had a common source, with Dio offering a ‘parallel 
narrative’, but also that Dio ‘obviously did not know of the senatorial decree’. However, the 
expression ὅτι οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ τινὰ περὶ τοὺς δούλους, ‘that the slaves were not justly treated in 
some manner’, could be a reference to the senatorial decree, and thus the matter is not so 
                                                                                                                                                        
negotiate an alteration in their circumstances through the publicly acceptable means of the flight to the shrine of 
the Palici. 
311 In the Loeb edition σύστασις was translated as ‘the united front’, and indeed this translation is the more 
typical for the noun. However, in the context this translation makes little sense, and I think that a better case can 
be made to translate the noun as ‘conflict’, a less common meaning of the noun, since the previous line had 
emphasised the conflicted nature of the island at this point. 
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simple. The evidence of the two passages, however, would not appear to support the 
conclusion about a common source without concessions to each author’s intervention. There 
is, for example, a difference between how the governor was persuaded to start the hearings, 
and also about the purpose of the hearings. In Diodorus the hearings clearly arise from a 
senatorial decree concerning free allies enslaved in Roman provinces and therefore the 
hearings aim to free those involved; in Dio the governor starts the hearings either out of 
concern for slave treatment, which may have been caused by the senatorial decree, or his own 
greed, and their purpose, it appears from the passage above, was to allow slaves to air their 
grievances against their masters. Furthermore, the outcomes of the events described by both 
authors are different. In Diodorus we finally hear of the greed of the governor, but as a reason 
that he stopped the hearings, at which point the slaves withdrew to the shrine of the Palici; in 
Dio the governor chooses, between the slaves and the owners, to anger the slaves over their 
owners to avoid trouble and so the slaves decide to turn to robbery. On this reading, if the two 
passages do share a source, one or both of Diodorus and Dio reworked the episode for a new 
purpose, for these differences are not minor, but demonstrate distinct objectives in each 
author. 
 
 If we consider, for example, what we can tell of the passage’s purpose in Dio, then we 
begin to see the problem of working out what actually happened in Sicily in this period. First, 
the introductory sentence, ὅτι Πούπλιος Λικίννιος Νέρουας στρατηγῶν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ‘Publius 
Licinius Nerva, who was governor in the island’, indicates that this passage belonged to a 
longer narrative:312 it does not appear to be an unwarranted suggestion that this passage was 
also part of an explanatory introduction to a longer narrative occurring during the period of 
the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. If this is the case then Dio’s explanation of the 
cause of the problems is different from Diodorus’. For Diodorus the problems arise from a 
single decision to revolt taken at the shrine of the Palici (36.3.3). In Dio, on the other hand, it 
appears to be founded on the decision of the slaves to turn to banditry more generally, which 
could suggest that he viewed the whole conflict as stemming from a rise in banditry in Sicily, 
not unlike the explanation given in Diodorus for the Sicilian Insurrection. This might help to 
explain the alteration of the whole passage, if we accept that it had the same source as 
Diodorus. For Dio the passage reflects what happens when a governor sets out, for reasons of 
personal profit, to interfere with relations between slaves and masters: had he not been 
                                                 
312 The failure to give the name of the island indicates that the text preceding this excerpt included the fact that 
the passage refers to Sicily. 
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involved, it follows that the slaves would not have had their hopes raised and then dashed, 
and therefore would not have turned to banditry. Freedom for slaves is never an issue in 
Dio’s version, and the whole episode rests distinctly on the correct handling of slave 
complaints.313 Either the removal of the senate’s decree, or its downplaying through the 
governor’s personal greed, simplifies the picture and allows for more direct apportionment of 
the blame: in the Diodoran version, while the governor is censured for his willingness to back 
out of the hearings for the sake of the owners, nonetheless the senatorial decree was the only 
cause of the initial decision to start the hearings. We are left with a significant problem: 
regardless of whether the senate did or did not issue the decree, it is clear that different 
authors could use the episode to construct alternative reasons that implied that the governor 
was essentially responsible for the troubles surrounding the so-called Second Sicilian Slave 
War.314 In many ways, then, regardless of how either text explains the cause in detail, there is 
little point in retaining the link in our reconstruction of how the so-called Second Sicilian 
Slave War arose. For Diodorus, as we saw above, there is little reason beyond the narrator’s 
opinion to see a connection, and for Dio the link extends only as far as seeing a rise in 
banditry lead to a rise of larger struggles, a distinctly generic explanation.315 
 
I.iii. The Revolts of Varius and Salvius 
 
The general link outlined above between the problem of enslaved allies and the outbreak of 
the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, suggested by Diodorus’ covert intrusion as narrator, 
is then strengthened by the narrator for the two following revolts – that under Varius, and the 
second that started with the killing of P. Clonius – by the connective gloss that follows 
(36.3.4): ἐκεῖθεν ἐν πολλοῖς τόποις τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν τόλµης ἐκδήλου γινοµένης, ‘(f)rom then 
on the boldness of the slaves was made plain in many places’. For the Sicilian Insurrection, 
Diodorus engaged in a considerable degree of authorial intervention in order to connect the 
prelude of the narrative to the main part of the narrative. As will be clear in the following 
                                                 
313 In many ways it is clear that Dio provides a less complete view of the situation in Sicily than Diodorus: in 
Diodorus the slaves withdraw to the shrine of the Palici when disappointed, which is, in the context of Sicily, a 
more explicable move than a direct withdrawal to banditry described in Dio; in addition to this, Dio is ignorant 
of, or chooses to ignore the wider context in which these events then fit. 
314 Both Dio and Diodorus’ narratives are in essence discourses on good and bad government. While this is not 
relevant to the thesis presented here, it is important that the rest of Diodorus’ narrative of the so-called Second 
Sicilian Slave War is primarily interested in the actions, good or bad, of the succession of Roman generals 
(36.4.6-8, 8-10), and their effect on the island. There are significant aspects of these narratives that remain to be 
studied in this regard, especially in light of Rome’s seeming interest in the realities of good and bad government 
in the late second century B.C.: for this see Hassell, Crawford and Reynolds (1974), 213-9.  
315 What Rubinsohn (1982), 443 no. 26, called Dio ‘resort[ing] to commonplaces’. 
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narrative, it is unclear if this was the case for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. 
Following the line above, Diodorus describes the revolt of a man named Varius (36.3.4-5): 
 
πρῶτοι τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀντεποιήσαντο κατὰ τὴν Ἁλικυαίων χώραν ἀδελφῶν δυεῖν 
µεγαλοπλούτων οἰκέται τριάκοντα, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Ὀάριος ὄνοµα· οἳ πρῶτον µὲν νυκτὸς 
κοιµωµένους τοὺς ἰδίους δεσπότας ἀπέσφαξαν, εἶτα ἐπὶ τὰς γειτνιώσας ἐπαύλεις παρελθόντες 
παρεκάλουν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τοὺς δούλους· καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ νυκτὶ συνέδραµον πλείους τῶν 
ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι. καὶ καταλαβόµενοι χωρίον φύσει ὀχυρόν, τοῦτο µᾶλλον ἐπωχύρωσαν, 
προσδεξάµενοι καὶ ἑτέρους δούλους ὡπλισµένους ὀγδοήκοντα. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῆς ἐπαρχίας 
Λικίνιος Νέρουας κατὰ τάχος αὐτοῖς ἐπελθὼν καὶ πολιορκῶν ἄπρακτον ἔσχε τὴν σπουδήν. 
 
The first to lay claim to freedom were thirty slaves of two exceedingly wealthy brothers in the region 
of Halicyae: a man named Varius led them. First, they cut the throats of their masters as they slept, 
then, going to the neighbouring farmsteads they summoned the slaves to freedom: in the same night 
more than one hundred and twenty assembled. Seizing a place that was naturally strong, they 
strengthened it more, having received eighty other armed slaves. The governor of the province, 
Licinius Nerva, had attacked them swiftly and besieged them, but his exertions were to no avail. 
 
This revolt was eventually suppressed through the betrayal of the rebels by a turn-coat bandit 
(Diod. Sic. 36.3.5-6 and Chapter VII). If Diodorus’ narrative preserved any clear indications 
of why the governor’s actions at Syracuse matter to this revolt, then these more elaborate 
comments have been lost, most likely through Photius’ summarising. As it stands, there is 
little reason within the narrative to connect this event to the withdrawal to the Shrine of the 
Palici. From the narrative we might expect there to be a number of allies enslaved in that 
area, but this is not indicated. In the absence of any demonstrated link between this episode 
and the broader background described in Diodorus, it might be best to place this revolt among 
those others reported for Italy around the same time principally because they happened in a 
chronological timeframe that matches that of the larger revolt. Otherwise, we might just as 
well assume that the Italian revolts, too, were part of a larger movement. If we exclude this 
option, as I do, we must accept that we have no grounds on which to connect the two events 
reported for Sicily either. 
 
 This conclusion leaves us with the remaining revolt to consider: the revolt of Salvius 
that led in turn to the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. Diodorus records the start of the 
revolt as follows (36.4.1-2): 
 
Τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη ἀπολυθέντων, ἧκόν τινες ἀπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι Πόπλιον 
Κλόνιον, γενόµενον ἱππέα Ῥωµαίων, ἐπαναστάντες οἱ δοῦλοι κατέσφαξαν ὀγδοήκοντα ὄντες, 
καὶ ὅτι πλῆθος ἀγείρουσι. καὶ ὁ µὲν στρατηγὸς ἑτέρων βουλαῖς παρακρουσθείς, ἤδη καὶ τῶν 
πλείστων στρατιωτῶν ἀπολελυµένων, καιρὸν παρεῖχε διὰ τῆς ἀναβολῆς τοῖς ἀποστάταις 
βέλτιον αὑτοὺ ἀσφαλίσασθαι. προῆγε δὲ µετὰ τῶν ἐνόντων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ διαβὰς τὸν 
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Ἄλβαν ποταµὸν παρῆλθε τοὺς ἀποστάτας διατρίβοντας ἐν ὄρει καλουµένῳ Καπριανῷ, καὶ 
κατήντησεν εἰς πόλιν Ἡράκλειαν ἐκ γοῦν τοῦ µὴ προσβαλεῖν αὐτοῖς τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀτολµίαν 
αὐτοῦ διαφηµίσαντες συχνοὺς ἀνέσειον τῶν οἰκετῶν. καὶ πολλῶν συρρεόντων καὶ τὸν 
δυνατὸν τρόπον εἰς µάχην παρασκευαζοµένων, ἐν ἑπτὰ ταῖς πρώταις ἡµέραις καθωπλίσθησαν 
πλείους τῶν ὀκτακοσίων, ἐφεξῆς δ΄ ἐγένοντο τῶν δισχιλίων οὐκ ἐλάττους. 
 
After the soldiers had been disbanded to their usual homes, some reports came that eighty slaves had 
risen up and murdered Publius Clonius, who had been made a Roman knight, and that a great number 
were gathering. The governor, led astray by the advice of others, as well as because the majority of his 
soldiers had been disbanded, at the critical time handed the rebels an opportunity, during the delay, to 
secure themselves. He advanced with the soldiers available, and crossing the river Alba passed by the 
rebels who were residing on the mountain called Kaprianus, and arrived at the city Heraclea. At all 
events, making known that the governor was a coward as a result of his not attacking them, they stirred 
up many of the slaves. Many flocked together and were prepared in a strong fashion for battle, within 
the first seven days more than eight hundred had been armed, immediately afterwards there were not 
less than two thousand. 
 
Here we encounter a similar problem to the revolt of Varius above: the narrative again fails to 
provide a reason to link this episode to any other, and does not even note a causal link 
between this instance of servile unrest and that of Varius just before. In short, from what we 
have of Diodorus’ narrative, the only reason given, explicitly or through the narrative, for 
why these two revolts are connected to the wider problems of Sicily was the line that literally 
relates the prelude to these sections (36.3.4): ἐκεῖθεν ἐν πολλοῖς τόποις τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν 
τόλµης ἐκδήλου γινοµένης, ‘(f)rom then on the boldness of the slaves was made plain in 
many places’. Even allowing for the explanation given by Dio for the larger revolt, these 
episodes do not appear to be rising from banditry, but are rather flash-points of servile unrest 
not unlike those recorded for Italy by Diodorus in his proem to the whole narrative: they are 
the kinds of sporadic, small scale up-risings of slaves seemingly characteristic of slavery in 
the American South, such as the Stono Slave Rebellion, Nat Turner’s slave rebellion, and the 
New York Slave Revolt of 1792.316 Thus, we rely utterly on the opinion of the narrator that 
his link is correct, for there is no reason beyond his statement to connect the two instances of 
servile discontent to an episode that, to all intents and purposes, was widely defused through 
slave action. 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
316 The Stono Slave Rebellion (September, 1739) included more than 60 slaves; Nat Turner’s slave rebellion 
(August, 1831) featured more than 70 slaves; the New York Slave Revolt (April, 1712) numbered 23 slaves. 
Each of the revolts lasted for barely a week at most. For further information regarding these revolts see: 
Aptheker (1966) and (1993); Genovese (1980); Hoffer (2010).  
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In his account of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, Diodorus is not engaging in a 
complex explanation for what happened, but he is giving his reader an impression of 
connectivity in Sicily that is only loosely if at all backed up by his narratorial comments. 
Once we strip off this authorial connection then we cannot build a persuasive context for the 
rise of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War from Diodorus’ narrative alone. While Sicily, 
on the evidence of Diodorus, was an island facing civic problems from as early as 106 
B.C.,317 the narrative does not convincingly connect the difficulties faced by the governor, 
Licinius Nerva, over the presence of unlawfully enslaved allies with the uprisings in the west 
of the island. We cannot, from this conclusion, comment for the moment on what was the 
‘true cause’ of the events in Sicily during this period, but we can at least conclude that 
Diodorus’ conception of events cannot provide a useful guide in this respect. In the absence 
of an explicitly relevant context in Diodorus, we will assess, in the following chapter, 
alternative contexts in which to interpret the evidence of Diodorus’ narrative. 
                                                 
317 The actions of C. Titinius Gadaeus are recorded by Diodorus as having taken place for two years prior to his 
involvement in the revolt of Varius (36.3.5). 
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VII. A Society in Stasis 
Sicily at the End of the Second Century B.C. 
 
 
ἀναρχίας δ΄ οὔσης διὰ τὸ µηδεµίαν Ῥωµαϊκὴν ἀρχὴν δικαιοδοτεῖν, 
πάντες ἀνυπεύθυνον ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντες πολλὰς καὶ µεγάλας συµφορὰς 
ἀπειργάζοντο· διὸ καὶ πᾶς τόπος ἔγεµεν ἁρπαγῆς βιαίου 
ταῖς τῶν εὐπόρων οὐσίαις ἐνεξουσιαζούσης. 
 
‘Since no Roman magistrate administered justice there was anarchy, and all men, 
having unaccountable licence, were causing misfortunes far and wide: therefore all regions 
were full of violent robbery that exerted authority over the property 
of the wealthy.’ Diod. Sic. 36.11.2 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that Diodorus’ narrative for the rise of the so-called 
Second Sicilian Slave War cannot provide us with a useful context in which to investigate the 
events. In this chapter I will suggest an alternative context for understanding the events that 
took place in Sicily between 106 and 93 B.C.: the wider context of Sicily in the late second 
century B.C. The aim here will be to analyse the evidence for the condition of Sicily at the 
end of the second century B.C., and to demonstrate that the island was suffering problems of 
internal order from as early at least as 106 B.C.,318 and very likely before this as well. The 
breakdown of order will be shown to have been exacerbated, but not caused by, the 
uncontrolled uprisings in the west of the island in 104 B.C. led by Salvius/Tryphon and 
Athenion, and the governor’s inability to control these. 
  
The analysis will be in two parts. In the first, focus will be given to a period of social 
disorder following the victory of Salvius/Tryphon at Morgantina (Diod. Sic. 36.6 and 11). 
This section of Diodorus’ text has been underappreciated in the past despite what it tells us 
about Sicily in this period. It will be argued that the outbreak of anarchy following the retreat 
of the Roman governor from Sicily is indicative of wider internal problems in the society of 
Sicily that existed before the rise of Salvius/Tryphon in 104 B.C. In the second part, 
Salvius/Tryphon’s and Athenions’ actions will be assessed as far as is possible from 
                                                 
318 The story of the death of a man from Morgantina, named Gorgus, at the hands of a band of bandits following 
the Sicilian Insurrection demonstrates the continuing problems Sicily had with banditry even following 
Rupilius’ victory over King Antiochus’ army: see Diod. Sic. 34/5.11. 
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Diodorus’ evidence in order to consider their intentions for the nascent rebellion. It will be 
shown that these two leaders differed in their approaches to running the revolt: while 
Athenion embraced the opportunity to wreak widespread but insignificant destruction, 
Salvius/Tryphon sought to forge a new state amidst the disorder of Sicily. Moreover, the 
accoutrements adopted by Salvius/Tryphon upon his acclamation to kingship were 
reminiscent more of holders of Roman imperium: this, it will be argued, is indicative of the 
disconnection that his movement had from the Hellenistic Greek world.  
 
I. The Decay of Social Order 
 
Diodorus’ narrative for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War is for the most part highly 
compressed, largely thanks to its preservation being almost entirely in Photius’ epitome. 
Therefore, while we are given a detailed description of the events of 104 B.C., the years 103 
and 102 B.C. are glossed over only summarily in a single brief section of the narrative (Diod. 
Sic. 36.9). Photius’ efforts at compression included a tightly worded précis of a collapse of 
order in the cities of Sicily in 104 B.C. A longer version of this passage comes from a rare 
Constantinian excerpt (Diod. Sic. 36.11). These passages, despite their brevity, preserve the 
best evidence we have for the problems facing Sicily at the end of the second century B.C., 
and as such demand considerable attention. Most importantly, they provide a valuable context 
for understanding the efforts of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion at forming their insurgent 
government. But before dealing with the large-scale outbreak of disorder, it is necessary to 
review the problems that Sicily had been experiencing before the revolt of Salvius/Tryphon 
in 104 B.C. 
 
I.i. …To Catch a Thief 
 
The earliest indication we find of the problems in Sicily in 104 B.C. is with the first revolt on 
the island under Varius, which preceded Salvius/Tryphon’s revolt. The particulars of this 
event have been discussed elsewhere (see Chapter VI) with the exception of one detail that is 
of relevance to the current problem. After his initial failure to destroy the rebels in their 
stronghold, the praetor on the island sought other methods of dealing with the situation (Diod. 
Sic. 36.3.5-6): 
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ἐπεὶ δὲ βίᾳ ἀνάλωτον τὸ φρούριον ἑώρα ἐπὶ τὴν προδοσίαν ὁρᾷ, καὶ σωτηρίας ὑποσχέσεσι 
Γάιον Τιτίνιον ἐπικαλούµενον Γαδαῖον ἀναπείσας (ἦν δ΄ οὗτος πρὸ δυεῖν ἐτῶν καταδικασθεὶς 
µὲν θανάτῳ, τὴν τιµωρίαν δ΄ ἐκφυγὼν καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἐλευθέρων κατὰ 
λῃστείαν ἀναιρῶν, οὐδένα δὲ τῶν οἰκετῶν παραλυπῶν) εἶχεν ὑπηρέτην τοῦ σκοποῦ. οὗτος 
ἔχων αὑτῷ πιστοὺς οἰκέτας ἱκανοὺς πρόσεισι τῷ φρουρίῳ τῶν ἀποστατῶν, ὡς δὴ 
συµµεθέξων τοῦ κατὰ Ῥωµαίων πολέµου· εὐµενῶς δὲ καὶ φιλοφρόνως προσδεχθεὶς ᾑρέθη 
διὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ στρατηγός, καὶ προὔδωκε τὸ φρούριον. 
 
When [Publius Licinius Nerva] saw that the citadel was impregnable to force, he looked to betrayal, 
and persuading Gaius Titinius, called by the surname Gadaeus, with a promise of immunity, involved 
him as a servant of the enterprise. This man had been condemned to death two years before, but having 
escaped the punishment had killed many of the free people of the island through banditry, while 
attacking no slaves. He, taking with him sufficient trusted slaves, approached the rebels’ citadel, as if 
going to take part in the war against the Romans: both favourably and kindly received he was even 
chosen as general because of his bravery, and then he betrayed the citadel. 
 
We learn here that in order to defeat the rebels, Nerva enlisted the help of a certain Gaius 
Titinius Gadaeus.319 This man, as the passage makes clear, was a notorious criminal who had 
been operating on the island for at least two years, and had met with no little success.320 At 
first sight it appears that the governor has found a creative and effective solution to what was 
a minor problem on the island, and indeed this interpretation is accurate; yet it misses certain 
important elements. We should note, first, that Gadaeus’ actions are described as killing free 
people κατὰ λῃστείαν, ‘through banditry’: the same nexus of implications that was drawn for 
Kleon is again present here. However, there is a marked difference between the banditry of 
Gadaeus and that of Kleon on several counts. Gadaeus’ actions appear to have some kind of 
social character to them, especially with his insistence on sparing slaves and killing only free 
people.321 
 
This is not the only important point here, however. The praetor’s action in recruiting a 
man from outside the normal bounds of society has a great many parallels in the ancient 
                                                 
319 Gadaeus has not been considered much in the past. Most recently Urbainczyk (2008a), 20, gives no name for 
him and only briefly notes his participation in the uprising; Bradley (1989), 67, likewise gives only a brief 
consideration of Gadaeus’ role, noting that the slaves were duped by him; likewise Dumont (1987), 233, and 
Manganaro (1980), 440. Many do not discuss Gadaeus at all: Toynbee (1965); Vogt (1965); Finley (1968); 
Goldsberry (1973); Perkins (2007); Strauss (2010). 
320 If he was sentenced to death two years prior to this event in 104 B.C. then it follows that he must have been 
doing something to be sentenced to death before that; he was, therefore, active since at least 106 B.C. Modern 
estimates of the lifespan of a person once they had turned bandit are between two and six years: see Hobsbawm 
(1959), 19. 
321 Although perhaps we should note that, given his eventual role in the downfall of the rebel enclave in the 
passage above, this reticence to harm slaves did not last long once Gadaeus was offered immunity for his 
crimes: he was clearly no ‘social bandit’ in the ‘noble robber’ mould (Hobsbawm (2000), 47-8), fighting against 
corrupt governors and despoiling the rich to help the poor; for the phenomenon of ‘social banditry’ see 
Hobsbawm (1972) and (2000), as well as criticism from Blok (1972) and Shaw (1984). Dumont (1987), 258, 
entertained the thesis that Gadaeus’ efforts to spare slaves included sparing the poor as well. 
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world. There were several occasions when a man formerly considered a ‘bandit’322 was 
officially recognised by a legitimate authority, or given de-facto control of the area in which 
they had operated. By way of example, Herod, at some point during his rule in the late first 
century B.C., granted the Babylonian Jew called Zamaris control of the borders of 
Trachonites in order to prevent banditry there. He did this despite Zamaris himself essentially 
being a bandit (see Joseph. AJ 17.23-31; see also Neusner 1984: 43).323 Similarly, in Roman 
Anatolia the authorities negotiated with the Isaurian bandits in 368 A.D. and even concluded 
a treaty with them (Amm. Marc. 27.9.7; see also Hopwood 1999a: 177-8, 188-9). What these 
events often have in common is an acknowledgement from the technically superior (and 
legitimate) forces that they cannot defeat the ‘bandits’, and so they treat with them: in the 
case of Roman Anatolia in 368 A.D., Hopwood (1999a: 178-9, 194-5) has argued that 
Rome’s willingness to communicate was partially down to a series of defeats that they had 
suffered in other theatres prior to the problems with the bandits. He stressed that, moreover, it 
was in times of considerable transformation of political factors in a variety of senses that 
‘bandits’ could become symbols of that transformation (1999a: 194-5). It is tempting to 
suggest a similar situation here with Nerva and Gadaeus: an acknowledgement of Nerva’s 
own inability to cope with the situation.324 In any case, in Gadaeus we have evidence of a 
man driven to banditry for some reason, but also capable of taking advantage of the situation 
on the island to survive for years, escape authority even once caught, and finally extort a deal 
from the praetor of the island. He does not, per se, indicate either way a state of order or 
disorder on the island in this period, and so we must look to other parts of Diodorus’ narrative 
to investigate this.  
 
I.ii. Violence and Disorder in Sicily 
 
Our best insight into the disorder on the island comes with the defeat of P. Licinius Nerva in 
104 B.C. outside Morgantina. His efforts to relieve the siege of the city had ended with his 
forces utterly routed by Salvius/Tryphon’s army, even if the city itself maintained its own 
                                                 
322 As discussed in Chapter II, the terminology would usually be either latro or λῃστής. 
323 In Josephus (AJ 18.310-70), again, we hear the story of the Jewish bandit brothers Anilaeus and Asinaeus in 
the 20s and 30s A.D. who were recognised by the Parthian king Artabanus as having control over a certain 
region of his kingdom that they had terrorised, despite it belonging to one of his satraps; for a discussion of this 
story see Fowler (2007), 147-62. 
324 Bradley (1989), 71, argued, furthermore, that Gadaeus represented a continuation of the lawlessness in the 
island that had been there since the end of the Sicilian Insurrection. In this, Bradley considered also the story of 
the man named Gorgus of Morgantina, who, most likely in 131 B.C., was caught outside the city by a band of 
fugitive slaves, and was killed when attempting to flee back to the city. 
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resistance to the besieging forces and remained untaken (Diod. Sic. 36.4.6-8). With this 
defeat the narrative quickly switches to outlining Athenion’s rise in the far west of the island 
(36.5) and then to an interlude, preserved both in Photius’ epitome and one of only two 
Constantinian fragments for the entire conflict, that detailed the great rise in disorder on the 
island. Given the location of this interlude between the rise of Athenion and the unification of 
the two rebel forces at Triocala, it would appear to take place in 104 B.C., after the defeat of 
Licinius Nerva at Morgantina (Diod. Sic. 36.6 and 11): 
 
Εἶχε δὲ τὴν Σικελίαν πᾶσαν σύγχυσις καὶ κακῶν Ἰλιάς. οὐ γὰρ οἱ δοῦλοι µόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν 
ἐλευθέρων οἱ ἄποροι πᾶσαν ἁρπαγὴν καὶ παρανοµίαν ἐργαζόµενοι, καὶ τοὺς περιτυγχάνοντας 
δούλους τε καὶ ἐλευθέρους, ὅπως µηδεὶς ἀπαγγέλλοι τὴν περὶ αὐτοὺς ἀπόνοιαν, ἐφόνευον 
ἀναιδῶς. διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ὑπελάµβανον τὰ µὲν ἐντὸς τειχῶν µόλις εἶναι ἴδια, 
τὰ δ΄ ἐκτὸς ἀλλότρια καὶ δοῦλα τῆς παρανόµου χειροκρασίας. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πολλὰ πολλοῖς 
ἄτοπα κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἐτολµᾶτο.  
 
Ruin and an Iliad of troubles held all Sicily. For not only the slaves, but even the impoverished free 
performed all kinds of robbery and lawlessness, and those that happened to be about, both slaves and 
free, so that no one might report their madness, they murdered ruthlessly. Therefore all those in the 
cities supposed that what was within the city walls was scarcely their own, but that what was without 
belonged to others and were slaves of the force of lawlessness. And many besides were the 
extraordinary ventures undertaken in Sicily, and by many.  
 
Ὅτι οὐ µόνον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν ὡρµηµένον κατέτρεχεν, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων οἱ τὰς ἐπὶ χώρας κτήσεις οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐτρέποντο πρὸς ἁρπαγὴν καὶ 
παρανοµίαν. οἱ γὰρ ἐλλιπεῖς ταῖς οὐσίαις διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ἅµα καὶ παρανοµίαν ἐξεχέοντο 
κατὰ συστροφὰς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰς µὲν ἀγέλας τῶν θρεµµάτων ἀπήλαυνον, τοὺς δὲ ἐν 
τοῖς σταθµοῖς τεθησαυρισµένους καρποὺς διήρπαζον, καὶ τοὺς περιτυγχάνοντας ἀνέδην 
ἐλευθέρους τε καὶ δούλους ἐφόνευον, ὅπως µηδεὶς ἀπαγγείλῃ τὴν περὶ αὐτοὺς ἀπόνοιάν τε 
καὶ παρανοµίαν. ἀναρχίας δ΄ οὔσης διὰ τὸ µηδεµίαν Ῥωµαϊκὴν ἀρχὴν δικαιοδοτεῖν, πάντες 
ἀνυπεύθυνον ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντες πολλὰς καὶ µεγάλας συµφορὰς ἀπειργάζοντο· διὸ καὶ πᾶς 
τόπος ἔγεµεν ἁρπαγῆς βιαίου ταῖς τῶν εὐπόρων οὐσίαις ἐνεξουσιαζούσης. οἱ δὲ πρότερον ἐν 
ταῖς πόλεσιν πρωτεύοντες ταῖς τε δόξαις καὶ τοῖς πλούτοις τότε διὰ τὴν ἀνέλπιστον τῆς τύχης 
µεταβολὴν οὐ µόνον ὑπὸ τῶν δραπετῶν ὑβριστικῶς ἀπέβαλλον τὰς εὐπορίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ 
τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐπηρεαζόµενοι καρτερεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο. διὸ καὶ πάντες ὑπελάµβανον τὰ µὲν 
ἐντὸς τῶν πυλῶν µόγις ὑπάρχειν ἴδια, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς τῶν τειχῶν ἀλλότρια καὶ δοῦλα τῆς 
παρανόµου χειροκρατίας εἶναι. καθόλου δ΄ ἦν κατὰ πόλεις φυρµὸς καὶ σύγχυσις τῶν κατὰ 
νόµους δικαίων. οἱ γὰρ ἀποστάται τῶν ὑπαίθρων κρατοῦντες ἀνεπίβατον ἐποιοῦντο τὴν 
χώραν, µνησικακοῦντες τοῖς δεσπόταις, οὐκ ἐµπιπλάµενοι δὲ τῶν ἀνελπίστων εὐτυχηµάτων· 
οἱ δὲ ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν δοῦλοι νοσοῦντες ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ µετεωριζόµενοι πρὸς ἀπόστασιν 
φοβερώτατοι τοῖς κυρίοις ὑπῆρχον.  
 
Not only did the multitude of slaves who had rushed to revolt ravage, but even those of the free who 
had no possessions on the land turned to robbery and lawlessness. For those without property, because 
of poverty and lawlessness alike, were pouring out en masse into the countryside and were driving 
away the herds of cattle, plundering the crops that had been stored in the farms, and freely murdered 
those who happened to be about, both free and slave, so that no one might bring tidings of their 
madness and lawlessness. Since no Roman magistrate administered justice there was anarchy, and all 
men, having unaccountable licence, were causing misfortunes far and wide; therefore all regions were 
full of violent robbery that exerted authority over the property of the wealthy. Those who before had 
held first place in their cities in both reputation and wealth now, because of their unexpected change of 
fortune, not only outrageously lost their abundance because of the runaways, but were even forced to 
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be steadfast in the face of violent threats from the free. Therefore, they all considered what was within 
the gates to be scarcely theirs, and that outside the walls to belong to others and to be slaves of the 
force of lawlessness. In a word there was disorder in the cities and confounding of justice under the 
law. For the rebels, being masters of the open country, made the countryside inaccessible, since they 
bore their masters a grudge, and were not getting a fill of their unlooked for success: the slaves within 
the walls, being sick in their minds, and buoyed up for revolt, began to cause great fear in their 
masters. 
 
The passages, while similar, reveal some notable differences. The Photian version ignores 
almost entirely an explanation for the events described, reducing it to a simple fact of 
widespread lawlessness taking place. By contrast, the Constantinian excerpt, which also more 
precisely defines those involved,325 gives a reasonably nuanced explanation of why there had 
been a descent into disorder: first, the landless were compelled διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ἅµα καὶ 
παρανοµίαν, ‘because of poverty and lawlessness alike’; and second, order deteriorated 
everywhere ἀναρχίας δ΄ οὔσης διὰ τὸ µηδεµίαν Ῥωµαϊκὴν ἀρχὴν δικαιοδοτεῖ, ‘since no 
Roman magistrate administered justice, there was anarchy’. Furthermore, when describing 
the problems within the cities, as opposed to the disorder in the countryside, the two accounts 
differ again. Photius gives an unduly simplistic impression of those in the city losing their 
possessions to those in the country, whereas the Constantinian excerpt defines the conflict in 
the cities as one between (36.11.2) οἱ δὲ πρότερον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν πρωτεύοντες ταῖς τε δόξαις 
καὶ τοῖς πλούτοις, ‘those who before had held first place in their cities in both reputation and 
wealth’, and οἱ ἐλευθέριοι, ‘the free’, inside the city. Judging by the contrast set up in the 
passage, these ‘free’ people would, most likely, have been the poor within the city, or at the 
very least, not amongst the ruling aristocracies of the cities.326 
 
 The passages also give an indication of the political dimensions inherent in the 
disorder.327 It is true that the actions of those in the countryside – butchering both slaves and 
                                                 
325 The Photian version records that (36.6) οὐ…οἱ δοῦλοι µόνον͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων οἱ ἄποροι, ‘not only 
the slaves, but even the impoverished free’, were involved in the disorder. From the Constantinian excerpt we 
learn that (36.11.1) οὐ µόνον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν ὡρµηµένον κατέτρεχεν͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ 
τῶν ἐλευθέρων οἱ τὰς ἐπὶ χώρας κτήσεις οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐτρέποντο πρὸς ἁρπαγὴν καὶ παρανοµίαν, ‘not only did the 
multitude of slaves who had rushed to revolt ravage, but even those of the free who had no possessions on the 
land turned to robbery and lawlessness’. The latter version is much more detailed, and more precisely identifies 
those among the free who were involved in the disorder. 
326 These differences, and in particular the greater precision of the Constantinian excerpt concerning those 
involved in the disorder, would seem to suggest that here, also, the Constantinian excerpt is the more faithful 
representation of the Diodoran original, a view supported by Rubinsohn (1982), 449-50.  
327 Toynbee (1965), 330, commented that ‘the free urban proletariat behaved even worse than they had behaved 
in the First (War)’; likewise Goldsberry (1973), 259, and Strauss (2010), 198. Manganaro (1980), 441, noted 
only that the participation of the impoverished free prolonged the conflict. Dumont (1987), 249, mentions the 
passages, but only as part of a discussion of why the slaves were agitating against their masters. Bradley (1989), 
78, describes Diodorus’ account here as ‘highly rhetorical’, and thereby did not discuss the importance of this 
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free who witnessed their looting – do not necessarily speak of an ideological basis for their 
ravaging, as argued by Rubinsohn (1982: 449-50). Yet he stated further (449-51) that these 
conflicts were part of a general breakdown of social order on the island. This breakdown 
reflected the weakening state of the Roman order in the Mediterranean at the time, and could 
have led the poor people in the cities to push for greater political equality, as they were in 
Rome as well. Moreover, he argued (446-7) that at the end of the second century B.C. the pax 
Romana would have appeared, to many, to have been crumbling. There is, indeed, reason to 
believe that this was the case: the actions of successive Roman generals in the campaign 
against Jugurtha in 111 and 110 B.C. had led to the creation of a special court to try them for 
their acceptance of bribes to shorten the war,328 and even commanders such as Q. Caecilius 
Metellus Numidicus and C. Marius took four years to complete the war;329 in 106 B.C. a 
legate in the war against the Tigurini was exiled when accused of maiestas for surrendering 
hostages and baggage to the enemy;330 L. Cassius Longinus had proposed in 104 B.C. laws to 
reduce the power of the nobility;331 perhaps most importantly, the Roman losses in Gaul were 
significant and only reversed in 102 B.C. and onwards, at least two years into the so-called 
Second Sicilian Slave War;332 because of this, Italy itself lived in fear of the Gauls (Sall. Iug. 
114); finally in Italy itself, in 104 B.C., a supposedly madman named T. Vettius had 
purchased, armed and freed his slaves in order to deal with his creditors (Diod. Sic. 36.2.1-
2a.1). Order was restored in the last event only through a preator equipping an army, and 
violently crushing the insurrection. In the period preceding 104 B.C., then, the Roman control 
over the Mediterranean may well have seemed to have been weakening. The conclusion that 
                                                                                                                                                        
indication of the widespread disorder in Sicily at this time. Many did not discuss these passages at all: see Vogt 
(1965); Finley (1968); Perkins (2007); Urbainczyk (2008a). 
328 L. Calpurnius Bestia in 111 B.C. was bribed by Jugurtha into giving the king an easy surrender, and then 
abandoned the province to hold elections in Rome: Sall. Iug. 27-9, 32.2, 85.16; Liv. Per. 64; Plut. Vit. Mar. 9.3; 
Flor. 1.36.7; Eutr. 4.26.1; Oros. 5.15.4. Sp. Postumius Albinus in 110 B.C. was outmanoeuvred by Jugurtha in 
Numidia, and when he returned to hold elections in Rome his army was defeated under the command of his 
brother, A. Postumius Albinus. This subsequently destroyed his influence in Rome: Sall. Iug. 35-43; Liv. Per. 
64; Flor. 1.36.9; Eutr. 4.26.3; Oros. 5.15.6; Cic. Brut. 128.  
329 Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus was appointed consul in 109 B.C. in order to fight Jugurtha, and was 
subsequently appointed proconsul for 108 and 107 B.C., in which year C. Marius replaced him after having been 
appointed consul. Marius was himself appointed proconsul in 105 B.C., meaning that even after commanders 
had been appointed who were more or less incorruptible, it still took five years to finish the war: Sall. Iug. 43-
92; Diod. Sic. 34/5.38; Liv. Per. 65; Strabo 17.3.12; Vell. Pat. 2.11.2; Val. Max. 2.7.2, 9.1.5; Frontin. Str. 1.8.8, 
2.3.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.7; Plut. Vit. Mar. 7-10; Flor. 1.36.11-4; Dio Cass. 26.89, 98.1; Eutr. 4.27.1-3; Veg. Mil. 3.10; 
Oros. 5.15.7-8. 
330 C. Polilius Laenas, legate in 107 B.C. under the consul L. Cassius Longinus – see Auct. ad Her. 1.25, 4.34; 
Cic. Balb. 11.28; Leg. 3.36; Inv. rhet. 2.72-3; Caes. B Gall. 1.14.7; Oros. 5.15.24. 
331 Longinus proposed a law to expel from the senate any man who had been deprived of their imperium by the 
people (Asc. 78 C). This law was then used to expel Q. Servilius Caepio in 104 B.C. – see Cic. De or. 2.124, 
197-200; Brut. 135; Tusc. 5.14; Balb. 28; Liv. Epit. 67. 
332 The losses given for the battle at Arausio range from 80,000 soldiers and 40,000 camp followers (Liv. Per. 
67; Oros. 5.16.3), to as few as 60,000 (Diod. Sic. 36.1).  
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the urban poor of Sicily were agitating for greater political representation may be going too 
far. But, even if it accords well with the general political situation in Rome in that period, we 
would do well to consider further the importance of this breakdown of order. We should do 
so not least for what it tells us about Sicilian society at the end of the second century B.C. in 
the wider context of the Mediterranean. 
 
I.iii. Violence and Disorder in Rome 
 
The various upheavals that gripped Rome throughout the first and second centures B.C. are 
instructive as a comparison. Nippel (1995: 75-84) noted that in the Roman Republic the 
major breakdowns of order were typically caused by extreme political circumstances, but also 
by the collapse of traditional methods of control and order. The outbreaks of severe senatorial 
violence against the Gracchi and Saturninus in the second century B.C. were all indicative of 
the feeling that the political order as a whole was threatened (57). Nonetheless, this extreme 
response relied on the senate being able to call on the support of a substantial number of the 
citizenry, and therefore it was only when the situation was perceived as an emergency that 
these actions could be taken. It is also important that, for Ti. Gracchus, his followers still held 
such respect for their senatorial attackers that they shrank from fighting back (App. B Civ. 
1.16.69), whereas increasingly with C. Gracchus and L. Saturninus the respect for the 
authority of the senate was undermined in the lead up to the fatal interactions (Nippel 1995: 
58-60), a situation that was to get worse in the later Republic. 
 
In the later conflicts of the Republic during the mid-first century B.C., Nippel (78) 
argued that the urban masses could no longer be kept in check by traditional means because 
they ‘no longer showed the deference to their social superiors which had once (as in 133 
B.C.) restrained them from actual confrontation’; the urban masses’ lack of deference is best 
exemplified in their attacks on the interrex of 52 B.C., Lepidus, in the aftermath of Clodius’ 
murder by Milo (Cic. Mil. 13; Ascon. 33, 36, 43C; Schol. Bob. 116 Stangl), and their 
subsequent burning of the Senate House. This in turn meant that the (78) ‘fundamental 
principles of the Republican constitution’ had to be abandoned at times, and soldiers brought 
in to the city to maintain order. Clodius’ actions before his death are also most illuminating 
for the Sicilian context. He drew on rituals of popular justice against both Cicero and 
Pompeius Magnus, in which he organised mock verses to be sung about Pompeius 
insinuating his homosexual inclination (Cic. Q Fr. 2.3.2; Plut. Pomp. 48.7), as well as night 
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time processions against Cicero (Cic. Dom. 14; Att. 4.1.6). In this way, Clodius took 
advantage of a form of popular justice typified by charivaris – also known as ‘rough music’ 
(Nippel 1995: 39-46) – which has been shown throughout history to express social and 
political protest. While we naturally have far greater information for the political climate of 
Rome throughout the later Republic, the context that can be constructed from this information 
for the much less defined situation in Sicily is of vital importance for understanding the few 
pieces of information that we do have for the island. 
 
 We should note, first, the general similarities to the situation during Rome’s troubles 
and those described in Sicily in the passages above. The situation described inside the towns 
of Sicily bears remarkable resemblances to the unrest in Rome in the late Republic. Diodorus 
remarks (36.11.2) that those who had once held the highest positions were forced to endure 
violent threats from the free people inside the city: we presume these people, by the implicit 
comparison presented in Diodorus’ narrative, were poor, or at least politically less important 
than those they agitated against. Here we might find evidence of popular justice similar to 
that practiced by Clodius in the 50s B.C., as demonstrated above. This lack of traditional 
respect was compounded by the prevailing anarchy of the island. Yet this anarchy is 
specifically attributed to one cause, namely that it existed (36.11.2) διὰ τὸ µηδεµίαν 
Ῥωµαϊκὴν ἀρχὴν δικαιοδοτεῖ, ‘since no Roman magistrate administered justice’. We see here 
a comparable situation to that in Rome, albeit caused through a different set of circumstances. 
The breakdown of traditional order amongst the urban masses was aggravated by an absence 
of authority, an absence caused by the victories of Salvius/Tryphon in the field against 
Licinius Nerva. Here we see, then, the circumstances described by Nippel for the failure of 
traditional methods of control. 
 
Moreover, this breakdown of order happened despite the strong Hellenistic gymnastic 
and civic culture that has been noted for the first and second centuries B.C. on the island, 
perhaps indicating a reliance on Roman authority to maintain the status quo of the island’s 
ruling classes.333 At the same time, the countryside had become unsafe, not only with the 
forces of Salvius/Tryphon, but also with the landless free, who were taking the opportunity to 
                                                 
333 Prag (2007b), 257-62, argued that Hellenistic Sicily had an active civic culture, and maintained a gymnastic 
culture, one encouraged by Rome, in order to ensure manpower. Finley (1968), 126, stressed that Rome sought 
to maintain friendly oligarchies in Sicily, rather than radical democracies; see also Rizzo (1980); Prag (2003); 
Pittia (2005); and Campagna (2006), 21, 32-4. We know from the Verrine Orations that some Sicilian towns 
were run by aristocratic senates organised with the help of Rome: Agrigentum in 197 B.C. (Cic. Verr. 2.2.123); 
Halaesa in 95 B.C (Cic. Verr. 2.2.122). 
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engage in wanton plunder. These events are not unconnected, and it appears that Sicily, in the 
late second century B.C., was riven with political problems, much like Rome in 103 and 100 
B.C. with the machinations of Saturninus: the poor and disenfranchised were only waiting for 
a suitable failure of traditional political controls in order to voice their dissent. What the 
sources cannot tell us, but is most likely to have been the case, is that this discontent was 
there for a time before the outburst in 104 B.C., and that these lapses of order, both within 
and without the cities, were symptomatic of a wider problem. It certainly appears that the 
problems in the countryside were not alleviated quickly, since Cicero noted in De lege 
Agraria (2.83) that in 101 B.C. M’. Aquilius had to lend grain to the towns of Sicily. In any 
case, the evidence discussed here is strongly indicative of considerable internal problems in 
Sicily in this period, beyond and separate from those represented by the insurrections of 
Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion. In what follows, then, I will investigate the social elements 
represented in Salvius/Tryphon’s and Athenion’s movements. 
 
II. The Sicilian Stasis 
 
Sicily in 104 B.C. faced a multitude of problems. As we saw above, in the absence of a 
praetor to maintain order the cities had collapsed into internecine struggles, while the 
countryside, no longer policed adequately owing to the escalating warfare that gripped the 
island, had descended into anarchy. Not least among the problems facing the beleaguered 
cities of Sicily was the force led by Salvius/Tryphon that had defeated and driven from the 
island the praetor, P. Licinius Nerva. The rise of this army had precipitated the following 
collapse of order; yet these events, in the sources at least, were not directly connected. It 
remains to investigate what social elements comprised Salvius/Tryphon’s forces and what 
this means for our interpretation of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. While for King 
Antiochus we could reconstruct the make-up of his kingdom from ‘internal’ evidence, for the 
movements of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion we have to rely on the literary accounts, albeit 
in this case from a much fuller account than that preserved for King Antiochus’ insurrection. 
 
II.i. Salvius/Tryphon: a Hellenistic consul? 
 
Despite having already been chosen as king at the start of the rebellion (Diod. Sic. 36.4.4), 
we hear of the accoutrements that Salvius/Tryphon employed to embellish his authority only 
after he had set up his royal palace at Triocala. At this point we get a glimpse into the image 
183 
 
of power that was being affected, and this is not as simple a picture as we might expect, given 
Salvius/Tryphon had been acclaimed βασιλεύς (Diod. Sic. 36.7.4): 
 
ἐξελέξατο δὲ καὶ τῶν φρονήσει διαφερόντων ἀνδρῶν τοὺς ἱκανούς, οὓς ἀποδείξας 
συµβούλους ἐχρῆτο συνέδροις αὐτοῖς· τήβεννάν τε περιπόρφυρον περιεβάλλετο καὶ 
πλατύσηµον ἔδυ χιτῶνα κατὰ τοὺς χρηµατισµούς, καὶ ῥαβδούχους εἶχε µετὰ πελέκεων τοὺς 
προηγουµένους, καὶ τἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ποιοῦσί τε καὶ ἐπικοσµοῦσι βασιλείαν ἐπετήδευε. 
 
He (Salvius) chose sufficient men who excelled in prudence, and appointing them as counsellors he 
used them as his councillors. He wore a purple bordered toga and a broad bordered chiton when in 
session, and had lictors bearing axes precede him; and in all other things he made it his business to 
both prepare and adorn himself as much as a king. 
 
The first line appears to reflect a perfectly acceptable Hellenistic institution, that of the φίλοι 
of the king, or at least an equivalent for the situation.334 Moreover, the final line would appear 
to confirm the general indication of the typical Hellenistic institution of kingship, with the 
phrase τἄλλα πάντα implying all the other aspects of monarchical regalia: we might assume a 
diadem, for example, had we no other information. Yet, the information between complicates 
matters. The symbols of office assumed, both the τήβεννάν τε περιπόρφυρον, ‘purple 
bordered toga’, and the ῥαβδούχους…µετὰ πελέκεων, ‘lictors bearing axes’, are emblematic 
of the office of the consul in Rome, or at least a praetor.335 Moreover, the συµβούλους 
referred to in the first line could well be taken as an imitation of a Roman magistrate’s 
consilium. The last line of the passage above is in fact verbally very similar to Photius’ gloss 
for King Antiochus following his acclamation, in which Photius recorded that he (34/5.2.16) 
πάντα τὰ ἄλλα τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν βασιλικῶς διακοσµήσας ‘arrayed his surroundings in a kingly 
manner’.336 We should note, for example, the repetition of the phrase πάντα τὰ ἄλλα, and the 
very similar verbs used in each sentence: διακοσµέω for Antiochus and ἐπικοσµέω for 
Salvius/Tryphon. The line given above concerning Antiochus was part of a passage that was 
heavily compressed (see Appendix 7: King Antiochus’ Title in Diodorus). Given the verbal 
similarity between this line and the one about Salvius/Tryphon, it would seem reasonable to 
suggest that both represent a form of Photian shorthand for a variety of details concerning the 
initial phases in the establishment of their authority by these rulers.  
                                                 
334 So Vogt (1965), 35; Bradley (1989), 117. 
335 The love-sick T. Vettius also assumed, under the title of King, the regalia of Roman offices, wearing a purple 
bordered toga and being preceded by lictors, yet he added to his regalia a diadem, which is not here mentioned 
for Salvius/Tryphon; see Diod. Sic. 36.2.4. The similarity of the description of Salvius/Tryphon’s regalia with 
that of a Roman magistrate has been noted before: see Toynbee (1965), 329; Vogt (1965), 35; Manganaro 
(1967), 220; Finley (1968), 145; Goldsberry (1973), 257; Manganaro (1980), 441; Dumont (1987), 268; Bradley 
(1989), 123; Wirth (2004), 284; Wirth (2006), 127; Perkins (2007), 48; Urbainczyk (2008a), 58 no. 38. 
336 This line is part of a statement in which we are also informed that Antiochus had adopted a diadem (Diod. 
Sic. 34/5.2.16). 
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 In his choices of regalia Salvius/Tryphon is quite unlike all the other leaders involved 
in the Sicilian Insurrection and the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War.337 While there are 
verbal similarities in Diodorus’ descriptions of both King Antiochus and Salvius/Tryphon for 
at least some parts, the remainder of the description is quite different. Antiochus adopted a 
Hellenistic diadem against Salvius/Tryphon’s purple bordered toga and lictors; Florus’ 
account (2.7.6) of King Antiochus agrees with that of Diodorus, describing him as 
‘regisque…decoratus insignibus’, ‘adorning himself…with the insignia of royalty’. We saw in 
Chapter I that King Antiochus, from the internal evidence of his kingdom, presented himself 
as a Sicilian Hellenistic monarch, who was part of, and in touch with the culture of Sicily. In 
this respect there is no confusion about the type of authority he represented even in the hostile 
literary tradition about his role as king. The polemical attacks on his character preserved in 
Diodorus and Florus are presented in terms explicable to a Hellenistic audience, familiar with 
the ideas and concerns of which Hellenistic kingship was a part. Salvius/Tryphon’s general 
and later successor is, likewise, described in different terms from his predecessor. We are 
informed by Diodorus (36.5.2) that Athenion, on his rise to kingship διάδηµα περιθέµενος, 
‘put on a diadem’, but we hear also from Florus that he was (2.7.10) ‘ipse veste purpurea 
argenteoque baculo et regium in morem fronte redimita…’, ‘himself arrayed with a purple 
robe and a silver sceptre, and crowned in the manner of a king…’ Our only sources for 
Athenion are literary,338 but they present a clear picture of a Hellenistic monarchy, albeit one 
acclaimed with no victory, and quickly followed by a reverse at Lilybaeum (Diod. Sic. 
36.5.2-4). Nowhere are we given any hint of a complicated inter-mingling of Hellenistic and 
Roman insignia in Athenion’s choices, even if we are given, at best, caricatures of a slave-
bandit leader in all our sources regarding Athenion. What are we to make of this difference 
between Salvius/Tryphon and both Athenion and Antiochus? 
 
II.ii. T. Vettius 
 
                                                 
337 Contra Bradley (1989), 116-7, 123; Callahan and Horsley (1998), 146-7; Perkins (2007), 48; Urbainczyk 
(2008a), 60. Wirth (2004), 284, argued that Salvius/Tryphon’s actions were an active and deliberate departure 
from the actions of King Antiochus.  
338 Beyond a small collection of slingshots bearing his name, for which see Appendix 12: Athenion’s Slingshots. 
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At this stage, it will be useful to consider another anomalous figure of the ancient accounts in 
the period, a certain T. Vettius.339 In 104 B.C., this man hatched a plot to escape his creditors, 
allegedly spurred on by his excessive love for a slave girl he had bought without the means to 
pay for her. The plot involved, among other things, arming four hundred of his own slaves 
and proclaiming himself king, while also taking on various insignia of magisterial 
significance (36.2.4): 
 
εἶτα ἀναλαβὼν διάδηµα καὶ περιβόλαιον πορφυροῦν καὶ ῥαβδούχους καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σύσσηµα 
τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ βασιλέα ἑαυτὸν συνεργίᾳ τῶν δούλων ἀναδείξας, τοὺς µὲν ἀπαιτοῦντας τὴν 
τιµὴν τῆς κόρης ῥαβδίσας ἐπελέκισεν 
 
Then, after taking up a diadem, purple cloak, lictors and the other regalia of power, and having, with 
the slaves cooperation, proclaimed himself king, he flogged and beheaded those who demanded 
payment for the girl. 
 
As is clear, Vettius assumed one clear aspect of Roman magisterial symbolism with his use of 
lictors. Yet, like Antiochus and Athenion, he also wore a diadem and a purple cloak, 
appearing therefore to have created a blend of both Roman and Greek attributes of power. 
Moreover, it is stressed that he proclaimed himself king.340 We would appear to have a 
precursor of Salvius/Tryphon’s combination, but because of the Roman context of this 
episode we must be careful of certain details. 
 
In particular, any accusation that a Roman aimed at kingship must be treated with due 
caution: this slur was common throughout the Republic, and was often cast at those who 
sought to pursue radical social or personal agendas. According to Diodorus, Scipio Nasica 
openly boasted that his slaying of Ti. Gracchus had prevented the latter from achieving a 
tyranny (34/5.33.6-7); more appositely, Plutarch (vit. Ti. Gracch. 19.2-3) records that a signal 
from Ti. Gracchus was mistaken for his requesting a crown, a mistake that precipitated the 
mass of senators to attack and kill both him and his supports. Regardless of the veracity of 
this tale, it is clear that the accusation of Ti. Gracchus seeking kingship had been made by his 
opponents, not least in the story that he was slain near the statues of the kings of Rome (App. 
B. Civ. 1.2.16).  This same accusation was made of C. Gracchus in 121 B.C. and L. 
Saturninus in 100 B.C. (vit. C. Gracch. 14.3 and Flor. 2.5.3 respectively). What is more, the 
                                                 
339 The T. Vettius episode is discussed in greater detail, and more generally, in Appendix 10: The Definition of a 
Slave Revolt. The episode is only preserved in Diodorus, at 36.2 and 2a. 
340 It is typically assumed that this statement about Vettius is an uncomplicated fact: see Toynbee (1965), 327-8; 
Vogt (1965), 35;  Dumont (1987), 226, 256; Bradley (1989), 72, 123; Yarrow (2006), 222-3; 
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senate sought, following the deaths of C. Gracchus and Saturninus, to enact lasting sanctions 
against their memories. These included the prohibition to mourn either man (for C. Gracchus 
see Plut. C. Gracch. 17.5; for Saturninus see Cic. Rab. Post. 24-5; Val. Max. 8.1 damn. 2, 3) 
and the destruction of their houses (Val. Max. 6.3.1c; Cic. Dom. 102). The form of sanctions 
followed the precedents set in the cases of the three men who had allegedly aimed at kingship 
in Rome in the early Republic: Sp. Cassius; Sp. Maelius; and M. Manlius Capitolinus.341 In 
the late Republic this same idea was used by Cicero to defend the actions of Milo after his 
killing of Clodius (Cic. Mil. 72, 80, 83). The accusation was also thrown at Cicero in the 
aftermath of the Catilinarian conspiracy (Cic. Sest. 109); indeed, the destruction of Cicero’s 
house following his voluntary exile in 58 B.C. (Cic. Dom. 100; App. B Civ. 2.3.15; Dio Cass. 
38.17.6) further invoked the punishments meted out to those accused of tyranny, even if 
Cicero argued later that the destruction of his house could not be compared in that way (Dom. 
100-3).342 It is highly unlikely that any of these figures actually aimed at kingship: yet, were 
we to have only a hostile source, this impression would remain. 
 
 With this in mind, we would do well to question the assumption that Vettius 
proclaimed himself king. In the narrative of the episode he is described at one point as (Diod. 
Sic. 36.2a.1) τῷ δὲ ἔρωτι δουλεύων, ‘being a slave to passion’. Indeed, the passage presaging 
Vettius’ final decision to kill his creditors characterises the whole enterprise as a ἀνέλπιστον 
ἐπιβουλὴν, ‘hopeless plot’, one that was παραλογωτάτῃ, ‘beyond all reason’. Moreover, it 
was a plot arrived at through διαλογισµοὺς παιδαριώδεις καὶ πολλῆς ἀφροσύνης µεστούς, 
‘childish and utterly foolish considerations’. Whatever the original source for this episode,343 
it is portrayed as a series of actions by a man completely devoid of sanity, driven by an 
excess of lust to extreme measures. As Urbainczyk (2008a: 17-8) noted, this detail is 
important for the narrative, since it explains to the ‘right’ thinking Romans how one of their 
own took up with slaves. Moreover, it fits perfectly into the Roman discourse outlined above 
that this man would aim for kingship, since his actions were otherwise un-Roman. Yet, 
moving away from the value judgements preserved by the sources concerning his sanity, with 
his choice of lictors to represent his authority, Vettius is not invoking kingship – and indeed 
                                                 
341 The destruction of these three men’s houses was recorded in antiquarian tradition: see Varro, Ling. 5.157; 
Cic. Dom. 101; Val. Max. 6.3.1b; Liv. 6.20.13. Regarding the three early Republican ‘kings’ generally, see 
Salerno (1990).  
342 The very fact that Cicero had to stress that interpretation strongly implies that others had already made the 
connection. 
343 If we consider the episode’s location near Capua (Diod. Sic. 36.2.5), it is likely to be Roman or Italian in its 
origin. 
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only the diadem speaks of kingship otherwise –  and he could just as easily have proclaimed 
himself consul or dictator. It is, of course, entirely possible that Vettius did proclaim himself 
king with the aid of his slaves, but we must be wary of accepting at face value any derogatory 
remark of this nature: especially in the context of Rome, any declaration of a man’s intent to 
become king must arouse suspicion. Certainly his other choices of insignia speak more of a 
Roman consul, a form of majestic power display with which Vettius must have been very 
familiar. 
 
This might be the answer to why Salvius/Tryphon’s choices of accoutrements were so 
different from those of the other leaders in Sicily in the second century. King Antiochus, 
from the evidence considered in Chapter I, clearly advertised himself as a Hellenistic 
monarch, and presented himself as such to the people of eastern Sicily; in this respect, he 
firmly understood the Hellenistic world that he was appealing to, and as such presents, even 
in the hostile literary narratives, an uncomplicated picture of kingship. Likewise Athenion, 
who we know was (Diod. Sic. 36.5.1) Κίλιξ τὸ γένος, ‘a Cilician by birth’, presented himself 
simply as a monarch, and his own background in Cilicia could well have given him a 
familiarity with the institution.344 For Salvius/Tryphon, as we noted in Chapter V, there is no 
information regarding his past.345 We can, therefore, only place him in Sicily.346 If this was 
the case then the only figures of authority that Salvius/Tryphon would have been familiar 
with were the succession of praetorian Roman governors, each with a consilium, purple 
bordered toga and an entourage of lictors. It is only natural that he would model himself on 
the Roman governors, but this also indicates that Salvius/Tryphon was not the usual, 
                                                 
344 Vogt (1965), 35, thought of both Salvius/Tryphon and Vettius as anticipating Caesar’s dictatorship with their 
combination of both monarchical and Roman symbols; Urbainczyk (2008a), 60, argued that the leaders 
appropriated symbols of power with which they were familiar from their own background, and therefore all took 
items of regalia that were linked to Greek monarchy. Despite this, she does not think that Salvius/Tryphon’s 
choice of Roman accoutrements were part of his background, but rather a statement of his acquisition of Roman 
authority. 
345 Although his name prior to taking a regal title, Salvius, could indicate an Italian origin: postulated by Finley 
(1968), 144, and Dumont (1987), 227, not least in Dumont’s case because of Salvius/Tryphon’s ‘goût pour les 
insignes du pouvoir romain’. Manganaro (1967), 220, noted the dichotomy between Salvius/Tryphon’s two 
names, arguing that the former is Roman and the latter Hellenistic. 
346 His choice of regal name, Tryphon, if it is indeed confirmed by the slingshots attested by Manganaro (2000), 
130 figs 34a-b, is unusual. Unless we posit an origin from somewhere within the Seleucid kingdom, and an 
unusual interest in the dynastic problems of the kingdom in the 140s and 130s B.C., then it appears to be 
inexplicable; for Diodotus Tryphon’s reign in Syria see Strabo 4.5.2. Finley (1968), 145, commented on 
Salvius/Tryphon’s choice of a Greek name; similarly Goldsberry (1973), 257. Bradley (1989), 77, took it to be 
an action designed to ‘strengthen his authority of his supporters’. Urbainczyk (2008a), 58, suggested that 
Tryphon was actually Salvius’ name. Most assume it to be an attempt to invoke an eastern form of kingship: 
Toynbee (1965), 329; Vogt (1965), 34; Dumont (1987), 226; Callahan and Horsley (1998), 146-7; Yarrow 
(2006), 223; Perkins (2007), 48; Strauss (2010), 194. 
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Hellenistic figure that we have seen in the Sicilian Insurrection, or indeed in the figure of 
Athenion who later fought in the rebellion. It is thus clear that the first leader of the 
insurrection at the end of second century B.C. considered the most intelligible source of 
authoritative insignia to adopt to be those of the Roman governors of Sicily. 
 
II.iii. Insurgent Organisation 
 
In order to understand the movement itself we must assess what evidence there is for the 
organisation that the rebels formed during the course of their insurrection. We saw in Chapter 
V, Salvius/Tryphon’s rise to kingship, and how the description of this event coloured his later 
conduct in the revolt. Quite unlike Eunus in the Sicilian Insurrection, about whom we hear 
very little regarding his initial organisation of his kingdom once acclaimed king, we are 
relatively well informed about Salvius/Tryphon’s organisation of his forces. Aside from his 
initial choice as leader, the first indication of the insurrection’s nature follows 
Salvius/Tryphon’s victory at Morgantina. There, after the victory over the Roman forces 
under the praetor Publius Licinius Nerva, but notably failing to take the city itself, he retired 
to the shrine of the Palici, and proceeded to sacrifice in celebration of his victory and 
proclaim himself king (Diod. Sic. 36.7.1): 
 
Ὁ δὲ τὴν Μοργαντίνην πολιορκήσας Σάλουιος, ἐπιδραµὼν τὴν χώραν µέχρι τοῦ Λεοντίνου 
πεδίου, ἤθροισεν αὐτοῦ τὸ σύµπαν στράτευµα, ἐπιλέκτους ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν 
τρισµυρίων, καὶ θύσας τοῖς Παλικοῖς ἥρωσι τούτοις µὲν ἀνέθηκε µίαν τῶν ἁλουργῶν 
περιπορφύρων στολὴν χαριστήρια τῆς νίκης, αὐτὸς δ΄ ἀναγορεύσας ἑαυτὸν βασιλέα Τρύφων 
µὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστατῶν προσηγορεύετο. 
 
After the siege of Morgantina, Salvius, having overrun the country as far as the plain of Leontini, 
gathered his whole army, chosen men of not less than thirty thousand, and having sacrificed to the 
Palici heroes, dedicated a purple bordered robe to them in thanksgiving for victory. He also proclaimed 
himself king and was addressed by the rebels as Tryphon. 
 
Here we have an example of the Hellenistic practice of acclamation or proclamation of 
kingship following a military success, and there is nothing particularly extraordinary about 
this, notwithstanding Salvius/Tryphon’s odd choice of accoutrements discussed above. The 
dedication at the shrine of the Palici is, on the other hand, significant. King Antiochus, as we 
saw, advertised a very strong connection to the cults of eastern Sicily, and with the shrine of 
the Palici to be found in the fertile lands around Leontini, Salvius/Tryphon could appear to be 
doing the same. Yet his subsequent move west, where he remained for the rest of his 
involvement in the conflict, undercuts any suggestion, as was argued for Antiochus, that 
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Salvius/Tryphon aimed to found his insurgency on support from the east of the island. The 
choice of dedication, a purple bordered toga, is easily reconcilable with the forces defeated: 
those under a Roman praetor.347 However, unless we wish to connect Salvius/Tryphon to 
Ducetius, and see him as a Sikel leader, we need to look to the shrine’s other important aspect 
for the meaning of Salvius/Tryphon’ actions: its relationship with the underrepresented on the 
island.348 By sacrificing the toga at a shrine so closely connected to Sicily, Salvius/Tryphon 
made a symbolic gesture that stressed his links to the unsupported of Sicily. In addition, the 
shrine’s function as an outlet of servile dissatisfaction, briefly mentioned in Chapter V, 
allowed Salvius/Tryphon to achieve a dual-purpose with his sacrifice. At this shrine a slave 
could abandon their abusive master and take refuge, and could only be taken back on the 
condition of a change in treatment from their master (Diod. Sic. 11.89).349 It is perhaps with 
this dual nature of the shrine that we can find the meaning behind Salvius/Tryphon’s actions: 
a form of solidarity with those underrepresented members of Sicilian society as well as the 
servile members of his insurgency. 
 
 If we follow the logic presented above, then Salvius/Tryphon appears to have engaged 
in the typical ancient practice of appealing to slaves and underrepresented free in times of 
war.350 Yet, his actions at the shrine suggest that he was interested in demonstrating solidarity 
with these groups that went beyond routine military requirements. It is arguable that his 
appeal to the impoverished free was unsuccessful in many respects since these groups were, 
for the most part, taking to widespread looting and disorder, as we saw above (Diod. Sic. 36.6 
and 11). Their actions do not, however, entirely preclude their taking up with 
Salvius/Tryphon’s forces. It is true that we should not talk of Salvius/Tryphon as siding with 
the slaves of Sicily, since in many respects his actions were typical of any ancient military 
                                                 
347 Perhaps the specificity of the robe (µίαν) implies that this was a robe captured from the praetor himself? 
348 It has been argued that the shrine preserved a priesthood that served an (Maniscalco and McConnell (2003), 
176) ‘active social agenda rooted in a sense of indigenous identity which championed those who opposed 
control from the outside’. In this respect, the shrine maintained a similar importance with regard to the 
protection of slaves from their masters, and so formed a type of social release in the island for those 
underrepresented. Wirth (2004), 284, rather saw the actions at the shrine as a form of intensification of the 
religious element of the conflict, while Perkins (2007), 48, noted the conflation of the cult’s duel native and 
slave aspects in this revolt. 
349 This shrine was discussed in Chapter VI, 166. 
350 After he had defeated L. Licinius Nerva, Salvius/Tryphon appealed to the slaves of Morgantina and offered 
them freedom (Diod. Sic. 36.4.8). It is likely that he hoped that the city would fall through treachery, but in the 
event the slaves in the city chose to accept their masters’ offer of freedom, and repulsed the besieging forces. 
Later, the Roman governor rescinded the offer, and in fact caused the desertion of slaves that Salvius/Tryphon 
had failed to achieve.  Dumont (1987), 250 no. 483, argued that the praetor’s later order was an embarrassment 
for him; Bradley (1989), 75, argued that this represented a lack of solidarity among the slaves of Sicily in this 
period; Urbainczyk (2008a), 45, noted that the slaves in the city were mistaken to accept their masters’ offer. 
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force when pressed for men (see Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient Warfare). However, it is 
nonetheless the case that his actions betray an unusual effort to engage with the slaves and 
poor of Sicily on an ideological and symbolic level, quite unlike those of Athenion. We saw, 
in Chapter V, that Athenion and Salvius/Tryphon differed in their opinions on how to combat 
the Roman forces in the lead up to the battle at Scirthaea, with Athenion’s plan of fighting in 
open battle preferred.351 This divergence is also present beyond the strategic level, and 
especially in the manner in which the two men organised the insurgency whilst in charge. 
  
II.iv. Settlement and Movement 
 
The main difference between the two leaders is one of their general aims within the conflict. 
Notwithstanding the fragmentary nature of our evidence, and the absence of any mention of 
Salvius/Tryphon outwith the narrative presented in Diodorus, the two leaders appear to have 
adopted quite different overall approaches. We will start by considering Salvius/Tryphon. 
There appears to be an intimation of considerations beyond mere survival in the initial phases 
of his rule, when we hear in Diodorus that he ordered his men to avoid cities as sources of 
(Diod. Sic. 36.4.4) ἀργίας...καὶ τρυφῆς, ‘idleness and luxury’; however, it is unclear how the 
source knows this to have been Salvius/Tryphon’s opinion:352 care ought to be taken in 
accepting this as indicative of his true strategy, especially since his first combative move was 
to attack Morgantina, and then to found a central stronghold for the rebellion at Triocala. The 
latter event gives a better indication of the type of movement he sought to create (Diod. Sic. 
36.7.2-3): 
 
τὸ δὲ φρούριον ὀχυρώτατον ὂν κατεσκεύαζε πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς καὶ ἐπὶ µᾶλλον 
ὠχύρου. Τριόκαλα δὲ αὐτό φασιν ὠνοµάσθαι διὰ τὸ τρία καλὰ ἔχειν, πρῶτον µὲν ναµατιαίων 
ὑδάτων πλῆθος διαφόρων τῇ γλυκύτητι, δεύτερον παρακειµένην χώραν ἀµπελόφυτόν τε καὶ 
ἐλαιόφυτον καὶ γεωργεῖσθαι δυναµένην θαυµαστῶς, τρίτον ὑπερβάλλουσαν ὀχυρότητα, ὡς 
ἂν οὔσης µεγάλης πέτρας ἀναλώτου· ἣν καὶ περιβόλῳ πόλεως σταδίων ὀκτὼ προσπεριβαλὼν 
καὶ ταφρεύσας βαθείᾳ τάφρῳ βασιλείοις ἐχρῆτο, πάσῃ ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἁπάντων 
πεπληρωµένην. κατεσκεύασε δὲ καὶ βασιλικὴν οἰκίαν καὶ ἀγορὰν δυναµένην δέξασθαι 
πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων.  
 
The citadel, which was very secure, he equipped with costly constructions and secured it more. It is 
said that this place is named Triocala because it has three fine features: first, many flowing springs 
remarkable for their sweetness; second, the country around is planted with both vines and olive trees 
                                                 
351 Bradley (1989), 80, also noted that Athenion’s general strategy of widespread raiding was at odds with the 
more sedentary nature of Salvius/Tryphon’s leadership. 
352 It is possible that this reference to idleness and luxury was something of a topos among ancient authors 
regarding town slaves. Certainly Columella (Rust. 1.8.1-2) thought that lazy and idle slaves were to be found in 
the cities, and counsels against appointing them as vilici. 
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and is wonderfully amenable to cultivation; third, surpassing strength, as it is a large and impregnable 
rock ridge. Tryphon surrounded the city with a wall of eight stades and a deep moat, and used it as his 
royal residence, filling it with every abundance required for living. He built a royal residence and an 
agora able to hold many people.  
 
This passage is followed immediately by the passage discussed above that described 
Salvius/Tryphon’s accoutrements once king. In total the passage gives a reasonably full 
description of the state that was created by the insurgency, and in this respect it appears to be 
much like any other Hellenistic state. In particular, the agora was an important civic feature 
for any Greek city. Moreover, the choice of location, one that could be easily defended, but 
also had good access to easily cultivated land, is typical of many Greek cities.353 What is 
most important about this passage is that it provides evidence of a clear desire among the 
rebels under Salvius/Tryphon to achieve more than just material gain from looting (or even 
their freedom, for those who had been slaves), and it traces the outline of a society in its 
infancy. The passage following the one above notes that Salvius/Tryphon wore his purple 
bordered toga (Diod. Sic. 36.7.4) κατὰ τοὺς χρηµατισµούς, ‘when in session’, again 
suggesting an effort at active political life, especially once we include his chosen councillors. 
While this particular state did not survive (much like the kingdom of King Antiochus in the 
130s B.C.), it nonetheless points up the possibility of one being founded on Sicily 
independently of the Roman authorities, even as late as 104 B.C. This is a vitally important 
point to remember when we recall that the island was in a state of almost total anarchy both 
in the countryside and within the cities: in this sea of chaos, the most organised state, free 
from the dependence on Rome that had crippled the other cities of Sicily in its absence, was 
that led by Salvius/Tryphon and populated by large numbers of people previously subjected 
to slavery in Sicily. 
 
 If we compare this strong evidence of organisation to the manner in which Athenion 
led the rebels, both in his initial leadership and following the death of Salvius/Tryphon in 102 
B.C., we will see that at no point did Athenion demonstrate the same kind of social planning 
or forethought. In the first instance, we have already seen that Athenion attacked Lilybaeum, 
and in the process of his retreat from the city, had to abandon his efforts to exploit 
agriculturally the area between Lilybaeum and Segesta (Diod. Sic. 36.5). His subsequent 
career gives no more indication of a careful plan. For example, his strong desire to oppose the 
forces of L. Licinius Lucullus in 103 B.C. in the field, rather than to withstand a siege was 
                                                 
353 See also Goldsberry (1973), 257; Bradley (1989), 116-7; Wirth (2006), 127; Perkins (2007), 48. 
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misplaced. This battle, which went badly for the insurgents, was followed by a successful 
effort at repelling Lucullus’ forces at Triocala, even accounting for the lost forces at Scirthaea 
(Diod. Sic. 36.8.5). 
 
 Yet, it is only once Athenion took sole command of the revolt in 102 B.C. following 
the death of Salvius/Tryphon that we get a proper indication of his aims for the forces. In 
Diodorus we hear relatively little about this phase of the war, with only a brief passage 
outlining Athenion’s actions once in command (36.9.1): 
 
Γάιος δὲ Σερουίλιος καταπεµφθεὶς στρατηγὸς διάδοχος Λουκούλλου οὐδ΄ αὐτός τι ἄξιον 
µνήµης ἔπραξε· διὸ καὶ ὁµοίως Λουκούλλῳ ὕστερον φυγῇ κατεδικάσθη. τελευτήσαντος δὲ 
Τρύφωνος, διάδοχος τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ Ἀθηνίων καθίσταται, καὶ τοῦτο µὲν πόλεις ἐπολιόρκει, 
τοῦτο δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν ἀδεῶς κατέτρεχε καὶ πολλῶν ἐκυρίευσε, τοῦ Σερουιλίου µηδὲν 
ἀντιπράττοντος. 
 
Gaius Servilius, sent out as governor to succeed Lucullus, accomplished nothing worthy of note: 
therefore, like Lucullus, he was later condemned to exile. After Tryphon died, Athenion was appointed 
his successor in office; he besieged cities and overran the whole country with impunity, and seized 
many places, while Servilius never acted against him. 
 
This narrative does not tell us a great deal. While the passage seems to imply that Athenion 
had some successes in taking parts of Sicily, we know from Cicero that he did not succeed in 
any of his attempts when besieging cities (Verr. 2.3.136), so we must not imagine Athenion’s 
control over Sicily being complete.354 Moreover, Lucullus’ attempts to sabotage the 
command of Servilius by disbanding his own army and breaking up his camp (Diod. Sic. 
36.9.2), meant that Athenion, in 102 B.C. at least, had carte blanche across Sicily to effect 
any strategy he wished. 
 
 A better indication of the type of strategy he then adopted is preserved in a fragment 
of Cassius Dio (27.93.4): 
 
ὅτι οἱ Μεσσήνιοι νοµίσαντες µηδὲν δεινὸν πείσεσθαι, πάντα τὰ πλείστου ἄξια καὶ τιµιώτατα 
ἐκεῖσε ὑπεξέθεντο. µαθὼν δὲ τοῦτο Ἀθηνίων, ὅσπερ που τὸ µέγιστον κράτος τῶν 
λῃστευόντων Κίλιξ ὢν εἶχεν, ἐπέθετο αὐτοῖς δηµοτελῆ τινα ἑορτὴν ἐν τῷ προαστείῳ ἄγουσι, 
καὶ ἐκείνων τε πολλοὺς σκεδασθέντας ἀπέκτεινε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὀλίγου κατὰ κράτος εἷλεν. 
χωρίον δέ τι Μάκελλαν εὐερκὲς τειχισάµενος ἰσχυρῶς τὴν γῆν ἐκακούργει. 
 
                                                 
354 Despite Athenion’s failure to capture any cities, we need not dismiss this passage of Diodorus (which is 
Photian in origin and clearly heavily epitomised) as merely hyperbole, pace Bradley (1989), 79. The attack on 
Messana, in fact, perfectly accords with the general statement here: Athenion besieged a city, having overrun the 
country from the west to the north east of the island, but also seized the location of Makella.  
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The Messenians, who had expected to suffer no danger, had brought all of their most valuable and 
prized possessions to that place for safety. When he learned of this, Athenion, the very Cilician who 
was leader of the bandits and held a strong force, set upon the Messenians when they were celebrating 
some public festival in the suburbs. He killed many of them as they scattered and almost seized the 
mastery of the city. After fortifying a certain spot, the Makella, with a wall, he violently ravaged the 
country. 
 
The passage describes a reasonably successful attack on Messana by Athenion, one which 
provided him with a base to ravage the country around the city; the narrative does not, 
however, indicate if Athenion succeeded in his principal objective, namely seizing the 
possessions of the Messenians. We must be careful, though, not to mistake a single successful 
attack with the greater strategy, and it is in the broader scheme of the conflict that this event 
tells us the most. While Salvius/Tryphon had the command of the insurgency, effort was 
made to secure a base of operations that was defensible, and nonetheless in an area that was 
well supplied: both the assault on Morgantina and the construction of a royal city at Triocala, 
replete with all the requisite structures of a Hellenistic city, accord with this. Slingshots 
bearing Athenion’s name have also been found near Leontini, which testifies to the presence 
of forces commanded by him operating in that area.355 This most likely took place in 102 
B.C. once he had assumed sole control of the insurgency. 
 
The passage above outlines an example of a quite different strategy being employed 
by Athenion. It would seem reasonable to suggest that the event described in the passage also 
belongs to 102 B.C., especially if the slingshots are indicative of military action by 
Athenion’s forces en route to Messana. If this is the case, Athenion abandoned, with a 
sizeable force under his direct command, the palace at Triocala and the efforts of the rebels in 
the west of the island, and marched the length of the island, merely to seize the possessions of 
the Messenians. The site could be argued to have been strategic, but with the majority of the 
rebels’ efforts expended for the previous two years in the west, and a semi-permanent seat of 
power established, the attempted seizure of Messana does not speak of a tightly focused 
effort to control Sicily. Indeed, the wide ranging raids conducted by Athenion are more 
redolent of the breakdown of social order on the island that was outlined earlier in the 
chapter.356 While Salvius/Tryphon sought to forge a community from the rebels and create an 
                                                 
355 See Appendix 11: Athenion’s Slingshots. 
356 Interestingly, the passage refers to Athenion’s force as λῃστευόντων, ‘bandits’, perhaps implying that Dio 
also saw Athenion and his men as part of the larger problem of the general breakdown of order in Sicily at this 
time: as we saw in Chapter VI, Dio described the slaves turning to banditry in reaction to the praetor’s injustices 
at the beginning of the conflict (27.93.3). Without more of Dio’s narrative, however, it is impossible to tell if 
this was intentional, or merely a method of varying the vocabulary when referring to Athenion’s men. 
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island of order amidst the anarchy of late second century B.C. Sicily, Athenion is best viewed 
as a symptom of the overall situation in Sicily. The greater significance given to Athenion in 
the historiographical sources – indeed, Salvius/Tryphon is not mentioned in any literary 
source other than Diodorus – is merely the result of his unique position in two respects: he 
entered into a vacuum of military power that enabled his ravaging to take place across a wide 
area, with little or no resistance; but, most importantly, he was killed in single combat by the 
Roman consul, M’. Aquilius, who finally ended the disorder (Diod. Sic. 36.10.1).357 
 
It is here, in the difference between the two approaches of Salvius/Tryphon and 
Athenion to leading the insurgency that we find the answer to the former’s disproportionately 
small presence in the historiographical record. At the end of Chapter V it was noted that 
Athenion’s death in single combat was one reason that he could be tolerated as a champion of 
the insurrection, but, perhaps, the reason is more complex still. For Athenion is an 
uncomplicated enemy; his war was fought in the field, and principally involved unsuccessful 
sieges and failed set-piece battles. He had no agenda beyond personal gain, or at least if he 
had an agenda beyond this, it is not recoverable from the sources as they remain and it made 
no appreciable impact on his actions while leader. Salvius/Tryphon, on the other hand, is a 
rather more intricate phenomenon. His actions in the battle at Morgantina, in routing the 
praetor’s army, as well as his choice of stronghold, both speak of a man with a considerable 
intellect. The sacrifice at the shrine of Palici and the structures set up in his capital 
demonstrated not only his clear understanding of the nature of the conflict he fought, but also 
an effort to define his followers by more than their individual desires for freedom, better 
social standing or whatever had driven them to their actions.358 On an island that lacked, in 
the period, social cohesion, it must have been deeply uncomfortable that those who were 
most underrepresented were able to form a state. 
 
This is not to argue that Salvius/Tryphon’s movement was of a similar kind to King 
Antiochus’ in the 130s B.C.: while the former did indeed create a state in opposition to 
Rome, unlike the latter’s it did not precipitate the problems in Sicily, but grew from them. 
Through his choice of magisterial regalia that owed so much to Roman norms, 
Salvius/Tryphon demonstrated the ideological and cultural disconnection from the Hellenistic 
                                                 
357 This event afforded Aquilius no small amount of political capital on his return to Rome: see Appendix 13: 
Honours for Victory. 
358 In this, I disagree with Bradley’s assertion (1998), 82, that the insurgency sought no goal beyond survival. 
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culture of Sicily and the wider Greek Mediterranean that his movement suffered from. Where 
King Antiochus managed to unite a sizeable portion of Sicily in a combined endeavour under 
a truly Hellenistic ruler, Salvius/Tryphon was the leader of a section of an island already in 
turmoil, a turmoil caused by problems that went far beyond what his actions represented.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Sicily at the end of the second century B.C. was an island beset by a variety of problems; the 
insurrections of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion were only one part of a complex series of 
events. That this is the case is evident especially in the fact that M’. Aquilius did not, in the 
end, settle the military problems in Sicily for another year after his victory over Athenion. 
Prorogued as proconsul in 100 B.C., he spent the year hunting down the splintered remains of 
Athenion’s forces, and no doubt lending his aid to the beleaguered rich in the cities of Sicily. 
The final one thousand survivors of those who had followed Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion, 
as Diodorus narrates, killed themselves rather than be condemned to the beasts (Diod. Sic. 
36.10.2-3). That it took Aquilius over a year to deal with the military troubles in Sicily is 
testimony to the problems that Sicily had faced, and it would not be surprising if many of the 
pockets of resistance that were wiped out were in fact composed of those landless free men 
who had taken advantage of the lack of authority in 104-102 B.C. Whatever measures he took 
to secure the island again in purely military terms were evidently successful:359 during the 
Social War, the island remained peaceful (Cic. Verr. 2.5.8),360 and it was well treated by 
Pompey when he was sent there to deal with the remaining Marians, with some exceptions, 
such as Messana (App. B Civ. 1.95.440; Plut. Vit. Pomp. 10.1-2 and 6-7; Mor. 203 C). 
 
Yet, the island had not been recovered fully through this military intervention. In 
social terms, juridically and economically, there was a lasting impact from the troubles of 
104-100 B.C., and these were not addressed by M’. Aquilius.361 In fact, in the aftermath of 
                                                 
359 In Chapter IV we saw that Aquilius’ ruling that slaves could not carry arms (Cic. Verr. 2.5.7) does not 
necessarily imply that only slaves were to blame for the problems in Sicily in this period. 
360 Brennan (2000), 481, argued that Cicero ‘strongly’ implied that there was a danger of a ‘slave uprising’ in 
Sicily during the Social War. Yet, we must wonder why there would have been a danger during the Social War 
from the slaves of Sicily, rather than the cities? There is little reason, beyond a generic distrust of any assertion 
that Cicero made in the Verrine Orations, to believe that he was hinting at or implying that Sicily almost had 
great problems with slaves during the Social War. Indeed we might note that to imply this was detrimental to his 
argument that Verres had over-emphasised the threat from a servile insurrection on the island. 
361 This conclusion is not incompatible with the view of the Roman intervention expressed on the denarius of 71 
B.C. on which the moneyer, a member of the Aquilii, boasts of M’. Aquilius’ role in aiding Sicily (Figure 28). 
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his consulship on the island, Aquilius was tried for mismanagement (Cic. Flac. 98; De or. 
2.195; Verr. 2.5.3; he was acquitted), implying at some level at least that he exploited the 
province, despite (or because of) its weakened state. It is only with a later governor, L. 
Sempronius Asellio, that we hear finally of the recovery of the island from its destitution, this 
most likely in 93 B.C. (Diod. Sic. 37.8; see Brennan 2000: 480 and 747 no. 263 for the date). 
Diodorus stresses that Asellio reformed the administration of justice on the island, and this 
might hint at the unresolved problems that had caused the internal problems in the cities of 
Sicily in 104 B.C., problems that had also affected the island in the 130s B.C. From 106 to 93 
B.C. the island had faced a unique complex of difficulties, and the insurrection led by 
Salvius/Tryphon was just one aspect of the whole. Indeed, regardless of the status of the 
participants in Salvius/Tryphon’s revolt – and we commit a gross over-simplification if we 
assume them all to be slaves – it remains that Sicily encountered, for over ten years, severe 
problems, and was often left, as in 104 B.C., in a state of chaos. We cannot then call this 
episode a ‘slave war’ without confirming the typical ancient bias towards recording military 
events; and we cannot call it a ‘Second Sicilian Insurrection’, for the events outlined here and 
in the previous two chapters are not of the same kind as those associated with King 
Antiochus. If we consider the problems as a whole, a better label suggests itself. For nearly 
fifteen years Sicily was torn by banditry, insurrection, political impotence from the ruling 
class, and either exploitation or failure from its Roman governors. The impoverished openly 
looted what they wanted; slaves seized their freedom, and took part in a short-lived effort to 
found a new state amidst the disorder. The Greeks had a term for this: στάσις. The island 
which had in part risen up against Rome in the Sicilian Insurrection was, only thirty years 
later, experiencing sustained problems that were both home-made and Roman-made: the 
Sicilian Stasis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
From the Roman perspective, the result of Aquilius’ actions represented an improvement over the disorder of 
the preceding years, although it is clear from the fact that Aquilius was tried for corruption after his time as 
governor that his actions were not universally popular in Sicily (Cic. Flac. 98; De or. 2.195; Verr. 2.5.3). 
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Conclusion: 
Renegotiating Sicilian History 
 
 
‘The two great slave wars of the later second century B.C. and Cicero's devastating critique 
of Caius Verres'governorship in 73-71 B.C. encourage a negative assessment of the island 
under Roman rule.’ Prag (2007a), 69. 
 
 
 
 
From the arguments put forward in this thesis it should by now be clear that I view the two 
conflicts that took place in Sicily in the second century B.C. as manifestations of the island’s 
strong Hellenistic culture, and as part of its negotiation with its imperial master, Rome. Both 
the Sicilian Insurrection and the Sicilian Stasis are telling examples of the fragility of the 
relationship between the Sicilians and Rome. For both conflicts it has been shown that a fresh 
analysis of all the relevant evidence in its most immediate context demonstrates that far from 
being events that inform us only about the state of slavery on the island in the second century 
B.C. the two conflicts also provide compelling evidence for the strength of the Hellenistic 
culture in Sicily, and how this culture could, in times of duress, manifest itself. At this point it 
may be useful to reconsider where we have come from to reach to this conclusion, and to 
reflect on what the conclusions put forward in this thesis mean for further study of Hellenistic 
Sicily and Hellenistic slavery. 
 
 Both the ancient literary sources and the majority of the modern accounts consider 
both the Sicilian Insurrection and the Sicilian Stasis to have been primarily concerned with 
slavery. In truth, the ancient accounts are unambiguous concerning this, and therefore place 
great stress on the status of those involved as ‘slaves’. The events were then employed to 
demonstrate aspects of other subjects: as part of a commentary on the correct moral 
administration of an empire (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.1-3, 27-33; 36.2-4; Dio.27.93.1-3); as part of 
the degeneration of a Republic into autocracy (Flor. 2.7); as a source for the great and 
(in)glorious deeds of Romans and foreigners (Val. Max. 2.7.3, 2.7.9, 4.3.10, 6.9.8, 9.12.1); as 
a suitably wicked and apposite comparison for a provincial governor (Cic. Verr. 2.2.136; 
2.3.65-6, 125; 2.4.112); or as an example of the results of moral failure (Oros. 5.9). Modern 
accounts, eschewing the strong vein of moralising in the ancient sources, have sought to 
understand the events in the context of ancient slavery, and as such have taken the ancient 
evidence and justified the ambiguities and textual problems with historical contexts that made 
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sense of them. The events have been variously interpreted as Syrian nationalistic uprisings 
caused by the mass-importation of Syrian slaves into Sicily (Vogt 1965: 40-3), as instances of 
maroonage and flight taken to extremes (Bradley 1989: xiv-xv; Bradley 2011b: 365), as the 
most prominent examples of the continual efforts by the slaves of the ancient world to revolt 
(Urbainczyk 2008a: 29-50), or just as examples of the lengths to which slaves would go in 
the ancient world when pushed to their limits (Westermann 1945 and 1955; Green 1961; 
Dumont 1987; Sacks 1990; Shaw 2000). Overwhelmingly the events have been accepted in 
their essential details as given by the ancient accounts (principally Diodorus Siculus and 
Florus), and analyses have concentrated not on challenging the inconsistencies of the ancient 
accounts, but on explaining them (away). 
 
Even those who stressed the non-servile element of the revolt reported in the ancient 
sources (Verbrugghe 1972; 1974), or those who emphasised the Sicilian context of the events 
and their meaning to the Sicilians themselves (Manganaro 1967; 1980; 1982; 1983; 1990a; 
1990b; 2000), have either been too abrupt in their dismissal of the ancient evidence (see 
Verbrugghe 1972; 1974), or have not provided any answers as to what, if the events in 
question were not slave revolts, actually took place (see: Verbrugghe 1972; 1974; and 
Manganaro 1982; 1983; 1990a; 1990b). With the important exception of Manganaro’s 
various articles on the subject, Rubinsohn’s (1982) careful work on the Sicilian Stasis, and 
some brief considerations in Verbrugghe’s 1972 article, the Sicilian context for both events 
has been ignored. Even Manganaro and Rubinsohn’s contributions have not questioned what 
it meant for a developing Roman province to be struck by provincial revolts or civic disorder 
so quickly in so short a space in time. In this thesis I have demonstrated that it is only by 
approaching the revolts from the point of view of their Sicilian context that we can begin to 
understand not only the inconsistencies of the ancient evidence, but also begin to answer why 
the province erupted in the manner that it did on two separate occasions in the space of thirty-
five years. 
 
 Yet, these conclusions also have important implications for the study of Sicily itself. 
If members of the province were, as I have argued, so deeply unhappy with Roman 
exploitation that they attempted to throw off the Roman governance, this should force us to 
reconsider the place of Sicily among the ‘possessions’ of the Roman empire: we have to 
question the assumption that Sicily and the Sicilians considered Rome’s taxation of the 
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province to be reasonable;362 and we must ask if we can consider the island as a unified entity 
and perhaps ask more directly who benefited from the Roman order on the island, and at 
whose cost?  Moreover, the conclusions reached regarding the Sicilian Stasis ask 
uncomfortable questions about the broader narrative of Sicily as an island of strong civic 
Hellenistic culture throughout the second and first centuries B.C.:363 how could such a strong 
civic culture collapse so completely merely because Roman governance was weakened; how 
did Sicily in general recover from a period of apparent anarchy, in which the strongest 
driving force of civic culture was a breakaway state of runaway slaves and dispossessed free 
people; and, moreover, how does this background affect our reading of the later literary 
evidence regarding Sicily during Verres’ governorships? It is certainly the case that we can 
no longer study any aspect of Sicily in the first and second centuries B.C. without taking 
proper account of the evidence for the Sicilian Insurrection and the Sicilian Stasis, since both 
events, while perhaps not attested well archaeologically, were clearly important to the island 
politically, militarily and structurally. A specific example will illuminate the problem. 
 
 In a recent article, Prag (2007a) has highlighted the nature of Rome’s military 
involvement with Sicily after 211 B.C. He has shown that the island was most likely policed 
by Sicilian soldiers, led by Sicilian officers (82-7). In this reconstruction he stressed the 
difficulty of assessing the evidence for Roman involvement on the island from literary 
sources, noting especially the patchy account in Livy and the difficulty of gleaning clear 
information regarding the Roman forces during the Sicilian Insurrection and Sicilian Stasis 
(76-8). Yet, despite concluding that (99) ‘...the evidence is growing ever stronger for the 
vitality of Republican Sicily’, Prag nonetheless considered the Sicilian Insurrection and 
Sicilian Stasis to be evidence for a (69) ‘...negative assessment of the island under Roman 
rule’. His engagement with both conflicts is limited, but a more thorough consideration of the 
events shows that, at least in the case of Sicilian Insurrection, they can be evidence for the 
strength of Sicilian Hellenistic culture, and perhaps even the gymnastic culture that interested 
Prag. 
 
                                                 
362 See, for example, Serrati’s (2000b: 123-4) comment that ‘Sicily was so productive that a second tithe was 
often requisitioned by the Roman government to feed its legions’. See also Carcopino (1914), 1-44; Rickman 
(1980), 37; and Bell (2007a), 199-200. 
363 See below and Chapter I.2, but also Manganaro (1996), 129-44; Wilson (2000), 144-5; Frey-Kupper (2006), 
27-56; Prag (2007b), 257-60. 
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 There is an additional irony in the study of Sicily under the Roman Republic that does 
not fully accommodate the study of the Sicilian Insurrection and Stasis. As I noted in Chapter 
I.2, there has been an increasing awareness of the strong civic culture of Sicily that was 
maintained throughout the Hellenistic period. This culture is linked, at times, to the powerful 
economy of Sicily, with Wilson (2000: 144-5) noting that ‘…local elites, even after paying 
off their tithe to Rome, still had money to spare to invest in new construction’.364 Evidence of 
this civic culture, and the Hellenistic constructions that went with it, is found in a wide 
variety of Sicilian sites, with Wilson (140-50) alone noting Soluntum, Ietas, Segesta, 
Tyndaris and Halaesa. The presence of civic buildings such as bouleuteria, stoai and theatres, 
as well as honorifics, formal agorai and building inscriptions have been interpreted as 
indicators of Sicilian culture.365 The gymnastic culture outlined by Prag (2007a) is, moreover, 
another example of the ties between the attested civic culture and the vibrancy of some local 
elites. Prag (2007a: 92) argued that ‘those who regularly trained in the gymnasion may have 
constituted the core, or in some cases an elite element of a city's fighting force…this 
gymnasion-based elite provided the leaders for these city-based elements [of Sicily’s 
military].’ Sicilian autonomy has also been found in the rise of localised numismatic output 
during the second century B.C. (Crawford 1985: 115; Frey-Kupper 2006: 27-56). This has all 
been attested as evidence of Sicily’s strong Hellenistic culture and in particular its political 
culture. 
 
Yet, despite all this evidence on the ground for a strong, independent civic culture, it 
is nonetheless the case that several Sicilian towns, when needing help to define their ruling 
elite, turned to Rome for help.366 I argued in Chapter VII that the collapse of order at the end 
of the second century B.C. during the Sicilian Stasis was partly caused by the excessive 
reliance among the Sicilian elite on Roman authority to support their rule, and there is an 
important corollary to this observation. The types of buildings and epigraphies described as 
evidence for Sicily’s culture illuminate only one aspect of Sicily: the ruling aristocracies. I 
noted before that this economic and civic culture was not universal, and I even tied this 
discrepancy to the decision of some cities to revolt against the Roman order under the 
guidance of King Antiochus. Moreover, the people of Sicily described by Diodorus as taking 
                                                 
364 See also Campagna (2006), 15-34, and Bell (2007b), 118. 
365 Manganaro (1996), 129-44; (1999), 76-7, 141; Campagna (2006), 15-34; Bell (2007b), 118; Prag (2007b), 
257-9. 
366 Agrigentum in 197 B.C. turned to Rome: see Cic. Verr. 2.2.123. Halaesa in 95 B.C did the same: see Cic. 
Verr. 2.2.122.  
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part in the insurgency under King Antiochus or venting their frustrations during the Sicilian 
Stasis – the poor free and slaves of Sicily – are precisely those who would not have left any 
evidence of their culture in the form of honorifics, building inscriptions and statues. Neither 
political leaders (not being aristocratic), nor members of the gymnasia of Sicily owing to 
their status (Prag 2007a: 92), these people are those who are not understood through the focus 
on the vibrant Hellenistic political culture of Sicily that relied on Roman sanction to operate; 
but they can be studied, albeit with difficulty, through analysis of the few times in Sicilian 
history that they made themselves unavoidable. These people demonstrated, during the 
Sicilian Insurrection and the Sicilian Stasis, that they were not thriving under Roman 
administration and taxation,367 and that some in Sicily wanted to renegotiate terms, even with 
those Sicilians who ostensibly ran affairs on the island. 
 
Nor does the evidence for Sicily’s Hellenistic culture illuminate all of the aristocratic 
society. In Chapter I.1 it was noted that King Antiochus’ coinage reflected a strong 
understanding and interest in the history and society of Sicily; in particular, the coinage 
connected to the tradition of political unification that existed before Roman domination, and 
was utilised to unite eastern Sicily against Rome. This familiarity with the history of Sicily, 
and the ideological implications of certain images, argues very persuasively for an element of 
King Antiochus’ movement that was in the position to maintain these cultural memories and 
appreciate their history: this is likely to have included members of the aristocracy in Sicily. 
These same aristocrats are unlikely to have survived (either literally, or as aristocrats) after 
King Antiochus’ defeat, and therefore a part of Sicily’s Hellenistic civilisation ended with 
them: the part that resisted, rather than colluded with, Roman governors. The Sicilian 
Insurrection, therefore, is evidence for a form of negotiation with Rome that is not preserved 
in the material record that is the focus of the current scholarship on Republican Sicily; 
moreover, this was a form of negotiation that succeeded, at least in part, in extracting 
compromises from Rome. This was demonstrated in Chapter I.2 through the reforms 
instigated by Rupilius on concluding the war (Cic. Verr. 2.2.32). Without this analysis we do 
not discover this vital form of interaction between Rome and some Sicilian communities, and 
we stress too much the ability and willingness of Sicilians to work with Rome. Furthermore, 
by failing to emphasise this evidence, the nuances in aristocratic reactions to Rome are lost in 
                                                 
367 This interpretation is at odds with Wilson (2000), 144-5, who argued that (144) ‘Roman rule brought 
prosperity to the Sicilians as well as benefits to Rome’, and Serrati (2000a), 112, who stated that ‘Sicilian grain 
played a tremendous logistical role in the Roman conquests of the second century, and Sicily enjoyed a period 
of peace and prosperity.’  
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the material evidence for continuity; and it is the very fact that King Antiochus’ forces lost 
that ensures that Sicily left no material evidence for the continuity of resistance to Roman 
rule. 
 
 In a different manner, the Sicilian Stasis preserves similarly problematic evidence for 
Sicily’s development as a province. Contrary to the Sicilian Insurrection, there is no evidence 
of aristocratic support for Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion’s revolt, nor for aristocratic support 
of the widespread disorder in the province. It is quite the opposite: the Sicilian Stasis is 
compelling evidence for aristocratic solidarity with Rome, since they relied on Rome to 
restore order to the island. The evidence from this later conflict strongly suggests that Sicily 
was far from a settled province with firm civic identities, but that in many cities there had 
been a complete collapse of social order, represented most clearly in the disrespect and open 
violence shown to those who had once been well regarded in their cities (Diod. Sic. 36.6 and 
11). The evidence in the narrative also demonstrates that some of the problems that caused 
the Sicilian Insurrection had not been adequately alleviated by Rupilius’ actions, and that 
Rome had to take considerable remedial action to stabilise the island between 106 and 93 
B.C.368 The poor and landless on the island were deeply unhappy with the conditions there 
and this was repeatedly demonstrated during the second century B.C., much as similar 
problems were demonstrated in Rome and Italy before and after the Social War. In addition, 
the unease among the landless and poor that became clear during the Sicilian Insurrection and 
Sicilian Stasis is only evident when approached through evidence for these two conflicts. 
Without thus engaging with the ancient accounts dicussed here, scholars concerned with 
Sicily as a province have missed a whole level of interactions between Roman and Sicily, and 
have not noted the considerable problems that Sicily faced from the 130s to the 90s B.C. 
  
 That this has not been noted in the works on the development of Sicily as a province 
is precisely because the Sicilian Insurrection and Sicilian Stasis have been relegated to the 
domain of ‘slavery studies’. This relegation has resulted in a skewed analysis of the two 
events which has focused too much on explicating the slave context of Diodorus’ narrative, 
and which has not attempted to understand how the two conflicts relate to Sicily as a 
province. In particular, the comparative lack of attention given to those passages of Diodorus 
that stress the involvement of the free poor and landless, and the reluctance to approach 
                                                 
368 The governor of c. 93 B.C., L. Sempronius Asellio, is credited with restoring the island’s fortunes: Diod. Sic. 
37.8. 
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Diodorus’ narrative as a piece of literature, means that problems with both the nature and 
content of the text have been ignored and the involvement of the free poor of Sicily reduced 
to footnotes.369 Moreover, it is only by studying the two conflicts in the context of the 
developing Sicilian province that we can understand correctly the place of slavery in 
Hellenistic Sicily, and the reactions of those in servitude to their condition. By over-
emphasising the negative assessments given in the ancient literary sources regarding those 
involved in the conflict (see Chapters II and V), and attempting to reinterpret those negatives 
in a positive light, scholarship has only reaffirmed the bias of the ancient literature in favour 
of these events as simply ‘slave revolts’. Worst of all, by stressing the servile aspect of the 
events, previous studies have denied the essential detail of cooperation between slave and 
free that is evident in the Sicilian Insurrection and the Sicilian Stasis, essentially creating a 
falsely sharp contrast between the worlds of the slaves and the free. Through studying the 
events in their most immediate context – Hellenistic Sicilian culture, society and history – we 
can begin to understand the relevance of the material to constructing our narratives of ancient 
Sicily, and the place of the island in the developing empire of Rome. 
 
These narratives must be more nuanced than simply describing the events in question 
in terms of slavery, and more complex than analysing Sicily’s engagement with Rome solely 
through its efforts to work with Rome. There has to be a new appreciation for the intricate 
web of views in Sicily concerning the relationship between slave and free, as well as between 
province and imperial centre. Most importantly, a new narrative of Sicily in the second 
century B.C. should be written. Throughout the century Sicily was an island engulfed in 
flames.370 Citizens and slaves rose up in anger, together and separately, and armies met their 
ends on the plains of eastern and western Sicily. Frustration at political incompetence, 
economic exploitation or juridical corruption drove portions of Sicily into revolt, from the 
aristocrats to the poorest farmers and slaves. On several occasions Roman control of the 
province was broken, and the island descended into disorder, or attempted to create its own 
order outwith the remit of Rome. Roman order was only restored on each occasion through 
hard fighting and political concessions. In the two hundred years after involvement in Sicily 
became a sine qua non for Rome, the negotiation with the inhabitants of the island was 
                                                 
369 See Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.48 for the Sicilian Insurrection and my discussion in Chapter I.2 no. 122, and Diod. 
Sic. 36.3.5-6, 36.6 and 11 for the Sicilian Stasis, and my discussion in Chapter VII. 
370 Powell (2002), 103-33, argued that during the wars between Sextus Pompeius, Octavian and M. Antonius, 
Sicily was ‘an island amid the flames’ of the war that raged throughout the Mediterranean, and a refuge for the 
proscribed of Antonius and Octavian. 
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consistent and heated. If Sicily profited from Roman involvement, as Cicero claimed (Verr. 
2.2.8), then it was only because the Sicilians had made the situation profitable through 
dissent, resistance, and in cases open insurgency against Rome. Although sporadic and 
fragmentary, the one fact that is clear from the literary, archaeological, and numismatic 
record regarding the Sicilians’ relationship with Rome from the third to the first centuries 
B.C. is that it was decidedly complex and definitely fragile. And in this, it may have been 
typical, for all we know, of Rome’s ‘relationships’ with its other ‘possessions’ – outside of 
and within Italy. 
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Appendix 1: The ΦΙΛΙΠΗΙΟΝ Gold Coinage 
 
GOLD COIN 1 (Campana, Enna 15) 
 
Obv: Male head, right, diademed with long hair. 
Rev: Nike standing right, right hand holding a crown (not visible); ΦΙΛΙΠΗΙΟΝ 
curved across the bottom. 
 
GOLD COIN 2 (Campana, Enna 16) 
 
Obv: Male head, right, diademed with long hair. 
Rev: Seated soldier left on pile of armour (?), left hand holds a spear, the right hand a 
club (?); ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟϚ upwards at left. 
 
These two coins have been published by Manganaro (1990a and 1990b), Berk and 
Bendall (1994) and Lorber (1994), and are listed in the catalogue of Campana (1997: 
158) as coins 15 and 16 from Enna. They are both made from gold, and appear to be, 
individually, the only specimens recorded with these types. The obverse is similar on 
both coins. I have been unable to view either coin in person, due to their location in a 
private collection, but according to Manganaro (1990b: 181) Coin 1 was found in the 
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area around Morgantina, although he does not say how he knows this.371 The coins 
are regarded by Manganaro (1990a: 418-9) as being issued by King Antiochus 
because Coin 2 shares, with the bronze issues firmly attributed to King Antiochus, 
the lunate sigma in its lettering. The unusual legends, which should cause concern, 
are suggested to have been chosen to confirm to the owner of the coin that it 
possessed the same weight as the famous staters of Philip II of Macedon (Manganaro 
1990b: 183; Berk and Bendall 1994: 7-8),372 and Berk and Bendall (1994: 8) 
suggested furthermore that the coins were designed by King Antiochus for use in 
overseas trade. Finally Lorber (1994: 3) has suggested that the two coins reference, 
through their imagery, Antoichus III as a liberator of Greece, and the ‘liberation’ of 
Greece by Flamininus.  
 
I have excluded these two coins from the main body of my analysis for 
several reasons. Most importantly, the attribution of the two coins to King Antiochus 
is problematic. There are three reasons given for this attribution. First, that the coins 
were found near Morgantina; second, that they share the lunate sigma with the 
bronze issues of King Antiochus; and third that they ‘must’ have been the coinage 
used by King Antiochus to fund his war. The first point may be discounted quite 
easily. Only one coin is claimed to have been found near Morgantina, and that is 
Coin 1, with the legend reading ΦΙΛΙΠΗΙΟΝ (Manganaro 1990b: 181). The lunate 
sigma, however, is not present on this coin, and it is too great a leap of faith to 
believe that because the other coin has the lunate sigma, and looks on the obverse 
like the former coin, the two coins are related, and that they were both found in 
Sicily. If there is no reason to link Coin 1 to King Antiochus, and the find site of 
Coin 2 is unknown, then we cannot link Coin 2 to Antiochus either. Furthermore, 
they are not stylistically similar to the bronze coins of King Antiochus, and do not 
share any types with them either, pace Lorber (1994: 2-3). Manganaro (1990a: 419) 
offered the final link between King Antiochus and these coins. Having argued that in 
                                                 
371 Berk and Bendall (1994), 8, claim that both coins were found near Morgantina, but state no 
evidence for the claim. Considering that the content of the article by Berk and Bendall is mostly a 
repetition of articles by Green (1961) and Manganaro (1982; 1983; 1990), it is possible that they 
considered the find site of Coin 2 to be near Morgantina because of its stylistic similarity to Coin 1, in 
spite of the fact that Manganaro (1990), 181, is not discussing Coin 2 in his article. 
372 Suggested by Manganaro (1990), 183 for Coin 1, and extended by Berk and Bendall (1994), 8 for 
Coin 2.  
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order for King Antiochus to have carried on a war against Rome he must have had 
large quantities of money, Manganaro concluded that (419) 
 
(p)er fare fronte alle esigenze della guerra, Antioco avrà potuto ricorrere ad 
una emissione di oro, la quale allora non poteva essere che del tipo del 
philipeion come quello rinvenuto a Morgantina. 
 
This is not a strong enough argument to link the gold issues to King Antiochus: there 
is no chronological, stylistic or epigraphic reason to connect them to him.373 
Furthermore, Manganaro was quite aware of this problem, noting that (419) 
 
tuttavia non può non meravigliare la rinunzia, nella leggenda, al nome 
personale e al titolo regale. 
 
Considering that the use of his title is the one consistent feature of King Antiochus’ 
bronze coinage, it is therefore very difficult to argue the case for their attribution to 
him, and it seems better to err on the side of caution and exclude them from the 
overall debate. 
 
 In addition, the legends are unusual. ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟϚ is uncomplicatedly 
nominative. While the nominative could be used on coins, it was normally used when 
expressing an ethnic identity for the authority of the coin, and even this was rare.374 It 
is has been suggested that King Antiochus may have used the legend in order to 
facilitate external trade,375 but this seems unlikely. The legend ΦΙΛΙΠΗΙΟΝ is rather 
odd, too. The most plausible explanation is that ΦΙΛΙΠΗΙΟΝ is a nominative 
adjective with νόµισµα understood, in order to indicate that the coin is of Philip. This 
is more likely than it being a reference to the Philipeion, a temple set up in Olympia 
by Philip II of Macedon.376 In any case, the fact that the legends are different on the 
two coins throws doubt on the suggestion that both were designed to achieve the 
same purpose and that they can be safely linked.377 
                                                 
373 So Sánchez León (2004), 225. 
374 Kraay (1976b), 6. 
375 Berk and Bendall (1994), 8; a claim made on the strength of Manganaro’s suggestion for Coin 1 
(1990), 183. 
376 Nicolaou (1976), 651. 
377 Andrew Burnett suggested in conversation, July 2008, that the coins were most likely fake. 
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Appendix 2: Sicilian Coinage c. 210 B.C. to the First 
Century B.C 
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Appendix 3: Sicilian Coinage 250 B.C. to c. 210 B.C. 
The Importance of Syracusan Coinage 
 
 
 
 
Hoard Total Coins Syracuse Coins 
IGCH 2215 5 0 
IGCH 2217 700 0 
IGCH 2218 38 0 
IGCH 2219 73 0 
IGCH 2220 18 0 
IGCH 2221 200 100 
IGCH 2223 900 900 
IGCH 2224 36 36 
IGCH 2225 1242 1242 
IGCH 2226 25 25 
IGCH 2227 2000 2000 
IGCH 2228 7 7 
IGCH 2229 350 42 
IGCH 2230 350 0 
IGCH 2231 159 0 
IGCH 2232 100 0 
IGCH 2233 200 0 
IGCH 2234 8 0 
IGCH 2235 44 9 
IGCH 2236 129 95 
IGCH 2237 46 0 
IGCH 2238 67 1 
IGCH 2239 32 1 
IGCH 2240 48 0 
IGCH 2241 84 74 
IGCH 2242 322 256 
IGCH 2243 17 0 
IGCH 2245 190 0 
IGCH 2246 11 2 
IGCH 2247 508 0 
TOTAL 7909 4790 
% Syracuse 60.56%  
Unused Hoards 
IGCH 2216 
IGCH 2222 
IGCH 2244 
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Appendix 4: Sicilian Coinage in the Fourth Century 
B.C. 
Corinthian Coinage and Pegasi 
 
Hoard Total 
Coins 
Corinthian 
Coins/Pegasi 
IGCH 2144 245 182 
IGCH 2146 32 26 
IGCH 2147 277 276 
IGCH 2148 58 58 
IGCH 2149 65 65 
IGCH 2150 19 18 
IGCH 2151 642 600 
IGCH 2152 17 16 
IGCH 2153 78 54 
IGCH 2154 67 0 
IGCH 2155 40 0 
IGCH 2156 12 0 
IGCH 2157 43 0 
IGCH 2158 12 0 
IGCH 2159 39 30 
IGCH 2161 27 0 
IGCH 2162 137 0 
IGCH 2163 18 0 
IGCH 2164 13 2 
IGCH 2165 10 0 
IGCH 2166 25 25 
IGCH 2167 13 7 
IGCH 2172 7 0 
IGCH 2173 2 0 
IGCH 2174 47 40 
IGCH 2175 3 3 
IGCH 2176 180 0 
IGCH 2179 21 16 
IGCH 2180 530 488 
IGCH 2181 460 454 
IGCH 2182 200 150 
IGCH 2183 89 79 
IGCH 2184 500 450 
IGCH 2185 357 250 
IGCH 2187 169 136 
IGCH 2188 243 243 
IGCH 2189 23 23 
23 (CH 5) 27 27 
42 (CH 7) 6 6 
56 (CH 7) 30 26 
57 (CH 7) 80 75 
58 (CH 7) 52 0 
59 (CH 7) 281 0 
Total 5196 3825 
% of 
Pegasi 73.61% 
 
 
Unused Hoards 
IGCH 2145 
IGCH 2160 
IGCH 2168 
IGCH 2169 
IGCH 2170 
IGCH 2171 
IGCH 2177 
IGCH 2178 
IGCH 2186 
28 (CH 5) 
21 (CH 6) 
296 (CH 8) 
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Appendix 5: Text and Translation of Diodorus’ 
Account of the Sicilian Insurrection378 
 
 
 
I. The Photian Version: Greek Text 
 
(34/5.2.1) Ὅτι µετὰ τὴν Καρχηδονίων κατάλυσιν ἐπὶ ἑξήκοντα ἔτεσι τῶν Σικελῶν 
εὐροούντων ἐν πᾶσιν͵ ὁ δουλικὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπανέστη πόλεµος ἐξ αἰτίας τοιαύτης. 
 
ἐπὶ πολὺ τοῖς βίοις ἀναδραµόντες καὶ µεγάλους περιποιησάµενοι πλούτους 
συνηγόραζον οἰκετῶν πλῆθος͵ οἷς ἐκ τῶν σωµατοτροφείων ἀγεληδὸν ἀπαχθεῖσιν 
εὐθὺς χαρακτῆρας ἐπέβαλλον καὶ στιγµὰς τοῖς σώµασιν. (34/35.2.2) ἐχρῶντο δὲ 
αὐτῶν τοῖς µὲν νέοις νοµεῦσι͵ τοῖς δ΄ ἄλλοις ὥς πῃ ἑκάστῳ ἡ χρεία ἐπέβαλλε. 
βαρέως δ΄ αὐτοῖς κατά τε τὰς ὑπηρεσίας ἐχρῶντο͵ καὶ ἐπιµελείας παντελῶς ὀλίγης 
ἠξίουν͵ ὅσα τε ἐντρέφεσθαι καὶ ὅσα ἐνδύσασθαι. ἐξ ὧν οἱ πλείους ἀπὸ λῃστείας τὸ 
ζῆν ἐπορίζοντο͵ καὶ µεστὰ φόνων ἦν ἅπαντα͵ καθάπερ στρατευµάτων διεσπαρµένων 
τῶν λῃστῶν. (34/35.2.3) οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ κωλύειν µὲν ἐπεχείρουν͵ κολάζειν δὲ οὐ 
τολµῶντες διὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὸ βάρος τῶν κυρίων͵ οἳ ἐδέσποζον τῶν λῃστῶν͵ 
ἠναγκάζοντο περιορᾶν λῃστευοµένην τὴν ἐπαρχίαν· οἱ πλεῖστοι γὰρ τῶν κτητόρων 
ἱππεῖς ὄντες τῶν Ῥωµαίων͵ καὶ κριταὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπαρχιῶν κατηγορουµένοις 
στρατηγοῖς γινόµενοι͵ φοβεροὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὑπῆρχον. 
 
(34/35.2.4) Πιεζόµενοι δὲ οἱ δοῦλοι ταῖς ταλαιπωρίαις καὶ πληγαῖς τὰ πολλὰ 
παραλόγως ὑβριζόµενοι͵ οὐχ ὑπέµενον. συνιόντες οὖν ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὰς εὐκαιρίας 
συνελάλουν περὶ ἀποστάσεως͵ ἕως εἰς ἔργον τὴν βουλὴν ἤγαγον. (34/35.2.5) ἦν δέ 
τις οἰκέτης Ἀντιγένους Ἐνναίου͵ Σύρος τὸ γένος ἐκ τῆς Ἀπαµείας͵ ἄνθρωπος µάγος 
καὶ τερατουργὸς τὸν τρόπον. οὗτος προσεποιεῖτο θεῶν ἐπιτάγµασι καθ΄ ὕπνον 
προλέγειν τὰ µέλλοντα͵ καὶ πολλοὺς διὰ τὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ µέρος εὐφυΐαν ἐξηπάτα. 
ἐντεῦθεν προϊὼν οὐ µόνον ἐξ ὀνείρων ἐµαντεύετο͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγρηγορότως θεοὺς 
                                                 
378 The text of Diodorus is that of the Loeb Classical Library, edited by Walton, F.R. (1967), Diodorus 
of Sicily, vol. 12, Cambridge. The translation is my own. 
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ὁρᾶν ὑπεκρίνετο καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀκούειν τὰ µέλλοντα. (34/35.2.6) πολλῶν δ΄ ὑπ΄ 
αὐτοῦ σχεδιαζοµένων ἀπὸ τύχης ἔνια πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἐξέβαινε· καὶ τῶν µὲν µὴ 
γινοµένων ὑπ΄ οὐδενὸς ἐλεγχοµένων͵ τῶν δὲ συντελουµένων ἐπισηµασίας 
τυγχανόντων͵ προκοπὴν ἐλάµβανεν ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν δόξα. τελευταῖον διά τινος µηχανῆς 
πῦρ µετά τινος ἐνθουσιασµοῦ καὶ φλόγα διὰ τοῦ στόµατος ἠφίει͵ καὶ οὕτω τὰ 
µέλλοντα ἀπεφοίβαζεν. (34/35.2.7) εἰς γὰρ κάρυον ἤ τι τοιοῦτο τετρηµένον ἐξ 
ἑκατέρου µέρους ἐνετίθει πῦρ καὶ τὴν συνέχειν αὐτὸ δυναµένην ὕλην· εἶτα ἐντιθεὶς 
τῷ στόµατι καὶ προσπνέων ποτὲ µὲν σπινθῆρας͵ ποτὲ δὲ φλόγα ἐξέκαεν. οὗτος πρὸ 
τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἔλεγε τὴν Συρίαν θεὸν ἐπιφαινοµένην αὐτῷ λέγειν ὅτι βασιλεύσει· 
καὶ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς ἄλλους µόνον͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν κύριον αὑτοῦ διετέλει 
λέγων. (34/35.2.8) εἰς δὲ γέλωτα τρεποµένου τοῦ πράγµατος͵ ὁ µὲν Ἀντιγένης 
ψυχαγωγούµενος ἐπὶ τῇ τερατείᾳ παρῆγε τὸν Εὔνουν εἰς τὰ σύνδειπνα τοῦτο γὰρ 
ὄνοµα τῷ τερατίᾳ καὶ διηρώτα περὶ τῆς βασιλείας καὶ πῶς ἑκάστῳ χρήσεται τῶν 
παρόντων· τοῦ δὲ ἀτρέπτως πάντα διηγουµένου͵ καὶ ὡς µετρίως χρήσεται τοῖς 
κυρίοις͵ καὶ τὸ σύνολον ποικίλως τερατευοµένου͵ γέλωτες ἐγίνοντο τοῖς 
παρακεκληµένοις͵ καί τινες αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης ἀξιολόγους µερίδας αἴροντες 
ἐδωροῦντο͵ ἐπιλέγοντες ὅπως͵ ὅταν γένηται βασιλεύς͵ τῆς χάριτος µνηµονεύοι. 
(34/5.2.9) οὐ µὴν ἀλλ΄ ἡ τερατεία προῆλθεν εἰς ἀληθινὸν ἀποτέλεσµα βασιλείας͵ καὶ 
τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ δεῖπνα δεξιωσαµένοις ἐν γέλωτι οὐ χωρὶς σπουδῆς 
ἐποιήσατο τῆς χάριτος. 
 
ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ὅλης ἀποστάσεως ἐγένετο τοιαύτη. (34/35.2.10) ∆αµόφιλός τις 
ἦν Ἐνναῖος͵ τὴν δ΄ οὐσίαν µεγαλόπλουτος͵ ὑπερήφανος δὲ τὸν τρόπον. οὗτος κακῶς 
εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ἐκέχρητο τοῖς δούλοις͵ καὶ ἡ γυνὴ δὴ Μεγαλλὶς ἀντεφιλονείκει τἀνδρὶ 
πρὸς τὴν τιµωρίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀπανθρωπίαν τὴν περὶ τοὺς δούλους. ἐξ ὧν 
ἀποθηριωθέντες οἱ προπηλακιζόµενοι συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ ἀποστάσεως 
καὶ φόνου τῶν κυρίων. καὶ πρὸς τὸν Εὔνουν ἐλθόντες ἠρώτων εἰ συγχωρεῖται παρὰ 
τῶν θεῶν αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευµένον. ὁ δὲ µετὰ τερατείας͵ ὡς εἰώθει͵ συνθέµενος ὅτι 
συγχωροῦσι͵ παραχρῆµα πείθει ἔχεσθαι τῆς ἐγχειρήσεως. (34/35.2.11) εὐθὺς οὖν 
τετρακοσίους τῶν ὁµοδούλων συνήθροισαν͵ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ καιρὸς ἐδίδου 
καθοπλισθέντες εἰς τὴν Ἔνναν τὴν πόλιν εἰσπίπτουσιν͵ ἀφηγουµένου αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ 
πυρὸς τὰς φλόγας τερατευοµένου τούτοις τοῦ Εὔνου. ταῖς δ΄ οἰκίαις ἐπεισελθόντες 
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πλεῖστον φόνον εἰργάζοντο͵ µηδ΄ αὐτῶν τῶν ὑποµαζίων φειδόµενοι. (34/35.2.12) 
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα µὲν τῆς θηλῆς ἀποσπῶντες προσήρασσον τῇ γῇ· εἰς δὲ τὰς γυναῖκας οὐδ΄ 
ἔστιν εἰπεῖν͵ καὶ ταῦτα βλεπόντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν͵ ὅσα ἐνύβριζόν τε καὶ ἐνησέλγαινον͵ 
πολλοῦ αὐτοῖς πλήθους τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως δούλων προστεθέντος͵ οἳ καὶ κατὰ τῶν 
κυρίων πρότερον τὰ ἔσχατα ἐνδεικνύµενοι οὕτω πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἄλλων φόνον 
ἐτρέποντο. (34/35.2.13) οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Εὔνουν πυθόµενοι τὸν ∆αµόφιλον ὅτι κατὰ 
τὸν πλησίον τῆς πόλεως περίκηπον διατρίβει µετὰ τῆς γυναικός͵ εἷλκον ἐκεῖθεν διά 
τινων ἐξ αὑτῶν σταλέντων αὐτόν τε καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα δεδεµένους ἐξαγκωνίσαντες͵ 
πολλὰς κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ὕβρεις ὑποσχόντας. µόνης δὲ τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτῶν οἱ δοῦλοι 
ὤφθησαν εἰς πάντα φεισάµενοι διὰ τὸ φιλάνθρωπον αὐτῆς ἦθος καὶ περὶ τοὺς 
δούλους συµπαθὲς καὶ βοηθητικὸν κατὰ δύναµιν. ἐξ ὧν ἐδείκνυτο τῶν δούλων οὐχὶ 
ὠµότης εἶναι φύσεως τὰ γινόµενα εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους͵ ἀλλὰ τῶν προϋπηργµένων εἰς 
αὐτοὺς ἀδικηµάτων ἀνταπόδοσις. (34/35.2.14) τὸν δὲ ∆αµόφιλον καὶ τὴν Μεγαλλίδα 
εἰς τὴν πόλιν οἱ ἀπεσταλµένοι ἑλκύσαντες͵ ὥσπερ ἔφηµεν͵ εἰς τὸ θέατρον 
εἰσήγαγον͵ συνεληλυθότος ἐνταῦθα τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀποστατῶν. καὶ τοῦ 
∆αµοφίλου τεχνάσασθαί τι πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν ἐγχειρήσαντος καὶ πολλοὺς τοῦ 
πλήθους τοῖς λόγοις ἐπαγοµένου͵ Ἑρµείας καὶ Ζεῦξις πικρῶς πρὸς αὐτὸν διακείµενοι 
πλάνον τε ἀπεκάλουν͵ καὶ οὐκ ἀναµείναντες τὴν ἀκριβῆ τοῦ δήµου κρίσιν ὁ µὲν διὰ 
τῶν πλευρῶν τὸ ξίφος ὠθεῖ͵ ὁ δὲ πελέκει τὸν τράχηλον ἔκοψεν.  
 
ἐκεῖθεν αἱρεῖται βασιλεὺς ὁ Εὔνους οὔτε δι΄ ἀνδρείαν οὔτε διὰ στρατηγίαν͵ 
διὰ δὲ µόνην τερατείαν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἄρξαι͵ ἅµα δὲ καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας 
οἱονεί τινα καλὸν οἰωνὸν ἐχούσης πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὑποταττοµένων εὔνοιαν. 
(34/35.2.15) Τῶν ὅλων δὲ τοῖς ἀποστάταις καταστὰς κύριος καὶ συναγαγὼν 
ἐκκλησίαν ἀνεῖλε µὲν τοὺς ἐζωγρηµένους τῶν Ἐνναίων͵ ὅσοις οὐκ ἦν ἡ τέχνη ὅπλα 
ἐργάζεσθαι͵ ἐκείνους δὲ δεδεµένους τοῖς ἔργοις ὑπέβαλλεν. ἔδωκε δὲ καὶ ταῖς 
θεραπαίναις τὴν Μεγαλλίδα χρήσασθαι ὡς ἂν βούλοιντο· καὶ αὗται κατεκρήµνισαν 
αἰκισάµεναι. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς ἰδίους ἀνεῖλε κυρίους Ἀντιγένη καὶ Πύθωνα. 
(34/35.2.16) περιθέµενος δὲ διάδηµα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν βασιλικῶς 
διακοσµήσας τήν τε συµβιοῦσαν αὐτῷ͵ Σύραν καὶ συµπολῖτιν οὖσαν͵ βασίλισσαν 
ἀποδείξας συνέδρους τε τοὺς συνέσει δοκοῦντας διαφέρειν ποιησάµενος͵ ὧν ἦν 
Ἀχαιὸς καὶ τοὔνοµα καὶ τὸ γένος͵ ἀνὴρ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ χειρὶ διαφέρων͵ καὶ ἐν τρισὶν 
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ἡµέραις πλείους τῶν ἑξακισχιλίων τὸν δυνατὸν καθοπλίσας τρόπον καὶ ἑτέρους 
συνεπαγόµενος ἀξίναις καὶ πελέκεσι χρωµένους ἢ σφενδόναις ἢ δρεπάνοις ἢ ξύλοις 
πεπυρακτωµένοις ἢ καὶ µαγείρων ὀβελοῖς͵ ἐπῄει πᾶσαν λεηλατῶν τὴν χώραν͵ καὶ 
πλῆθος ἄπειρον οἰκετῶν προσλαµβάνων ἐθάρρησε καὶ στρατηγοῖς Ῥωµαίων 
πολεµῆσαι͵ καὶ συµπλακεὶς τῷ πλήθει πολλάκις ἐκράτησεν͵ ἔχων ἤδη στρατιώτας 
ὑπὲρ τοὺς µυρίους.  
 
(34/35.2.17) Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Κλέων τις Κίλιξ ἄλλων δούλων ἀποστάσεως ἦρξε. 
καὶ πάντων ταῖς ἐλπίσι µετεωρισθέντων ὡς ἀντιπολεµήσει τὰ στασιάσαντα πρὸς 
ἀλλήλους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς οἱ ἀποστάται διαφθείροντες ἐλευθερώσουσι τὴν 
Σικελίαν τῆς στάσεως͵ παρὰ δόξαν ἀλλήλοις συνέβησαν͵ τοῦ Κλέωνος ὑποταγέντος 
ψιλῷ τοῦ Εὔνου προστάγµατι καὶ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ οἷα δὴ βασιλεῖ χρείαν 
ἀποπληροῦντος͵ ἔχοντος οἰκεῖον πλῆθος στρατιωτῶν πεντακισχιλίων· ἡµέραι δ΄ 
ἐγγὺς ἦσαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως τριάκοντα. 
 
(34/35.2.18) Καὶ µετὰ βραχὺ ἐκ Ῥώµης ἥκοντι στρατηγῷ Λευκίῳ Ὑψαίῳ͵ 
ἔχοντι στρατιώτας ἐκ Σικελίας ὀκτακισχιλίους͵ εἰς πόλεµον καταστάντες οἱ 
ἀποστάται ἐνίκησαν͵ πλῆθος ὄντες δισµύριοι. µετ΄ οὐ πολὺ δὲ ἀθροίζεται τὸ 
σύστηµα αὐτῶν εἰς µυριάδας εἴκοσι͵ καὶ πολλοῖς τοῖς πρὸς Ῥωµαίους πολέµοις 
ἐνευδοκιµήσαντες ἔλαττον αὐτοὶ ἔπταιον. (34/35.2.19) οὗ διαβοηθέντος κατά τε 
Ῥώµην δούλων ἀπόστασις ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα συνοµοσάντων ἀνήπτετο͵ καὶ κατὰ 
τὴν Ἀττικὴν ὑπὲρ χιλίων͵ ἔν τε ∆ήλῳ καὶ κατ΄ ἄλλους πολλοὺς τόπους· οὓς τάχει τε 
τῆς βοηθείας καὶ τῇ σφοδρᾷ κολάσει τῆς τιµωρίας οἱ καθ΄ ἕκαστον ἐπιµεληταὶ τῶν 
κοινῶν θᾶττον ἠφάνισαν͵ σωφρονίσαντες καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ὅσον ἦν ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει 
µετέωρον. (34/35.2.20) κατὰ δὲ Σικελίαν ηὔξετο τὸ κακόν͵ καὶ πόλεις ἡλίσκοντο 
αὔτανδροι καὶ πολλὰ στρατόπεδα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστατῶν κατεκόπησαν͵ ἕως Ῥουπίλιος 
ὁ Ῥωµαίων στρατηγὸς τὸ Ταυροµένιον ἀνεσώσατο Ῥωµαίοις͵ καρτερῶς µὲν αὐτὸ 
πολιορκήσας καὶ εἰς ἄφατον ἀνάγκην καὶ λιµὸν τοὺς ἀποστάτας συγκλείσας͵ ὥστε 
ἀρξαµένους ἐκ παίδων βορᾶς καὶ διελθόντας διὰ γυναικῶν µηδὲ τῆς αὑτῶν 
ἀλληλοφαγίας µηδ΄ ὅλως φείσασθαι· ὅτε καὶ Κοµανὸν τὸν ἀδελφὸν Κλέωνος 
φεύγοντα ἐκ τῆς πολιορκουµένης πόλεως εἷλε. (34/35.2.21) καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον 
Σαραπίωνος Σύρου τὴν ἄκραν προδόντος͵ συµπάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δραπετῶν ὁ 
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στρατηγὸς ἐκυρίευσεν· οὓς καὶ αἰκισάµενος κατεκρήµνισεν. ἐκεῖθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἔνναν 
ἐλθὼν παραπλησίως ἐπολιόρκει͵ εἰς ἐσχάτην ἀνάγκην συγκλείων τὰς τῶν 
ἀποστατῶν ἐλπίδας. καὶ Κλέωνα τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐξελθόντα τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἡρωικῶς 
ἀγωνισάµενον µετ΄ ὀλίγων ὑπὸ τῶν τραυµάτων δείξας νεκρόν͵ εἷλε καὶ ταύτην 
προδοσίᾳ τὴν πόλιν͵ ἐπεὶ οὐδ΄ ἦν ἁλώσιµος διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα βίᾳ χειρός.  
 
(34/35.2.22) ὁ δὲ Εὔνους ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς σωµατοφύλακας ὄντας χιλίους 
ἔφυγεν ἀνάνδρως εἴς τινας παρακρήµνους τόπους. ἀλλ΄ οἱ µὲν σὺν αὐτῷ ἄφυκτον τὸ 
περὶ αὑτοὺς δεινὸν ἐπιστάµενοι͵ ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὁ στρατηγὸς Ῥουπίλιος ἐπ΄ αὐτοὺς 
ἤλαυνεν͵ ἀλλήλους τοῖς ξίφεσιν ἔφθαζον ἀπαυχενίσαντες. ὁ δὲ τερατίας Εὔνους καὶ 
βασιλεὺς καταφυγὼν διὰ δειλίαν ἔν τισι κοιλάσιν ἐξειλκύσθη ἅµα τεττάρων͵ 
µαγείρου καὶ ἀρτοποιοῦ καὶ τοῦ τρίβοντος αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ λουτρῷ καὶ τετάρτου τοῦ 
παρὰ τοὺς πότους εἰωθότος ψυχαγωγεῖν αὐτόν. (34/35.2.23) καὶ παραδοθεὶς εἰς 
φυλακὴν καὶ τοῦ σώµατος αὐτοῦ διαλυθέντος εἰς φθειρῶν πλῆθος οἰκείως τῆς περὶ 
αὐτὸν ῥᾳδιουργίας κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον ἐν τῇ Μοργαντίνῃ. ἐντεῦθεν Ῥουπίλιος 
ἐπιτρέχων ὅλην τὴν Σικελίαν ἅµα λογάσιν ὀλίγοις θᾶττον ἤπερ τις ἤλπισε παντὸς 
αὐτὴν ἠλευθέρωσε λῃστηρίου. 
 
(34/35.2.24) Ὅτι ὁ τῶν ἀποστατῶν βασιλεὺς Εὔνους ἑαυτὸν µὲν Ἀντίοχον͵ Σύρους 
δὲ τῶν ἀποστατῶν τὸ πλῆθος ἐπωνόµασεν. (Photius,  Bibl.  pp. 384-386 B.) 
 
II. The Photian Version: Translation 
 
(34/5.2.1) After the destruction of Carthage, when things had been flowing smoothly 
for the Sicilians in every respect for sixty years, the slave war rose up against them 
for the following reason. 
 
Since they had become more prosperous in their daily lives and acquired 
great wealth they were buying up a large number of (household) slaves, onto whose 
bodies, as they were led away from the slave merchant like cattle, they were 
inflicting brands and marks. (34/5.2.2) They employed the young men as herdsmen, 
while they employed the others in such ways as need arose for each. They abused 
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them with a heavy hand in their service, and altogether thought them worthy of the 
minimum of care as far as concerned food and clothing. The majority of them 
provided themselves with a livelihood through banditry, and everywhere was full of 
bloodshed, since the bandits were scattered like armies of soldiers. (34/5.2.3) The 
governors tried to repress them, but did not dare to punish them because of the power 
and influence of the men who were the masters of the bandits, so they were forced to 
disregard the plundering of the province: for since most of the owners were Roman 
knights (equites), and were judges for charges against governors from provinces, 
they caused fear in the governors. 
 
(34/5.2.4) The slaves, oppressed by their hardships, and frequently ill-treated 
with blows beyond reason, could not endure. Therefore, meeting with each other as 
opportunity allowed, they talked together about revolt, until they put their plan into 
action. (34/5.2.5) There was a certain household slave of Antigenes of Enna, a Syrian 
from Apamea, a magician and wonder-worker in manner. This man claimed by 
divine commands to foretell the future through dreams and because of his talent in 
this direction he fooled many. Progressing from there, he did not simply prophesy 
from dreams, but even while awake he pretended to see gods and to hear from them 
the future. (34/5.2.6) Of the many stories that he invented, some, by chance, turned 
out to be true, and since those that did not come to pass were questioned by no-one, 
while those that did happen were acclaimed, the reputation of this man grew. Finally, 
through some contrivance, in the midst of some frenzy, he produced fire and flames 
from his mouth, and thus foretold the future. (34/5.2.7) For he would place into a nut, 
or something such as this, that was pierced on both sides, fire and fuel to maintain it: 
then placing it in his mouth and blowing kindled either sparks or flame. Before the 
revolt this man used to say that the Syrian goddess showed herself to him saying that 
he would be King: and he kept repeating this not only to others, but also to his own 
master. (34/5.2.8) When the matter became something of a joke, Antigenes, beguiled 
by his knowledge of wonders, would bring Eunus (for this was the wonder-worker’s 
name) into his banquets and continually ask about his kingdom and how he would 
treat each of those present: and since he explained everything without hesitation, 
explaining how moderately he would treat the masters, and in general talked in a 
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colourful manner about wonders, laughter erupted among the guests, and some of 
them, lifting substantial portions from the table gave them to him as gifts, saying as 
they did so that whenever he became King he should remember the favour. (34/5.2.9) 
But the fact is that his wonder-working did result in the true creation of his kingdom, 
and he made the repayment of the favour to those who had pledged it in jest at the 
banquets not without seriousness. 
 
The start of the whole revolt took place as follows. (34/5.2.10) There was a 
certain Damophilus of Enna, an exceedingly wealthy man, and of arrogant character. 
This man had mistreated his slaves to excess, and his wife Megallis competed with 
her husband in the punishment and in her overall inhuman treatment of the slaves. In 
consequence of this, those treated with contempt, who had been made savage by the 
treatment, came to a mutual agreement to revolt and to murder their masters. They 
went to Eunus and asked if their plans found favour with the gods. He used his usual 
wonder-working to confirm that the gods did favour them, and persuaded them to 
embark on their undertaking forthwith. (34/5.2.11) Immediately, therefore, they 
gathered together 400 fellow slaves, and having armed themselves as opportunity 
offered, they attacked the city of Enna, with Eunus leading them, working wonders 
of flames of fire for them. When they entered the houses they wrought carnage, not 
even sparing suckling babies, (34/5.2.12) but tearing them from the breast dashed 
them on the ground: while in regard to the women it is not even possible to say (and 
their husbands were actually looking on) what insults and outrages they perpetrated 
on them. A great multitude of slaves from the city had joined them, who, first 
exhibiting the worst (outrages) against their masters thus turned themselves to the 
slaughter of others. (34/5.2.13) Those around Eunus, learning that Damophilus was 
wasting time with his wife in his garden near the city, dispatched some of them (to 
them) and dragged both the man and his wife from that place with their hands bound 
behind their backs, enduring many outrages along the road. For the daughter alone 
were the slaves seen to be considerate in all respects on account of her benevolent 
nature, both her sympathy to the slaves and readiness to help as far as she could.  As 
a result of this it was demonstrated that the things perpetrated on others were not 
from the natural savagery of slaves, but were retribution for past wrongs to them. 
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(34/5.2.14) The men who had been dispatched dragged Damophilus and Megallis 
into the city, as we were saying, and led them into the theatre, where the multitude of 
rebels had assembled. But when Damophilus attempted to contrive something to save 
himself, and was bringing many of the multitude to his side with his words, 
Hermeias and Zeuxis, bitterly disposed towards him, stigmatized him as deceiving 
and did not wait for the formal judgement of the assembly, but one thrust a sword 
through his side, the other cut his neck with an axe.  
 
Then, Eunus was chosen king, and not because of his courage, nor his 
generalship, but only because of his knowledge of wonders and his setting of the 
revolt in motion, but also at the same time because his name seemed to hold some 
favourable omen with regard to the goodwill of his subjects. (34/5.2.15) When he 
was appointed as master for everything by the insurgents and he had summoned 
together an assembly, he killed the captives from Enna, all those who were not 
skilled in working arms, while those who were he bound and put to work. He gave 
Megallis to the/her handmaids to deal with however they wished: and after torturing 
her they threw her down a precipice. He himself killed his own masters Antigenes 
and Pytho. (34/5.2.16) After putting on a diadem and arraying his surroundings in a 
kingly manner, and having proclaimed his wife, who was Syrian and from the same 
city, Queen, he appointed a council of men who seemed to excel in intelligence, 
among whom was Achaeus, Achaeus (both in name and birth) a man who excelled in 
both planning and deeds. In three days he had armed more than six thousand as well 
as he could, and others he had drawn to himself furnished with hatchets and axes or 
slings or scythes or fire hardened stakes or even kitchen spits. He swept over the 
whole country plundering, and since he was enrolling countless multitudes of 
household-slaves, he even ventured to do battle with Roman generals, and having 
become engaged in close fighting, he prevailed many times with his multitudes, 
having by this time more than ten thousand soldiers. 
 
(34/5.2.17) During this time Kleon, a certain Cilician, began a revolt of other 
slaves: and although all were buoyed up by hope that the seditious factions would 
wage war against one another, and that the rebels themselves, by destroying 
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themselves utterly, would release Sicily from discord, unexpectedly they came to 
terms with one another, Kleon having been subordinated to the mere command of 
Eunus, and discharging the service of a general such as indeed for a king, having his 
own band of five thousand soldiers.  It was nearly thirty days after the revolt. 
 
(34/5.2.18) After a short time, the rebels engaged in warfare with a general 
arrived from Rome, Lucius Hypsaeus, who had eight thousand Sicilian soldiers, and 
were victorious, being 20,000 strong. In a short while their number had reached 
200,000, and in many battles against the Romans they gained glory and only 
infrequently came off worse. (34/5.2.19) Because word of this was spread abroad, in 
Rome a revolt was gained 150 slave adherents who swore together, and in Athens 
more than a thousand, and in Delos and in many other places:  by swift assistance 
and violent retribution the military commanders in each of these places quickly 
obliterated these rebellions, and chastened others, as many as were buoyed up for 
rebellion. (34/5.2.20) In Sicily the trouble was increasing, and cities were being 
captured together with their men, and many armies were cut to pieces by the rebels, 
until Rupilius, the Roman general, recovered Tauromenium for the Romans, after a 
severe siege and enclosing the rebels in unutterable duress and hunger, so that 
beginning with the flesh of the children and progressing through the women, they did 
not altogether abstain from eating the flesh of each other: at the time when also he 
captured Komanus, the brother of Kleon, as he fled out of the besieged city. 
(34/5.2.21) Finally, after Sarapion of Syria betrayed the citadel, the general became 
master of all of the runaways in the city, whom, having tortured, he threw down a 
precipice. From there he came to Enna which he besieged in a similar way, enclosing 
into extreme duress the hopes of the rebels. After the general Kleon had come out of 
the city, and had exerted himself heroically with a few men, Rupilius displayed him 
dead from his wounds, and he captured this city too by betrayal, since it was not easy 
to capture by force, because of its strong position. 
 
(34/5.2.22) Eunus, taking up a bodyguard of a thousand men, fled in an 
unmanly fashion to certain precipitous regions. But those with him, knowing that the 
danger around them was inescapable, for already the general Rupilius was hastening 
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towards them, took the initiative by beheading one another with swords: however 
Eunus, the wonder-worker and king, having through cowardice fled for refuge in 
certain caves, was dragged out together with four men, a cook, a baker, the man who 
massaged him in the bath and a fourth, who had been accustomed, throughout the 
drinking bouts, to beguiling him. (34/5.2.23) Transmitted to prison, and after his 
flesh had dissolved into a mass of lice, he ended his life in a way worthy of his 
knavery, in Morgantina. Thereupon Rupilius, covering over the whole of Sicily 
together with a few picked men, faster than anyone expected, freed Sicily from all 
the bands of robbers. 
 
(34/5.2.24) Eunus, the king of the rebels, named himself Antiochus, and the 
multitude of rebels Syrians. 
 
III. The Constantinian Excerpts: Greek Text 
 
(34/35.2.25) Ὅτι οὐδέποτε στάσις ἐγένετο τηλικαύτη δούλων ἡλίκη συνέστη ἐν τῇ 
Σικελίᾳ. δι΄ ἣν πολλαὶ µὲν πόλεις δειναῖς περιέπεσον συµφοραῖς͵ ἀναρίθµητοι δὲ 
ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες µετὰ τέκνων ἐπειράθησαν τῶν µεγίστων ἀτυχηµάτων͵ πᾶσα δὲ 
ἡ νῆσος ἐκινδύνευσεν πεσεῖν εἰς ἐξουσίαν δραπετῶν͵ ὅρον τῆς ἐξουσίας τιθεµένων 
τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ὑπερβολὴν τῶν ἀκληρηµάτων. καὶ ταῦτα ἀπήντησε τοῖς µὲν 
πολλοῖς ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως͵ τοῖς δὲ πραγµατικῶς ἕκαστα δυναµένοις κρίνειν 
οὐκ ἀλόγως ἔδοξε συµβαίνειν. (34/35.2.26) διὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εὐπορίας τῶν 
τὴν κρατίστην νῆσον ἐκκαρπουµένων ἅπαντες σχεδὸν οἱ τοῖς πλούτοις 
προκεκοφότες ἐζήλωσαν τὸ µὲν πρῶτον τρυφήν͵ εἶθ΄ ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ ὕβριν. ἐξ ὧν 
ἁπάντων αὐξανοµένης ἐπ΄ ἴσης τῆς τε κατὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν κακουχίας καὶ τῆς κατὰ τῶν 
δεσποτῶν ἀλλοτριότητος͵ ἐρράγη ποτὲ σὺν καιρῷ τὸ µῖσος. ἐξ οὗ χωρὶς 
παραγγέλµατος πολλαὶ µυριάδες συνέδραµον οἰκετῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν δεσποτῶν 
ἀπώλειαν. τὸ παραπλήσιον δὲ γέγονε καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιρούς͵ 
Ἀριστονίκου µὲν ἀντιποιησαµένου τῆς µὴ προσηκούσης βασιλείας͵ τῶν δὲ δούλων 
διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν δεσποτῶν κακουχίας συναπονοησαµένων ἐκείνῳ καὶ µεγάλοις 
ἀτυχήµασι πολλὰς πόλεις περιβαλόντων. 
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(34/35.2.27) Ὅτι παραπλησίως καὶ πρὸς τὰς γεωργίας ἕκαστος τῶν πολλὴν 
χώραν κεκτηµένων ὅλα σωµατοτροφεῖα συνηγόραζον· ... τοὺς µὲν πέδαις δεσµεύειν͵ 
τοὺς δὲ ταῖς βαρύτησι τῶν ἔργων καταπονεῖν͵ πάντας δὲ τοῖς ὑπερηφάνοις 
χαρακτῆρσι κατέστιζον. διὸ δαὶ τοσοῦτο τῶν οἰκετῶν ἐπέκλυσε πλῆθος ἅπασαν 
Σικελίαν͵ ὥστε τοὺς ἀκούοντας τὴν ὑπερβολὴν µὴ πιστεῦσαι. καὶ γὰρ τῶν 
Σικελιωτῶν οἱ πολλοὺς πλούτους κεκτηµένοι διηµιλλῶντο πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν 
ὑπερηφανίας τε καὶ πλεονεξίας καὶ κακουργίας. εἰς τοιαύτην γὰρ συνήθειαν 
ῥᾳδιουργίας τοὺς νοµεῖς ἤγαγον οἱ πολλοὺς οἰκέτας κεκτηµένοι τῶν Ἰταλικῶν ὥστε 
τροφὰς µὲν µὴ παρέχειν͵ ἐπιτρέπειν δὲ λῃστεύειν. (34/35.2.28) τοιαύτης δοθείσης 
ἐξουσίας ἀνθρώποις διὰ µὲν τὴν ἰσχὺν τῶν σωµάτων δυναµένοις πᾶν τὸ κριθὲν 
ἐπιτελεῖν͵ διὰ δὲ τὴν ἄνεσιν καὶ σχολὴν εὐκαιροῦσι͵ διὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἔνδειαν 
ἀναγκαζοµένοις ταῖς παραβόλοις ἐγχειρεῖν πράξεσιν͵ συνέβη ταχὺ τὴν παρανοµίαν 
αὐξηθῆναι. τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις τόποις τοὺς καθ΄ ἕνα καὶ δύο τὰς 
ὁδοιπορίας ποιουµένους ἐφόνευον· εἶτα ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων ἐπαύλεις νυκτὸς 
ἀθρόοι συντρέχοντες ἐξῄρουν βίᾳ ταύτας καὶ τὰς κτήσεις διήρπαζον καὶ τοὺς 
ἀνθισταµένους ἀνῄρουν. (34/35.2.29) ἀεὶ δὲ µᾶλλον τῆς τόλµης προβαινούσης͵ οὔτε 
τοῖς ὁδοιπόροις νυκτὸς ἡ Σικελία βάσιµος ἦν οὔτε τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας ζῆν εἰωθόσιν 
ἀσφαλὴς ἐπὶ ταύτης ἡ διατριβή͵ πάντα δὲ βίας καὶ λῃστείας καὶ παντοδαπῶν φόνων 
ἦν µεστά. τοῖς δὲ νοµεῦσιν ἀγραυλίας γεγενηµένης καὶ σκευῆς στρατιωτικῆς͵ 
εὐλόγως ἅπαντες ἐνεπιµπλῶντο φρονήµατος καὶ θράσους· περιφέροντες γὰρ ῥόπαλα 
καὶ λόγχας καὶ καλαύροπας ἀξιολόγους καὶ δέρµατα λύκων ἢ συάγρων 
ἐσκεπασµένοι τὰ σώµατα καταπληκτικὴν εἶχον τὴν πρόσοψιν καὶ πολεµικῶν ἔργων 
οὐ πόρρω κειµένην. (34/35.2.30) κυνῶν τε ἀλκίµων ἄθροισµα συνεπόµενον ἑκάστῳ 
καὶ τροφῆς καὶ γάλακτος καὶ κρεῶν παρακειµένων πλῆθος ἐξηγρίου τάς τε ψυχὰς 
καὶ τὰ σώµατα. ἦν οὖν πᾶσα χώρα µεστὴ καθάπερ στρατευµάτων διεσπαρµένων͵ ὡς 
ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν ἐπιτροπῆς τοῦ θράσους τῶν δούλων καθωπλισµένου. 
(34/35.2.31) οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ κωλύειν µὲν ἐπεχείρουν τὴν ἀπόνοιαν τῶν οἰκετῶν͵ 
κολάζειν δὲ οὐ τολµῶντες διὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὸ βάρος τῶν κυρίων ἠναγκάζοντο 
περιορᾶν τὴν ἐπαρχίαν λῃστευοµένην. οἱ πλεῖστοι γὰρ τῶν κτητόρων ἱππεῖς ὄντες 
ἐντελεῖς τῶν Ῥωµαίων͵ καὶ κριταὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπαρχιῶν κατηγορουµένοις 
στρατηγοῖς γινόµενοι͵ φοβεροὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὑπῆρ χον. 
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(34/35.2.32) Ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωργίας ἀσχολούµενοι τῶν Ἰταλικῶν 
παµπληθεῖς οἰκέτας ὠνούµενοι καὶ πάν τας χαράττοντες τοῖς στίγµασι τροφὰς µὲν 
οὐχ ἱκανὰς παρείχοντο͵ τῇ δὲ βαρύτητι τῶν ἔργων κατέξαινον ... τὴν παρ΄ αὐτῶν 
ταλαιπωρίαν. (Const. Exc.  2(1), pp. 302-303.) 
 
(34/35.2.33) Ὅτι οὐ µόνον κατὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς δυναστείας τοὺς ἐν ὑπεροχῇ 
ὄντας ἐπιεικῶς χρὴ προσφέρεσθαι τοῖς ταπεινοτέροις͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἰδιωτικοὺς 
βίους πρᾴως προσενεκτέον τοῖς οἰκέταις τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας. ἡ γὰρ ὑπερηφανία καὶ 
βαρύτης ἐν µὲν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀπεργάζεται στάσεις ἐµφυλίους τῶν ἐλευθέρων͵ ἐν δὲ 
τοῖς κατὰ µέρος τῶν ἰδιωτῶν οἴκοις δούλων ἐπιβουλὰς τοῖς δεσπόταις καὶ ἀπο 
στάσεις φοβερὰς κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι κατασκευάζει. ὅσῳ δ΄ ἂν τὰ τῆς ἐξουσίας εἰς 
ὠµότητα καὶ παρα νοµίαν ἐκτρέπηται͵ τοσούτῳ µᾶλλον καὶ τὰ τῶν ὑποτεταγµένων 
ἤθη πρὸς ἀπόνοιαν ἀποθηριοῦται· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ τῇ τύχῃ ταπεινὸς τοῦ µὲν καλοῦ καὶ τῆς 
δόξης ἑκουσίως ἐκχωρεῖ τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι͵ τῆς δὲ καθηκούσης φιλανθρωπίας 
στερισκόµενος πολέµιος γίνεται τῶν ἀνηµέρως δεσποζόντων. (Const. Exc.  4, pp.  
383-384) 
 
       (34/35.2.34) Ὅτι ∆αµόφιλός τις ἦν τὸ γένος Ἐνναῖος͵ τὴν οὐσίαν 
µεγαλόπλουτος͵ τὸν τρόπον ὑπερήφανος͵ ὃς πολλὴν χώρας περίοδον γεωργῶν͵ 
παµπληθεῖς δὲ βοσκηµάτων ἀγέλας κεκτηµένος οὐ µόνον τὴν τρυφὴν τῶν κατὰ 
Σικελίαν Ἰταλικῶν ἐζήλωσεν͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς οἰκέτας πλῆθος καὶ τὴν εἰς 
τούτους ἀπανθρωπίαν καὶ βαρύτητα. ἐπὶ µὲν γὰρ τῆς χώρας ἵππους τε πολυτελεῖς καὶ 
τετρακύκλους ἀπήνας µετ΄ οἰκετῶν στρατιωτικῶν περιήγετο· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις 
εὐπρεπῶν παίδων πλῆθος͵ ἔτι δὲ κολάκων ἀνάγωγον παραδροµὴν ἔχειν ἐφιλοτιµεῖτο. 
(34/35.2.35) κατὰ δὲ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰς ἐπαύλεις ἀργυρωµάτων ἐκθέσεις τορευτῶν 
καὶ στρωµάτων θαλαττίων πολυτελείας ἐκπονούµενος παρετίθετο τραπέζας 
ὑπερηφάνους καὶ βασιλικὰς ταῖς δαψιλείαις͵ ὑπεραίρων τὴν Περσικὴν τρυφὴν ταῖς 
δαπάναις καὶ πολυτελείαις· ὑπερέβαλε δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν. ἀνάγωγος γὰρ 
καὶ ἀπαίδευτος τρόπος ἐξουσίας ἀνυπευθύνου καὶ τύχης µεγαλοπλούτου κυριεύσας 
τὸ µὲν πρῶτον κόρον ἐγέννησεν͵ εἶθ΄ ὕβριν͵ τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ὄλεθρόν τε αὐτῷ καὶ 
συµφορὰς µεγάλας τῇ πατρίδι. (34/35.2.36) ἀγοράζων γὰρ οἰκετῶν πλῆθος ὑβρι 
στικῶς αὐτοῖς προσεφέρετο͵ στίγµασι σιδήρου χαράττων τὰ σώµατα τῶν ἐλευθέρων 
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µὲν ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι γεγενηµένων͵ αἰχµαλωσίας δὲ καὶ δουλι κῆς τύχης 
πεπειραµένων. καὶ τούτων τοὺς µὲν πέ δαις δεσµεύων εἰς τὰς συνεργασίας ἐνέβαλλε͵ 
τοὺς δὲ νοµεῖς ἀποδεικνύων οὔτ΄ ἐσθῆτας οὔτε τροφὰς ἐχορήγει τὰς ἁρµοττούσας. 
(Const. Exc.  2(1), p. 304.) 
 
(34/35.2.38) Ὅτι ∆αµόφιλος ὁ Ἐνναῖός ποτε προσελθόντων αὐτῷ τινων 
οἰκετῶν γυµνῶν καὶ διαλεγοµένων ὑπὲρ ἐσθῆτος οὐκ ἠνέσχετο τὴν ἔντευξιν͵ ἀλλ΄ 
εἰπών· Τί γάρ; οἱ διὰ τῆς χώρας ὁδοιποροῦντες γυµνοὶ βα δίζουσι͵ καὶ οὐχ ἑτοίµην 
παρέχονται τὴν χορηγίαν τοῖς χρείαν ἔχουσιν ἱµατίων; ἐπέταξε προσδῆσαι τοῖς κίοσι 
καὶ πληγὰς ἐµφορήσας ἐξαπέστειλεν ὑπερηφάνως. (Const. Exc.  4, p. 384.)  
 
(34/35.2.37) Ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ∆αµόφιλος διὰ τὴν αὐθάδειαν καὶ τὴν ὠµότητα τῶν 
τρόπων οὐκ ἦν ἡµέρα καθ΄ ἣν οὐκ ᾐκίζετό τινας τῶν οἰκετῶν ἐπ΄ αἰτίαις οὐ δικαίαις. 
οὐχ ἧττον δὲ ἡ γυνὴ τούτου Μεταλλὶς χαίρουσα ταῖς ὑπερηφάνοις τιµωρίαις ὠµῶς 
προσεφέρετο ταῖς θεραπαινίσι καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν τοῖς ὑποπεσοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐξ 
ἀµφοτέρων ὕβριν καὶ τιµωρίαν ἀπεθηριώθησαν οἱ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς κυρίους͵ καὶ 
διαλαβόντες µηδὲν ἔτι χεῖρον τῶν παρόντων αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἀπαντήσεσθαι. ... (Const. 
Exc.  2(1), p. 304.) 
 
(34/35.2.24b) Ὅτι συνετίθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ δοῦλοι περὶ ἀποστάσεως 
καὶ φόνου τῶν κυρίων. παρελθόντες δὲ πρὸς τὸν Εὔνουν οὐκ ἄπωθεν διατρίβοντα 
ἠρώτων εἰ συγχωρεῖται παρὰ τῶν θεῶν αὐτοῖς τὸ βεβουλευµένον. ὁ δὲ 
τερατευόµενος µετ΄ ἐνθουσιασµοῦ καὶ περὶ τίνων ἥκουσι ἀκούσας διεσάφησεν ὅτι 
διδόασιν αὐτοῖς οἱ θεοὶ τὴν ἀπόστασιν͵ ἐὰν µηδεµίαν ὑπερβολὴν ποιησάµενοι 
παραχρῆµα µὲν ἐγχειρήσωσι ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς· ὑπὸ γὰρ τῆς πεπρωµένης αὐτοῖς 
κεκυρῶσθαι πατρίδα τὴν Ἔνναν͵ οὖσαν ἀκρόπολιν ὅλης τῆς νήσου. τοιούτων λόγων 
ἀκούσαντες καὶ διαλαβόντες ὅτι τὸ δαιµόνιον αὐτοῖς συνεπιλαµβάνεται τῆς 
προαιρέσεως͵ οὕτως παρέστησαν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν ὥστε µηδεµίαν 
ἀναβολὴν τῶν δεδογµένων ποιεῖσθαι. εὐθὺς οὖν τοὺς µὲν δεδεµένους ἔλυον͵ τῶν δὲ 
ἄλλων τοὺς πλησίον διατρίβοντας συλλαβόµενοι περὶ τετρακοσίους συνήθροισαν ἐπί 
τινος ἀγροῦ πλησίον ὄντος τῆς Ἔννης. συνθέµενοι δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πίστεις ἐπὶ 
σφαγίων ἐνόρκους νυκτὸς ποιησάµενοι καθωπλίσθησαν͵ ὥς ποτ΄ οὖν ὁ καιρὸς 
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συνεχώρει· πάντες δὲ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὅπλων τὸν θυµὸν ἀνελάµβανον κατὰ τῆς 
ἀπωλείας τῶν ὑπερηφάνων κυρίων· καὶ τούτων ἀφηγεῖτο Εὔνους. καὶ 
παρακαλοῦντες ἀλλήλους περὶ µέσας νύκτας εἰσέπεσον εἰς τὴν πόλιν καὶ πολλοὺς 
ἀνῄρουν. (Const. Exc.  3, pp. 206-207.)  
 
(34/35.2.39) Ὅτι κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἦν τοῦ ∆αµοφίλου θυγάτηρ͵ παρθένος 
µὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν͵ ἁπλότητι δὲ τρόπων καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ διαφέρουσα. αὕτη τοὺς 
µαστιζοµένους ὑπὸ τῶν γονέων ἀεὶ φιλοτίµως εἰώθει παρηγορεῖσθαι͵ καὶ τοῖς 
δεδεµένοις τῶν οἰκετῶν ἐπαρκοῦσα διὰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν θαυµαστῶς ὑπὸ πάντων 
ἠγαπᾶτο. καὶ τότ΄ οὖν τῆς προγεγενηµένης χάριτος ξενολογησάσης αὐτῇ τὸν παρὰ 
τῶν εὖ πεπονθότων ἔλεον͵ οὐ µόνον οὐδεὶς ἐτόλµησε µεθ΄ ὕβρεως ἐπιβαλεῖν τῇ 
κόρῃ τὰς χεῖρας͵ ἀλλὰ πάντες ἄθικτον πάσης ὕβρεως τὴν ἀκµὴν αὐτῆς ἐτήρησαν. 
προχειρισάµενοι δὲ ἐξ αὑτῶν τοὺς εὐθέτους͵ ὧν ἐκτενέστατος ἦν Ἑρµείας͵ 
ἀπήγαγον εἰς Κατάνην πρός τινας οἰκείους. (Const. Exc.  2(1), p. 305.)  
 
(34/35.2.40) Ὅτι ἀπηγριωµένων τῶν ἀποστατῶν δούλων πρὸς ὅλην τὴν 
οἰκίαν τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ τρεποµένων πρὸς ἀπαραίτητον ὕβριν καὶ τιµωρίαν͵ 
ὑπέφαινον ὡς οὐ δι΄ ὠµότητα φύσεως͵ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς προγεγενηµένας εἰς αὐτοὺς 
ὑπερηφανίας ἐλύττων πρὸς τὴν τῶν προαδικησάντων κόλασιν τραπέντες.  
 
Ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς οἰκέταις αὐτοδίδακτός ἐστιν ἡ φύσις εἰς δικαίαν ἀπόδοσιν 
χάριτός τε καὶ τιµωρίας. (Const. Exc.  4, p. 384.)  
 
(34/35.2.41) Ὅτι ὁ Εὔνους µετὰ ἀναγορευθῆναι βασιλεὺς πάντας ἀνελών͵ 
ἐκκλέψας µόνους ἀφῆκε τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἔµπροσθεν χρόνοις κατὰ τὰς τοῦ κυρίου 
συµπεριφορὰς ἐν τοῖς συνδείπνοις ἀποδεδεγµένους αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ τε µαντικῇ καὶ κατὰ 
τὰς ἐκ τῆς τραπέζης δόσεις φιλανθρώπως· ὥστε θαυµάσαι ἦν τήν τε τῆς τύχης 
περιπέτειαν καὶ τὸ τὴν κατὰ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων εὐεργεσίαν ἀµειφθῆναι σὺν καιρῷ 
τηλικαύτῃ χάριτι. (Const. Exc.  2(1), p. 305.)  
 
(34/35.2.42) Ὅτι Ἀχαιὸς ὁ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιόχου σύµβουλος τοῖς 
πραττοµένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δραπετῶν οὐκ εὐαρεστούµενος ἐπετίµα τε τοῖς τολµωµένοις 
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ὑπ΄ αὐτῶν καὶ µάλα θρασέως προέλεγεν ὅτι συντόµου τεύξονται τιµωρίας. ὃν ὁ 
Εὔνους παρρησιαζόµενον τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχε τοῦ θανάτῳ περιβαλεῖν ὥστε οὐ µόνον 
ἐδωρήσατο τὴν τῶν δεσποτῶν οἰκίαν͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ σύµβουλον ἐποιήσατο. (Const. Exc.  
4, p. 384.)  
 
(34/35.2.43) Ὅτι καὶ ἄλλη τις ἐγένετο ἀπόστασις δραπετῶν καὶ σύστηµα 
ἀξιόλογον. Κλέων γάρ τις Κίλιξ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ταῦρον τόπων͵ συνήθης ὢν ἐκ 
παίδων τῷ λῃστρικῷ βίῳ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν νοµεὺς γεγονὼς ἱπποφορβίων͵ οὐ 
διέλιπεν ὁδοιδοκῶν καὶ παντοδαποὺς φόνους ἐπιτελούµενος. ὃς πυθόµενος τὴν κατὰ 
τὸν Εὔνουν προκοπὴν καὶ τὰς τῶν µετ΄ αὐτοῦ δραπετῶν εὐηµερίας ἀποστάτης 
ἐγένετο͵ καί τινας τῶν πλησίον οἰκετῶν πείσας συναπονοήσασθαι κατέτρεχε τὴν 
πόλιν τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων καὶ τὴν πλησιόχωρον πᾶσαν. (Const. Exc.  2(1), p. 305.)  
 
(34/35.2.44) Ὅτι ἡ κατεπείγουσα χρεία καὶ σπάνις ἠνάγκαζε πάντα 
δοκιµάζειν τοὺς ἀποστάτας δούλους͵ οὐ διδοῦσα τὴν τῶν κρειττόνων ἐκλογήν.  
 
(34/35.2.45) Ὅτι ὑπῆρχεν οὐ διοσηµίας δεόµενον τὸ συλλογίσασθαι τῆς 
πόλεως τὸ εὐάλωτον. φανερὸν γὰρ ἦν καὶ τοῖς εὐηθεστάτοις ὅτι τῶν τειχῶν διὰ τὴν 
πολυχρόνιον εἰρήνην κατερρυηκότων καὶ πολλῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς στρατιωτῶν 
ἀπολωλότων͵ ἔσται τῆς πόλεως εὐκατόρθωτος ἡ πολιορκία.   
 
(34/35.2.46) Ὅτι ὁ Εὔνους ἐκτὸς βέλους ἐπιστήσας τὴν δύναµιν ἐβλασφήµει 
τοὺς Ῥωµαίους͵ ἀποφαινόµενος οὐχ ἑαυτοὺς ἀλλ΄ ἐκείνους εἶναι δραπέτας τῶν 
κινδύνων. µίµους δὲ ἐξ ἀποστάσεως τοῖς ἔνδον ἐπεδείκνυτο͵ δι΄ ὧν οἱ δοῦλοι τὰς 
ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κυρίων ἀποστασίας ἐξεθεάτριζον͵ ὀνειδίζοντες αὐτῶν τὴν 
ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εἰς τὸν ὄλεθρον προαγούσης ὕβρεως.  
(34/35.2.47) Ὅτι τὰ ἐξηλλαγµένα δυστυχήµατα͵ εἰ καί τινες πεπεισµένοι 
τυγχάνουσι µηδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιστροφὴν ποιεῖσθαι τὸ θεῖον͵ ἀλλ΄ οὖν γε 
σύµφορόν ἐστι τῷ κοινῷ βίῳ τὴν ἐκ θεῶν δεισιδαιµονίαν ἐντετηκέναι ταῖς τῶν 
πολλῶν ψυχαῖς. ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ δι΄ ἀρετὴν ἰδίαν δικαιοπραγοῦντες͵ τὸ δὲ πολὺ φῦλον 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων νοµικαῖς κολάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἐκ θεοῦ τιµωρίαις ἀπέχεται τῶν 
κακουργηµάτων. 
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(34/35.2.48) Ὅτι πολλῶν καὶ µεγάλων κακῶν ἐπισυµβάντων τοῖς 
Σικελιώταις͵ τούτοις ἅπασιν ὁ δηµοτικὸς ὄχλος οὐχ οἷον συνέπασχεν͵ ἀλλὰ 
τοὐναντίον ἐπέχαιρε προσεπιφθονῶν ἀνίσου τύχης καὶ ἀνωµάλου ζωῆς. ὁ γὰρ 
φθόνος ἐκ τῆς προγεγενηµένης λύπης µετέβαλεν εἰς χαράν͵ ὁρῶν τὸ λαµπρὸν τῆς 
τύχης µεταπεπτωκὸς εἰς τὸ πρότερον ὑπ΄ αὐτῆς ὑπερορώµενον σχῆµα͵ καὶ τὸ πάντων 
δεινότατον͵ οἱ µὲν ἀποστάται προνοηθέντες ἐµφρόνως περὶ τοῦ µέλλοντος οὔτε τὰς 
ἐπαύλεις ἐνεπύριζον οὔτε τὰς ἐν αὐταῖς κτήσεις καὶ καρπῶν ἀποθέσεις ἐλυµαίνοντο͵ 
τῶν τε πρὸς τὴν γεωργίαν ὡρµηκότων ἀπείχοντο͵ οἱ δὲ δηµοτικοὶ διὰ τὸν φθόνον ἐπὶ 
τῇ προφάσει τῶν δραπετῶν ἐξιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν οὐ µόνον τὰς κτήσεις διήρπαζον͵ 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἐπαύλεις ἐνεπύριζον. (Const. Exc.  4, pp. 384-385.) 
 
IV. The Constantinian Excerpts: Translation 
 
(34/5.2.25) There was never a discord of slaves so great as that which erupted in 
Sicily, through which many cities encountered terrible circumstances, countless men 
and women, along with their children, experienced the greatest misfortunes, and all 
the island ran the risk of falling into the power of the fugitives, who measured the 
extent of their power by the excess of misfortunes of the free. These things happened 
unexpectedly and contrary to expectations to most people, but to those who could 
judge each matter realistically, they did not seem to happen unaccountably. 
(34/5.2.26) For because of the excessive wealth of those enjoying the fruits of the 
most excellent island, nearly all of those who had become wealthy strove after first 
luxury, then arrogance and insolence. Because of this, and since the mistreatment of 
the slaves and their estrangement from their masters increased equally, there was, 
when opportune, a general outburst of hatred. From this, without formal command, 
tens of thousands of slaves joined forces for the destruction of their masters. A 
similar thing happened in Asia during the same period, when Aristonicus laid claim 
to a kingdom that did not belong to him, and the slaves, because of mistreatment by 
their masters, shared in this man’s folly and encompassed many cities in great 
misfortunes. 
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 (34/5.2.27) In a similar fashion, the large landowners were buying whole 
slave markets to work their land ... to bind some with fetters, and to exhaust others 
with weight of work, and they marked all with arrogant brands. In consequence, so 
large a multitude of (household) slaves flooded all Sicily, that those who heard the 
extravagant numbers did not believe them. For those of the Sicilian Greeks who had 
acquired much wealth were contending hotly with the Greeks of Italy in arrogance, 
greed and wickedness. The Italians who had acquired many slaves allowed their 
herdsmen such a self-indulgent life-style that they did not provide them food, but 
permitted them to plunder. (34/5.2.28) Since power such as this had been given to 
men who, because of their physical strength were able to accomplish everything they 
chose, and because of their licence and leisure had the opportunity, and because of 
their lack of food were compelled to undertake perilous tasks, it came about that 
there was a swift increase in lawlessness. For first they murdered those who travelled 
singly or in pairs in conspicuous places: then, coming together in bands, they 
attacked in the night the farm houses of the weak, and were destroying them by force 
and were plundering the possessions and were killing those who resisted. (34/5.2.29)  
Since their courage kept growing ever greater, by night Sicily was not passable to 
travellers, and for those accustomed to living in the countryside it was not safe to 
spend time there. Everywhere was filled with violence, banditry and killings of all 
kinds. Since the herdsmen were experienced in the countryside and equipped like 
soldiers, they all were, with good reason, full of arrogance and boldness: for since 
they were carrying clubs, spears and remarkable shepherd’s crooks, and covered their 
bodies with the hides of wolves or wild boars, they had a striking appearance and one 
that was not far from warlike. A pack of fierce dogs following each man, and a 
plentiful supply of milk and meat being available made their bodies and minds wild. 
Therefore the whole countryside was full as though of scattered armies, as if the 
boldness of the slaves had been armed by the decision/guardianship of the masters. 
(34/5.2.31) The governors tried to repress the madness of the slaves, but did not dare 
to punish them, and because of the power and strength of the masters they were 
forced to disregard the plundering of the province. For since most of the owners were 
recognised Roman knights (equites), and were judges for charges against governors 
from provinces, they caused fear in the governors. 
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 (34/5.2.32) The Italians who were engaged in farming purchased vast 
numbers of (household) slaves, branded them all with marks, and did not provide 
sufficient food, but wasted them away with the burdens of work ... distress from 
them. 
 
 (34/5.2.33) Not only in the exercise of political power should prominent men 
behave moderately to those who are humble, but also in their private lives, if they are 
wise, they should attend gently to their slaves. For just as arrogance and a heavy 
hand in cities produces civil conflicts among the free citizens, so in private homes it 
produces slave plots against their masters, and terrible revolts in common against 
cities. The more the powers that be might be changed into savagery and lawlessness, 
so much more are the characters of those subject to that power made savage to the 
point of despair: for all who chance has made humble willingly yield to those in 
power for virtue and good repute, but when deprived of good treatment become an 
enemy of those who savagely lord it over him. 
 
 (34/5.2.34) There was a certain Damophilus, whose family came from Enna, 
an exceedingly wealthy man, and of arrogant character, who, since he cultivated a 
vast circuit of land, and had acquired large herds of cattle, not only emulated the 
luxury of the Italians in Sicily, but even their great numbers of slaves and their 
inhumanity and arrogance towards them. For he always had with him in the 
countryside four-wheeled wagons and lavish horses with a retinue of armed slaves: 
in addition to these he prided himself on having many handsome slave boys and an 
ill-bred following of flatterers. (34/5.2.35) In the city and in his country houses he 
worked hard to produce extravagant exhibitions of silver plate worked in relief and 
coverings dyed with purple and served sumptuous and royal dinners in abundance; 
he exceeded Persian luxury in expense and extravagance: he surpassed them even in 
arrogance. For his ill-bred and uneducated nature, having gained possession of 
unaccountable power and an excessive fortune, first produced satiety, then 
wantonness, and finally ruin for himself and great misfortunes for his country. 
(34/5.2.36) For, buying great numbers of slaves in the market, he used to treat them 
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outrageously, branding marks on the bodies of those who had been born free in their 
own countries, but who had experienced the fate of slavery through capture in war. 
Some of them he fettered in chains and threw into worker’s barracks, while others he 
assigned as herdsmen, and provided neither appropriate clothing nor food. 
 
 (34/5.2.38) Damophilus of Enna, when some naked slaves approached him 
and talked with him about clothing, he could not endure the conversation, but said, 
“What? Do those who walk through the country go naked, and do they not offer a 
ready supply for those who need clothes?” He ordered them bound to pillars and 
beaten, and dismissed them arrogantly. 
 
 (34/5.2.37) Because of his wilfulness and cruelty of character, there was not a 
day when the same Damophilus was not mistreating some of his slaves without just 
cause. The wife of this man, Metallis, who delighted no less in arrogant punishments, 
treated her maidservants, and the other slaves who fell in her way, cruelly. Because 
of the outrages and punishments from both of them, the slaves became brutal towards 
their masters, and believing that nothing worse than the present evils could come to 
them ... 
 
 (34/5.2.24b) The slaves agreed with one another about revolt and the murder 
of their masters. They came to Eunus, who was spending time not far away, and they 
asked if their decision was approved by the gods. He began working wonders in a 
frenzy, and when he heard why they had come he made clear that the gods gave them 
permission to revolt, so long as they did not delay but immediately undertook their 
enterprise: for it was fated that Enna, the citadel of the whole island, was fixed as 
their homeland. Since they had heard these words and believed that the divine power 
was assisting them in their plan, they were so disposed in their minds for revolt that 
they made no delay in what they had decided. Immediately, therefore, they set free 
those who had been bound and of the others they collected those that lived nearby, 
and assembled about four hundred in a certain area near Enna. After making a 
covenant among one another and taking oaths of trust by night over sacrifices, they 
armed themselves as opportunity allowed at that time: all of them took up the 
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strongest weapon of all, a desire for the destruction of their arrogant masters: and 
Eunus was their leader. While encouraging one another they burst into the city about 
midnight and were killing many. 
 
 (34/5.2.39) In Sicily there was a daughter of Damophilus, not yet married, but 
outstanding for her simple character and humanity. She had always been accustomed 
to generously soothe those flogged by her parents, and since she assisted those slaves 
who had been bound she was wondrously regarded with affection for her fairness by 
all. Therefore, since her previous kindness raised at this time a contribution of pity 
for her from those whom she had treated well, not only did no-one dare to lay violent 
hands her, but all maintained her flower untouched from all outrage. Selecting from 
them suitable persons, of whom Hermeias was most warmly attached to her, they led 
her to Catana to some relatives. 
 
 (34/5.2.40) Although the rebellious slaves had become savage against the 
whole household of their masters and turned to implacable violence and revenge, 
they showed a little that it was not because of the natural savagery, but because of the 
arrogance that had earlier been shown to them that they were raging, having turned to 
the punishment of those who had been first in wrong doing. 
 
 Even among slaves, nature is self-taught with regard to just restitution of both 
gratitude and vengeance. 
 
 (34/5.2.41) Eunus, after being proclaimed king, killed all of them, and 
dismissed only those who, in times past, in accordance with the indulgences of his 
master, had received him into their banquets and in both his prophecy and in their 
gifts from their table treated him kindly: here was an amazing thing, both a sudden 
change in fortune, and a good deed concerning a paltry thing taken in exchange for 
so great a favour, at a critical time. 
 
 (34/5.2.42) Achaeus, the counsellor of King Antiochus, not being well 
pleased with the accomplishments of the runaways both censured them for the things 
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undertaken by them, and very boldly proclaimed that they would meet with speedy 
retribution. Eunus was so far from putting him to death for his outspokenness that he 
not only presented him with the house of his masters, but even made him a 
counsellor. 
 
 (34/5.2.43) There was another revolt of runaways and a band worthy of 
mention. For a certain Kleon, a Cilician from a region about the Taurus, who was 
accustomed from childhood to a life of banditry and in Sicily became a herder of 
horses, constantly waylaid people and committed murders of every kind. When he 
learned of the progress of Eunus, and the successes of the runaways with him, he 
became a rebel and persuading some of the (household) slaves nearby to share in 
folly with him he overran the city of Acragas and all the surrounding countryside. 
 
 (34/5.2.44) Their pressing need and poverty compelled the rebel slaves to 
approve as fit everyone, and did not give them the choice of those better suited. 
 
 (34/5.2.45) The fact was that it needed no omens to realise that the city was 
easy to capture. For it was obvious even to the simple minded that since the walls 
had fallen into ruins because of the long standing peace, and many of her soldiers 
had been killed, the siege of the city would be easily effected. 
 
 (34/5.2.46) Eunus, having stationed his force beyond the range of the 
missiles, taunted the Romans, declaring that it was not his men, but they who were 
running away from danger. He displayed mimes from the revolt for those within the 
city, through which the slaves made a public show of the revolts from their 
individual masters, casting in their teeth the arrogance and excessive violence that 
had led to their ruin. 
 
 (34/5.2.47) As for extraordinary ill-fortune, even if there happen to be some 
who are persuaded that the divine has nothing to do with such retribution, yet surely 
it is expedient for the common life that fear of the gods is dissolved into the minds of 
the many. For there are few who act honestly because of their own goodness, but 
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most people are kept from doing wrong by legal punishments and retribution from 
the divine. 
 
 (34/5.2.48) When many great evils fell upon the Sicilians, the popular mob 
was not only unsympathetic to all these, but on the contrary rejoiced, since they 
begrudged their unequal fate and irregular way of life. For envy turned quickly from 
a prior pain into joy, when the mob saw that the glorious fate had changed into a 
form formerly overlooked by them. Most terrible of all, the rebels, exercising rational 
forethought concerning the future, neither set fire to farm houses nor damaged the 
stock in them and the harvest lying in store, and held off from those who had turned 
to farming. The populace, however, because of their envy, and behind the pretext of 
the runaways, went out into the countryside and not only plundered the estates, but 
even set fire to the farm houses. 
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Appendix 6: Merely a Slavish Copyist? 
Diodorus and the Problem of His Sources for the Sicilian 
Insurrection 
 
 
‘…it requires too great an act of faith to believe that the excerpts [of Diodorus] 
now extant preserve evidence of literary ingenuity…’ Bradley (1989), 136. 
 
 
 
 
The sentiment expressed by Bradley in the above quotation is all too indicative of the 
general regard in which Diodorus’ worth as a historian is held. In a recent 
commentary on Books 11-12 of Diodorus, Green (2006: 1) commented that the one 
fact that ‘… virtually all classicists think they know about [Diodorus is] that he is a 
mere slavish copyist only as good as his source’. His comments were made at the 
start of an argument set to rehabilitate Diodorus. In doing so, Green responded to 
Stylianou (1998), whose work rose from the tradition of Volquardsen (1868) that 
viewed Diodorus as a ‘historical compiler of low stature’ (Stylianou 1998: 139). 
Diodorus’ history, therefore, was seen as a work that was composed through (137) 
‘incompetence, lack of care, and ignorance’, with (15) ‘empty and inept rhetoric 
and…poverty of vocabulary’.379 Green is not alone in attempting to rehabilitate 
Diodorus (among other ‘secondary’ historians) as a writer and historical source, 
although with few exceptions most attempts do not extend into the problematic and 
fragmentary later books, in which the Slave War narratives are preserved.380 Perhaps 
the most nuanced approach taken to date has been that of Hau in her studies of the 
interactions between Diodorus and his sources with particular reference to a specific 
passage of Book 32 (2006) and the representation of changeability of fortune and 
moralising in relation to his sources (2009). She concluded that Diodorus was 
capable of adapting what he found to suit his own purposes, and composing material 
himself in his proems. 
 
                                                 
379 Stylianou (1998) is not alone in his views: see also, e.g., Soltau (1889), 368; Schwartz (1903), col. 
663; Schäfer (1930), 350-1, (quoting a letter from Willamowitz); Nock (1959), 5; Hornblower (1981), 
28. This list is not exhaustive. 
380 Sacks (1982); Rubincam (1998a); Rubincam (1998b); Bosworth (2003); Green (2006); Sulimani 
(2008). The exceptions to this list are Sacks (1990); Sacks (1994); Matsubara (1998). 
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 In spite of this recent renaissance of scholarship prepared to explore afresh 
Diodorus’ worth as both a source of information and a creative historian, scholarship 
on the Sicilian Insurrection has continued to focus on the lost text of Posidonius as 
the principal, indeed in some cases only source for Diodorus’ narrative.381 By so 
doing, it has effectively denied Diodorus the kind of creative abilities in his treatment 
of this episode which are now conceded him for his treatment of other historical 
happenings. In contrast, I will argue that in the only section of the Sicilian 
Insurrection narrative for which we have a comparable potential source, comparison 
can demonstrate that Diodorus could engage creatively and significantly with the 
historical tradition. My aim in doing this will not be to argue what source Diodorus 
may have been using, either Posidonius or otherwise, or to argue that he was 
composing history entirely of his own accord. Rather, I will argue against the notion 
that we can conclusively settle on understanding Posidonius’ compositional 
methodology as the best or only way of understanding the Diodoran text. My reason 
for challenging this assumption is that the over-zealous attribution of the narrative as 
entirely or even mostly Posidonian in structure and purpose lends itself, in most 
cases, to an opinion that the essential details of the narrative itself need not be 
questioned. This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that the challenges the text poses for 
the modern historian lie in the first instance in understanding how the various pieces 
fit together chronologically, or in what historical context they should fit.382 On the 
                                                 
381 The most extreme view is that held by Bradley (1989), 133-6, in which he states that Posidonius 
was the source for Diodorus, and that ‘if [Diodorus] followed his usual methodological procedures 
when using [Posidonius], [Diodorus’] account of the slave wars could be assumed to be reasonably 
accurate, reliable, and comprehensive.’ In a more recent account, Urbainczyk (2008a), 82-3, with due 
reference to the work of Sacks (1990), acknowledged that while the principal source was most likely 
Posidonius, elements of the narrative may well have been Diodoran in origin. The other source is 
usually ascribed to sections of the narrative that contain historical mistakes and anachronisms: e.g. see 
Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.3, 31. The following all believe Posidonius to be the principal, if not necessarily the 
sole, source: Forrest and Stinton (1962), 88; Vogt (1965), 21; Verbrugghe (1974), 48; Sacks (1990), 
142-54; Shaw (2001), 27; Ambaglio (2008), 27, 68; Bradley (2011a), 247. 
382 Forrest and Stinton (1962), 88, in response to Green (1961) who had not mentioned Posidonius in 
his paper but had considered Caecilius Rufus as a source, postulated Posidonius as the source for 
Diodorus, following Rathke (1904), who argued for a Posidonian origin on grounds of the 
‘sympathetic’ account of Diodorus, although they also suggest L. Calpurnius Piso’s annalistic history 
as another source, providing no evidence for the statement. Both Vogt (1965), 21, and Verbrugghe 
(1974, 48; 1975, 189-191) agree that Posidonius had to be the sole source. Bradley (1989), 134-6, 
took great comfort in the fact that Diodorus used Posidonius as a source. A more nuanced approach 
was taken by Sacks (1990), 142-54, Matsubara (1998), 144-7, and Urbainczyk (2008a), 82-6, 
regarding different elements of the narrative to be from Posidonius and Diodorus’ other source 
(unspecified normally, although postulated by Sacks (1990), 149-51 to be local sources in Sicily), but 
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occasions where, on the other hand, the details of the narrative are challenged, the 
supposition used to challenge them is either that the questionable aspects are 
Diodoran intrusions, implying the need for an unfavourable opinion of Diodorus’ 
compositional method,383 or that the narrative is based on incorrect assumptions from 
Posidonius about Sicilian history, made in order to fill gaps in his knowledge, which, 
in turn, denies any creative influence outside of Posidonius.384 In contrast, the 
following investigation will demonstrate that Diodorus’ engagement with the 
historical tradition could alter the narrative in ways profound enough to significantly 
change its focus not only in sections that were historically erroneous, but also in 
matters of rhetorical stress. It will be shown that Diodorus’ engagement with his 
material could be complex enough that without the original text for comparison it is 
impossible to extract the source from the text: once this is understood, it will be clear 
that trying to understand the surviving narrative through a (postulated) Diodoran 
source is flawed, and that the only way forward is to address the text in its own right.  
 
I. Posidonius’ Damophilus 
 
I shall expand my argument basing myself on the example of the Damophilus 
episode. The text below, a fragment of Posidonius quoted by Athenaeus, is the only 
piece of evidence that can be used to link Posidonius to the specific account of the 
Sicilian Insurrection in Diodorus.385 The passage describes, in similar terms to those 
of Diodorus, one event of the war, and reads as follows (12.59.21-9 = F59 Kidd): 
 
Ποσειδώνιος δ΄ ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ τῶν Ἱστοριῶν περὶ ∆αµοφίλου λέγων τοῦ Σικελιώτου͵ δι΄ ὃν ὁ 
δουλικὸς ἐκινήθη πόλεµος͵ ὅτι τρυφῆς ἦν οἰκεῖος͵ γράφει καὶ ταῦτα· τρυφῆς οὖν δοῦλος ἦν 
καὶ κακουργίας͵ διὰ µὲν τῆς χώρας τετρακύκλους ἀπήνας περιαγόµενος καὶ ἵππους καὶ 
θεράποντας ὡραίους καὶ παραδροµὴν ἀνάγωγον κολάκων τε καὶ παίδων στρατιωτικῶν. 
ὕστερον δὲ πανοικίᾳ ἐφυβρίστως κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν περιυβρισθείς. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
universally agreeing that the historical mistakes must come from Diodorus’ other sources, not 
Posidonius. 
383 Sacks (1990), 147-51; Matsubara (1998), 170-3. 
384 Verbrugghe (1972), 535-59; Verbrugghe (1975), 194-200. 
385 Jacoby (1927) took far greater liberties with the text of Diodorus as accurately reflecting 
Posidonius, and the work of Kidd and Edelstein (1972) corrected this imbalance with a due degree of 
caution. Most importantly for the Sicilian Insurrection, F108 in Jacoby, which contained the majority 
of the slave narrative in Diodorus, was not accepted in Kidd and Edelstein, leaving only F59 Kidd as a 
link between Diodorus and Posidonius for the Sicilian Insurrection. 
237 
 
 
Posidonius, in the eighth book of his Histories, says about Damophilus of Sicily, because of 
whom the slave war was set in motion, that he was addicted to luxury, and he writes this: 
“He was therefore a slave of luxury and wickedness, leading round the countryside with him 
four-wheeled wagons, horses, beautiful attendants, an ill-bred following of flatterers and 
even of boys dressed as soldiers. But later he, with his whole household, wantonly ended his 
life after having been grievously insulted by his slaves. 
 
This is comparable to a passage of Diodorus about Damophilus preserved in the 
Constantinian excerpts, except that the passage in Diodorus belongs to a longer piece 
of text (34/5.2.34-8). The text of Diodorus, where comparable, reads thus 
(34/5.2.34): 
 
ἐπὶ µὲν γὰρ τῆς χώρας ἵππους τε πολυτελεῖς καὶ τετρακύκλους ἀπήνας µετ΄ οἰκετῶν 
στρατιωτικῶν περιήγετο· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εὐπρεπῶν παίδων πλῆθος͵ ἔτι δὲ κολάκων 
ἀνάγωγον παραδροµὴν ἔχειν ἐφιλοτιµεῖτο. 
 
For he always had with him in the countryside four-wheeled wagons and lavish horses with a 
retinue of armed slaves: in addition to these he was eager to have many handsome slave boys 
and an ill-bred following of flatterers. 
 
These two passages have been relatively understudied in the past. For example, 
Malitz (1983), in a major monograph on Posidonius that reserved a whole section of 
the fourth chapter to Sklaven und Piraten, and that gave the text of the Athenaeus in 
full (150), summarily concluded from the existence of the Athenaeus only (37) ‘daß 
sich Diodor eng an den Wortlaut der Historien [des Poseidonios] gehalten hat’. A 
similar conclusion was reached by Theiler (1982), who stated ‘daß der erste 
sizilische Sklavenkrieg (135-132) von Diodor aus Poseidonios genommen ist.’ 
Perhaps so, but even a subtle change of wording could alter the drive and intention of 
a text, or cause problems for our interpretation of the text, including the one under 
discussion here, as we shall see in due course. The line advocated by Malitz was 
previously taken by Momigliano (1975: 33-4) who viewed the Posidonian fragment 
as a reason ‘to feel no qualms in taking Diodorus as a faithful epitomizer of what 
must have been a compact and careful section of Posidonius on the slave war in 
Sicily.’ Laffranque in 1964 also connected the two passages (119 n.43; 147-8) but 
did not draw any further conclusions. For Brunt (1980: 486) the two passages served 
as proof of Diodorus’ use of Posidonius, but despite citing the connection in a 
paragraph aiming to show that we cannot always be certain that fragments of 
historians from the ancient world necessarily represented their work, he did not take 
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the opportunity to test this hypothesis with an analysis of the passages in question 
here. Sacks (1990: 144-5) took a more nuanced approach, arguing that this fragment 
demonstrated that Diodorus followed Posidonius in attributing the start of the revolt 
to Damophilus, but made no effort to demonstrate the variance between the two 
texts. Certain differences between the two passages were noted by Urbainczyk 
(2008a: 85-6), but she did not pursue them beyond the observation that ‘the 
[Posidonian] extract is briefer than the account found in the epitome of Diodorus, 
which is unexpected if the latter took it from the former and elaborated on it.’ 
Finally, Ambaglio (2008: 27), in his only comment on the above passage of 
Posidonius, stated that ‘(l)a convergenza a proposito di un motivo molto particolare, 
il lusso del padrone Damofilo, rivela tra i due autori un accordo senza ombre…’; he 
had earlier on the page noted that Posidonius had been recognised as Diodorus’ 
source for books 33-37 ‘pur se mancano elementi inoppugnabili di prova’. Garnsey 
(1997: 163-5) did note that there are important aspects of Posidonius’ passage 
missing from the corresponding Diodorus, and stated that (163) ‘one fragment apart, 
it is something of an act of faith to claim that any particular passage [of Diodorus] is 
wholly or substantially Posidonian.’ In sum, with the exception of Garnsey, all the 
authors allow their interpretation to rest on the assumption that we can say something 
of the interrelationship between Diodorus and Posidonius; yet, no other author has 
attempted to compare the texts directly and in detail.386 So doing, however, will 
demonstrate that the evidence offered here cannot allow a firmer view of the 
interrelationship between Diodorus and Posidonius for the narrative of the Sicilian 
Insurrection. So let us start from the beginning. 
 
 We should first note the similarities. In places the vocabulary is strikingly 
similar: for example, both use the phrase τετρακύκλους ἀπήνας, and παραδροµήν 
ἀνάγωγον κολάκων, albeit with a different word order. Verbally there are 
similarities, as both passages use the verb περιάγοµαι or περιάγω in some form. In 
addition, in spite of the differing vocabulary used to describe them, θεράποντας 
ὡραίους in Posidonius and εὐπρεπῶν παίδων in Diodorus mean very similar things: 
both seem to refer to an entourage of handsome male followers. Furthermore both 
                                                 
386 Both Reinhardt (1926) and Schmidt (1980) ignore the passage completely. 
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passages are giving essentially the same description of Damophilus’ activities in 
Sicily. In this respect it seems likely that at the very least Posidonius and Diodorus 
shared a source, or perhaps that Diodorus used Posidonius for this section: this has 
been noted before.387 However, there are certain features that speak against putting 
too much emphasis on understanding Posidonius’ historical methods as the only way 
in which we can further our analysis of Diodorus’ later books, including his narrative 
on the so-called Slave War. These features, I argue, suggest that Diodorus had a 
creative input into this passage in some important ways. 
 
 First, the opening and closing lines of the Posidonian passage have no direct 
parallel in Diodorus. In particular the rhetorical sentiment that Damophilus τρυφῆς 
οὖν δοῦλος ἦν καὶ κακουργίας, ‘was therefore a slave of luxury and wickedness’ is 
completely unparalleled,388 unlike the statement about his death, which is mirrored, 
in a sense, by the overall narrative of Diodorus that gives a much lengthier 
description of Damophilus’ capture and demise among the slaves.389 This narrative is 
                                                 
387 Momigliano (1975), 33-4; Brunt (1980), 486; Sacks (1990), 142, 145; Garnsey (1997), 163; 
Matsubara (1998), 144-5; Urbainczyk (2008a), 85-6. 
388 Urbainczyk (2008a), 85-6, viewed this line as one of the reasons to believe that the passage is 
genuinely Posidonian, however Garnsey (1997), 164, noted that this line was missing from Diodorus. 
In this he reflected (1997), 165, that Diodorus’ narrative did not retain any aspects of Stoicism that 
one might have expected if it was merely a copy of Posidonius, but did contain humanitarian 
sentiments. Malitz (1983), 140 n.40, noted, on the other hand, that this kind of expression features 
twice elsewhere in Diodorus, once about Tiberius Gracchus (34/5.6.1 – προστάτην δὲ ἄρχοντα τὸν 
µήτε χάριτος µήτε φόβου δοῦλον) and a second time about Titus Vettius (36.2a – τῷ ἔρωτι δουλεύων) 
but not in the context of the Sicilian Insurrection. If these two expressions came from Posidonius, as 
Malitz believes, then it is even more significant that this expression is avoided by Diodorus when 
describing Damophilus, as he clearly was not averse to the description in other places. 
389 Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.13-4: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Εὔνουν πυθόµενοι τὸν ∆αµόφιλον ὅτι κατὰ τὸν πλησίον τῆς 
πόλεως περίκηπον διατρίβει µετὰ τῆς γυναικός͵ εἷλκον ἐκεῖθεν διά τινων ἐξ αὑτῶν σταλέντων αὐτόν 
τε καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα δεδεµένους ἐξαγκωνίσαντες͵ πολλὰς κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ὕβρεις ὑποσχόντας. µόνης δὲ 
τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτῶν οἱ δοῦλοι ὤφθησαν εἰς πάντα φεισάµενοι διὰ τὸ φιλάνθρωπον αὐτῆς ἦθος καὶ 
περὶ τοὺς δούλους συµπαθὲς καὶ βοηθητικὸν κατὰ δύναµιν. ἐξ ὧν ἐδείκνυτο τῶν δούλων οὐχὶ ὠµότης 
εἶναι φύσεως τὰ γινόµενα εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους͵ ἀλλὰ τῶν προϋπηργµένων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀδικηµάτων 
ἀνταπόδοσις. τὸν δὲ ∆αµόφιλον καὶ τὴν Μεγαλλίδα εἰς τὴν πόλιν οἱ ἀπεσταλµένοι ἑλκύσαντες͵ 
ὥσπερ ἔφηµεν͵ εἰς τὸ θέατρον εἰσήγαγον͵ συνεληλυθότος ἐνταῦθα τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀποστατῶν. καὶ 
τοῦ ∆αµοφίλου τεχνάσασθαί τι πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν ἐγχειρήσαντος καὶ πολλοὺς τοῦ πλήθους τοῖς 
λόγοις ἐπαγοµένου͵ Ἑρµείας καὶ Ζεῦξις πικρῶς πρὸς αὐτὸν διακείµενοι πλάνον τε ἀπεκάλουν͵ καὶ 
οὐκ ἀναµείναντες τὴν ἀκριβῆ τοῦ δήµου κρίσιν ὁ µὲν διὰ τῶν πλευρῶν τὸ ξίφος ὠθεῖ͵ ὁ δὲ πελέκει 
τὸν τράχηλον ἔκοψεν. ‘Those around Eunus, learning that Damophilus was wasting time with his wife 
in his garden near the city, dispatched some of them (to them) and dragged both the man and his wife 
from that place with their hands bound behind their backs, enduring many outrages along the road. 
For the daughter alone were the slaves seen to be considerate in all respects on account of her 
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preserved only by the Photian account of the war, and so could, potentially, have also 
been considerably longer than it now appears, if Photius had compressed the original, 
although it is unclear if this was the case; this is notwithstanding the possibility that 
Photius could have altered the structure and in places wording of the text. This 
passage is not paralleled in what we have of Posidonius. 
 
Second, the two passages differ in other small ways. There are very minor 
alterations: in the Posidonian passage the section describing Damophilus’ entourage 
round Sicily is a subordinate clause controlled by a participle of περιάγοµαι, which 
governs all the accusatives in the sentence; moreover the journey of Damophilus 
through the countryside is described with the preposition διά. In Diodorus, half of the 
segment is controlled by an indicative middle of the verb περιάγω, in which the 
journey through the country is described with ἐπί rather than διά. The other half of 
the extract, including the κολάκων ἀνάγωγον παραδροµήν from the Posidonian 
passage, is controlled by a new indicative verb φιλοτιµέοµαι, and so represents a 
more significant change in the structure from Posidonius and, it must be noted, a 
change in the characterisation of Damophilus:390 his striving for handsome slave 
boys and ill-bred flatterers.391 These alterations, however, are generally very slight, 
but focus ought to be given to this additional facet of Damophilus, because it affects 
how we read the subsequent narrative about Damophilus, and that understanding 
gives greater weight to this alteration. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
benevolent nature, both her sympathy to the slaves and readiness to help as far as she could.  As a 
result of this it was demonstrated that the things perpetrated on others were not from the natural 
savagery of slaves, but were retribution for past wrongs to them. The men who had been dispatched 
dragged Damophilus and Megallis into the city, as we were saying, and led them into the theatre, 
where the multitude of rebels had assembled. But when Damophilus attempted to contrive something 
to save himself, and was bringing many of the multitude to his side with his words, Hermeias and 
Zeuxis, bitterly disposed towards him, stigmatised him as deceiving and did not wait for the formal 
judgement of the assembly, but one thrust a sword through his side, the other cut his neck with an 
axe.’ 
390 The verb φιλοτιµέοµαι is not in and of itself pejorative in Diodorus. Typically it means ‘to make a 
special effort for’ or ‘to put all one’s effort in something’ (e.g. 1.63.1; 2.25.8; 3.18.4; 36.3; 15.44.2). 
However, context is of vital importance. In the context above, it is things for which Damophilus 
strove that provides the negative context, and by this stroke the verb has a sense of the pejorative to it. 
391 There are also some minor changes to the vocabulary, including the change of θεράποντας ὡραίους 
in Posidonius to εὐπρεπῶν παίδων in Diodorus, which also include the addition of an adjective to 
describe the horses: πολυτελής. 
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II. The Structure of Damophilus’ Death 
 
As we saw above, Posidonius’ passage ends with a very brief notice of Damophilus’ 
death. The Diodoran passage, on the other hand, continues with a series of extra 
details about Damophilus that further our understanding of his character. Having 
learnt that he was eager for his followers and handsome slaves, we are informed of 
another series of character vices that he held, far beyond the portrait in Posidonius 
(Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.35): 
 
κατὰ δὲ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰς ἐπαύλεις ἀργυρωµάτων ἐκθέσεις τορευτῶν καὶ στρωµάτων 
θαλαττίων πολυτελείας ἐκπονούµενος παρετίθετο τραπέζας ὑπερηφάνους καὶ βασιλικὰς ταῖς 
δαψιλείαις͵ ὑπεραίρων τὴν Περσικὴν τρυφὴν ταῖς δαπάναις καὶ πολυτελείαις· ὑπερέβαλε δὲ 
καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν. ἀνάγωγος γὰρ καὶ ἀπαίδευτος τρόπος ἐξουσίας ἀνυπευθύνου καὶ 
τύχης µεγαλοπλούτου κυριεύσας τὸ µὲν πρῶτον κόρον ἐγέννησεν͵ εἶθ΄ ὕβριν͵ τὸ δὲ 
τελευταῖον ὄλεθρόν τε αὐτῷ καὶ συµφορὰς µεγάλας τῇ πατρίδι. 
 
In the city and in his country houses he worked hard to produce extravagant exhibitions of 
silver plate worked in relief and coverings dyed with purple and served sumptuous and royal 
dinners in abundance; he exceeded Persian luxury in expense and extravagance: he surpassed 
them even in arrogance. For his ill-bred and uneducated nature, having gained possession of 
unaccountable power and an excessive fortune, first produced satiety, then wantonness, and 
finally ruin for himself and great misfortunes for his country. 
 
He is, in addition to being eager for handsome slave boys and ill-bred flatterers, also 
extravagant, arrogant, ill-bred, uneducated and wanton. Comparisons are added 
between him and the Persians, with his role as the superlative over even them. When 
finally this hyperbolic passage ends, it does indeed end with a foreshadowing of his 
demise, but with no mention of his family, only his country. The exemplumif it 
shared a common historical source with Posidonius, has been adapted, with a simple 
addition of a new verb, to be part of a wider invective against the character of 
Damophilus that connects him with a greater range of vices and failures, and the 
wider point of Diodorus’ narrative. On this evidence, if Diodorus was using 
Posidonius here for the extended passage, he was adapting what he found there at 
least to some extent, either adding significant context to the character of Damophilus 
and fleshing his character out to a greater degree or reworking the structure of 
Posidonius’ presentation. We can now see that the difference in the length of the two 
passages noted by Urbainczyk (2008a: 85-6) is of fundamental importance: we can 
no longer accept, as Momigliano had, that Diodorus is a ‘faithful epitomizer’, as it is 
242 
 
 
clear that he was able (and willing) to alter his text to suit his own purposes, if indeed 
his source was Posidonius. In other words, it does not follow that because he utilised 
the vocabulary he may have found in Posidonius – Malitz’ contention (1983: 37) that 
he stuck to the ‘Wortlaut der Historien [des Posidonios]’ – he necessarily had to hold 
to the essential meaning of what was said. Moreover, the passage of Diodorus is set 
into a narrative that gives great detail about the character and actions of Damophilus. 
As we will see below, it is unlikely that the Posidonian passage given here was 
presented in the same context as that of the Diodoran passage: wherever this 
information in Diodorus is coming from it is not from a logical extension of the 
structure of Posidonius that we have. 
 
When introducing the passage of Posidonius, Athenaeus does not provide 
much, if any context for it.392 It is given in a list of examples of excessive luxury, and 
gives no indication of why Posidonius mentioned the episode, or in what context he 
did so. He does provide the information that it is about Damophilus (12.59.22-3), δι΄ 
ὃν ὁ δουλικὸς ἐκινήθη πόλεµος, ‘because of whom the slave war was set in motion’, 
but it is unclear if this comes from Posidonius, or Athenaeus’ own memory. 
Presumably there was some context for the remark in Posidonius, but this provides 
no guarantees. There is a reasonable likelihood for this passage to have been a part of 
a preface in Posidonius to a narrative of the so-called First Sicilian Slave War,393 but 
even if this is the case, some important, indeed crucial points remain. It is uncertain 
how long the passage was before Athenaeus’ excerpt, but the structure within the 
passage is built on a µέν...δέ clause. For Posidonius, the µέν clause includes the 
entire description of Damophilus’ entourage, which is then contrasted in the δέ 
clause with his, and his family’s demise at the hands of their slaves for their actions: 
the link between the two is implied by the clause. Interestingly, Diodorus’ passage is 
not built on a µέν...δέ clause.  In Diodorus, the µέν is followed by a succession of δέ 
                                                 
392 Pelling (2000), 186-8, commented that Athenaeus’ methodology when quoting authors in his work 
was not necessarily concerned with accuracy, but chiefly with achieving a variety of aims within the 
text. To this end, Pelling, 189, argued that Athenaeus would happily alter the wording slightly of texts 
in order to play upon his speakers’ own faulty memories, or to test his readers, and that therefore we 
cannot assume that Athenaeus was a (187) ‘plodding transcriber’. For the purposes here, this means 
that we cannot be absolutely certain that Athenaeus is representing the words of Posidonius faithfully, 
but unfortunately without the original text of Posidonius (which of course I argue Diodorus cannot be 
taken to represent) we cannot ascertain the accuracy of Athenaeus’ use of Posidonius. 
393 My thanks to John Marincola for pointing this possibility out to me. 
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clauses, that each demonstrates different features of Damophilus’ character with 
reference to an earlier statement that concerned his imitation of the Italians in Sicily 
(34/5.2.34). Therefore, Diodorus’ version notes, through the structure adopted, that 
Damophilus had an entourage while he travelled about Sicily, he was eager to have 
handsome slave boys and ill-bred flatterers for followers, and that his efforts toward 
luxury meant that he surpassed the Persians themselves in arrogance. This difference 
in structure is important. The Posidonius passage is a self-contained exemplum about 
Damophilus, detailing briefly his lifestyle and personal vices, and linking them 
directly with his demise: it perhaps prefaced a longer narrative.394 For Diodorus, on 
the other hand, it is merely a stylised method of developing Damophilus’ character 
toward becoming the paradigm of bad slave treatment it fulfils in the narrative.395 
Regardless of the function of the passage in Posidonius, however, it remains that if 
Diodorus did take the passage from Posidonius he has, at the very least, slightly 
redrafted it, altered its structure, and placed it into the middle of his narrative. And 
even if Posidonius also placed the passage into the middle of his narrative, Diodorus 
has nonetheless altered its purpose: the internal structure of the passage serves now 
to develop important facets of Damophilus’ failings, and, in turn, the immediate 
reference to his death is removed. I suggest from the comparison of the two passages 
that even if Posidonius was a major source for the rest of Diodorus’ narrative of the 
Sicilian Insurrection, we can have no guarantees that Diodorus did not adapt what he 
found to suit his own rhetorical purpose throughout his narrative. Nor could we 
distinguish between any postulated Diodoran and Posidonian emphasis in the text 
where we have only Diodorus’ text surviving, as changes to emphasis can noticeably 
alter the drive of a passage, such as the one above, in which it is possible that 
Diodorus has indeed preserved most of the vocabulary of his potential source. 
Finally, we cannot rely on Diodorus preserving the overall structure of any potential 
author on which he was basing his narrative: although we cannot define for certain 
                                                 
394 I personally see little reason to doubt this, but as this longer narrative does not exist it is not useful 
to speculate on its nature. 
395 Chaplin (2000), 71-2, noted that exempla were rhetorical devices in a narrative, and therefore were 
malleable, dependent upon the purpose they served in the narrative. In this context, we can see that 
Diodorus was utilising this malleability of exempla in order to fit a new purpose: indeed this suggests 
even more so that we cannot assume that Diodorus, if he used Posidonius for this passage, represents 
Posidonius faithfully if his use of Posidonius was subject to alteration to suit a new purpose. 
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how Posidonius was utilising the Damophilus exemplum, it does not appear to be 
integrated into the centre of a narrative as Diodorus has done. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
To sum up. I think that we ought to adopt a more subtle approach to Diodorus’ 
working method. For while it is likely, although by no means certain, that Diodorus 
used Posidonius for his description of at least some of the vices of Damophilus, this 
does not preclude his use of other sources.396 Can we rule that Diodorus’ own 
revision of his sources did not inevitably alter them in fundamental ways in any 
case? Bosworth (2003: 194) argued that secondary historians did not invent facts 
themselves to embellish their works, but provided the interpretation and framework 
in which the details they pulled from their sources were interpreted in order to create 
a new picture. He writes (2003: 194): ‘(s)election was part of the creative process. 
When faced with a multiplicity of sources, a historian would opt for the treatment 
most conducive to exemplary moralizing, and the same episode could be shaped to 
convey very different messages.’ We cannot be sure of the ultimate source or sources 
for Diodorus’ factual information regarding the Sicilian Insurrection, even if 
Posidonius was perhaps one of them; and we cannot be certain of where one source 
stops and another starts in the narrative, including where Diodorus himself started 
and stopped altering. In the case of the Damophilus episode, the differences evident 
in the narrative threads of the two surviving texts – i.e. in Posidonius and in Diodorus 
– show a distinct difference in historical use: where we do not have the two texts to 
compare, we cannot be certain of the extent of this interplay. And this plays both 
ways: we also cannot be certain of where the shaping and structure of the narrative 
reflects Diodorus’ vision, and where it is merely taken from his source. Therefore the 
most fruitful way ahead is not to focus above all else on Diodorus’ source for the 
information concerning the different events for which he provides the only surviving 
text, but to try to understand how the text as we have it displays the information and 
what kind of stories it tells. 
                                                 
396 Several sources have been postulated, including local Sicilian sources, Caecilius Rufus and the 
annals of L. Calpurnius Piso. See also no. 382 above. 
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Appendix 7: King Antiochus' Title in Diodorus 
 
 
Ὅτι ὁ τῶν ἀποστατῶν βασιλεὺς Εὔνους ἑαυτὸν µὲν Ἀντίοχον͵ Σύρους δὲ τῶν 
ἀποστατῶν τὸ πλῆθος ἐπωνόµασεν. (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.24) 
 
Eunus, the king of the rebels, named himself Antiochus, and the multitude of rebels Syrians. 
 
Ὅτι Ἀχαιὸς ὁ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιόχου σύµβουλος τοῖς πραττοµένοις ὑπὸ τῶν 
δραπετῶν οὐκ εὐαρεστούµενος ἐπετίµα τε τοῖς τολµωµένοις ὑπ΄ αὐτῶν καὶ µάλα 
θρασέως προέλεγεν ὅτι συντόµου τεύξονται τιµωρίας. ὃν ὁ Εὔνους 
παρρησιαζόµενον τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχε τοῦ θανάτῳ περιβαλεῖν ὥστε οὐ µόνον 
ἐδωρήσατο τὴν τῶν δεσποτῶν οἰκίαν͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ σύµβουλον ἐποιήσατο. (Diod. Sic. 
34/5.2.42) 
 
Achaeus, the counsellor of King Antiochus, not being well pleased with the accomplishments 
of the runaways both censured them for the things undertaken by them, and very boldly 
proclaimed that they would meet with speedy retribution. Eunus was so far from putting him 
to death for his outspokenness that he not only presented him with the house of his masters, 
but even made him a counsellor. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Eunus’ title once king, Antiochus, is mentioned only twice in the literary source 
tradition, and both times in Diodorus: the epitome of Photius and the excerpts of 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus both mention the title once respectively, but it is 
unlikely that these mentions are from a verbatim transmission of Diodorus. 
Acknowledging this peculiarity in the communication of Diodorus’ text does, 
however, cause problems for the attribution of the coinage of King Antiochus to 
Eunus and the Sicilian Insurrection, if the only connections in the literary tradition 
come in the Byzantine period. For this reason, a careful analysis of the two passages 
is important in order to assess if this problem is insurmountable or not. 
 
I. The Passages 
I.i. The First Passage 
 
At the end of his preservation of Diodorus’ 34th book, Photius adds a single line to 
conclude the whole episode: he adds that Eunus ἑαυτὸν µὲν Ἀντίοχον͵ Σύρους δὲ 
τῶν ἀποστατῶν τὸ πλῆθος ἐπωνόµασεν, ‘named himself Antiochus, and the multitude 
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of rebels Syrians’.397 In the run of the narrative this line is unconnected to anything 
that had come before, and indeed comes after Eunus himself had died. The placement 
of the line, its disconnection from the rest of the narrative, and the presence of ὅτι to 
introduce the line would seem to suggest that this is a gloss added by Photius in order 
to provide additional information that he thought would be helpful for the preceding 
narrative. This hypothesis may be corroborated by the fact that this use of ὅτι was 
only the second time that Photius used the introductory expression in his whole 
retention of Diodorus’ narrative. For the moment I do not want to comment on 
whether this information came from outside of Diodorus or not, but I think it is clear 
that Photius was not copying directly from the run of Diodorus’ narrative. 
 
I.ii. The Second Passage 
 
The second passage is rather clearer than the first. In a brief passage, mirrored in a 
very short notice in the Photian version (34/5.2.16), the Constantinian excerpt 
records the unexpected raising of a man named Achaeus to the rank of counsellor 
after he criticised the rebels for their excesses. The oddity lies in the fact, noted by 
Walton (1967: 87) in the Loeb edition, that the excerptor records Achaeus’ position 
as ὁ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιόχου σύµβουλος, ‘the counsellor of King Antiochus’ at the 
start of the narrative passage in which he gains the title. It would seem clear that, as 
the whole purpose of the passage relies on the fact that Achaeus’ fate is unexpected, 
this inclusion of his future title at the start of the passage is an addition by the 
excerptor. What is unusual is that he uses the title of King Antiochus when referring 
to Achaeus at this point, when the passage itself refers to King Antiochus as Eunus. 
It would appear on first sight that both references to King Antiochus belong to the 
work of the excerptors, and do not belong to Diodorus’ text. But there are other 
issues to be considered. 
 
II. King Antiochus’ Title 
 
                                                 
397 The reference to the naming of the other slaves as Syrians has been dealt with elsewhere: see 
Chapter I.1, no. 73. 
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First, these two additions suggest that in the Byzantine period there was an accepted 
version in which Eunus took the title of King Antiochus on becoming king. The 
source of this information, however, is not clear. No other source for the conflict 
records his name as anything other than Eunus. This alone is not evidence enough to 
link King Antiochus with Eunus. We must look again at the coinage to assess their 
provenance. For this assessment, owing to the fact that the coinage of King 
Antiochus is almost entirely held in private collections in Sicily (either the collection 
of Cammarata or Bruno; see Manganaro 2000: Plates 85-8), I am reliant in some 
cases on the opinions of Manganaro and Robinson for the likely provenance. 
 
 Robinson noted as early as 1920 (175) that the coin held in the British 
Museum (Figure KA4a), which was once attributed by Professor Percy Gardner to 
the uncertain section of the Syrian series in the British Museum, and was acquired in 
1868 along with one hundred and eighty other Sicilian coins, was most likely Sicilian 
for reasons of ‘…style…the epigraphy with its round sigma, and the fabric, which 
lacks the characteristic bevelled edge of Syria’. He furthered this suggestion by 
noting that as the coin was bought in a collection that was entirely from Lipari or 
Sicily, it was ‘…humanly speaking, certain that this coin also was found in the 
Western Mediterranean’. His views were built upon by Manganaro (1982: 237), who 
argued that the coin (Figure KA2f) ‘…non può essere identificato con alcuno degli 
omonimi dinasti di Siria, la monetazione bronzea dei quali si rivela diversa per 
merallo, tecnica, tipologia e sopratutto per i caratteri epigrafici della leggenda, 
ignorando l’uso delle lettere lunate.’ The majority of the coins are held in the 
collection of Cammarata (Figures KA2a-g; KA3a; KA4c), which Manganaro 
claimed was formed and composed from (239) ‘l’area locale’, and the two from the 
collection of Bruno (Figures KA2h-i), put together by Bruno’s uncle, are part of a 
collection that Manganaro described (1990a: 418) as ‘…una vecchia collezione 
formata dallo zio Restivo Navarra a Enna’. We might reasonably claim that the 
majority of the coinage of King Antiochus (fourteen out of fifteen specimens: 
93.33%) was found in Sicily:398 while few of these provenances are firmly 
                                                 
398 The remaining example of the coin type here given as Figure KA4 which I have not discussed yet, 
KA4b, is in the collection of the Museum of Syracuse, and came, according to De Agostino (1939), 
85, ‘dalle Collezione del farmacista Vetri di Enna’. 
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accountable, the overwhelming trend is toward a Sicilian find spot for nearly all the 
examples. 
 
To these logistical considerations we must add the conclusions drawn in 
Chapter I about the significance of the imagery of the coinage. There I argued that 
the imagery connected strongly to a cultural and historical context of eastern Sicily, 
and was most explicable in that context. Robinson (1920: 175) saw that the imagery 
of the coin here given as Figure KA4a was ‘essentially Sicilian in character’, and that 
its types were ‘most uncommon in the Seleucid series’. With due deliberation given 
to their most likely find sites (and we ought to note that at least three of the 
specimens were found in and around Enna itself: Figures KA2h-i and KA4b), and 
their strongly focussed imagery, it would certainly seem very likely that the authority 
under which the various coins were produced, a King Antiochus, was based in Sicily. 
Furthermore, Bussi (1998: 24-5) noted that this coinage of King Antiochus was 
produced on the same weight system as that used across the island in the second 
century B.C., which was matched to that of Rome. This, I suggest, shows that the 
coinage was not only likely to have originated in Sicily, but also dated after or during 
the influx of Roman coinage into Sicily; this, as I have shown in Chapter I, took 
place in the second century B.C. 
 
III. Coins and Texts 
 
We are left, then, with the following position: in Sicily, after the Roman 
reorganisation of the island subsequent to the siege of Syracuse, a man called King 
Antiochus produced a bronze coinage that was stylistically and ideologically tied to 
eastern Sicily. The mere presence of a Hellenistic monarch in Sicily in this period 
would force us to question his relationship with Rome, considering the typical fate of 
Hellenistic monarchs who attempted to set up kingdoms in areas reorganised by 
Rome.399 With full acknowledgement of the potential circularity of the argument, the 
only man in ancient Sicilian history who we know became king, and yet of whose 
                                                 
399 The most pertinent example here would be Andriscus’ short-lived kingship in Macedonia; see 
Poly. 36.10; Diod. Sic. 31.40a, 32.15; Zonar. 9.28; Liv. Per. 48-50. 
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title as king we are not aware, is Eunus:400 it follows that if we were to connect King 
Antiochus with anyone in Sicily at this time, it would have to be Eunus.401 The issue 
of why the title King Antiochus does not appear in the literary sources, while still an 
important question, is not, I think, one we can conclusively answer. 
 
The answer could well rest, for example, on issues of the biases of either 
Diodorus or Posidonius: Sacks (1990: 151-3) argued for a strong bias in favour of 
Rome in Posidonius, which could then explain why the title of a man who 
represented a movement against Rome was repressed. Taken further, this could also 
explain, if Posidonius was Livy’s source for the Sicilian Insurrection, why the title is 
not present in Livy, or his derivatives. It is equally possible that Diodorus did in fact 
mention the title, but in a passage that has now either been compressed, or ignored by 
the excerptors. For example Photius provides us with the following passage, which 
could have been compressed to miss out the detail of a regal title at any point in the 
passage (Diod. Sic. 34/5.2.16): 
 
περιθέµενος δὲ διάδηµα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν βασιλικῶς διακοσµήσας 
τήν τε συµβιοῦσαν αὐτῷ͵ Σύραν καὶ συµπολῖτιν οὖσαν͵ βασίλισσαν ἀποδείξας 
συνέδρους τε τοὺς συνέσει δοκοῦντας διαφέρειν ποιησάµενος͵ ὧν ἦν Ἀχαιὸς καὶ 
τοὔνοµα καὶ τὸ γένος͵ ἀνὴρ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ χειρὶ διαφέρων 
 
After putting on a diadem and arraying his surroundings in a kingly manner, and having 
proclaimed his wife, who was Syrian and from the same city, Queen, he appointed a council 
of men who seemed to excel in intelligence, among whom was Achaeus, Achaeus (both in 
name and birth) a man who excelled in both planning and deeds. 
 
In any case, as I have stated already, it would seem, from the inclusion of the title by 
the Byzantine excerptors that in that period there was a version in which Eunus took 
the title King Antiochus on assuming the kingship. There is also considerable 
evidence to place King Antiochus in Sicily during the second century B.C. owing to 
his coinage, and if we accept this then we are left with few episodes of Sicilian 
history to which we can attach him. The only event that was both chronologically 
                                                 
400 If we accept the arguments above that the use of the title King Antiochus come from the 
excerptors, and not Diodorus. 
401 Regardless of whether this connection is still valid, it would remain nonetheless the case that in 
Sicily, during the second century B.C., a Greek king arose, and appeared to be making an effort to 
unite the people of Sicily under his cause. 
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and geographically similar to the apparent area of King Antiochus’ influence was the 
Sicilian Insurrection, which centred on Enna under the command of Eunus. 
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Appendix 8: The Elogium of Polla 
 
 … 
 viam fecei ab Regio ad Capum et 
 in ea via ponteis omneis, miliarios 
 tabelariosque poseivei. Hince sunt 
 Nouceriam meilia LI, Capuam XXCIIII 
 Muranum LXXIIII, Cosentiam CXXIII 
Valentiam CLXXX…, ad Fretum ad 
 Statuam CCXXXI…, Regium CCXXXVII. 
 Suma af Capua Regium neilia CCCXXI… 
 Et eidem praetor in 
 Sicilia fugiteivos Italicorum 
 conquaeisivei redideique 
 homines DCCCCXVII. Eidemque 
 primus fecei ut de agro poplico 
 aratoribus cederent paastores. 
 Forum aedisque poplicas heic fecei. 
 
…I built the road from Rhegium to Capua and on that road I put all the 
bridges, milestones, and signposts. From here it is 51 miles to Nuceria, 84 to 
Capua, 74 to Muranum, 123 to Cosentia, 180 to Valentia, 231 to the statue at 
the Straits, and 237 to Rhegium; total from Capua to Rhegium 321 miles. I 
also as praetor in Sicily hunted down and returned 917 runaway slaves to 
Italici. Further, I was the first one to make shepherds withdraw from public 
land in favour of ploughmen. I built the forum and public buildings here.402 
  
The elogium from Polla in Vallo di Diano in Lucania has been known since the 
fifteenth century, and is currently part of a monument on the road to Polla, from 
which it derives its name (Carlsen 2010: 304). The text records the actions of a man, 
presumably consul when erecting the inscription – although the line recording this, 
and his name, is lost. He constructed a road from Capua to Rhegium, captured and 
returned 917 runaway slaves to their Italici owners, effected some form of land 
reform, and finally built a forum and other public buildings on the site where the 
inscription was originally erected. 
 
 Owing to the missing first line, it is entirely unclear who was responsible for 
this monument. Briefly, the two favoured candidates are P. Popillius Laenas (cos. 
                                                 
402 CIL X 6950 = ILS 23 = ILLRP 454. The translation is taken from Carlsen (2010), 304. 
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132 B.C.) and T. Annius Rufus (cos. 128 B.C.),403 although Ap. Claudius Pulcher 
(cos. 143 B.C.) has also been suggested in the past.404 Brennan (2000: 153) has noted 
that it is likely that if the identification with T. Annius Rufus is correct, then he 
would have been praetor in Sicily in 131 B.C., since it is unlikely that he would have 
neglected to mention his achievements in fighting in that conflict had he actually 
done so. Moreover, this would make T. Annius Rufus the annual successor of P. 
Rupilius. T. Annius Rufus could then have been pro. pr. in 130 and perhaps also 129 
B.C. while he carried out the road construction noted in the elogium. If on the other 
hand the author of the inscription is Ap. Claudius Pulcher, then the runaway slaves 
and their Italici owners are not relevant to the Sicilian Insurrection. However, if the 
author was P. Popillius Laenas, or more likely T. Annius Rufus, then we need to 
address what effect this evidence has on the argument put forward in Chapter I 
regarding the Sicilian Insurrection. 
 
 The inscription has been adduced as evidence against the argument that the 
Sicilian Insurrection has more to do with Sicilian revolt than slavery. In the CAH2 
IX, Lintott argued that (27) 
 
…we have the unimpeachable evidence of a contemporary inscription, in which the 
magistrate operating in Italy and Sicily at the end of the first revolt claims to have 
rounded up and returned to their masters 917 runaway slaves of Italian owners. The 
success of the slaves in Sicily would have been a magnet for those working with 
herds or on the land in south Italy. 
 
                                                 
403 For an overview of the various identifications see Brennan (2000), 152-3. Mommsen (CIL V 935) 
argued for P. Popillius Laenas, and placed him as praetor in Sicily in 135 B.C. and was followed in 
this, initially, by Broughton (MRR I), 489. However, later Broughton (MRR III), 169, corrected 
himself and favoured the identification with T. Annius Rufus. This was first argued by Wiseman 
(1987), 99-125, from a milestone found at Vibo Valentia inscribed with ‘T. Annius T.f. pr.’ (ILLRP 
454a). This led Wiseman (1987), 123-5, to argue that Annius helped to pacify Sicily after the end of 
Sicilian Insurrection and then, Wiseman argued, as part of his Sicilian provincia, built the road in 
southern Italy and rounded up the runaway slaves.  
404 Verbrugghe (1973), followed by Gordon (1983), 88. Verbrugghe’s argument hinged on the Sicilian 
Insurrection starting as early as 138 B.C. – which is not correct – and that it was highly unlikely, in his 
opinion, that runaway slaves captured during or just after the revolt would have escaped crucifixion 
(32): ‘(i)t is very difficult to believe that they did not participate in the rebellion if they were captured 
in 131. And if they did participate, they surely then would have been crucified.’ This is not a very 
persuasive analysis, even if the events in question had been, uncomplicatedly, a slave revolt. 
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A similar judgement can be found in Brennan’s otherwise excellent analysis of the 
elogium. He argued that it was logical for the Sicilian praetor’s provincia to extend 
into southern Italy, since (2000: 152) 
 
Lucania and Bruttium…served as a likely place of refuge for the rebel slaves, once 
defeated. This is where the praetor T. Annius must have rounded up most of his 
nine-hundred-odd fugitives – and there their owners, the “Italici,” lived. 
 
However, there is no reason to think, a priori, that the presence of slaves turns any 
event into a slave revolt (see Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient Warfare). Moreover, 
whilst some of those defeated in the Sicilian Insurrection may have fled across to 
Italy, it is equally likely that these 917 runaways had, rather than taken part in the 
Insurrection, merely taken the opportunity it presented to escape their servitude in the 
disorder. It is not, on this interpretation, that important who the Italici actually were, 
either Italians resident in Sicily, or Italians resident in Italy: refuge in flight was not 
uncommon in times of uncertainty and war, and we assume too much if we argue 
that these 917 runaways must have been part of the Sicilian Insurrection. We could 
therefore take the elogium cautiously as evidence that, regardless of the precise date, 
mid second century B.C., Sicily faced enough troubles and strife for slaves to 
abscond themselves from their masters (which, for all we know, may have been a 
typical feature of slavery in Roman times). Moreover, the elogium is evidence for the 
pressing need of a road through Lucania and Bruttium which would improve 
communications with Sicily405 and aid – incidentally as it were – in the suppression 
of the troubles that enabled slaves to abscond in such numbers. 
                                                 
405 Wiseman (1987), 124, first suggested this interpretation of the elogium. 
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Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient Warfare 
 
Introduction 
 
The practice of freeing slaves to fight during times of war had a long history in the 
ancient world, and indeed extended into the modern world (see, for example, the 
papers collected in Brown and Morgan 2006). The purpose of this appendix is to 
illustrate this practice. I have divided the lists below, somewhat artificially, into 
examples for this practice from the Greek and Roman worlds. These lists are by no 
means exhaustive, but provide a good survey of some of the more important 
examples. It is clear from the examples listed below that the freeing of slaves to fight 
in ancient conflicts was a regular occurrence, and that the presence of slaves and ex-
slaves fighting in a conflict on either side does not constitute evidence for the 
identification of a war or rebellion as a ‘slave war’ or ‘slave rebellion’. 
 
I. The Greek World 
 
The earliest examples come from the Persian Wars: at the battle of Marathon, 
Pausanias records the grave of the slaves who fought for the Athenians (1.32.5); at 
Thermoplyae, helots fought alongside the Spartans in the battle (Herod. 8.25.2) as 
well as at Plataea (Herod. 9.10.1, 28.2, 29.1); Hunt (1998: 40) has argued that slaves 
must have rowed in the fleets at the battle of Salamis as certain references in the 
ancient texts refer to crews on the ships being only partly free, and moving into the 
Peloponnesian War there is evidence from Thucydides that slaves were regularly 
used in non-Athenian navies (Thuc. 1.55.1; 2.103.1; 8.15.2, 84.2). Staying with the 
Peloponnesian War: Brasidas fought alongside 700 Helots (Thuc. 4.80.5, 78.1); 
elsewhere Thucydides records 2000 helots serving in the Spartan army (4.80.3); at 
the siege of Syracuse a relief force was sent under Gylippus that also included 600 
Helots (Thuc. 7.19.3, 58.3); finally, Athens is well recorded as freeing slaves in order 
to man its fleet before the battle of Aegospotami (Xen. Hell. 1.6.24; Ar. Ran. 693-4 
with schol. 694; IG i³ 1032). In other conflicts there are further examples of the 
practice of freeing slaves to fight: Dionysius I manned 60 ships with freed slaves 
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(Diod. Sic. 14.58.1); in 305/4 the Rhodians bought and freed slaves to fight during a 
siege (Diod. Sic. 20.84.3); the Achaeans also freed 12,000 slaves in order to resist 
Rome (Poly. 38.15.3; Paus. 7.15.7). 
 
II. The Roman World 
 
In the Roman world there are a large number of examples from the late republican 
period: Catiline was accused of inciting slaves to join him during his uprising (Cic. 
Cat. 42.1-2; 46.3); Caesar accused Pompey of using slave herdsmen as cavalry 
during the civil war (Caes. B Civ. 1.24). Moving beyond mere accusations of inciting 
slaves: the Pompeian leaders in the civil war drafted slaves into the new legions 
raised in 47 B.C. (App. B Afr. 19.3, 20.4, 35.4 and 6, 36.1, 88.1); Cn. Pompeius also 
formed a legion from natives and slaves while in Spain (App. B Hisp. 7.4, 35.4); 
Cicero claimed that Anthony drew soldiers from the ergastula after Mutina (Fam. 
11.10.3); Sex. Pompeius and Octavian freed slaves to fight for them or to man their 
fleets (Sex. Pompeius’ fleets: App. B Civ. 5.131; Dio 48.19.4; 49.12.4; Oros. 6.18; 
RG 25.1; Sex. Pompeius’ legions: App. B Civ. 4.85; Vel. Pat. 2.73; Dio 49.12.4; 
Augustus’ fleets: Dio 48.49.1; Suet. DA 16.1.). In earlier history C. Graccus and F. 
Flaccus tried to free slaves to defend themselves against the senate in Rome (App. B 
Civ. 1.26) and after the battle of Cannae the Romans formed two legions from slaves 
who had just been manumitted (Liv. 22.57). Towards the end of the Social War, Q. 
Pompaedius Silo freed and armed 20,000 slaves for infantry, and 1000 for cavalry 
(Diod. Sic. 37.2.9). According to Florus (2.9.11), Marius freed and armed slaves and 
convicts on returning to Italy in 87 B.C. In the imperial period we have one reference 
in Tacitus to Otho having freed gladiators to fight for him (Hist. 2.11). This passage 
is particularly interesting because Tacitus also recorded that this was a means 
resorted to by even strict generals in civil war, indicating that it was a typical practice 
otherwise. 
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Appendix 10: The Definition of a Slave War 
 
Introduction 
 
What is a ‘slave war?406 Among the modern works on ancient slavery, and especially 
among those that discuss ‘slave wars’ exclusively, this question has been answered 
often, but always without any conscious acknowledgement of the question. The 
answer to the question, in each modern work, lies in the choices made by the author 
of what material to include and what interpretive framework to choose in which to 
analyse the material. The purpose here will be to reassess what answers have been 
given to the question, and in turn to examine the suppositions and assumptions that 
underlie these answers. This study will be limited to two select ancient case studies 
(the war against Aristonicus in Asia Minor and the uprising of T. Vettius near Capua 
in the late second century B.C.) which have been included in two influential works as 
‘slave wars’: that of Urbainczyk (2008a) on ‘slave wars’ specifically, and that of 
Vogt (1965), in his study of structure of ‘slave wars’.407 Although different from one 
another in approach, these studies have been chosen because they are characteristic 
of the modern take to the study of ancient slave revolts. 
 
I. ‘Slave Wars’ 
I.i. The Ancients’ View 
 
As I noted in Chapter III.3, ancient authors were not altogether scientific when 
describing the underlying causes of conflicts or events. In particular, their definition 
                                                 
406 Throughout this appendix the term ‘slave war’ will be used as synonymous of ‘slave rebellion’ and 
‘slave revolt’ (‘Sklavenaufstände’ and ‘guerre servili’ in German and Italian respectively), as these 
terms are used essentially interchangeably in modern scholarship. 
407 Other authors have mentioned one or either of the conflicts, but to avoid excessive length the 
survey here will focus on only these two authors. The others include: Pareti (1927), 65; Rubinsohn 
(1982), 446-7; Vavrinek (1975), 109-29; Manganaro (1980), 440; Bradley (1989), 72-3, 78, 123; 
Hermann-Otto (2009), 129; Strauss (2010), 192. The notable exception to the general reticence to 
discuss what might be defined as a ‘slave war’ is Rubinsohn’s discussion, (1982), 443 n. 28. There he 
engaged with the definition, suggesting that the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War ought not be 
termed a ‘slave revolt’ because ‘the movements are not purely servile in origin or in objectives 
pursued.’ He noted that this definition did not necessitate a denial that the ‘majority of the participants 
were slaves de iure’, and in this respect he demonstrated, in a sense, his own definition of a ‘slave 
war’: a movement that is purely servile in origin and perhaps also objectives pursued, and one largely 
made up of servile participants. 
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of what constituted a ‘slave war’ could be decidedly imprecise, encompassing events 
that had causes and roots that went far beyond, or in some cases had nothing to do 
with, slavery as an issue. The first example I want to discuss, the conflict with 
Aristonicus in general was regarded in ancient literary accounts as a dynastic war, 
and not as a ‘slave war’.408 Nonetheless, not only has the conflict with Aristonicus 
been discussed by Urbainczyk (2008a; 2008b) and Hermann-Otto (2009) among 
‘slave wars’, but the ancient sources for the war were also included in Yavetz’s 1988 
source-book for ancient ‘slave wars’. This then begs the question: if the ancient 
sources are generally clear that Aristonicus’ war with Rome was not about slavery, 
why has it become part of the modern discourse on the subject? The answer lies with 
two passages from two ancient authors: Diodorus Siculus and Strabo. Together the 
two authors focus in different ways on the slave element of Aristonicus’ support, and 
this in turn has led to a confusion of their importance in the modern literature. For 
example, Diodorus, in his introduction to the Sicilian Insurrection, made a 
connection between the two events (34/5.2.26): 
 
τὸ παραπλήσιον δὲ γέγονε καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιρούς͵ 
Ἀριστονίκου µὲν ἀντιποιησαµένου τῆς µὴ προσηκούσης βασιλείας͵ τῶν δὲ δούλων 
διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν δεσποτῶν κακουχίας συναπονοησαµένων ἐκείνῳ καὶ µεγάλοις 
ἀτυχήµασι πολλὰς πόλεις περιβαλόντων. 
 
A similar thing [to the Sicilian Insurrection] happened in Asia during the same period, when 
Aristonicus laid claim to a kingdom that did not belong to him, and the slaves, because of 
mistreatment by their masters, shared in this man’s folly and encompassed many cities in 
great misfortunes. 
 
Strabo also stressed a servile element in Aristonicus’ followers, albeit in a rather 
different fashion. He related the actions of Aristonicus as seemingly drawing in 
disenchanted free followers and slaves with promises of freedom for the slaves and 
something (that is not specified) for the free (14.1.38): 
 
Μετὰ δὲ Σµύρναν αἱ Λεῦκαι πολίχνιον͵ ὃ ἀπέστη σεν Ἀριστόνικος µετὰ τὴν 
Ἀττάλου τοῦ φιλοµήτορος τελευτήν͵ δοκῶν τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ 
                                                 
408 All the following authors present the conflict as just a war: Just. Epit. 36.4.5-12, 37.1.1-3; Sall. His. 
4.69.8-9; Cic. Phil. 11.8.18; Laelius, De Amicitia 11.37; Livy, Per. 59; Oros. 5.10.1-5; Eutr. 4.8.21-9, 
4.9.1-23; Val. Max. 3.2.12; Vel. Pat. 2.4.1; Plut. Vit. Flam. 21.6; Flor. 1.35.1-7. This body of evidence 
led Kim (1988), 163, to conclude that ‘Aristonicus’ dynastic claim was the most fundamental element 
throughout his movement.’ 
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διανοούµενος εἰς ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν· ἐν τεῦθεν µὲν οὖν ἐξέπεσεν ἡττηθεὶς 
ναυµαχίᾳ περὶ τὴν Κυµαίαν ὑπὸ Ἐφεσίων͵ εἰς δὲ τὴν µεσόγαιαν ἀνιὼν ἤθροισε διὰ 
ταχέων πλῆθος ἀπόρων τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ δούλων ἐπ΄ ἐλευθερίᾳ κατακεκληµένων͵ 
οὓς Ἡλιοπο λίτας ἐκάλεσε. πρῶτον µὲν οὖν παρεισέπεσεν εἰς Θυάτειρα͵ εἶτ΄ 
Ἀπολλωνίδα ἔσχεν͵ εἶτ΄ ἄλλων ἐφίετο φρουρίων· οὐ πολὺν δὲ διεγένετο χρόνον͵ 
ἀλλ΄ εὐθὺς αἵ τε πόλεις ἔπεµψαν πλῆθος͵ καὶ Νικοµήδης ὁ Βιθυνὸς ἐπεκούρησε καὶ 
οἱ τῶν Καππαδόκων βασιλεῖς. ἔπειτα πρέσβεις Ῥωµαίων πέντε ἧκον͵ καὶ µετὰ ταῦτα 
στρατιὰ καὶ ὕπατος Πόπλιος Κράσσος͵ καὶ µετὰ ταῦτα Μάρκος Περπέρνας͵ ὃς καὶ 
κατέλυσε τὸν πόλεµον ζωγρίᾳ λαβὼν τὸν Ἀριστόνικον καὶ ἀναπέµψας εἰς Ῥώµην. 
ἐκεῖνος µὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ δεσµωτηρίῳ κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον͵ Περ πέρναν δὲ νόσος 
διέφθειρε͵ Κράσσος δὲ περὶ Λεύκας ἐπιθεµένων τινῶν ἔπεσεν ἐν µάχῃ. Μάνιος δ΄ 
Ἀκύλ λιος ἐπελθὼν ὕπατος µετὰ δέκα πρεσβευτῶν διέταξε τὴν ἐπαρχίαν εἰς τὸ νῦν 
ἔτι συµµένον τῆς πολιτείας σχῆµα. 
 
After Smyrna one comes to Leucae, a small town, which after the death of Attalus 
Philometor was caused to revolt by Aristonicus, who was reputed to belong to the royal 
family and intended to usurp the kingdom. Now he was banished from Smyrna, after being 
defeated in a naval battle near the Cymaean territory by the Ephesians, but he went up into 
the interior and quickly assembled a large number of resourceless people, and also of slaves, 
invited with a promise of freedom, whom he called Heliopolitae. Now he first fell upon 
Thyateira unexpectedly, and then got possession of Apollonis, and then set his efforts against 
other fortresses. But he did not last long; the cities immediately sent a large number of troops 
against him, and they were assisted by Nicomedes the Bithynian and by the kings of the 
Cappadocians. Then came five Roman ambassadors, and after that an army under P. Crassus 
the consul, and after that M. Perperna, who brought the war to an end, having captured 
Aristonicus alive and sent him to Rome. Now Aristonicus ended his life in prison; Perperna 
died of disease and Crassus, attacked by certain people in the neighbourhood of Leucae, fell 
in battle. 
 
Now the important points to be drawn out of this concern the context. For all the 
authors mentioned in note 408 the war with Aristonicus is referred to within the 
context of the events surrounding Ti. Gracchus, and as such there is never a link 
made to slavery in those authors. They have no problem with conceptualising the 
conflict as concerned with Aristonicus’ claim to the possessions of his uncle. 
Diodorus, who is about to relate at some length the Sicilian Insurrection, focuses on 
the presence of the slaves, and sees a relationship between the two events he is 
discussing. In fact, it is clear from all the evidence that Aristonicus’ turning to the 
slaves for supporters was out of desperation, and even in Diodorus there is no 
indication, pace Urbainczyk (2008a: 16), that the slaves involved had already 
revolted before joining Aristonicus: taking into account the evidence of Strabo above 
it would seem more sensible to err on the side of caution in this respect, and leave the 
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active role to Aristonicus in recruiting the slaves.409 In short, if we are prepared to 
look beyond the presence of slaves and the spectre of a ‘slave war’, the passages in 
question make at least as much, if not more sense. So much for Aristonicus: the vast 
majority of our ancient sources view his uprising as a dynastic dispute, but as we will 
see below, this has not prevented modern scholarship from focussing on the two 
passages that actually stress the servile elements under Aristonicus. 
 
 The second example, that of T. Vettius’ uprising, is at first glance less 
complex in how it is presented by the only source to record it, Diodorus Siculus: he 
appears to present it uncomplicatedly as a ‘slave war’. This has led to the event’s 
smooth absorption into the chronicle of ancient ‘slave wars’ in the modern 
accounts.410 On closer inspection, however, it seems that we cannot be so certain of 
this supposition. The event is one of the few that is recorded by both Photius and in 
the Constantinian excerpts throughout the narrative of the so-called Second Sicilian 
Slave War (36.2 and 2a). It is necessary to look at several aspects individually to 
unpack fully how Diodorus is presenting the conflict, starting with how it is 
introduced (36.2.1-2 and 2a.1): 
 
Πρὸ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τῶν δούλων ἐπαναστάσεως ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὴν 
Ἰταλίαν πλείους ἀποστάσεις ὀλιγοχρόνιοι καὶ µικραί͵ καθάπερ τοῦ δαιµονίου 
προσηµαίνοντος τὸ µέγεθος τῆς ἐσοµένης κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἐπαναστάσεως͵ πρώτη 
µὲν ἡ περὶ Νουκερίαν͵ τριάκοντα οἰκετῶν συνωµοσίαν ποιησαµένων καὶ ταχὺ 
κολασθέντων͵ δευτέρα ἡ περὶ τὴν Καπύην͵ διακοσίων οἰκετῶν ἐπαναστάντων καὶ 
ταχὺ καταλυθέντων.  
 
τρίτη δὲ παράδοξος γέγονέ τις. ἦν Τίτος Μενουίτιος͵ ἱππεὺς µὲν Ῥωµαίων͵ 
µεγαλοπλούτου δὲ πατρὸς παῖς. οὗτος ἠράσθη θεραπαινίδος ἀλλοτρίας κάλλει 
διαφερούσης. 
 
Before the uprising of slaves in Sicily there occurred in Italy several short lived and minor 
revolts, as if the divine were announcing the magnitude of the coming uprising in Sicily. The 
first was in Nuceria, where thirty slaves formed a conspiracy and were quickly punished, the 
second was in Capua, where two hundred slaves rose up and were quickly put down.  
 
                                                 
409 It is perfectly possible that, as Diodorus suggest (34/5.2.26), the slaves were being abused by their 
masters and therefore were eager to join Aristonicus, but it does not follow from the passage that they 
had already chosen to revolt separately. 
410 Pareti (1927), 65; Vogt (1965), 27, 49; Manganaro (1980), 440; Bradley (1989), 72-3, 78, 123; 
Urbainczyk (2008a), 17. 
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The third one was contrary to all expectations. There was a man Titus Minucius,411 a Roman 
knight, the son of an exceedingly wealthy father. He conceived a passion for a beautiful 
slave girl owned by another. 
 
Ὅτι πολλαὶ ἐπαναστάσεις ἐγένοντο οἰκετῶν· πρώτη µὲν ἡ περὶ τὴν Νουκερίαν͵ 
τριάκοντα οἰκετῶν συνωµοσίαν ποιησαµένων καὶ ταχὺ κολασθέντων͵ δευτέρα δὲ ἡ 
περὶ τὴν Καπύην͵ διακοσίων οἰκετῶν ἐπαναστάντων καὶ ταχὺ κολασθέντων· 
 
τρίτη δὲ ἀπόστασις ἐγένετο παράδοξος καὶ πολὺ τὰς εἰθισµένας διαλλάττουσα. ἦν 
γάρ τις Τίτος µὲν Οὐέττιος͵ ἱππεὺς δὲ Ῥωµαίων͵ ὃς ἔχων πατέρα µεγαλόπλουτον καὶ 
νέος ὢν παντελῶς εἰς ἐπιθυµίαν ἦλθεν ἀλλοτρίας θεραπαινίδος κάλλει διαφερούσης. 
 
There were many uprisings of slaves:412 the first was in Nuceria, where thirty slaves formed 
a conspiracy and were quickly punished, the second was in Capua, where two hundred slaves 
rose up and were quickly punished. 
 
The third revolt was contrary to all expectations and very different from the normal. For 
there was a certain Titus Vettius, a Roman knight, who had an exceedingly wealthy father, 
and being a very young man he had a desire for a very beautiful slave girl owned by another. 
 
Now, with the exception at the start of the Constantinian excerpt, discussed in note 
412, which would imply that these conflicts were clearly regarded as slave revolts, 
Diodorus is merely including these three ἀποστάσεις, ‘revolts’, as a prelude or divine 
pronouncement of the coming Sicilian revolt, not as independent examples of ‘slave 
wars’. It is undeniable that the first two revolts are to do with issues of slavery, but 
for the third, as we will see, this is not so clear. The narrative of the third revolt 
continues as follows (36.2.2-6):413 
 
εἰς ἔρωτα παράδοξον αὐτῆς ἐµπεσὼν ἐξηγόρασεν αὐτήν͵ οὕτω τοῦ τε µανιώδους 
ἔρωτος βιαζοµένου καὶ τοῦ κυρίου τῆς κόρης τὴν πρᾶσιν µόλις κατανεύσαντος͵ 
ταλάντων Ἀττικῶν ἑπτά͵ καὶ χρόνον ὥρισε καθ΄ ὃν ἀποτίσει τὸ χρέος…ὡς δὲ καὶ 
ταύτης ἐπιστάσης οἱ µὲν ἀπῄτουν͵ ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν πλέον εἶχεν ἀνύειν͵ ὁ δ΄ ἔρως 
ἤκµαζεν͵ ἐπεχείρησε πράξει παραλογωτάτῃ…συναγοράσας γὰρ πεντακοσίας 
πανοπλίας καὶ χρόνον τῆς τιµῆς συντάξας͵ καὶ πιστευθείς͵ λάθρᾳ πρὸς ἀγρόν τινα 
                                                 
411 Every other reference in the Photius and the Constantinian excerpts is to Titus Vettius, or Οὐέττιος, 
so somewhere there is a textual error, probably in this passage. 
412 This much shorter introductory sentence, which is reflected in the Photian version with a much 
longer lead up to the list of revolts, would appear to indicate the work of the excerptor giving at least 
some context to the following text. The difficulty is with the inclusion of οἰκέτης in the opening, 
which is not mirrored in the Photian version. It would appear from the Photian version that Diodorus 
himself did not call these events ‘slave revolts’ directly, but implied as such from his narrative: this is 
not the case with the Constantinian excerpt above which leaves no room for interpretation of the 
matter. 
413 There is a parallel version for the first section in the Constantinian excerpts (36.2a.1), but as it only 
adds circumstantial detail, and does not record the whole event, I will be using the Photian version for 
the following discussion, and will draw on the Constantinian excerpt only when it would illustrate a 
salient point. I have also slightly abridged the narrative in order to cut out unnecessary details, and to 
focus on the important features of the narrative for the purpose here. 
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παρακοµίσας τοὺς ἰδίους ἀνέσεισε πρὸς ἀπόστασιν οἰκέτας͵ τετρακοσίους ὄντας. 
εἶτα ἀναλαβὼν διάδηµα καὶ περιβόλαιον πορφυροῦν καὶ ῥαβδούχους καὶ τὰ ἄλλα 
σύσσηµα τῆς ἀρχῆς͵ καὶ βασιλέα ἑαυτὸν συνεργίᾳ τῶν δούλων ἀναδείξας͵ τοὺς µὲν 
ἀπαιτοῦντας τὴν τιµὴν τῆς κόρης ῥαβδίσας ἐπελέκισεν͵ ἐξοπλίσας δὲ τοὺς οἰκέτας 
ἐπῄει τὰς σύνεγγυς ἐπαύλεις͵ καὶ τοὺς µὲν προθύµως συναφισταµένους καθώπλιζε͵ 
τοὺς δ΄ ἀντιπράττοντας ἀνῄρει. ταχὺ δὲ συναγαγὼν στρατιώτας πλείους τῶν 
ἑπτακοσίων καὶ τούτους εἰς ἑκατονταρχίας καταλέξας͵ ἐνεβάλετο χάρακα καὶ τοὺς 
ἀφισταµένους ὑπεδέχετο.  
 
τῆς δ΄ ἀποστάσεως εἰς Ῥώµην ἀπαγγελθείσης͵ ἡ σύγκλητος ἐµφρόνως περὶ αὐτῆς 
ἐβουλεύσατο καὶ κατώρθωσε. τῶν γὰρ κατὰ πόλιν στρατηγῶν ἀπέδειξεν ἕνα πρὸς 
τὴν τῶν δραπετῶν σύλληψιν͵ Λεύκιον Λούκουλλον…ὁ δὲ Οὐέττιος τὴν ὁρµὴν τοῦ 
Λουκούλλου πυθόµενος κατελάβετο λόφον καρτερόν͵ ἔχων τοὺς πάντας πλέον τῶν 
τρισχιλίων καὶ πεντακοσίων. καὶ τὸ µὲν πρῶτον συµβολῆς γενοµένης 
ἐπλεονέκτησαν οἱ δραπέται ἐκ τόπων ὑπερδεξίων µαχόµενοι· µετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸν µὲν 
στρατηγὸν τοῦ Οὐεττίου Ἀπολλώνιον διαφθείρας ὁ Λούκουλλος καὶ τῇ δηµοσίᾳ 
πίστει τὴν ἄφεσιν τῆς τιµωρίας βεβαιώσας͵ ἔπεισεν αὐτὸν προδότην γενέσθαι τῶν 
συναποστατῶν. διὸ καὶ τούτου συνεργοῦντος τοῖς Ῥωµαίοις καὶ τὰς χεῖρας 
προσφέροντος τῷ Οὐεττίῳ͵ φοβηθεὶς τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἁλώσεως τιµωρίαν ἑαυτὸν 
ἀπέσφαξεν͵ αὐτίκα συναπολωλότων καὶ τῶν τῆς ἀποστάσεως κεκοινωνηκότων 
πλὴν τοῦ προδόντος Ἀπολλωνίου. καὶ ταῦτα µὲν πρὸ τῆς κατὰ Σικελίαν͵ ὥσπερ 
προοιµιαζόµενα ταύτῃ͵ µεγίστης ἀποστάσεως· ἥτις ἀρχὴν ἔλαβε τοιαύτην. 
 
He conceived a passion for a beautiful slave girl owned by another. After he had lain with 
her and fallen in love contrary to all expectation he bought her and having been so 
overpowered by a mad passion, the master of the girl only just consented to the sale, for 
seven Attic talents, he fixed a time for the repayment of the debt...When this day arrived and 
the creditors demanded repayment, he did not have enough to pay, his passion was at its 
height, and he attempted an undertaking beyond all reason…For having bought five hundred 
suits of armour and arranged a time of payment, and was trusted, he secretly conveyed them 
to a certain field and stirred up his own slaves to revolt, four hundred in number. Then, after 
taking up a diadem, purple cloak, lictors and the other regalia of power, and having, with the 
slaves cooperation, proclaimed himself king, he flogged and beheaded those who demanded 
payment for the girl. Arming his slaves, he marched on nearby farms and armed those 
willing to join the rebellion, but killed those opposed. Soon, after he brought together more 
than seven hundred soldiers and organised them into centuries, he set to work upon a 
palisade and welcomed any rebels. 
 
When the rebellion was reported in Rome, the senate sensibly took council about it and set 
things straight. For of the generals in the city they appointed one to apprehend the runaways, 
Lucius Lucullus…When Vettius learned of Lucullus’ attack, he seized a strong hill, having 
more than three thousand five hundred in all. At the start of the battle the runaways had the 
advantage since they fought from higher ground: but after this Lucullus, by bribing 
Apollonius the general of Vettius and confirming in the name of the state his immunity from 
punishment, persuaded him to turn traitor against his fellow-rebels. Therefore, since he was 
cooperating with the Romans, and turned his forces on Vettius, who, afraid of the 
punishments from capture, cut his own throat, in a moment the other rebels were destroyed 
together, except for the traitor Apollonius. 
 
The drive for the revolt throughout the narrative is the passion and madness of T. 
Vettius. Where slavery comes into the story it is either as the cause of his madness – 
and indeed in the Constantinian excerpt (36.2a.1), seen in a metaphorical sense 
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Vettius is noted as τῷ δὲ ἔρωτι δουλεύων, ‘being a slave to passion’ – or in relation 
to the tools with which Vettius forged his venture. The slaves are not an active force, 
and it would be difficult to claim that this revolt was about slavery: it is a strange 
story, but it is about, in effect, the dangers of excessive passion. Why Diodorus 
included it in a list of ‘slave wars’ that formed a prelude to a ‘slave war’ is less clear; 
but perhaps the willingness of T. Vettius to use his slaves as soldiers, and the 
philosophical rhetoric about his becoming a slave to passion created a link between 
this event and the others narrated, beyond simple chronological conditions. In any 
case, it would seem to me to be incorrect to continue the mistaken categorisation of 
Diodorus in modern accounts. Regardless of how unbelievable the story may seem to 
be,414 the whole episode is really about an eques’ mad venture; as we will see below, 
however, this approach has not been taken in all cases.  
 
I.ii. The Modern View 
 
As I outlined above, this overview will be limited to two modern accounts. For both, 
I wish to demonstrate the ways in which they discuss the two ancient episodes, to 
show that it is their focus, and not the evidence of the ancient sources, that forces the 
stress onto the servile element in the events. Furthermore, this analysis will 
demonstrate that neither author is clear on what they conceive of as a ‘slave war’, 
and so incorporate events that ought to fall outwith the remit of their discussion. 
 
 Vogt (1965: 20) opened his discussion Zur Struktur der antiken 
Sklavenkriege with a comment on the unusual fact that all ‘die großen 
Sklavenaufstände’ in the ancient world happened between 140 and 70 B.C. He 
followed this statement with a list of the ‘Sklavenaufstände’ that he had in mind: ‘der 
erste sizilische Aufstand (136/5-132), die Erhebung des Aristonikos in Asien (133-
129), der zweite sizilische Aufstand (104-100), der Krieg des Spartakus (73-71).’ As 
he then proceeded to discuss the different structures of the ‘slave revolts’ he had 
chosen, Vogt devoted considerable space to Aristonicus (31-3, 43-5, 48). What is 
                                                 
414 Urbainczyk (2008a), 17, describes Diodorus’ account as ‘…a rather unconvincing tale of a love-
sick individual…’ 
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unusual in his treatment of Aristonicus is that he did not appear to consider it 
important for slaves to have had an active role in the conflict in order for it to be 
considered a ‘slave war’, going so far as to say that (33) 
 
(f)ür uns bleiben die aufständischen Sklaven Asiens stumme Werkzeuge 
eines Prätendenten... 
 
It might seem surprising, then, that he included Aristonicus at all in a list of ‘slave 
wars’. But throughout his description of Aristonicus’ uprising, Vogt focused on 
either Aristonicus’ integration of disparate groups (including slaves; 31-3) or the 
potential social organisation of his new state (43-5): the latter debate based on the 
sole reference to the Heliopolitae of Aristonicus in Strabo (14.1.38), who attaches no 
importance to the term. It seems to be enough that slaves were involved in an event 
that appeared to speak of social change, because Vogt is clear that the event was, in 
essence, a dynastic problem that led to a revolutionary instance driven by Aristonicus 
(31): ‘…von Anfang an also (war) das revolutionäre Geschehen planvoll bestimmt.’ 
 
Vogt’s attitude towards the T. Vettius episode is somewhat clearer. While 
describing the ‘slave revolts’ preceding the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War, 
Vogt included, without comment, the T. Vettius episode among the (27) 
‘Verschwörungen der Unfreien’. Later he noted Lucullus’ success in using treachery 
to defeat Vettius as an example of slave conspiracies being crushed through betrayal 
(49). At no point did he consider how the implications of Vettius’ leadership may 
have affected how we view this event, nor did he stop to question if the motives of 
the uprising factor into the equation: was slavery at its core, or, as the ancient sources 
seem to suggest, did it concern a lapse of sanity in one man who then took advantage 
of those around him to seize power? Without answering these questions Vogt leaves 
it unclear as to what he considered to be a ‘slave war’: was it merely the involvement 
of slaves? 
 
Urbainczyk (2008a) discussed Aristonicus in detail in her monograph, Slave 
Revolts in Antiquity. She stated, for example, that in the accounts of Aristonicus (14) 
‘…we are told that the slaves had the support of the free people…’ and furthermore 
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that (15) ‘Aristonicus…took advantage of an uprising of the slaves and formed an 
army to resist the Romans.’ Such a sequence of events, however, does not occur in 
the ancient sources; nor is there any explicit mention of ‘an uprising of the slaves.’ 
Urbainczyk has derived this reading from a passage of Diodorus (34/5.2.26), as seen 
above. She interpreted the line τῶν δὲ δούλων διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν δεσποτῶν κακουχίας 
συναπονοησαµένων ἐκείνῳ, ‘the slaves, because of mistreatment by their masters, 
shared in this man’s folly’, as indicating (Urbainczyk 2008: 16) ‘…that the slaves 
had already rebelled and that these rebels joined forces with Aristonicus.’ She went 
on to say that the manner in which Diodorus sets out events suggested ‘…not that 
Aristonicus recruited the slaves because he promised them freedom, but rather they 
had been badly treated and so joined the revolt.’ Urbainczyk seems to be prioritising 
her interpretation of Diodorus over Strabo’s evidence in order to infer a ‘slave war’ 
in the beginning of the conflict.  Whilst this could be used as evidence that the 
conflict reflected more than just a dynastic problem, she also construed that (14) 
‘...slaves had the support of free people’. However, the two texts of Diodorus and 
Strabo are not mutually exclusive in their explanations, and it is entirely possible that 
the slaves joined willingly because they were poorly treated and offered freedom. 
Whether or not a ‘slave war’ already took place remains uncertain according to 
Diodorus. Urbainczyk later commented that (88) ‘[Diodorus] adds that the same 
thing [as the Sicilian Insurrection] happened in Asia when Aristonicus claimed the 
kingship’ (my emphasis). However, Diodorus uses the expression (34/5.2.26) τὸ 
παραπλήσιον δὲ γέγονε, ‘a similar thing happened’, to describe the events in Asia.  
The specific word παραπλήσιον implies that the two events were not entirely 
identical; they were comparable but not one and the same.415 
 
Urbainczyk’s view on the purpose behind freeing slaves also remains to be 
considered.  She followed a question posed by Vavrinek (1975: 115):  
 
Was [Aristonicus] a revolutionary leader who, conscious of his purpose, placed 
himself in command of the revolting slaves, or was the freeing of the slaves merely 
                                                 
415 In another article (2008b, 97) Urbainczyk translates τὸ παραπλήσιον δὲ γέγονε as ‘(a)lmost the 
identical thing’, which would imply that there was little different between the two events: this is not 
clear from Diodorus’ text, nor does he imply this. 
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a tactical device which he was forced to employ because he lacked other means of 
achieving his aims? 
 
Urbainczyk (2008a: 63) concluded that the second option was more probable, but 
added that we must stress the likely reasons of the slaves for fighting, namely that 
they wanted to achieve freedom and would have done so by any means possible. 
However, the freeing of slaves, at times, was a necessary tactic and common practice 
in the ancient world (see Appendix 9): through his actions Aristonicus becomes no 
more of a slave leader than Octavian or Sextus Pompeius in the civil wars.416 It 
seems as though Urbainczyk’s discussion of Aristonicus’ uprising to some extent 
overemphasises the servile nature of the event beyond the capacity of the ancient 
evidence.  Her approach to the T. Vettius episode highlights this aspect as well. 
 
Given the problems I have foregrounded with interpreting the T. Vettius 
episode as a ‘slave war’, Urbainczyk’s (2008a) interpretation remains contentious. 
Despite acknowledging the role of T. Vettius, she nonetheless describes the event as 
(17) 
 
…the seeds of yet another uprising of slaves, whatever the motives of the leader. 
The point is that whatever the intentions of Vettius Minutius, arming so many slaves 
had consequences far beyond one Roman noble either losing his sense from desire, 
or trying to escape his debts. One might imagine that such a story developed in order 
for the Romans to understand for themselves why one of their own took up with 
slaves. 
 
She also included this episode in a list of ‘slave wars’ that had ended through 
treachery (17 n. 36), and in this followed Vogt.  Her explanation, however, deserves 
closer attention: the mere act of arming slaves does not necessarily imply a 
unification of forces.  Moreover, the ancient evidence attests to the use of slaves in 
warfare for a variety of reasons. If, as Urbainczyk urges above, we look beyond the 
motives concerned in arming slaves and concentrate solely on the act when 
                                                 
416 Elsewhere (2008b, 97-8), Urbainczyk argued that we cannot rule out the development of a desire to 
abolish slavery in Aristonicus’ fight, in spite the lack of evidence in our ancient sources regarding this 
wish, stating that ‘(q)uite apart from the consideration that the personal wishes of leaders may not 
have much influence on the historical course of events, there is also the possibility that ideas evolve 
over time with changing circumstances.’ Nonetheless, without any evidence to suggest the rise of this 
idea in Aristonicus’ forces, it seems prudent not to impose the concept from a purely modern 
perspective. 
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determining the importance of these events, then we must consider those freeing the 
slaves as joining them, which creates more problems. Following this rationale, the 
Second Punic War, the Peloponnesian War and even the civil wars of the Late 
Roman Republic can be rendered as ‘slave wars’. The extant evidence for the T. 
Vettius episode does not allow for an interpretation in which he becomes a partisan 
of rebellious slaves, and it seems problematic to include the event in a list of ‘slave 
wars’ merely because Diodorus considered it one (Urbainczyk 2008a: 14 n. 23). 
Never having explicitly defined the term, Urbainczyk seemed to regard any conflict 
involving slaves collectively as a ‘slave war’. The intentions of those who armed the 
slaves remain unexplored and her proclivity to emphasize her interpretation of a 
‘slave war’ results in a debatable reading of ancient evidence.  In order to fully 
understand the events of Aristonicus and T. Vettius, and determine which incidents 
correctly fall in a similar category, a more concrete definition of this term is 
necessary.     
 
In sum, despite never being explicit about her definition of a ‘slave war’, 
Urbainczyk seemed to regard any conflict involving slaves as a ‘slave war’, whatever 
the intentions of those arming the slaves. Her focus on ‘slave wars’ led to 
interpretations of the ancient evidence that can not be supported from the evidence. 
This, however, is precisely the problem: without a clear definition, we are left 
questioning the inclusion of certain events incorporated in her study, especially those 
involving Aristonicus and T. Vettius. 
 
Conclusion: A New Definition? 
 
By now it should have become clear that I do not regard the uprising of Aristonicus 
and the T. Vettius episode as ‘slave wars’. For each there are stronger grounds for 
viewing the involvement of the slaves to have been purely at the behest of free 
people, with the slaves benefiting only if their free benefactor also succeeded. 
Furthermore, I have argued elsewhere in this thesis that the Sicilian Insurrection 
should also not be considered a ‘slave war’ for a variety of reasons, despite the 
strong literary evidence for servile involvement. For each of the conflicts discussed 
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here, their inclusion among discussion of ‘slave wars’ came from a willingness to 
foreground wherever possible the inclusion of slaves in the combatants, to the 
detriment of any other participants. This approach must not be taken, and more care 
must be given to analysing the purpose of each conflict. If we consider, for example, 
Aristonicus, then we can see that the slaves’ opportunity to join the revolt was 
predicated on Aristonicus’ offer to do so: we assume too much if we think that they 
would have revolted in any case had he not offered.417 In the Sicilian Insurrection, 
we have seen that the coinage of King Antiochus was appealing very specifically to 
the Sicilians of eastern Sicily: even allowing for the presence of slaves in the army of 
King Antiochus, and I see little reason to doubt their inclusion, it is clear that the 
Insurrection aimed to rely upon the support of the free, and the legitimacy that would 
follow from that support. In any case, it is clear that the use of slaves in times of 
warfare was common in the ancient world (see Appendix 9: Slaves in Ancient 
Warfare). The aim here is not to provide an all-encompassing definition which will 
filter out alleged ‘slave wars’ from true slave revolts, but to show that an 
unwillingness to be open about how or why we discuss these events leads to an over-
reliance on the often unreliable views of the ancient authors and the uncritical 
inclusion of certain events that can in no way be called ‘slave wars’. As a corollary to 
this, the explanation of these events as ‘slave wars’ leads, in turn, to incorrect 
contextual evidence being drawn in to the discussion, which, then, in a circular 
argument, supports their inclusion as ‘slave wars’. A more open analysis of these 
events will avoid these pitfalls, and allow us a clearer understanding of not only 
slavery in the ancient world, but also of wider social issues and forms of protest. 
                                                 
417 The same applies for the T. Vettius episode: without the actions of T. Vettius it is conceivable that 
his slaves may have revolted, but in the case of his endeavour, their complicity was utterly reliant on 
his actions. We ought to note that Diodorus does not suggest that all the slaves offered their freedom 
to fight for Vettius accepted: at 36.2.4 Diodorus notes that Vettius gave arms to those who joined him, 
but killed those who resisted. 
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Appendix 11: Athenion’s Slingshots 
 
There is a small pool of epigraphic evidence with which we can supplement the 
narrative of Diodorus for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War: slingshots. A 
small number of slingshots bearing Athenion’s name have been found in Sicily (IG 
14.2407a-d).418 Of these, two have no find spots recorded (c and d) and so need not 
detain us. The other two are recorded as being found near Leontini (b) and in the area 
of Panormus (a). Their find spots would appear to indicate, then, actions by men 
under the command of Athenion in the plains of Leontini and at Panormus. Both 
require some additional attention to assess their significance. 
 
 The find spot near Leontini would not appear, on first glance, to be 
problematic, since the rebels spent a considerable amount of time in the area, and 
ended up at the shrine of the Palici. Yet, in the chronology of the war in Diodorus, 
these actions all took place before the joining of the forces under Athenion and 
Salvius. The slingshot would then appear to give evidence that after the withdrawal 
by the rebels to Triocala and the subsequent battle at Scirthaea (Diod. Sic. 36.7-8), 
forces under Athenion fought in the area around Leontini. This action would be best 
placed in the praetorship of Servilius, when Diodorus recorded that Servilius’ 
inaction allowed Athenion to plunder freely across the island (36.9.2). The second 
slingshot, possibly discovered in the area of Panormus, is more difficult to assess. 
Chronologically it could have been fired at any point, since Athenion was operating 
at Lilybaeum prior to the move to Triocala, and could have ventured north, following 
the road round the coast, and then down from Panormus to Triocala by the road 
between Agrigentum and Panormus. This is, perhaps, a better solution than placing 
                                                 
418 Manganaro (1982), 241, and (2000), 131-2, has published a number of other slingshots which seem 
to relate to Salvius. If we accept his reconstruction of two slingshots in particular (2000), 130 figs 
34a-b, which do not appear in IG, then there would also seem to be slingshots bearing Salvius’ royal 
name, Tryphon, found near the suggested site of Triocala (modern Caltabellotta). Sadly, these 
slingshots tell us nothing more about the war, merely bearing the inscription ΝΙΚΑ/ΤΡΥΦΩΝΟϚ. 
Furthermore, in IG XIV there are a total of 26 entries recording slingshot finds in Sicily, and these 
have been variously attributed to the forces either for or against the insurgency based upon their 
choices of deities or specification of which city and unit thereof the slinger came from (Manganaro 
1982: 243; 2000: 130-3; Bradley 1989: 75 no. 14, 80 no. 22; Shaw 2000: 128-9). Without better 
archaeological contexts, however, we cannot state their date or target. Until this evidence is brought to 
light, we must restrict ourselves to using only the slingshots that explicitly state their commander. 
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the fighting at Panormus in the period after Scirthaea if we consider the following. 
We know from Dio (27.93.4) that Athenion attacked Messana, and this attack ought 
to be placed after the battle of Scirthaea, unless we want to allow for Athenion 
moving across the entire island, from Lilybaeum to Messana, before being recalled to 
Triocala by Salvius. This could then give us an itinerary for Athenion’s movements 
into the east after Scirthaea, as we have evidence that he fought in the plains of 
Leontini; I would suggest that this took place on his march to Messana. This 
demonstrates a rough area for the operations of Salvius/Tryphon and Athenion. In 
sum, then, Athenion and Salvius were active in an area spreading from Lilybaeum, 
up to Panormus and across to Messana, and also in an area stretching from north of 
Heraclea across to Morgantina and Leontini. 
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Appendix 12: Text and Translation of Diodorus’ 
Account of the Sicilian Stasis419 
 
 
 
I. Photian Version and Constantinian Exerpts: Greek Text 
 
(36.1.1) Ὅτι ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἐν Ῥώµῃ͵ καθ΄ οὓς Μάριος µὲν τοὺς κατὰ 
Λιβύην βασιλεῖς Βόκχον καὶ Ἰουγούρθαν κατεπολέµησε µεγάλῃ παρατάξει͵ καὶ 
πολλὰς µὲν τῶν Λιβύων µυριάδας ἀνεῖλεν͵ ὕστερον δὲ αὐτὸν Ἰουγούρθαν 
συλληφθέντα ὑπὸ Βόκχου͵ ὥστε τυχεῖν συγγνώµης παρὰ Ῥωµαίων ὑπὲρ ὧν αὐτοῖς 
κατέστη πρὸς πόλεµον͵ λαβὼν ἐκεῖθεν αἰχµάλωτον εἶχε͵ µεγίστοις δὲ πταίσµασι τοῖς 
κατὰ Γαλατίαν τῶν Κίµβρων πολεµούντων Ῥωµαῖοι περιπεσόντες ἠθύµουν͵ κατὰ 
τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἧκόν τινες ἀπὸ Σικελίας ἀπόστασιν ἀγγέλλοντες οἰκετῶν εἰς 
πολλὰς ἀριθµουµένων µυριάδας. οὗ προσαγγελθέντος͵ ἐν πολλῇ περιστάσει τὸ 
Ῥωµαϊκὸν ἅπαν συνεχόµενον διετέλει͵ ὡς ἂν στρατιωτῶν ἐπιλέκτων σχεδὸν 
ἑξακισµυρίων ἐν τῷ πρὸς Κίµβρους κατὰ Γαλατίαν πολέµῳ διολωλότων͵ καὶ 
ἀπόρων ὄντων εἰς ἀποστολὴν στρατιωτῶν λογάδων. 
(36.2.1) Πρὸ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τῶν δούλων ἐπαναστάσεως ἐγένοντο 
κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πλείους ἀποστάσεις ὀλιγοχρόνιοι καὶ µικραί͵ καθάπερ τοῦ 
δαιµονίου προσηµαίνοντος τὸ µέγεθος τῆς ἐσοµένης κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν 
ἐπαναστάσεως͵ πρώτη µὲν ἡ περὶ Νουκερίαν͵ τριάκοντα οἰκετῶν συνωµοσίαν 
ποιησαµένων καὶ ταχὺ κολασθέντων͵ δευτέρα ἡ περὶ τὴν Καπύην͵ διακοσίων 
οἰκετῶν ἐπαναστάντων καὶ ταχὺ καταλυθέντων.  
(36.2.2) τρίτη δὲ παράδοξος γέγονέ τις. ἦν Τίτος Μενουίτιος͵ ἱππεὺς µὲν 
Ῥωµαίων͵ µεγαλοπλούτου δὲ πατρὸς παῖς. οὗτος ἠράσθη θεραπαινίδος ἀλλοτρίας 
κάλλει διαφερούσης. συµπλακεὶς δ΄ αὐτῇ καὶ εἰς ἔρωτα παράδοξον αὐτῆς ἐµπεσὼν 
ἐξηγόρασεν αὐτήν͵ οὕτω τοῦ τε µανιώδους ἔρωτος βιαζοµένου καὶ τοῦ κυρίου τῆς 
κόρης τὴν πρᾶσιν µόλις κατανεύσαντος͵ ταλάντων Ἀττικῶν ἑπτά͵ καὶ χρόνον ὥρισε 
καθ΄ ὃν ἀποτίσει τὸ χρέος· ἐπιστεύετο δὲ διὰ τὴν πατρῴαν περιουσίαν. ἐνστάντος δὲ 
τοῦ ὁρισθέντος͵ καὶ µὴ ἔχων ἀποδοῦναι͵ πάλιν ἔταξε τριάκοντα ἡµερῶν προθεσµίαν. 
                                                 
419 The text of Diodorus is that of the Loeb Classical Library, edited by Walton, F.R. (1967), Diodorus 
of Sicily, vol. 12, Cambridge. The translation is my own. 
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(36.2.3) ὡς δὲ καὶ ταύτης ἐπιστάσης οἱ µὲν ἀπῄτουν͵ ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν πλέον εἶχεν ἀνύειν͵ 
ὁ δ΄ ἔρως ἤκµαζεν͵ ἐπεχείρησε πράξει παραλογωτάτῃ. ἐπιβουλεύει µὲν γὰρ τοὺς 
ἀπαιτοῦντας͵ ἑαυτῷ δὲ µοναρχικὴν ἐξουσίαν περιέθηκε. συναγοράσας γὰρ 
πεντακοσίας πανοπλίας καὶ χρόνον τῆς τιµῆς συντάξας͵ καὶ πιστευθείς͵ λάθρᾳ πρὸς 
ἀγρόν τινα παρακοµίσας τοὺς ἰδίους ἀνέσεισε πρὸς ἀπόστασιν οἰκέτας͵ 
τετρακοσίους ὄντας. (36.2.4) εἶτα ἀναλαβὼν διάδηµα καὶ περιβόλαιον πορφυροῦν 
καὶ ῥαβδούχους καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σύσσηµα τῆς ἀρχῆς͵ καὶ βασιλέα ἑαυτὸν συνεργίᾳ τῶν 
δούλων ἀναδείξας͵ τοὺς µὲν ἀπαιτοῦντας τὴν τιµὴν τῆς κόρης ῥαβδίσας ἐπελέκισεν͵ 
ἐξοπλίσας δὲ τοὺς οἰκέτας ἐπῄει τὰς σύνεγγυς ἐπαύλεις͵ καὶ τοὺς µὲν προθύµως 
συναφισταµένους καθώπλιζε͵ τοὺς δ΄ ἀντιπράττοντας ἀνῄρει. ταχὺ δὲ συναγαγὼν 
στρατιώτας πλείους τῶν ἑπτακοσίων καὶ τούτους εἰς ἑκατονταρχίας καταλέξας͵ 
ἐνεβάλετο χάρακα καὶ τοὺς ἀφισταµένους ὑπεδέχετο.  
(36.2.5) τῆς δ΄ ἀποστάσεως εἰς Ῥώµην ἀπαγγελθείσης͵ ἡ σύγκλητος 
ἐµφρόνως περὶ αὐτῆς ἐβουλεύσατο καὶ κατώρθωσε. τῶν γὰρ κατὰ πόλιν στρατηγῶν 
ἀπέδειξεν ἕνα πρὸς τὴν τῶν δραπετῶν σύλληψιν͵ Λεύκιον Λούκουλλον. οὗτος δὲ 
αὐθηµερὸν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώµης ἐπιλέξας στρατιώτας ἑξακοσίους͵ εἰς τὴν Καπύην ἦλθε 
συναθροίσας πεζοὺς µὲν τετρακισχιλίους͵ ἱππεῖς δὲ τετρακοσίους. (36.2.6) ὁ δὲ 
Οὐέττιος τὴν ὁρµὴν τοῦ Λουκούλλου πυθόµενος κατελάβετο λόφον καρτερόν͵ ἔχων 
τοὺς πάντας πλέον τῶν τρισχιλίων καὶ πεντακοσίων. καὶ τὸ µὲν πρῶτον συµβολῆς 
γενοµένης ἐπλεονέκτησαν οἱ δραπέται ἐκ τόπων ὑπερδεξίων µαχόµενοι· µετὰ δὲ 
ταῦτα τὸν µὲν στρατηγὸν τοῦ Οὐεττίου Ἀπολλώνιον διαφθείρας ὁ Λούκουλλος καὶ 
τῇ δηµοσίᾳ πίστει τὴν ἄφεσιν τῆς τιµωρίας βεβαιώσας͵ ἔπεισεν αὐτὸν προδότην 
γενέσθαι τῶν συναποστατῶν. διὸ καὶ τούτου συνεργοῦντος τοῖς Ῥωµαίοις καὶ τὰς 
χεῖρας προσφέροντος τῷ Οὐεττίῳ͵ φοβηθεὶς τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἁλώσεως τιµωρίαν ἑαυτὸν 
ἀπέσφαξεν͵ αὐτίκα συναπολωλότων καὶ τῶν τῆς ἀποστάσεως κεκοινωνηκότων πλὴν 
τοῦ προδόντος Ἀπολλωνίου. καὶ ταῦτα µὲν πρὸ τῆς κατὰ Σικελίαν͵ ὥσπερ 
προοιµιαζόµενα ταύτῃ͵ µεγίστης ἀποστάσεως· ἥτις ἀρχὴν ἔλαβε τοιαύτην. (Photius, 
Bibl. pp. 386-387 B.) 
(36.2a.1) Ὅτι πολλαὶ ἐπαναστάσεις ἐγένοντο οἰκετῶν· πρώτη µὲν ἡ περὶ τὴν 
Νουκερίαν͵ τριάκοντα οἰκετῶν συνωµοσίαν ποιησαµένων καὶ ταχὺ κολασθέντων͵ 
δευτέρα δὲ ἡ περὶ τὴν Καπύην͵ διακοσίων οἰκετῶν ἐπαναστάντων καὶ ταχὺ 
κολασθέντων· 
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τρίτη δὲ ἀπόστασις ἐγένετο παράδοξος καὶ πολὺ τὰς εἰθισµένας 
διαλλάττουσα. ἦν γάρ τις Τίτος µὲν Οὐέττιος͵ ἱππεὺς δὲ Ῥωµαίων͵ ὃς ἔχων πατέρα 
µεγαλόπλουτον καὶ νέος ὢν παντελῶς εἰς ἐπιθυµίαν ἦλθεν ἀλλοτρίας θεραπαινίδος 
κάλλει διαφερούσης. ἐπιπλακεὶς δὲ αὐτῇ καὶ συµβιώσας ἱκανόν τινα χρόνον εἰς 
ἔρωτα παράδοξον ἐνέπεσε καὶ διάθεσιν µανίᾳ παρεµφερῆ. διὰ γὰρ τὴν φιλοστοργίαν 
ἐπιβαλόµενος ἐξαγοράσαι τὴν παιδίσκην τὸ µὲν πρῶτον ἔσχε τὸν δεσπότην αὐτῆς 
ἀντιπράττοντα͵ µετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῷ µεγέθει τῆς τιµῆς προτρεψάµενος ἐξηγόρασεν 
αὐτὴν ταλάντων Ἀττικῶν ἑπτά͵ καὶ τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τῆς τιµῆς εἰς τακτὸν χρόνον 
συνέθετο. πιστευθεὶς δὲ τοῦ χρήµατος διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς εὐπορίαν ἀπήγαγε τὴν 
θεραπαινίδα͵ καὶ καταδὺς εἴς τινα τῶν πατρικῶν ἀγρῶν ἐξεπλήρου τὴν ἰδίαν 
ἐπιθυµίαν. ὡς δὲ ὁ συγκείµενος τοῦ χρέους χρόνος διῆλθεν͵ ἧκον οἱ πεµφθέντες εἰς 
τὴν ἀπαίτησιν. ὁ δὲ εἰς τὴν τριακοστὴν ἡµέραν ἀναβαλόµενος τὴν ἀπόλυσιν͵ καὶ τὸ 
µὲν χρῆµα οὐ δυνάµενος πορίσαι͵ τῷ δὲ ἔρωτι δουλεύων͵ ἐπεχείρησε πράξει 
παραλογωτάτῃ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦ πάθους τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀναβολῆς 
ἐπακολουθοῦσαν αἰσχύνην ἐξετράπη πρὸς διαλογισµοὺς παιδαριώδεις καὶ πολλῆς 
ἀφροσύνης µεστούς. πρὸ ὀφθαλµῶν γὰρ λαµβάνων τὸν ἐσόµενον τῆς ἐρωµένης 
διαχωρισµὸν τοῖς µὲν ἀπαιτοῦσι τὴν τιµὴν ἀνέλπιστον ἐπιβουλὴν συνεστήσατο. ... 
(Const. Exc. 3, p. 208.) 
(36.3.1) Κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς Κίµβρους τοῦ Μαρίου στρατείαν ἔδωκεν ἡ 
σύγκλητος ἐξουσίαν τῷ Μαρίῳ ἐκ τῶν πέραν θαλάττης ἐθνῶν µεταπέµπεσθαι 
συµµαχίαν. ὁ µὲν οὖν Μάριος ἐξέπεµψε πρὸς Νικοµήδην τὸν τῆς Βιθυνίας βασιλέα 
περὶ βοηθείας· ὁ δὲ ἀπόκρισιν ἔδωκε τοὺς πλείους τῶν Βιθυνῶν ὑπὸ τῶν 
δηµοσιωνῶν διαρπαγέντας δουλεύειν ἐν ταῖς ἐπαρχίαις. (36.3.2) τῆς δὲ συγκλήτου 
ψηφισαµένης ὅπως µηδεὶς σύµµαχος ἐλεύθερος ἐν ἐπαρχίᾳ δουλεύῃ καὶ τῆς τούτων 
ἐλευθερώσεως οἱ στρατηγοὶ πρόνοιαν ποιῶνται͵ τότε κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὢν 
στρατηγὸς Λικίνιος Νέρουας ἀκολούθως τῷ δόγµατι συχνοὺς τῶν δούλων 
ἠλευθέρωσε͵ κρίσεις προθείς͵ ὡς ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡµέραις πλείους τῶν ὀκτακοσίων τυχεῖν 
τῆς ἐλευθερίας. καὶ ἦσαν πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν νῆσον δουλεύοντες µετέωροι πρὸς τὴν 
ἐλευθερίαν.  
(36.3.3) οἱ δ΄ ἐν ἀξιώµασι συνδραµόντες παρεκάλουν τὸν στρατηγὸν 
ἀποστῆναι ταύτης τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. ὁ δ΄ εἴτε χρήµασι πεισθεὶς εἴτε χάριτι δουλεύσας τῆς 
µὲν τῶν κριτηρίων τούτων σπουδῆς ἀπέστη͵ καὶ τοὺς προσιόντας ἐπὶ τῷ τυχεῖν τῆς 
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ἐλευθερίας ἐπιπλήττων εἰς τοὺς ἰδίους κυρίους προσέταττεν ἐπαναστρέφειν. οἱ δὲ 
δοῦλοι συστραφέντες καὶ τῶν Συρακουσῶν ἀπαλλαγέντες καὶ καταφυγόντες εἰς τὸ 
τῶν Παλικῶν τέµενος διελάλουν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ ἀποστάσεως. (36.3.4) ἐκεῖθεν 
ἐν πολλοῖς τόποις τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν τόλµης ἐκδήλου γινοµένης͵ πρῶτοι τῆς 
ἐλευθερίας ἀντεποιήσαντο κατὰ τὴν Ἁλικυαίων χώραν ἀδελφῶν δυεῖν 
µεγαλοπλούτων οἰκέται τριάκοντα͵ ὧν ἡγεῖτο Ὀάριος ὄνοµα· οἳ πρῶτον µὲν νυκτὸς 
κοιµωµένους τοὺς ἰδίους δεσπότας ἀπέσφαξαν͵ εἶτα ἐπὶ τὰς γειτνιώσας ἐπαύλεις 
παρελθόντες παρεκάλουν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τοὺς δούλους· καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ νυκτὶ 
συνέδραµον πλείους τῶν ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι. (36.3.5) καὶ καταλαβόµενοι χωρίον φύσει 
ὀχυρόν͵ τοῦτο µᾶλλον ἐπωχύρωσαν͵ προσδεξάµενοι καὶ ἑτέρους δούλους 
ὡπλισµένους ὀγδοήκοντα. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῆς ἐπαρχίας Λικίνιος Νέρουας κατὰ 
τάχος αὐτοῖς ἐπελθὼν καὶ πολιορκῶν ἄπρακτον ἔσχε τὴν σπουδήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ βίᾳ 
ἀνάλωτον τὸ φρούριον ἑώρα ἐπὶ τὴν προδοσίαν ὁρᾷ͵ καὶ σωτηρίας ὑποσχέσεσι 
Γάιον Τιτίνιον ἐπικαλούµενον Γαδαῖον ἀναπείσας (ἦν δ΄ οὗτος πρὸ δυεῖν ἐτῶν 
καταδικασθεὶς µὲν θανάτῳ͵ τὴν τιµωρίαν δ΄ ἐκφυγὼν καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν κατὰ τὴν 
χώραν ἐλευθέρων κατὰ λῃστείαν ἀναιρῶν͵ οὐδένα δὲ τῶν οἰκετῶν παραλυπῶν) εἶχεν 
ὑπηρέτην τοῦ σκοποῦ. (36.3.6) οὗτος ἔχων αὑτῷ πιστοὺς οἰκέτας ἱκανοὺς πρόσεισι 
τῷ φρουρίῳ τῶν ἀποστατῶν͵ ὡς δὴ συµµεθέξων τοῦ κατὰ Ῥωµαίων πολέµου· 
εὐµενῶς δὲ καὶ φιλοφρόνως προσδεχθεὶς ᾑρέθη διὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ στρατηγός͵ καὶ 
προὔδωκε τὸ φρούριον. τῶν δ΄ ἀποστατῶν οἱ µὲν µαχόµενοι κατεκόπησαν͵ οἱ δὲ τὴν 
ἀπὸ τῆς ἁλώσεως δεδιότες τιµωρίαν ἑαυτοὺς κατεκρήµνισαν. ἡ µὲν οὖν πρώτη τῶν 
δραπετῶν στάσις κατελύθη τὸν εἰρηµένον τρόπον. 
(36.4.1) Τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη ἀπολυθέντων͵ ἧκόν τινες 
ἀπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι Πόπλιον Κλόνιον͵ γενόµενον ἱππέα Ῥωµαίων͵ ἐπαναστάντες οἱ 
δοῦλοι κατέσφαξαν ὀγδοήκοντα ὄντες͵ καὶ ὅτι πλῆθος ἀγείρουσι. καὶ ὁ µὲν 
στρατηγὸς ἑτέρων βουλαῖς παρακρουσθείς͵ ἤδη καὶ τῶν πλείστων στρατιωτῶν 
ἀπολελυµένων͵ καιρὸν παρεῖχε διὰ τῆς ἀναβολῆς τοῖς ἀποστάταις βέλτιον αὑτοὺ 
ἀσφαλίσασθαι. (36.4.2) προῆγε δὲ µετὰ τῶν ἐνόντων στρατιωτῶν͵ καὶ διαβὰς τὸν 
Ἄλβαν ποταµὸν παρῆλθε τοὺς ἀποστάτας διατρίβοντας ἐν ὄρει καλουµένῳ 
Καπριανῷ͵ καὶ κατήντησεν εἰς πόλιν Ἡράκλειαν ἐκ γοῦν τοῦ µὴ προσβαλεῖν αὐτοῖς 
τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀτολµίαν αὐτοῦ διαφηµίσαντες συχνοὺς ἀνέσειον τῶν οἰκετῶν. καὶ 
πολλῶν συρρεόντων καὶ τὸν δυνατὸν τρόπον εἰς µάχην παρασκευαζοµένων͵ ἐν ἑπτὰ 
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ταῖς πρώταις ἡµέραις καθωπλίσθησαν πλείους τῶν ὀκτακοσίων͵ ἐφεξῆς δ΄ ἐγένοντο 
τῶν δισχιλίων οὐκ ἐλάττους.  
(36.4.3) πυθόµενος δ΄ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ τὴν αὔξησιν αὐτῶν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἡγεµόνα 
προεχειρίσατο Μάρκον Τιτίνιον͵ δοὺς αὐτῷ στρατιώτας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἔννης 
φρουροὺς ἑξακοσίους. οὗτος δὲ µάχῃ προσβαλὼν τοῖς ἀποστάταις͵ ἐπεὶ καὶ τῷ 
πλήθει καὶ ταῖς δυσχωρίαις ἐπλεονέκτουν ἐκεῖνοι͵ ἐτράπη σὺν τοῖς περὶ αὐτόν͵ 
πολλῶν µὲν ἀναιρεθέντων͵ τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ῥιψάντων τὰ ὅπλα καὶ φυγῇ µόλις 
διασωθέντων. καὶ οἱ ἀποστάται ὅπλων τε εὐπορήσαντες τοσούτων ἀθρόον καὶ νίκης 
θρασύτερον εἴχοντο τῶν ἔργων͵ καὶ πάντες τῶν δούλων ἐµετεωρίζοντο πρὸς 
ἀπόστασιν. (36.4.4) καὶ πολλῶν καθ΄ ἡµέραν ἀφισταµένων σύντοµον καὶ παράδοξον 
ἐλάµβανον αὔξησιν͵ ὡς ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡµέραις πλείους γενέσθαι τῶν ἑξακισχιλίων. τότε 
δὴ καὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίαν συνελθόντες καὶ βουλῆς προτεθείσης πρῶτον µὲν εἵλαντο 
βασιλέα τὸν ὀνοµαζόµενον Σάλουιον͵ δοκοῦντα τῆς ἱεροσκοπίας ἔµπειρον εἶναι καὶ 
ταῖς γυναικείαις θέαις αὐλοµανοῦντα. οὗτος βασιλεύσας τὰς µὲν πόλεις ἀργίας αἰτίας 
καὶ τρυφῆς νοµίζων ἐξέκλινεν͵ εἰς τρία δὲ µερίσας τοὺς ἀποστάτας καὶ ἴσους 
ἡγεµόνας ἐγκαταστήσας ταῖς µερίσι προσέταξεν ἐπιέναι τὴν χώραν καὶ πρὸς ἕνα 
τόπον καὶ καιρὸν ἅπαντας ἀπαντᾶν. (36.4.5) διὸ πολλῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐπελασίας ἄλλων τε 
ζῴων καὶ ἵππων εὐπορήσαντες ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ κατεσκευάσθησαν ἱππεῖς µὲν πλείους 
τῶν δισχιλίων͵ πεζοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν δισµυρίων͵ ἤδη καὶ γυµνασίαις 
πολεµικαῖς ἐνδιαπρέποντες. προσπεσόντες οὖν ἄφνω πόλει ὀχυρᾷ Μοργαντίνῃ 
προσβολὰς ἐνεργεῖς καὶ συνεχεῖς ἐποιοῦντο. 
(36.4.6) ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ὡς βοηθήσων τῇ πόλει ἐπελθών͵ νυκτοπορίᾳ 
χρησάµενος͵ ἔχων µεθ΄ ἑαυτοῦ Ἰταλιώτας τε καὶ ἐκ Σικελίας σχεδὸν στρατιώτας 
µυρίους͵ κατέλαβε τοὺς ἀποστάτας ἀσχολουµένους περὶ τὴν πολιορκίαν͵ καὶ 
ἐπιθέµενος αὐτῶν τῇ παρεµβολῇ καὶ εὑρὼν ὀλίγους µὲν τοὺς φυλάττοντας͵ πλῆθος 
δὲ γυναικῶν αἰχµαλώτων καὶ λείας ἄλλης παντοδαποῦς͵ ῥᾳδίως ἐξεῖλε τὴν 
στρατοπεδείαν. καὶ ταύτην µὲν διήρπασεν͵ ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Μοργαντίνην ἦγεν. (36.4.7) οἱ 
δ΄ ἀποστάται ἐξαίφνης ἀντεπιθέµενοι͵ καὶ ὑπερδέξιον τὴν στάσιν ἔχοντες βιαίως τε 
ἐπιρράξαντες εὐθὺς ἐπὶ προτερήµατος ἦσαν· οἱ δὲ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἐτράπησαν πρὸς 
φυγήν. τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως τῶν ἀποστατῶν κήρυγµα ποιησαµένου µηδένα κτείνειν τῶν 
τὰ ὅπλα ῥιπτούντων͵ οἱ πλεῖστοι ῥιπτοῦντες ἔφευγον. καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ 
καταστρατηγήσας τοὺς πολεµίους ὁ Σάλουιος τήν τε παρεµβολὴν ἀνεκτήσατο καὶ 
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περιβόητον νίκην ἀπενεγκάµενος πολλῶν ὅπλων ἐκυρίευσεν. (36.4.8) ἀπέθανον δὲ 
ἐν τῇ µάχῃ τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν τε καὶ Σικελῶν οὐ πλείους ἑξακοσίων διὰ τὴν τοῦ 
κηρύγµατος φιλανθρωπίαν͵ ἑάλωσαν δὲ περὶ τετρακισχιλίους. ὁ δὲ Σάλουιος͵ 
πολλῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κατορθώµατος συρρεόντων͵ διπλασιάσας τὴν ἰδίαν 
δύναµιν ἐκράτει τῶν ὑπαίθρων͵ καὶ πολιορκεῖν πάλιν ἐπεχείρει τὴν Μοργαντῖναν͵ 
κηρύγµατι δοὺς τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ δούλοις τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. τῶν δὲ κυρίων 
ἀντιπροτεινόντων αὐτοῖς ταύτην͵ εἰ σφίσι συναγωνίσαιντο͵ εἵλοντο µᾶλλον τὴν ἀπὸ 
τῶν κυρίων͵ καὶ προθύµως ἀγωνισάµενοι ἀπετρίψαντο τὴν πολιορκίαν. ὁ δὲ 
στρατηγὸς µετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀνατρέψας αὐτοµολῆσαι τοὺς πλείστους 
παρεσκεύασε τοῖς ἀποστάταις. 
(36.5.1) Περὶ δὲ τὴν Αἰγεσταίων καὶ Λιλυβαϊτῶν χώραν͵ ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων 
τῶν πλησιοχώρων͵ ἐνόσει πρὸς ἀπόστασιν τὰ πλήθη τῶν οἰκετῶν. γίνεται δὲ τούτων 
ἀρχηγὸς Ἀθηνίων ὄνοµα͵ ἀνὴρ ἀνδρείᾳ διαφέρων͵ Κίλιξ τὸ γένος. οὗτος οἰκονόµος 
ὢν δυοῖν ἀδελφῶν µεγαλοπλούτων͵ καὶ τῆς ἀστροµαντικῆς πολλὴν ἔχων ἐµπειρίαν͵ 
ἔπεισε τῶν οἰκετῶν πρῶτον µὲν τοὺς ὑφ΄ ἑαυτὸν τεταγµένους περὶ διακοσίους ὄντας͵ 
ἔπειτα τοὺς γειτνιῶντας͵ ὥστε ἐν πέντε ἡµέραις συναχθῆναι πλείους τῶν χιλίων. 
(36.5.2) ὑπὸ δὲ τούτων αἱρεθεὶς βασιλεὺς καὶ διάδηµα περιθέµενος ἐναντίαν τοῖς 
ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀποστάταις τὴν διάθεσιν ἐποιεῖτο. οὐ γὰρ προσεδέχετο πάντας τοὺς 
ἀφισταµένους͵ ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀρίστους ποιούµενος στρατιώτας τοὺς ἄλλους ἠνάγκαζε 
µένοντας ἐπὶ τῶν προγεγενηµένων ἐργασιῶν ἐπιµελεῖσθαι τῆς ἰδίας ἕκαστον 
οἰκονοµίας καὶ τάξεως͵ ἐξ ὧν καὶ τροφὰς ἀφθόνους τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐχορηγεῖτο. 
(36.5.3) προσεποιεῖτο δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτῷ διὰ τῶν ἄστρων προσηµαίνειν ὡς ἔσοιτο 
τῆς Σικελίας συµπάσης βασιλεύς· διὸ δεῖν αὐτῆς τε τῆς χώρας καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ζῴων 
τε καὶ καρπῶν ὡς ἰδίων φείδεσθαι. τέλος ἀθροίσας ὑπὲρ τοὺς µυρίους ἐτόλµησε 
πόλιν ἀπόρθητον τὸ Λιλύβαιον πολιορκεῖν. µηδὲν δὲ ἀνύων µετανίστατο αὐτῆς͵ 
εἰπὼν αὐτῷ τοὺς θεοὺς τοῦτο ἐπιτάττειν· ἐπιµένοντας γὰρ ἂν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ 
δυστυχήµατος πειραθῆναι. (36.5.4) παρασκευαζοµένου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως 
ἀναχώρησιν͵ κατέπλευσάν τινες ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ κοµίζοντες ἐπιλέκτους Μαυρουσίους͵ 
οἳ ἐπὶ βοήθειαν ἦσαν ἀπεσταλµένοι τοῖς Λιλυβαΐταις͵ ἔχοντες ἡγούµενον ὃς 
ὠνοµάζετο Γόµων. οὗτος σὺν τοῖς ἅµ΄ αὐτῷ κατὰ νύκτα καὶ ἀνελπίστως ἐπιθέµενος 
τοὺς περὶ Ἀθηνίωνα ὁδοιποροῦντας͵ πολλοὺς καταβαλόντες͵ οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ 
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τραυµατίσαντες͵ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐπανῆλθον. διόπερ οἱ ἀποστάται τὴν ἐκ τῆς 
ἀστροµαντείας πρόρρησιν ἐθαύµαζον. 
(36.6.1) Εἶχε δὲ τὴν Σικελίαν πᾶσαν σύγχυσις καὶ κακῶν Ἰλιάς. οὐ γὰρ οἱ 
δοῦλοι µόνον͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων οἱ ἄποροι πᾶσαν ἁρπαγὴν καὶ παρανοµίαν 
ἐργαζόµενοι͵ καὶ τοὺς περιτυγχάνοντας δούλους τε καὶ ἐλευθέρους͵ ὅπως µηδεὶς 
ἀπαγγέλλοι τὴν περὶ αὐτοὺς ἀπόνοιαν͵ ἐφόνευον ἀναιδῶς. διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὰς 
πόλεις ὑπελάµβανον τὰ µὲν ἐντὸς τειχῶν µόλις εἶναι ἴδια͵ τὰ δ΄ ἐκτὸς ἀλλότρια καὶ 
δοῦλα τῆς παρανόµου χειροκρασίας. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πολλὰ πολλοῖς ἄτοπα κατὰ τὴν 
Σικελίαν ἐτολµᾶτο. (Photius, Bibl. pp. 387-389.) 
(36.11.1) Ὅτι οὐ µόνον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν 
ὡρµηµένον κατέτρεχεν͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων οἱ τὰς ἐπὶ χώρας κτήσεις οὐκ 
ἔχοντες ἐτρέποντο πρὸς ἁρπαγὴν καὶ παρανοµίαν. οἱ γὰρ ἐλλιπεῖς ταῖς οὐσίαις διὰ 
τὴν ἀπορίαν ἅµα καὶ παρανοµίαν ἐξεχέοντο κατὰ συστροφὰς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰς 
µὲν ἀγέλας τῶν θρεµµάτων ἀπήλαυνον͵ τοὺς δὲ ἐν τοῖς σταθµοῖς τεθησαυρισµένους 
καρποὺς διήρπαζον͵ καὶ τοὺς περιτυγχάνοντας ἀνέδην ἐλευθέρους τε καὶ δούλους 
ἐφόνευον͵ ὅπως µηδεὶς ἀπαγγείλῃ τὴν περὶ αὐτοὺς ἀπόνοιάν τε καὶ παρανοµίαν. 
(36.11.2) ἀναρχίας δ΄ οὔσης διὰ τὸ µηδεµίαν Ῥωµαϊκὴν ἀρχὴν δικαιοδοτεῖν͵ πάντες 
ἀνυπεύθυνον ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντες πολλὰς καὶ µεγάλας συµφορὰς ἀπειργάζοντο· διὸ καὶ 
πᾶς τόπος ἔγεµεν ἁρπαγῆς βιαίου ταῖς τῶν εὐπόρων οὐσίαις ἐνεξουσιαζούσης. οἱ δὲ 
πρότερον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν πρωτεύοντες ταῖς τε δόξαις καὶ τοῖς πλούτοις τότε διὰ τὴν 
ἀνέλπιστον τῆς τύχης µεταβολὴν οὐ µόνον ὑπὸ τῶν δραπετῶν ὑβριστικῶς 
ἀπέβαλλον τὰς εὐπορίας͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐπηρεαζόµενοι καρτερεῖν 
ἠναγκάζοντο. (36.11.3) διὸ καὶ πάντες ὑπελάµβανον τὰ µὲν ἐντὸς τῶν πυλῶν µόγις 
ὑπάρχειν ἴδια͵ τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς τῶν τειχῶν ἀλλότρια καὶ δοῦλα τῆς παρανόµου 
χειροκρατίας εἶναι. καθόλου δ΄ ἦν κατὰ πόλεις φυρµὸς καὶ σύγχυσις τῶν κατὰ 
νόµους δικαίων. οἱ γὰρ ἀποστάται τῶν ὑπαίθρων κρατοῦντες ἀνεπίβατον ἐποιοῦντο 
τὴν χώραν͵ µνησικακοῦντες τοῖς δεσπόταις͵ οὐκ ἐµπιπλάµενοι δὲ τῶν ἀνελπίστων 
εὐτυχηµάτων· οἱ δὲ ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν δοῦλοι νοσοῦντες ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ 
µετεωριζόµενοι πρὸς ἀπόστασιν φοβερώτατοι τοῖς κυρίοις ὑπῆρχον. (Const. Exc. 
2ž1Ÿ, p. 314.) 
(36.7.1) Ὁ δὲ τὴν Μοργαντίνην πολιορκήσας Σάλουιος͵ ἐπιδραµὼν τὴν 
χώραν µέχρι τοῦ Λεοντίνου πεδίου͵ ἤθροισεν αὐτοῦ τὸ σύµπαν στράτευµα͵ 
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ἐπιλέκτους ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν τρισµυρίων͵ καὶ θύσας τοῖς Παλικοῖς ἥρωσι 
τούτοις µὲν ἀνέθηκε µίαν τῶν ἁλουργῶν περιπορφύρων στολὴν χαριστήρια τῆς 
νίκης͵ αὐτὸς δ΄ ἀναγορεύσας ἑαυτὸν βασιλέα Τρύφων µὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστατῶν 
προσηγορεύετο. (36.7.2) διανοούµενος δὲ τὰ Τριόκαλα καταλαβέσθαι καὶ 
κατασκευάσαι βασίλεια πέµπει καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηνίωνα͵ µεταπεµπόµενος αὐτὸν ὡς 
στρατηγὸν βασιλεύς. πάντες µὲν οὖν ὑπελάµβανον τὸν Ἀθηνίωνα τῶν πρωτείων 
ἀντιποιήσεσθαι͵ καὶ διὰ τὴν στάσιν τῶν ἀποστατῶν ῥᾳδίως καταλυθήσεσθαι τὸν 
πόλεµον· ἡ δὲ τύχη καθάπερ ἐπίτηδες αὔξουσα τὰς τῶν δραπετῶν δυνάµεις 
ὁµονοῆσαι τοὺς τούτων ἡγεµόνας ἐποίησεν. ἧκε µὲν γὰρ συντόµως µετὰ τῆς 
δυνάµεως ἐπὶ τὰ Τριόκαλα ὁ Τρύφων͵ ἧκε δὲ καὶ Ἀθηνίων µετὰ τρισχιλίων͵ 
ὑπακούων ὡς στρατηγὸς βασιλεῖ τῷ Τρύφωνι͵ τὴν ἄλλην αὑτοῦ δύναµιν κατατρέχειν 
τὴν χώραν καὶ ἀνασείειν πρὸς ἀπόστασιν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπεσταλκώς. µετὰ δὲ ταῦτα 
ὑπονοήσας ὁ Τρύφων τὸν Ἀθηνίωνα ἐπιθήσεσθαι ἐν καιρῷ παρέδωκεν εἰς φυλακήν. 
τὸ δὲ φρούριον ὀχυρώτατον ὂν κατεσκεύαζε πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς καὶ ἐπὶ µᾶλλον 
ὠχύρου. (36.7.3) Τριόκαλα δὲ αὐτό φασιν ὠνοµάσθαι διὰ τὸ τρία καλὰ ἔχειν͵ 
πρῶτον µὲν ναµατιαίων ὑδάτων πλῆθος διαφόρων τῇ γλυκύτητι͵ δεύτερον 
παρακειµένην χώραν ἀµπελόφυτόν τε καὶ ἐλαιόφυτον καὶ γεωργεῖσθαι δυναµένην 
θαυµαστῶς͵ τρίτον ὑπερβάλλουσαν ὀχυρότητα͵ ὡς ἂν οὔσης µεγάλης πέτρας 
ἀναλώτου· ἣν καὶ περιβόλῳ πόλεως σταδίων ὀκτὼ προσπεριβαλὼν καὶ ταφρεύσας 
βαθείᾳ τάφρῳ βασιλείοις ἐχρῆτο͵ πάσῃ ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἁπάντων 
πεπληρωµένην. κατεσκεύασε δὲ καὶ βασιλικὴν οἰκίαν καὶ ἀγορὰν δυναµένην 
δέξασθαι πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων. (36.7.4) ἐξελέξατο δὲ καὶ τῶν φρονήσει διαφερόντων 
ἀνδρῶν τοὺς ἱκανούς͵ οὓς ἀποδείξας συµβούλους ἐχρῆτο συνέδροις αὐτοῖς· 
τήβεννάν τε περιπόρφυρον περιεβάλλετο καὶ πλατύσηµον ἔδυ χιτῶνα κατὰ τοὺς 
χρηµατισµούς͵ καὶ ῥαβδούχους εἶχε µετὰ πελέκεων τοὺς προηγουµένους͵ καὶ τἄλλα 
πάντα ὅσα ποιοῦσί τε καὶ ἐπικοσµοῦσι βασιλείαν ἐπετήδευε. 
(36.8.1) Προχειρίζεται δὲ κατὰ τῶν ἀποστατῶν ἡ σύγκλητος τῶν Ῥωµαίων 
Λεύκιον Λικίνιον Λούκουλλον͵ ἔχοντα στρατιώτας µυρίους µὲν καὶ τετρακισχιλίους 
Ῥωµαίους καὶ Ἰταλούς͵ Βιθυνοὺς δὲ καὶ Θετταλοὺς καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνας ὀκτακοσίους͵ ἐκ 
δὲ τῆς Λευκανίας ἑξακοσίους͵ ὧν ἡγεῖτο Κλέπτιος͵ ἀνὴρ στρατηγικὸς καὶ ἐπ΄ 
ἀνδρείᾳ περιβόητος͵ ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἑτέρους ἑξακοσίους͵ ὡς γενέσθαι σύµπαντας 
ἑπτακισχιλίους καὶ µυρίους͵ οὓς ἔχων κατέλαβε τὴν Σικελίαν. (36.8.2) ὁ δὲ Τρύφων 
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ἀπολύσας Ἀθηνίωνα τῆς αἰτίας ἐβουλεύετο περὶ τοῦ πρὸς Ῥωµαίους πολέµου. καὶ 
τῷ µὲν ἤρεσκεν ἐν τοῖς Τριοκάλοις ἀγωνίζεσθαι͵ Ἀθηνίων δὲ συνεβούλευε µὴ 
συγκλείειν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς πολιορκίαν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι. κρατησάσης δὲ 
ταύτης τῆς βουλῆς κατεστρατοπέδευσαν πλησίον Σκιρθαίας͵ ὄντες οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν 
τετρακισµυρίων· ἀπεῖχε δ΄ αὐτῶν ἡ Ῥωµαίων παρεµβολὴ στάδια δυοκαίδεκα. 
(36.8.3) τὸ µὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐγίνοντο συνεχεῖς ἀκροβολισµοί· εἶτα παραταξαµένων 
ἑκατέρων καὶ τῆς µάχης ὧδε κἀκεῖσε ῥεπούσης καὶ πολλῶν ἑκατέρωθεν πιπτόντων͵ 
ὁ µὲν Ἀθηνίων ἔχων συναγωνιζοµένους διακοσίους ἱππεῖς͵ ἐπικρατῶν πάντα τὸν 
περὶ αὑτὸν τόπον νεκρῶν ἐπλήρωσε͵ τρωθεὶς δ΄ εἰς ἀµφότερα τὰ γόνατα καὶ τρίτην 
λαβὼν ἄχρηστος ἐγένετο πρὸς τὴν µάχην· ἐξ οὗ οἱ δραπέται ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσόντες 
πρὸς φυγὴν ἐτράπησαν. (36.8.4) ὁ δὲ Ἀθηνίων ὡς νεκρὸς ὢν ἔλαθε͵ καὶ 
προσποιηθεὶς τετελευτηκέναι τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιλαβούσης διεσώθη. ἐπεκράτησαν δὲ 
λαµπρῶς οἱ Ῥωµαῖοι͵ φυγόντων καὶ τῶν µετὰ Τρύφωνος καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου· καὶ 
πολλῶν κατὰ τὴν φυγὴν κοπέντων τέλος οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν δισµυρίων ἀνῃρέθησαν. 
οἱ δὲ λοιποί͵ τῆς νυκτὸς συνεργούσης͵ διέφυγον εἰς τὰ Τριόκαλα· καίτοι ῥᾴδιον ἦν 
ἐπιδιώξαντι τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τούτους ἀνελεῖν. (36.8.5) ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δ΄ 
ἐτεταπείνωτο τὸ οἰκετικὸν ὥστε καὶ ἐβουλεύσαντο ἐπὶ τοὺς κυρίους ἐπαναδραµεῖν 
καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοῖς ἐγχειρίσαι· πλὴν ἐπεκράτησεν ἡ γνώµη τῶν µέχρι τελευτῆς 
ὑποθεµένων ἀγωνίσασθαι καὶ µὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἑαυτοὺς καταπροδοῦναι. µετὰ δ΄ 
ἐνάτην ἡµέραν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἧκε πολιορκήσων τὰ Τριόκαλα. καὶ τὰ µὲν ἀναιρῶν͵ τὰ 
δὲ ἀναιρούµενος͵ ἔλαττον ἔχων ἀπηλλάγη͵ καὶ οἱ ἀποστάται αὖθις ἐφρονηµατίζοντο. 
ἤνυε δὲ τῶν δεόντων ὁ στρατηγὸς εἴτε διὰ ῥᾳστώνην εἴτε διὰ δωροδοκίαν οὐδέν· 
ἀνθ΄ ὧν καὶ δίκην ὕστερον κριθεὶς Ῥωµαίοις ἔδωκε. 
(36.9.1) Γάιος δὲ Σερουίλιος καταπεµφθεὶς στρατηγὸς διάδοχος Λουκούλλου 
οὐδ΄ αὐτός τι ἄξιον µνήµης ἔπραξε· διὸ καὶ ὁµοίως Λουκούλλῳ ὕστερον φυγῇ 
κατεδικάσθη. τελευτήσαντος δὲ Τρύφωνος͵ διάδοχος τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ Ἀθηνίων 
καθίσταται͵ καὶ τοῦτο µὲν πόλεις ἐπολιόρκει͵ τοῦτο δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν ἀδεῶς 
κατέτρεχε καὶ πολλῶν ἐκυρίευσε͵ τοῦ Σερουιλίου µηδὲν ἀντιπράττοντος. (Photius, 
Bibl. pp. 389-390.) 
(36.9.2) Ὅτι Λούκουλλος ὁ στρατηγὸς πυθόµενος διαβεβηκέναι τὸν πορθµὸν 
Σερουίλιον Γάιον στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τὴν διαδοχὴν τοῦ πολέµου͵ τούς τε στρατιώτας 
ἀπέλυσε καὶ τοὺς χάρακας καὶ τὰς κατασκευὰς ἐνέπρησε͵ βουλόµενος τὸν 
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διαδεχόµενον τὴν ἀρχὴν µηδεµίαν ἔχειν ἀξιόλογον ἀφορµὴν εἰς τὸν πόλεµον. 
βλασφηµούµενος γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ δοκεῖν τὸν πόλεµον αὔξειν ὑπελάµβανε τῇ τούτου 
ταπεινώσει καὶ ἀδοξίᾳ καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κατηγορίαν καταλύειν. (Const. Exc. 4, pp. 
392-393.) 
(36.10.1) Τοῦ δ΄ ἐνιαυσίου χρόνου διελθόντος ὕπατος ἐν Ῥώµῃ Γάιος Μάριος ᾑρέθη 
τὸ πέµπτον καὶ Γάιος Ἀκύλλιος· ὧν ὁ Ἀκύλλιος στρατηγὸς κατὰ τῶν ἀποστατῶν 
σταλεὶς διὰ τῆς ἰδίας ἀνδρείας ἐπιφανεῖ µάχῃ τοὺς ἀποστάτας ἐνίκησε. καὶ πρὸς 
αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν βασιλέα τῶν ἀποστατῶν Ἀθηνίωνα συµβαλὼν ἡρωικὸν ἀγῶνα 
συνεστήσατο͵ καὶ τοῦτον µὲν ἀνεῖλεν͵ αὐτὸς δ΄ εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν τρωθεὶς 
ἐθεραπεύθη. καὶ στρατεύει ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπολειποµένους τῶν ἀποστατῶν͵ ὄντας µυρίους. 
οὐχ ὑποµεινάντων δὲ τὴν ἔφοδον͵ ἀλλ΄ εἰς τὰ ὀχυρώµατα καταφυγόντων͵ ὅµως 
Ἀκύλλιος οὐκ ἐνεδίδου πάντα πράττων ἕως αὐτοὺς ἐκπολιορκήσας ἐχειρώσατο. 
(36.10.2) ἔτι δ΄ ὑπολειποµένων χιλίων καὶ στρατηγὸν ἐχόντων τὸν Σάτυρον͵ τὸ µὲν 
πρῶτον ἐπεβάλετο διὰ τῶν ὅπλων αὐτοὺς χειρώσασθαι͵ µετὰ δὲ ταῦτα 
διαπρεσβευόντων καὶ παραδόντων ἑαυτοὺς τῆς µὲν παραυτίκα τιµωρίας ἀπέλυσεν͵ 
ἀπαγαγὼν δὲ εἰς τὴν Ῥώµην θηριοµάχας αὐτοὺς ἐποίησε. (36.10.3) τοὺς δέ φασί 
τινες ἐπιφανεστάτην ποιήσασθαι τοῦ βίου καταστροφήν· τῆς µὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰ θηρία 
µάχης ἀποστῆναι͵ ἀλλήλους δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν δηµοσίων βωµῶν κατασφάξαι͵ καὶ τὸν 
τελευταῖον αὐτὸν τὸν Σάτυρον ἀνελόντα· τοῦτον δὴ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν αὐτοχειρίᾳ ἡρωικῶς 
καταστρέψαι. ὁ µὲν οὖν κατὰ Σικελίαν τῶν οἰκετῶν πόλεµος͵ διαµείνας ἔτη σχεδόν 
που τέτταρα͵ τραγικὴν ἔσχε τὴν καταστροφήν. (Photius, Bibl. p. 390.) 
 
II. Photian Version and Constantinian Excerpts: Translation 
 
(36.1.1) In Rome, about the same time that Marius defeated the Libyan kings 
Bocchus and Jugurtha in a great battle, and killed many tens of thousands of Libyans, 
and later Bocchus seized Jugurtha, and so he won pardon from the Romans for 
having gone to war with them, Marius took Jugurtha from that place and kept him 
captive, furthermore when the Romans, having encountered great misfortunes in 
Gaul during the Cimbric wars, were disheartened, at the same time some men came 
from Sicily bringing news of a revolt of slaves numbering into the tens of thousands. 
On this news, the whole Roman state fell into a great crisis, since nearly sixty 
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thousand chosen soldiers had died in the war against the Cimbri in Gaul, and there 
was a shortage of troops to send out. 
 
(36.2.1) Before the uprising of slaves in Sicily there occurred in Italy several 
short lived and minor revolts, as if the divine were announcing the magnitude of the 
coming uprising in Sicily. The first was in Nuceria, where thirty slaves formed a 
conspiracy and were quickly punished, the second was in Capua, where two hundred 
slaves rose up and were quickly put down.  
 
(36.2.2) The third one was contrary to all expectations. There was a man 
Titus Minucius,420 a Roman knight, the son of an exceedingly wealthy father. He 
conceived a passion for a beautiful slave girl owned by another. After he had lain 
with her and fallen in love contrary to all expectation he bought her and having been 
so overpowered by a mad passion, the master of the girl only just consented to the 
sale, for seven Attic talents, he fixed a time for the repayment of the debt: he was 
given credit because of his father’s wealth. The fixed time arrived, and he did not 
have the means to pay, so he once more agreed to pay in thirty days. (36.2.3) When 
this day arrived and the creditors demanded repayment, he did not have enough to 
pay, his passion was at its height, and he attempted an undertaking beyond all reason. 
For he contrived against his creditors, and conferred monarchical power on himself. 
For having bought five hundred suits of armour and arranged a time of payment, and 
was trusted, he secretly conveyed them to a certain field and stirred up his own 
slaves to revolt, four hundred in number. (36.2.4) Then, after taking up a diadem, 
purple cloak, lictors and the other regalia of power, and having, with the slaves 
cooperation, proclaimed himself king, he flogged and beheaded those who demanded 
payment for the girl. Arming his slaves, he marched on nearby farms and armed 
those willing to join the rebellion, but killed those opposed. Soon, after he brought 
together more than seven hundred soldiers and organised them into centuries, he set 
to work upon a palisade and welcomed any rebels. 
 
                                                 
420 Every other reference in the Photius and the Constantinian excerpts is to Titus Vettius, or Οὐέττιος, 
so it is likely that there is a textual error here. 
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(36.2.5) When the rebellion was reported in Rome, the senate sensibly took 
council about it and set things straight. For of the generals in the city they appointed 
one to apprehend the runaways, Lucius Lucullus. He, the same day, selected six 
hundred soldiers from Rome, and arrived at Capua having assembled four thousand 
infantry and four hundred cavalry. (36.2.6) When Vettius learned of Lucullus’ attack, 
he seized a strong hill, having more than three thousand five hundred in all. At the 
start of the battle the runaways had the advantage since they fought from higher 
ground: but after this Lucullus, by bribing Apollonius the general of Vettius and 
confirming in the name of the state his immunity from punishment, persuaded him to 
turn traitor against his fellow-rebels. Therefore, since he was cooperating with the 
Romans, and turned his forces on Vettius, who, afraid of the punishments from 
capture, cut his own throat, in a moment the other rebels were destroyed together, 
except for the traitor Apollonius. These events took place before the great revolt in 
Sicily, as if making a prelude for it: this began as follows. (Photius, Bibl. Pp. 386-7 
B.) 
 
(36.2a.1) There were many uprisings of slaves: the first was in Nuceria, 
where thirty slaves formed a conspiracy and were quickly punished, the second was 
in Capua, where two hundred slaves rose up and were quickly punished. 
 
The third revolt was contrary to all expectations and very different from the 
normal. For there was a certain Titus Vettius, a Roman knight, who had an 
exceedingly wealthy father, and being a very young man he had a desire for a very 
beautiful slave girl owned by another. Having slept with her, and lived with her for a 
sufficient time he fell in passion contrary to all expectations and into a state near to 
madness. Wishing, because of his affection, to take possession of the girl, he at first 
faced the opposition of her master, but after this, having persuaded by the magnitude 
of the price, he bought her for seven Attic talents, and fixed the payment of the price 
at a stated time. Having gained credit for the sum because of his father’s wealth he 
carried the girl off, and going down to one of his father’s farms fulfilled his private 
desire. When the time agreed on for the debt arrived, those sent to retrieve the debt 
arrived. He put off the settlement for thirty days, and not being able to provide the 
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money, but being a slave to passion, he attempted an undertaking beyond all reason. 
For because of the excess of his condition and the shame resulting from his deferred 
payment he turned to childish and utterly foolish considerations. For facing an 
immediate separation from his love he contrived a hopeless plot against those 
demanding payment…421 (Const. Exc. 3, p. 208.) 
 
(36.3.1) During Marius’ campaign against the Cimbri the senate granted 
Marius permission to summon allies from the nations across the sea. Therefore, 
Marius dispatched a message to Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, about aid: he 
responded that the majority of the Bithynians had been seized by the tax farmers to 
be slaves in the provinces. (36.3.2) Then the senate decreed that no free ally should 
be a slave in a province and that the governors should make provision for their 
freedom, and Licinius Nerva, who was governor in Sicily at that time, and following 
the decree, set free many of the slaves, setting up a court, so that in a few days more 
than eight hundred obtained their freedom. And all those in slavery on the island 
were buoyed up at the thought of freedom. 
 
(36.3.3) The authorities assembled, and exhorted the governor to desist from 
this enterprise. He, either because he was bribed, or slavishly to honour them, gave 
up interest in these courts, and when men approached to win freedom, he rebuked 
them and ordered them to return each to his own master. The slaves, collecting 
together, departed from Syracuse and took refuge in the shrine to the Palici, and 
discussed with one another about revolt. (36.3.4) From then on the boldness of the 
slaves was made plain in many places. The first to lay claim to freedom were thirty 
slaves of two exceedingly wealthy brothers in the region of Halicyae: a man named 
Varius led them. First, they cut the throats of their masters as they slept, then, going 
to the neighbouring farmsteads they summoned the slaves to freedom: in the same 
night more than one hundred and twenty assembled. (36.3.5) Seizing a place that was 
naturally strong, they strengthened it more, having received eighty other armed 
slaves. The governor of the province, Licinius Nerva, had attacked them swiftly and 
                                                 
421 The text stops here, and the µέν just before suggests a continuation of the sentence which is not 
preserved. 
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besieged them, but his exertions were to no avail. When he saw that the citadel was 
impregnable to force, he looked to betrayal, and persuading Gaius Titinius, called by 
the surname Gadaeus, with a promise of immunity, involved him as a servant of the 
enterprise. This man had been condemned to death two years before, but having 
escaped the punishment had killed many of the free people of the island through 
banditry, while attacking no slaves. (36.3.6) He, taking with him sufficient trusted 
slaves, approached the rebels’ citadel, as if going to take part in the war against the 
Romans: both favourably and kindly received he was even chosen as general because 
of his bravery, and then he betrayed the citadel. Of the rebels, some were cut down 
while fighting, while others, fearing the punishments upon capture, threw themselves 
off the precipice. The first sedition of the runaways was put down in the manner 
described. 
 
(36.4.1) After the soldiers had been disbanded to their usual homes, some 
reports came that eighty slaves had risen up and murdered Publius Clonius, who had 
been made a Roman knight, and that a great number were gathering. The governor, 
led astray by the advice of others, as well as because the majority of his soldiers had 
been disbanded, at the critical time handed the rebels an opportunity, during the 
delay, to secure themselves. (36.4.2) He advanced with the soldiers available, and 
crossing the river Alba passed by the rebels who were residing on the mountain 
called Kaprianus, and arrived at the city Heraclea. At all events, making known that 
the governor was a coward as a result of his not attacking them, they stirred up many 
of the slaves. Many flocked together and were prepared in a strong fashion for battle, 
within the first seven days more than eight hundred had been armed, immediately 
afterwards there were not less than two thousand.  
 
(36.4.3) When the governor learnt in Heraclea of their growth he appointed 
Marius Titinius as commander, giving him six hundred soldiers from the Enna 
garrison. Titinius carried out an attack on the rebels, but since they had the advantage 
in greater numbers and rough terrain, he and those around him were routed, many 
having been killed, while the remainder threw down their weapons and with 
difficulty saved themselves through flight. The rebels, having procured both so many 
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weapons all at once and a victory, grew in boldness from their deeds, and all of the 
slaves were buoyed up for rebellion. (36.4.4) Since every day many revolted, they 
built up their force quickly and contrary to expectations, so that in a few days they 
were more than six thousand. At that time, then, they gathered in an assembly and 
when the proposal was put before them they first chose as king one named Salvius, 
who was reputed to be practised in divination and a flute player in mystic orgies for 
women. He, on becoming king, avoided cities, considering them to be the cause of 
idleness and luxury, but divided the rebels into three parts and established equal 
commanders for the parts, and he ordered them to pillage the countryside and to meet 
in full at one place and time. (36.4.5) Therefore, since they had plenty of horses and 
other animals because of their raids, in a little time they were equipped with more 
than two thousand cavalry and not less than twenty thousand infantry, and indeed 
were eminent in military exercises. Therefore, falling suddenly on the strong city of 
Morgantina, they made continuous and active assaults. 
 
(36.4.6) The governor, in order to come to aid the city, made a night march, 
having with him about ten thousand soldiers from Sicily and the Italian Greeks; he 
discovered that the rebels were engaged in the siege and attacked their encampment, 
and finding that there were few guards, and many captive women and other forms of 
booty, he took the encampment easily. He sacked this, and went on to Morgantina. 
(36.4.7) The rebels all of a sudden counter-attacked, and since they had a 
commanding position above, and attacked forcibly, they immediately were in the 
ascendancy: the forces of the governor were turned to flight. When the king of the 
rebels made a proclamation to kill none of those who threw down their arms, the 
majority fled dropping their weapons. Having outwitted the enemy in this fashion, 
Salvius both regained the camp and, having obtained a famous victory, got 
possession of many weapons. (36.4.8) Not more than six hundred Italian Greeks and 
Sicilians died in the battle because of the humanity of the proclamation, but about 
four thousand were taken. Salvius, since many joined him because of his success, 
doubled his forces and was master of the countryside, and again endeavoured to 
besiege Morgantina, and was offering, by proclamation, freedom to the slaves in the 
city. Their masters offered this to them in turn, if they would join in the struggle with 
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them, and the slaves chose rather the offer from their masters, and fighting with 
enthusiasm resisted the siege. After this the governor, by nullifying their freedom, 
caused the majority to desert to the rebels. 
 
(36.5.1) In the territory of Segesta and Lilybaeum, and yet others adjacent, 
the multitude of slaves were sick for revolt. The chief of these was one named 
Athenion, a man excelling in courage, a Cilician by birth. He was the steward of two 
exceedingly wealthy brothers, and having great experience of astrology, he first 
persuaded those of the slaves formed up under him, about two hundred, then those in 
the vicinity, so that in five days more than a thousand had been brought together. 
(36.5.2) When he had been chosen king by these men and had put on a diadem, he 
adopted the opposite disposition to all the other rebels. For he did not accept all who 
revolted, but making soldiers of the best he compelled the others to remain at their 
previous work, and each to engage in their own domestic affairs and post; therefore 
he was able to furnish plentiful provisions for his soldiers. (36.5.3) He pretended that 
the gods foretold to him through the stars that he would be king of all Sicily: 
therefore there was a need to spare the land itself, the animals on it and the crops as 
his own. Finally, having gathered more than ten thousand, he undertook to besiege 
the city of Lilybaeum, which had never been captured. After accomplishing nothing 
he removed himself from it, saying that the gods ordered this: for were they to 
continue the siege they would experience misfortune. (36.5.4) While he was 
preparing to retreat from the city, some ships put in carrying Mauretanian auxiliaries, 
who had been sent to help Lilybaeum, having as leader one called Gomon. He, with 
his men, unexpectedly attacked those walking with Athenion in the night, killing 
many, wounding not a few, and returned to the city. As a result, the rebels wondered 
at the prediction from the stars. 
 
(36.6.1) Ruin and an Iliad of troubles held all Sicily. For not only the slaves, 
but even the impoverished free performed all kinds of robbery and lawlessness, and 
those that happened to be about, both slaves and free, so that no one might report 
their madness, they murdered ruthlessly. Therefore all those in the cities supposed 
that what was within the city walls was scarcely their own, but that what was without 
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belonged to others and were slaves of the force of lawlessness. And many besides 
were the extraordinary ventures undertaken in Sicily, and by many. (Photius, Bibl. 
Pp. 387-9.) 
 
(36.11.1) Not only did the multitude of slaves who had rushed to revolt 
ravage, but even those of the free who had no possessions on the land turned to 
robbery and lawlessness. For those without property, because of poverty and 
lawlessness alike, were pouring out en masse into the countryside and were driving 
away the herds of cattle, plundering the crops that had been stored in the farms, and 
freely murdered those who happened to be about, both free and slave, so that no one 
might bring tidings of their madness and lawlessness. (36.11.2) Since no Roman 
magistrate administered justice there was anarchy, and all men, having 
unaccountable licence, were causing misfortunes far and wide; therefore all regions 
were full of violent robbery that exerted authority over the property of the wealthy. 
Those who before had held first place in their cities in both reputation and wealth 
now, because of their unexpected change of fortune, not only outrageously lost their 
abundance because of the runaways, but were even forced to be steadfast in the face 
of violent threats from the free. (36.11.3) Therefore, they all considered what was 
within the gates to be scarcely theirs, and that outside the walls to belong to others 
and to be slaves of the force of lawlessness. In a word there was disorder in the cities 
and confounding of justice under the law. For the rebels, being masters of the open 
country, made the countryside inaccessible, since they bore their masters a grudge, 
and were not getting a fill of their unlooked for success: the slaves within the walls, 
being sick in their minds, and buoyed up for revolt, began to cause great fear in their 
masters. (Const. Exc. 2, p. 314.) 
 
(36.7.1) After the siege of Morgantina, Salvius, having overrun the country as 
far as the plain of Leontini, gathered his whole army, chosen men of not less than 
thirty thousand, and having sacrificed to the Palici heroes, dedicated a purple 
bordered robe to them in thanksgiving for victory. He also proclaimed himself king 
and was addressed by the rebels as Tryphon. (36.7.2) Intending to seize Triocala and 
build a palace, he sent to Athenion as king to a general. Therefore everyone expected 
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that Athenion would lay claim to the first place, and that because of the sedition 
among the slaves the war would collapse easily: but fortune, as if on purpose to 
increase the power of the runaways, made their leaders to be of one mind. For 
Tryphon came directly to Triocala with his army, and likewise Athenion came with 
three thousand, complying as a general to King Tryphon, having sent the rest of his 
army to overrun the country, and to stir up the slaves for revolt. After this Tryphon, 
suspecting that Athenion would attack given the opportunity, threw him in jail. The 
citadel, which was very secure, he equipped with costly constructions and secured it 
more. (36.7.3) It is said that this place is named Triocala because it has three fine 
features: first, many flowing springs remarkable for their sweetness; second, the 
country around is planted with both vines and olive trees and is wonderfully 
amenable to cultivation; third, surpassing strength, as it is a large and impregnable 
rock ridge. Tryphon surrounded the city with a wall of eight stades and a deep moat, 
and used it as his royal residence, filling it with every abundance required for living. 
He built a royal residence and an agora able to hold many people. (36.7.4) He chose 
sufficient men who excelled in prudence, and appointing them as counsellors he used 
them as his councillors. He wore a purple bordered toga and a broad bordered chiton 
when in session, and had lictors bearing axes precede him; and in all other things he 
made it his business to both prepare and adorn himself as much as a king. 
 
(36.8.1) The senate of Rome appointed Lucius Licinius Lucullus against the 
rebels, with an army of fourteen thousand Romans and Italians, eight hundred 
Bithynians, Thessalians and Acarnanians, six hundred Lucanians, commanded by 
Cleptius, a man versed in generalship and famous for bravery, and a further six 
hundred in addition, for a total of seventeen thousand,422 with these he seized Sicily. 
(36.8.2) Tryphon, having absolved Athenion of guilt, was taking counsel about the 
war against Rome. His choice was to fight at Triocala, but Athenion advised that 
they should not shut themselves into a siege, but ought to fight in the open. This plan 
prevailed, and they encamped near Scirthea, no fewer than forty thousand strong: the 
Roman camp was twelve stades from them. (36.8.3) First there was constant 
skirmishing. Next, after the two armies had drawn up opposite each other, the battle 
                                                 
422 The text is wrong here, as the total is only sixteen thousand.  
288 
 
 
swung this way and that, with many dead on both sides. Athenion, who had a force 
of two hundred cavalry fighting with him, was victorious and filled the area around 
him with corpses. He was, however, wounded in both knees, and taking a third injury 
was useless to the battle: because of this the runaways, losing spirit, were turned to 
flight. (36.8.4) Athenion escaped detection as being a corpse, and by pretending to be 
dead came through safely in the night. The Romans won a magnificent victory, since 
those with Tryphon, and Tryphon himself, fled; many were cut down in flight, and 
not less than twenty thousand died. The remainder, under the cover of night, escaped 
into Triocala: though it was easy to kill them too if the governor had pursued them. 
(36.8.5) The slaves had come to such a low point that they even considered returning 
to their masters and placing themselves in their hands: however the judgement 
prevailed of those arguing to fight till death prevailed, and not to utterly betray 
themselves to the hated enemy. After nine days the governor arrived to besiege 
Triocala. After inflicting some casualties, but also suffering some, he departed the 
worse off, and the rebels were back to being presumptuous. The governor 
accomplished nothing of what needed doing, either because of indolence or because 
of taking bribes: because of this he was later tried and punished by the Romans and 
brought to justice. 
 
(36.9.1) Gaius Servilius, sent out as governor to succeed Lucullus, 
accomplished nothing worthy of note: therefore, like Lucullus, he was later 
condemned to exile. After Tryphon died, Athenion was appointed his successor in 
office; he besieged cities and overran the whole country with impunity, and seized 
many places, while Servilius never acted against him. (Photius, Bibl. pp. 389-90.) 
 
(36.9.2) When the governor, Lucullus, learned that Gaius Servilius, the 
governor to succeed him for the war, had crossed the straits, he both disbanded his 
soldiers and set fire to his camp and its fittings, since he did not want his successor to 
the command to have any important resources for the war. For since he was being 
slandered for his seeming to expand the war, he supposed that by humiliation and 
contempt of this man he would dispel the charges against himself. (Const. Exc. 4, pp. 
392-3.) 
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(36.10.1) When the year had finished, Gaius Marius was elected consul for the fifth 
time with Gaius Aquilius:423 of them, Aquilius was sent as general against the rebels 
and by his own bravery he defeated the rebels in a famous battle. Confronting 
Athenion, the actual king of the rebels, he exhibited a brave struggle, and killed him, 
although he, having been wounded in the head, was treated. He advanced with the 
army against the remaining rebels, which were ten thousand in number. When they 
did not await his advance, but fled for refuge into their strongholds, nevertheless 
Aquilius did not fail in attempting everything until by forcing them to capitulate he 
subdued them. (36.10.2) Yet a thousand remained, with Satyrus as their leader. 
Aquilius at first attempted to subdue them through arms, but later, after they had 
exchanged envoys and handed themselves over, he released them from immediate 
punishments, and bringing them back to Rome he made them those who fight beasts. 
(36.10.3) Some say that they made a most magnificent end of their lives: for they 
avoided battle with the beasts, and slaughtered one another at the public altars, 
Satyrus himself killing the last man. This man then, after the rest, died heroically by 
his own hand. Therefore the slave war in Sicily, that persisted for about four years, 
had an end that befitted a tragedy. (Photius, Bibl. p. 390.) 
                                                 
423 Diodorus is wrong here, it was Manius Aquilius. 
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Appendix 13: Honours for Victory? 
 
It has become a commonplace to assert, following Aulus Gellius (5.6.21-3) and Pliny 
(N.H. 15.125), that one reason for denying a general a triumph was that his 
opponents were slaves. The evidence typically adduced for this includes the ovations 
of Crassus over Spartacus, Perperna for his victory at Enna over the armies of Eunus 
during the Sicilian Insurrection, and Aquilius for his over Athenion during the so-
called Second Sicilian Slave War. This has led one scholar to remark that (Marshall 
1972: 671) ‘(i)n view of the attitude towards a victory over slaves, it was a 
considerable mark of distinction that Crassus was allowed a celebration at all’ for his 
victory over Spartacus.424 The implication is that the conflicts just briefly mentioned 
were not regarded as significant (enough) by the Romans to earn the successful 
generals esteemed honours for victory. Yet, a brief overview of the honours actually 
awarded, as well as their relative merit, may throw some doubt on the notion that the 
Romans allocated a lesser status to the conflicts in question. 
 
To start with, it is not clear in all of the ancient texts that the awards of 
ovations were because of a pre-existing rule (pace Gellius and Pliny),425 and a brief 
reassessment of the evidence will demonstrate that matters are not so simple. In the 
cases of both Perperna and Crassus there are explicit statements that the choice of 
asking for an ovation was made by the generals themselves. For Perperna we have 
only the testimony of Florus, who gives a rather problematic account of the whole 
Sicilian Insurrection: he records it as finished by Perperna, when in fact Rupilius had 
to complete the war in the year after Perperna was praetor on the island (as a 
subordinate to Calpurnius Piso who was consul that year in Sicily). Florus records 
the following (2.7.8): 
                                                 
424 Shaw (2001), 13, argued that ‘(r)epressing rebellious slaves was beneath the dignity of [praetors 
and consuls,] and the legionary soldiers they commanded’, and characterised this type of engagement 
as a ‘sordid task’; Strauss (2010: 196), asserted that there was ‘little glory in suppressing a slave 
rebellion.’ 
425 Beard (2007), 187-218, has recently reminded us that the ‘rules’ often discussed for the assignation 
of triumphs (for example that requiring five thousand enemies killed; see Val. Max. 2.8) were not hard 
and fast, but that in fact the process of celebrating or not celebrating a triumph was one of negotiation 
with both the senate and the people of Rome, and that it could require one of either’s permission, 
although even generals that had been denied the right by both groups could still triumph. 
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…fuitque de servis ovatione contentus, ne dignitatem triumphi servili inscriptione 
violaret. 
 
[Perperna] was content with an ovation for his victory over the slaves, so that he might not 
violate the dignity of a triumph with a servile title. 
 
Brennan (1993: 168-73) has persuasively argued that Perperna’s ovation was 
awarded for clearing the hill-top of Enna of the forces of King Antiochus, allowing a 
delegation of priests to access the sanctuary located there. Bearing this in mind, it 
would be unusual for Perperna to request a triumph: regardless of the status of those 
defeated, it would be odd for a praetor operating in subordination to a consul, a 
praetor who neither finished the war, nor brought his army home, nor even broke the 
back of the enemy’s resistance, to request the highest honour from the senate. It is 
therefore understandable that he chose discretion. 
 
 We then have the case of Crassus. Plutarch records that Crassus did not even 
attempt to ask for a triumph, and in fact that it was ignoble for him to celebrate even 
the ovation. However, Pliny claims that Crassus used his influence to secure, 
nonetheless, a laurel wreath rather than a myrtle one for his ovation, which could be 
considered a form of honour for a triumph (N.H. 15.125; discussed in Beard 2007: 
265). There is, therefore, a slight complication. Plutarch notes (Vit. Crass. 11.8): 
 
Κράσσος δὲ τὸν µὲν µέγαν θρίαµβον οὐδ' αὐτὸς αἰτεῖν ἐπεχείρησεν, ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ 
τὸν πεζόν, ὀούαν δὲ καλούµενον, ἀγεννῶς καὶ παρ' ἀξίαν ἐπὶ δουλικῷ πολέµῳ 
θριαµβεύειν. 
 
…but Crassus did not attempt to demand the major triumph, and it was considered sordid 
and unworthy of him that he triumphed on foot, called an ovation, for a servile war. 
 
It is stressed in both the accounts of Appian (B. Civ. 1.120) and Plutarch (Comp. 
Crass. et Nic. 3.2) that Crassus was eager to secure the glory of the conflict for 
himself, and so there was clearly an understanding that a conflict of this nature could 
bring glory, and that therefore individuals sought it. In the case of Crassus, he also 
sought to augment this glory yet further by combining (on certain interpretations) the 
aspects of both the triumph and the ovation. We might also note that Plutarch uses 
the same verb, θριαµβεύω, to describe the action of marching in ovation, revealing 
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the potential ambiguity of the term θρίαµβος without clarification. Moreover, the 
Greek text of Plutarch implies only that the ovation was a poorer honour; it is still 
clear that Crassus was being bestowed with glory (the verb used to describe his 
action is θριαµβεύω) regardless of the type of procession. 
 
 For both of the generals just discussed, we have evidence that they sought, by 
choice, not a triumph but an ovation. The case of Aquilius is not so clear. His 
honours are recorded in two places: Athenaeus and Cicero’s de Oratore. Athenaeus 
(5.213b) records, based on Posidonius, that on his return to Athens, the tyrant 
Athenion informed the crowd that Mithridates, among other things, had captured M’. 
Aquilius, ὁ τὸν ἀπὸ Σικελίας καταγαγών θρίαµβον, ‘who celebrated a triumph after 
his Sicilian campaign’. The ambiguity of what honour was bestowed is clarified by 
Cicero (De or. 2.195), who depicted M. Antonius remembering Aquilius ‘ovantem in 
Capitolinum ascendisse’ ‘mounting in an ovation to the Capitol’. There is no doubt, 
then, that Aquilius won an ovation for the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. 
 
Nonetheless, there remains an additional oddity. Manius Aquilius was also 
known for having slain Athenion in single combat during the final main battle of the 
campaign in Sicily (Diod. Sic. 36.10.1). However the details of the spolia opima are 
reconstructed from the ancient sources,426 it is clear that Aquilius fulfilled all the 
‘criteria’ for claiming this honour: he was a general under his own auspices; he 
defeated the identified enemy leader in sole combat;427 and he did so during a pitched 
battle. It is possible that this tradition had been forgotten in Aquilius’ time, since the 
last known example before him was Marcellus in 222 B.C. (see MRR I 232-3; Plut. 
Vit. Marc. 7-8; Liv. Per. 20; Verg. Aen. 6.855-9); it is also possible, but highly 
unlikely, that he requested the honour and it was never granted, or perhaps even that 
he never asked for it. It is still the case that Aquilius was famous enough for his 
exploits to be acquitted of charges of extortion during his time as governor of Sicily 
in 98 B.C. This was largely because (Cic. Flac. 98) ‘cum fugitivis fortiter bellum 
                                                 
426 See Festus 202.14 and Liv. 4.20.3-11 for two ancient opinions on the matter; for modern 
reconstructions see:  Dessau (1906); Picard (1957), 131-3; Syme (1959); Rüpke (1990), 217-23; Rich 
(1999); Flower (2000); Sailor (2006). 
427 Perhaps Athenion’s status as a slave could have been problematic in this regard, but the fame 
garnered for this achievement could be seen as evidence that this was not such a problem. 
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gesserat’, ‘he had waged war with the runaways valiantly’, and he had sustained 
bodily injuries in the process (De or. 2.195), most specifically from the enemy leader 
himself (Verr. 2.5.3). There is a strong likelihood that Aquilius was guilty,428 and in 
this would be in keeping with a line of governors in Sicily down to c. 93 B.C., when 
a certain L. Sempronius Asellio allegedly won renown for his recovery of the island 
from devastation through his careful administration after finding the island destitute 
(Diod. Sic. 37.8; for the date see Brennan (2000) 480 and 747 n.263). Regardless of 
whether he won the award, therefore, Aquilius won notable, and functional honours 
for his actions in the conflict that were not at all affected by the status of the conflict 
he fought in. 
 
 Thus, in every one of three conflicts, the victorious general won honours 
from the senate, winning an ovation. If, on the basis of this, we consider Publius 
Rupilius, it seems likely that he did not go empty handed either. To be sure, there is 
no record of any honours awarded him in the sources; and the fasti triumphales are 
not extant for the period of his consulship. It follows that whatever can be said of 
him can only be conjecture; but, in addition to the general ‘success rate’ here 
discussed, it is important to note that the Sicilian Insurrection had already seen one 
ovation awarded to a subordinate commander, indicating first the potential for award 
from the conflict, but also the honour attached to the fight. It seems therefore 
reasonable to suggest that Rupilius may have asked for a triumph, but that he 
possibly received an ovation.429 
 
 To sum up. If we take into account all the honours won by generals fighting 
in conflicts typically regarded as slave revolts in the Republic, it would appear that 
the status of the engagements was not one for which no glory could be won. Indeed, 
we might better note that in none of these wars was a general not awarded an honour; 
one might say that these conflicts almost guaranteed honours for the Roman general 
                                                 
428 Indeed Cicero actually admits as much in the pro Flacco (98). 
429 Marshall (1972), 672, argued that Rupilius won an ovation, while Bradley (1989), 68-9, considered 
it possible that he won a triumph for his victory. Valerius Maximus credits both L. Calpurnius Piso 
(4.3.10) and P. Rupilius (6.9.8) with ending the war; we know that M. Perperna was awarded an 
ovatio, possibly during the year of Piso’s consulship and it is possible that Valerius Maximus’ 
confusion was caused by the fact that an ovation for the conflict was awarded during Piso’s 
consulship. 
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on success, or, perhaps rather more accurately, that they were like any other conflict 
in this sense. If we consider, also, that the decision to ask for an ovation was often 
ascribed to the generals themselves, it seems rather more likely that the ‘rules’ 
governing the attribution of honours mentioned in Gellius (5.6.21-3) and Pliny (N.H. 
15.125) were later inventions designed to explain why certain conflicts were awarded 
‘only’ an ovation. The decision resting with the generals would also seem to 
contradict the interpretation that the awarding of an ovation was a method of (Beard 
2007: 291) ‘rewarding those who had defeated enemies of lower status, namely 
slaves’. In their own day, successful generals were proud to be seen celebrating 
successes in the conflicts they fought; the three incidents here discussed show, 
therefore, that these conflicts were not conceptually downgraded by the Romans who 
fought in them, at least not when it came to obtaining honours for victory. Perhaps 
there are other elements of these conflicts which currently suffer from the belittling 
label of ‘servility’ that may regard closer scrutiny. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure KA1: King Antiochus on obverse with winged thunderbolt on reverse. Source: 
Manganaro (1990a) Plate 85 Fig. 5. (Collection Cammarata). 
 
Figure KA2a: King Antiochus on obverse 
with quiver on reverse. Source: 
Manganaro (1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 1 
(Collection Cammarata). 
KA2b: King Antiochus on obverse with 
quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro 
(1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 2 (Collection 
Cammarata). 
 
KA2c: King Antiochus on obverse with 
quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro 
(1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 3 (Collection 
Cammarata). 
KA2d: King Antiochus on obverse with 
quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro 
(1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 5 (Collection 
Cammarata). 
 
KA2e: King Antiochus on obverse with 
quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro 
(1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 4 (Collection 
Cammarata). 
KA2f: King Antiochus on obverse with 
quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro 
(1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 6 (Collection 
Cammarata). 
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KA2g: King Antiochus on obverse with 
quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro 
(1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 7 (Collection 
Cammarata). 
 
KA2h: King Antiochus on obverse with 
quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro 
(1990a), Plate 88 Fig. 1 (Collection 
Bruno). 
 
KA2i: King Antiochus on obverse with quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro 
(1990a), Plate 87 Fig. 2 (Collection Bruno). 
 
 
KA3a: Athena on obverse with club on 
reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), 
Plate 88 Fig. 3 (Collection Cammarata). 
 
KA3b: Athena on obverse with club on 
reverse. Source: Manganaro (1990a), 
Plate 88 Fig. 4 (Collection Vagliasindi). 
KA4a: Demeter on obverse with ear of 
corn on reverse. Source: Manganaro 
(1990a), Plate 86 Fig. 3 (British 
Museum). 
 
KA4b: Demeter on obverse with ear of 
corn on reverse. Source: Manganaro 
(1990a), Plate 86 Fig. 4 (Syrcause, 
Archaeological Museum). 
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Figure KA4c: Demeter on obverse with ear of corn on reverse. Source: Manganaro 
(1990a), Plate 86 Fig. 5 (Collection Cammarata) 
 
Figure 1: Coin of Centuripe, c. 241-150 
B.C.; Zeus on obverse with winged 
thunderbolt on reverse. Source: SNG 
ANS 3, Plate 37 no. 1307; Calciati III, 
169-72, nos. 3-4, SNG Morcom 572-4. 
 
Figure 2: Coin of Syrcause, c. 230-216 
B.C.; Gelon on obverse with winged 
thunderbolt on reverse. Source: SNG 
ANS 5, Plate 29 nos. 898-902. 
 
Figure 3: Coin of Syracuse, 215-214 
B.C.; Hieronymus on obverse with 
winged thunderbolt on reverse. Source: 
SNG ANS 5, Plate 33 nos. 1024-39. 
 
Figure 4: Coin of Demetrius I Soter, c. 
162-50 B.C.; Demetrius on obverse with 
quiver on reverse. Source: Manganaro 
(1990a), Plate 88 Figs 5-6. 
 
Figure 5: Coin of Halaesa, after 241 
B.C.; Artemis on obverse with quiver on 
reverse. Source: SNG ANS 3, Plate 34 
no. 1191. 
 
Figure 6: Coin of Tauromenium, after 
300 B.C.; Apollo laureate on obverse 
with tripod on reverse. Source: SNG 
ANS 5, Plate 35 nos. 1114-23. 
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Figure 7: Coin of Centuripe, after 241 B.C.; 
Apollo on obverse with lyre on reverse. 
Souce: SNG ANS 3, Plate 38 nos. 1316-9. 
 
Figure 8: Coin of Syracuse, after 212 
B.C.; Artemis on obverse with Apollo 
standing on reverse. Source: SNG 
ANS 5, Plate 34 nos. 1104-6. 
 
Figure  9: Coin of Morgantina, c. 150-50 
B.C.; Artemis on obverse with Nike 
standing on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 4, 
Plate 17 nos. 481-2. 
 
Figure 10: Coin of Agyrium, c. 345-
300 B.C.; helmeted head on obverse 
with club on reverse. Source: SNG 
ANS 5, Plate 41 no. 1304. 
 
Figure 11: Coin of Aluntium, c. 212-150 
B.C.; Herakles on obverse with club and 
quiver on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 3, 
Plate 34 no. 1193. 
 
Figure 12: Coin of Caleacte, c. 241-
150 B.C.; Herakles on obverse with 
club on reverse. Source: SNG Cop. 
157; Calciati I, 130, no. 5. 
 
Figure 13: Coin of Centuripe, c. 212-
150 B.C.; Herakles on obverse with club 
on reverse. Source: Calciati III, 177, no, 
9. 
 
Figure 14: Coin of Cephaloedium, c. 241-
210 B.C.; Herakles on obverse with club 
on reverse. Source: Calciati I, 373-4, no. 
10. 
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Figure 15: Coin of Menaenum, after 210 
B.C.; Herakles on obverse with club on 
reverse. Source: SNG ANS 4, Plate 10 
nos. 288-9. 
 
Figure 16: Coin of Centuripe, c. 212-150 
B.C.; Demeter on obverse with plough 
on reverse. Source: SNG Morcom 569-
71; Calciati III, 175-6, nos. 7-8. 
 
Figure 17: Coin of Hybla Magna, after 
210 B.C.; Artemis on obverse with 
Demeter holding corn on reverse. 
Source: Calciati III, 43, no. 2. 
 
Figure 18: Coin of Leontini, after 210 
B.C.; Demeter on obverse with bushel of 
corn on reverse. Source: Calciati III, 81, 
no. 9. 
 
Figure 19: Coin of Syracuse, c. 247-16 
B.C.; Poseidon on obverse with trident 
on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 5, Plate 
31 nos. 964-1015. 
 
Figure 20: Coin of Syracuse, c. 247-16 
B.C.; Hieron II on obverse with 
horseman on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 
5, Plate 29-31 nos. 923-63. 
 
Figure 21:Coin of Syracuse 317-289 
B.C.; Arethusa on obverse with biga on 
reverse. Source: Kraay (1976a), Plate 
48 no. 134. 
 
Figure 22: Coin of Syracuse, c. 247-16 
B.C.; Kore on obverse with biga on 
reverse. Source: SNG ANS 5, Plate 27 
nos. 862-67. 
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Figure 23: Coin of Catana, 3
rd
-2
nd
 
century B.C.; Apollo on obverse with Isis 
on reverse. Source: SNG ANS 3, Plate 
36 nos. 1278-84. 
 
Figure 24: Coin of Mamertines, 3
rd
-2
nd
 
century B.C.; Zeus on obverse with 
advancing warrior on reverse. Source: 
SNG ANS 4, Plate 16 nos. 440-51. 
 
Figure 25: Coin of Mamertine, 3
rd
-2
nd
 
century B.C.; Apollo on obverse with 
standing Nike on reverse. Source: SNG 
ANS 4, Plate 16 nos. 453-8. 
 
Figure 26: Coin of Mamertines, 3
rd
-2
nd
 
century B.C.; Ares on obverse with 
horseman on reverse. Source: SNG 
ANS 4, Plate 15 nos. 423-30. 
 
Figure 27: Roman as, 169-58 B.C.; 
Janus laureate on obverse with prow on 
reverse. Source: RRC 195/1. 
 
Fig 28: Roman denarius, 71/70 B.C.; 
bust of virtus on obverse, with Roman 
soldier raising Sicilia from ground on 
reverse. Source: RRC 401/1. 
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